Opinion
Submitted June 1, 2000.
July 26, 2000.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Cotter, J.), rendered January 29, 1999, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and resisting arrest, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
Amy L. Colvin, Halesite, N.Y., for appellant.
Denis Dillon, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Bruce E. Whitney and Andrea M. DiGregorio of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAWRENCE J. BRACKEN, J.P., DANIEL W. JOY, LEO F. McGINITY, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The showup procedure utilized in this case was not impermissibly suggestive, since "the record discloses that [it] was conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the offense and to the subsequent apprehension of the defendant" (People v. Sanchez, 178 A.D.2d 567, 568; see also, People v. Bunker, 259 A.D.2d 757).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's credibility by questioning him about his prior convictions, while prohibiting any questioning about the facts underlying these convictions (see, People v. Ricks, 135 A.D.2d 844). Use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes is not automatically precluded because the crimes charged are similar to the prior convictions (see, People v. McBride, 255 A.D.2d 459), or because the prior convictions are remote in time (see, People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he unlawfully entered the building (see, Matterof Ryan R., 254 A.D.2d 49) while harboring an intent to commit a crime therein (see, People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).