People v. Michelle L. (In re Anthony S.)

Full title: In re ANTHONY S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT

Date published: Aug 20, 2013

2013 Ill. App. 2d 130274 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

Opinion

No. 2-13-0274

08-20-2013

In re ANTHONY S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee v. Michelle L., Respondent-Appellant).

HUDSON

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Du Page County.

No. 11-JA-86

Honorable

Anthony V. Coco,

Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Zenoff and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: The trial court's determination that minor was neglected is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; respondent's argument directed to the trial court's order of temporary custody was mooted by the trial court's subsequent dispositional order; the trial court did not lack jurisdiction to enter the adjudicatory and dispositional orders; and the trial court's dispositional order was voidable rather than void due to trial court's failure to hold dispositional hearing within the time frame specified in the controlling statute, but respondent did not establish that it was the result of reversible error.

¶ 1 I. INTRODUCTION

¶ 2 Respondent, Michelle L., appeals an order of the circuit court of Du Page County adjudicating her son, Anthony S., neglected. Before this court, she contends that the trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court acted beyond the authority purportedly granted it by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2010)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On October 13, 2011, the State filed a petition alleging that the minor was neglected in that his environment was injurious to his welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(11)(b) (West 2010)). Specifically, the petition cited "numerous police incidents of family domestic disputes involving the minor's sibling and Respondent Mother with both parties alleged to have been the aggressor at various times including, but not limited to, the following incident dates: 01/27/11, 03/16/11, 04/03/11, 04/15/11, 05/25/11, 07/29/11, 08/14/11, 08/15/11, 08/29/11, 08/31/11, 09/03/11, 09/15/11, and 09/21/11." The petition further stated, "Respondent Mother has refused to cooperate with various social services offered to improve the family situation." The sibling referenced in the petition is the minor's sister, Angelina (a similar petition was filed regarding Angelina on the same day). On October 25, 2011, the trial court issued the following order:

"Sheltercare is denied; Court finding no immediate and urgent necessity without any findings as to probable cause or reasonable efforts. Minor shall reside with Respondent Father until further Court Order. Mother shall have same visitation arrangements as previously ordered for Father."

¶ 5 Given the fact-intensive nature of this appeal, we will set forth the testimony presented at the adjudicatory hearing in detail. The first witness called by the State was Detective Kowal of the Naperville police department. At about 6 p.m. on January 27, 2011, he met with respondent. He had been dispatched to her residence in response to a "domestic call or 911 call" that had been placed by Angelina. Anthony was also present, and Angelina was locked in the bathroom. Kowal characterized the house as "filthy." Respondent and Angelina had been fighting over house rules and chores. Angelina told Kowal that she was afraid of respondent and that respondent abused her "verbally and sometimes physically." However, Angelina stated that she had not been hit that day. Kowal observed no injuries and made no arrests. During this visit, Kowal stated, Anthony was "all over the place," "running between rooms, [and] jumping on the sofa right next to [respondent]." Kowal was also dispatched to the residence at about 10:30 p.m. on April 3, 2011. He explained, "Someone had requested a well-being check on Angelina." No one answered when he first knocked. He contacted dispatch and had dispatch call the residence. Subsequently, respondent answered his knocking. Respondent was upset, her voice was raised, and she was yelling. Respondent would not allow Kowal to see Angelina, whom, respondent said, was sleeping. ¶ 6 Officer Greg Rink, also of the Naperville police department, next testified for the State. On March 16, 2011, Rink was dispatched to respondent's residence regarding a "possible physical domestic." He met with Angelina, who was standing outside on the side of the house. He then went to the door and tried to speak with respondent. Respondent acted as if Rink "pretty much wasn't there." She walked past Rink and started screaming at Angelina. Respondent called Angelina a "little brat, fucking little brat," "used the work fuck or fucking several times," and "[c]alled her disrespectful." Rink tried unsuccessfully to calm respondent down. After failing to do so, he again spoke with Angelina. Angelina said that she and respondent fight a lot. Angelina was not sure why Rink had been called to the house. He then spoke with respondent, who stated that Angelina was disrespectful and refused to follow "house rules." Angelina told Rink that respondent "hits her with anything she can get her hands on" (she specifically mentioned a cane). Respondent stated that she does not hit Angelina "that hard." Angelina stated that the blows sometimes leave marks. Angelina further stated that respondent calls her a "slut" and a "whore." Respondent replied that she only called her a "whore" once. Rink also testified that, as he approached the residence, he could smell urine. Rink thought that Anthony was "down the street with some other children" during this incident. ¶ 7 Rink continued that on August 14, 2011, he was again dispatched to the residence at about 10 p.m for a "possible physical domestic." He spoke with respondent, who reported that she and Angelina were fighting over Angelina doing household chores. Also, Angelina had an item of clothing that belonged to respondent. Respondent entered Angelina's room to look for more clothing. Angelina picked up a "pole or light or something" to use for self defense, as she was afraid respondent would hit her. Respondent dumped out several drawers of clothing. At one point, Angelina pushed respondent out of the way so she could leave the room. Therefore, Rink arrested Angelina for domestic battery. Rink added that he had been called to respondent's residence on more than five occasions, typically regarding domestic-violence issues. ¶ 8 The State next called Officer Matthew Wagner, who is employed by the Naperville police department. On May 25, 2011, Wagner was dispatched to the home of respondent's neighbors. Angelina was at the neighbors' house, claiming that she had been struck at home. Angelina had some marks on her arm and appeared scared. The marks-bruises-were on the back of Angelina's forearms. Some appeared older, some newer. Angelina told Wagner that they were from respondent hitting her. Most often, respondent used a broomstick or a belt. Angelina explained that she raises her arms to block the blows and that is how the bruises get on the back of her forearms. ¶ 9 Angelina told Wagner that two days earlier, she came home from a friend's house where she had been working on a school project until 10 p.m. Respondent yelled at her and told her to do some chores, so Angelina started cleaning the kitchen. At 2 a.m., Angelina was still cleaning the kitchen. Respondent came into the room, yelled at Angelina, threw a "glass candle jar" at her (which hit Angelina in the stomach), pushed Angelina out of the house, and then locked the door. Angelina remained outside for an hour. When Angelina returned inside the house, she noted that respondent had smashed her school project. Angelina also stated that their house was "kind of dirty," but there was "some food." ¶ 10 Wagner and Angelina returned to respondent's residence. Wagner testified that the house was filthy. He noted spoiled food in several locations, maggots, and a "[v]ery strong smell." Respondent was not present initially, but she returned while Wagner was present. She stated that Angelina is out of control and that she runs out of the house any time respondent tries to discipline her. She did not know where Angelina got the bruises, and she denied abusing her children. Wagner arrested respondent for domestic battery. During cross examination, Wagner related that Angelina told him that respondent only hits her and that she leaves Anthony alone. ¶ 11 The next witness to testify for the State was Sergeant Kathleen Anderson of the Naperville police department. On July 29, 2011, Anderson responded to a domestic violence call at respondent's residence. When she knocked on the front door, Anthony answered. She entered the residence, where she met respondent and Angelina. The home appeared to be in disarray. Anderson asked respondent about the condition of the home. Respondent stated that she was disabled and had trouble keeping up with cleaning the house. She also told Anderson that Angelina refused to help her. Anderson asked why the police had been called on this occasion. Respondent stated that Anthony and Angelina had been fighting. Angelina had kicked Anthony in the back. Respondent broke up the fight and told the children to get ready so that they could go and register for school. Respondent and Angelina then started fighting over the use of the house's main bathroom. Since respondent was using it, Angelina went to use respondent's bathroom. When respondent discovered Angelina was using her bathroom, she tried to enter it. According to respondent, Angelina opened the door slightly and sprayed cleaning supplies on her. Angelina again opened the door and threw a candle at respondent. When Angelina opened the door a third time, respondent threw the candle into the bathroom. Angelina again threw it out, striking respondent in the face (Anderson observed no injuries). ¶ 12 Anderson described respondent as "very angry and kind of agitated." Anderson spoke with Angelina, who confirmed respondent's version of events. Angelina and Anthony were sitting on the couch next to respondent as Anderson spoke to her. Anthony also agreed with respondent's description of what had occurred (he stated he had observed the dispute). Anderson described Angelina's demeanor as quiet and polite. Respondent stated that she wanted Angelina arrested. Angelina said that she wanted to go to a mental health hospital. Anderson arrested Angelina, who was charged with two counts of domestic battery (one against respondent and one against Anthony). ¶ 13 Officer Kate Koziol, a patrol officer for the City of Naperville, was the next witness called by the State. On September 3, 2011, at about 11 p.m., Koziol was dispatched to respondent's residence regarding a domestic dispute. She noted "clutter" as she entered the house. Respondent and Anthony were present in the house's "main room." She asked respondent why she had called the police. Respondent stated that Angelina had been "wailing on" Anthony while they were at Pizza Hut. Angelina had kicked and punched Anthony in the stomach and legs. Respondent stated that she kept telling Angelina to stop. After leaving Pizza Hut, they went to a gas station. Angelina continued to kick and punch Anthony. Respondent told her to stop. When they got home, respondent called the police. Koziol spoke to Anthony. He stated that Angelina had been staring at him. He told her to stop, and she began hitting him at that point. Koziol also spoke with Angelina. Angelina stated that Anthony had been kicking her and she grabbed his feet to stop him. During this incident, respondent called Angelina a "white nigger" (respondent later agreed with this assertion). ¶ 14 Koziol testified that she also responded to respondent's residence on September 21, 2011, again regarding a domestic incident. The house was cluttered and difficult to walk through. Koziol met with respondent, who stated that she and Angelina had been in a dispute over an alarm clock. Angelina had been playing music too loud on the clock (apparently a clock-radio, though it is simply identified as an alarm clock in the record). Respondent took it away from her. Angelina shoved both respondent and Anthony as she tried to get the clock back. Koziol talked to Angelina. Angelina said that she needed the clock to wake up in time for school. She asked Anthony to move so she could get the clock. When he did not move, Angelina pushed him out of the way. She acknowledged that she may have pushed respondent as well. Angelina was arrested for domestic battery. Koziol could not recall how many times she had been to respondent's residence in 2011, but characterized it as "many." Koziol stated that respondent did the proper thing by calling the police when she was unable to control Angelina. ¶ 15 Officer Sean Driscoll of the Naperville police department next testified for the State. On September 15, 2011, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Driscoll was dispatched to respondent's residence regarding a domestic incident. Respondent, Angelina, and Anthony were present. Respondent had called the police because Angelina had returned three hours late from picking up Anthony from school. Respondent asked Angelina to do the dishes, and Angelina refused. An argument ensued. Angelina pushed respondent repeatedly. By the time Driscoll arrived, Angelina was locked in her room. He knocked, and she let him in. He described Angelina as cooperative. Angelina stated she had not used her hand to push respondent, but had simply pushed past her to get to her room, making contact with her body. Respondent's demeanor was angry and loud. Respondent also complained of back problems. Driscoll described the house as "overwhelmingly cluttered." He added, "There was a path through the clutter pretty much between each room." Driscoll did not speak with Anthony. He was, however, in the house (Driscoll recalled Anthony climbing on the sofa). He had been to respondent's house on three occasions. Ultimately, Angelina was arrested and charged with domestic battery. ¶ 16 Donna Swanson, a social worker employed by the Naperville police department, was the State's next witness. Swanson was assigned to provide services to respondent and her family. Swanson had her first contact with respondent in January 2011 as a follow up to a domestic violence incident that occurred in December 2010. Following a conversation with respondent, Swanson sent her referrals for family counseling and youth services. Swanson was unable to make further contact with respondent. In March 2011, she sent respondent a letter asking respondent to contact her if respondent was interested in the referrals they had discussed. Swanson next had contact with respondent in July 2011. Respondent had been arrested for domestic battery. On July 14, respondent left a message for Swanson stating that she had been in denial but was now ready to talk. They spoke on July 19. Respondent said Angelina was a pathological liar. She stated Angelina was bad and that she was tired of it. She denied causing the bruising on Angelina's arms. ¶ 17 On August 26, 2011, Swanson met with respondent at respondent's residence. Earlier that day, Swanson called respondent and asked if she and a detective (Baker) could come to respondent's house. Respondent did not want them to come to her house. She was unhappy with a DCFS (Department of Children and Family Services) report. Swanson stated that respondent was angry and terminated their conversation by hanging up the phone. Swanson called back and got respondent's voice mail. She left a message stating that she and Baker were still going to come out. They arrived about 3:15. No one answered when they knocked. After five or six minutes, respondent came to the door, opening it "just a little bit." Swanson said "hello" and identified herself. Eventually, respondent allowed them to enter. The house was cluttered and felt cramped. Respondent related that her relationship with Angelina was strained and that Angelina was very difficult to control. During the visit, Angelina and Anthony arrived home from school. Swanson thought Angelina's appearance "seemed fine," but respondent was "flustered" over it. On August 29, Swanson was informed by a detective that respondent no longer wished to receive services from Swanson. Swanson called respondent and confirmed this. ¶ 18 Swanson also testified that the relationship between respondent and Anthony was "just mom and a small child, nothing strained, nothing outside of the ordinary." Swanson testified that clients are often resistant to her involvement in their cases. She agreed that when she and the detective went to respondent's house, they had no particular authority to compel respondent to allow a visit and if she would have declined to open the door, they would have left. Moreover, Swanson was aware respondent had been arrested, but did not know whether she was represented by counsel or whether counsel had advised respondent not to accept services. According to Swanson, there were 18 contacts between the police and respondent's family during 2011. ¶ 19 The State next called Charles Partin. Partin testified that he is a neighbor of respondent and that he knows Angelina. Angelina goes to school with Partin's son and has been over to his house on several occasions. In May 2011, Partin was walking his dog at about 11 p.m. Angelina was standing outside the door of her home barefooted. Angelina was outside for over an hour. Partin asked her if she was hungry. Angelina stated that she was, so Partin brought her something to eat. On another occasion, he observed Anthony in the garage crying. Angelina was running across the street. Respondent, who had "some type of a stick," was yelling at Angelina, calling her a "stupid bitch and other names." Respondent also yelled that Angelina "better come back" and threatened to "beat her ass." Anthony was "standing there crying and screaming." This went on for "[a] good five minutes." On July 8, 2011, Partin was smoking a cigarette in his driveway. Anthony was walking down the street, looking between houses, and calling for Angelina. This took place over the course of about 20 minutes. It was dark; Partin thought it was around 9 p.m. On August 15, 2011, Partin was again in his driveway and his wife was in the garage. Respondent approached and asked whether Angelina was there. She then threatened to have Partin and his wife arrested if they allowed Angelina to stay at their house because, according to respondent, they were harboring a runaway. ¶ 20 Partin stated that he and his wife fed Angelina and Anthony "[p]robably more than 20 times" during the summer of 2011. "A couple of times," the children asked for food. They told Partin that they were not being fed at home. Partin testified that, despite the temperature being in the high 80s, Angelina wore "fluffy snow boots" for about a month. The Partins' daughter gave Angelina some sandals. Partin would observe Angelina outside at night-between 9 and 11:30-by herself. He would sometimes see Angelina and Anthony unsupervised at a nearby park after dark. ¶ 21 Janice Rubin next testified for the State. She testified that she was employed by Good Shepard Church of Naperville as the Director of Family Life Student Ministries. The church is located about a city block from respondent's residence. Rubin first met respondent in late summer or early fall of 2010. Respondent told Rubin that Angelina could be a "troublemaker" and that Angelina "leads Anthony astray" at times. On October 2, 2010, Angelina and Anthony were in the youth room despite the fact that there were no activities going on at the church at that time. They were alone. Rubin approached them and said "hello," but she did not ask them to leave. On another occasion, Rubin learned that Angelina was in the church. Rubin could not find her. She called respondent to tell her that Angelina had been there. Respondent was upset and accused Rubin of having called DCFS. Rubin explained that the church had not called DCFS and that she simply wished to make sure Angelina had gotten home safely. Respondent replied that Angelina had not been home all day and that she still had not returned. They spoke a while longer and, when Rubin again inquired as to whether Angelina had made it home, respondent abruptly hung up. Rubin called the police. ¶ 22 Rubin further testified that she was concerned about the children. Angelina and Anthony would sometimes wander around the church. They occasionally would take soda out of the refrigerator and look for food in the kitchen. Moreover, that they were unsupervised concerned Rubin as well. In total, Rubin believed the children were wandering around the church six to eight times. On some occasions, they would be asked to leave and then return later the same day. They were generally respectful to people at the church. Rubin had not seen the children after April 3, 2011. She testified that they were not banned from going to church; rather, she believed their absence was respondent's decision. ¶ 23 The State then called Eliane Stefango, a supervisor at Metropolitan Family Services. Around July 26, 2011, she received a referral from the Naperville police regarding respondent's family. When she met with respondent, Anthony was present. Stefango did not speak to Anthony, as her organization was not providing services to him. She first met with respondent on or about August 11, 2011. Respondent told Stefango that she was having a lot of problems with Angelina. Angelina would steal money from her, leave the house without permission, stay away for long periods of time, and refuse to do her chores. As they were speaking, Anthony did something respondent did not like (Stefango did not see what). Respondent screamed at him sufficiently loudly to cause Stefango to jump. Angelina was hospitalized at this time in a psychiatric facility. Respondent told Stefango that this was the third such hospitalization. ¶ 24 Stefango again met with respondent the next week. Angelina was scheduled to return from the hospital. When she arrived, respondent and Angelina were arguing. Respondent sent Angelina to her room. Respondent told Stefango that Angelina was doing the same things she had been doing before her hospitalization. Respondent had to call the police over the previous weekend. Stefango went to Angelina's room and spoke with her. Angelina was calm and cooperative. Angelina told Stefango that she liked school and had friends there. She did not interact with children in the neighborhood because respondent did not want her to do so. Angelina thought that the source of the domestic problems her family was experiencing was that respondent was "always getting her in trouble and calling the police." She continued that her mother did not let her do anything, have any privacy, or have her own things. Angelina stated that she wished she had a good relationship with respondent. ¶ 25 Stefango saw Angelina on August 23, 2011, which was two days before school was to commence for the year. Stefango asked whether Angelina had everything she needed, and Angelina responded that she did not. Respondent stated that she did not have the time or the money to get Angelina what she needed for school. Stefango took Angelina to get school supplies. She asked Angelina how things were going. Angelina stated that she and respondent were still fighting. Currently, respondent was upset that Angelina had shaved her legs. Stefango spoke with Angelina about a week later at school. Angelina liked meeting with Stefango at school, as she "felt that she could speak." ¶ 26 Stefango testified that she completed her assessment around September 1, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Stefango learned that respondent and Angelina had a probation appointment. As this appointment concerned Angelina, Stefango decided to go to the probation office to see if respondent and Angelina wanted her to be involved. She met with respondent and Angelina. Angelina started talking, and respondent "jumped at her" and told her to "shut up" because she was talking. Respondent told Stefango that she did not want her involved in Angelina's probation. It was apparent to Stefango, however, that Angelina wanted her there. Stefango was on vacation for a portion of September. When she returned, she called respondent. Respondent stated that she did not want Stefango involved with Angelina. She said that Stefango was "too nice" to Angelina and that "everybody is too nice to her." Respondent stated, "[S]he's that [sic]manipulating all of you." Stefango asked respondent if she wanted to know the result of Stefango's assessment, and respondent said that she was not interested. Treatment never progressed beyond the assessment stage. Following Angelina's release from the hospital, she was given a prescription for Abilify. However, respondent told Stefango that she had not been to the pharmacy because she had not had the time to do so and she was sick. In fact, during the entire time Stefango was involved in the case, Angelina did not receive this medication. ¶ 27 Patrick Homa, an investigator from DCFS, next testified for the State. Over respondent's objection as to relevance, Homa testified to events occurring in 2008. On August 7 of that year, he was assigned to a case involving respondent's family. The Warrenville police discovered two children-Angelina and Anthony-near Route 59 in Batavia. The children were allegedly panhandling. They were taken into custody. Homa testified that "[f]urther information was brought out that the children said that they hadn't been eating" and that "Mom wouldn't - didn't make anything for them to eat." Homa also stated that Angelina had a scratch in the middle of her forehead and said that her mother hit her. Angelina was nine years old at the time and Anthony was four. Homa spoke with respondent, who told him she thought the kids were outside playing at the time the police took them in to custody. She denied hitting Angelina and stated that there were two hot dogs on the table for the children. Respondent appeared resentful during this conversation. Anthony did not appear to Homa to have any marks or injuries, but he did need a bath and some clean clothes. During cross examination, Homa admitted that their investigation did show that there was adequate food in respondent's house. Homa also read a report stating that it was recommended that the "case be unfounded for cuts, welts and bruises by abuse to the child." ¶ 28 Teresa McBride of the Warrenville police department was the State's next witness. Respondent interposed an objection to the relevance of her testimony, which was overruled. She testified that on August 7, 2008, at about 7 p.m., she was dispatched to an area on Route 59 because two children were panhandling in the middle of the road. She made contact with the children. Angelina told McBride that they were hungry and had not eaten since the night before. They planned to spend the night at McDonald's. Anthony was not wearing shoes. Angelina explained that the reason they had not eaten was that Anthony had embarrassed respondent. They had gone to "Carm's Beef," and respondent got a sandwich for herself, but did not get anything for the children. McBride asked Angelina about a mark on her forehead, and Angelina said it was from when respondent hit her two days earlier. She also said respondent hit her a lot and that she was afraid of respondent. According to Angelina, respondent used her hands or a belt. McBride also spoke with Anthony, who "said what his sister had said." He was hungry. ¶ 29 McBride later spoke with respondent. Respondent was told it was important that a parent know where their children are at all times. Respondent stated no parent knows where their children are all of the time. When asked what would have happened if one of her children had been injured or killed, respondent replied, "Shit happens." Respondent was arrested. It was McBride's "guesstimate" that the children were found "at least a half mile" from their home. She further testified that no one went to respondent's residence to see if food was available for the children because "that wasn't in question," rather "[i]t was a matter of whether or not they were allowed to eat." The children had never stated that the reason they had not eaten was that food was not available. ¶ 30 Following McBride's testimony, the State called respondent. She testified that, at the time of the hearing, Angelina was 13 years old and Anthony was 7 years old. Respondent stated that she loves her children and tries to take care of them. She expects Angelina to show respect to others in the house and to help with household chores. In 2011, Angelina's chores were to keep her room clean, pick up after herself, and do the dishes. Respondent testified that Angelina throws things around out of anger, breaks into boxes where things were packed, makes holes in the walls, and damages furniture. Respondent denied telling a caseworker that Angelina was the source of all of her problems. She also denied telling Stefango that she was too nice to Angelina. Respondent testified that she did not throw things at Angelina. She acknowledged that she had hit her on the arm, "but never in an abusive capacity - never to give bruises." Respondent also denied ever calling Angelina a whore, and she could not recall telling a police officer that she had called Angelina a whore on one occasion. She admitted that she may have "slipped a few times" and directed profanity toward Angelina; however, she claimed that she "apologized to her right afterwards." ¶ 31 When asked where Anthony was during her confrontations with Angelina, respondent said that he was often in another room of the house (which, she agreed, was small). The State asked how Anthony reacted at such times. Respondent replied, "It depends on the situation." "Often if Angelina has started a problem," she continued, "he's upset with her." Respondent also stated that she had never asked Anthony how he felt about respondent's yelling. She did not believe that he enjoyed hearing the confrontations. ¶ 32 Respondent testified that she had been diagnosed with depression "a long time ago." She is also on permanent disability due to a back injury, for which she takes hydrocodone. In 2011, she was also taking a narcotic administered via a patch. Respondent stated she never gave Angelina the Abilify that had been prescribed for her because she lost the prescription. ¶ 33 Respondent was shown a picture of a bag of meat sitting on top of a freezer in the garage. She stated that Angelina took the meat out of the freezer to make her mad. Thus, respondent continued, Angelina was responsible for the stench reported by one of the police officers who visited the house. Respondent stated that since Angelina left, the house has been spotless. She testified that she was not aware that Angelina had been going to the neighbors house after school. She stated that the first time she met Partin, he was drunk and belligerent. One of the reasons respondent stopped meeting with Stefango was that Stefango believed it was not "that big of a deal" when Angelina shaved her legs in defiance of respondent's directives. However, her dissatisfaction with Stefango did not stem solely from that situation. ¶ 34 Following respondent's testimony, the State rested. Subsequently, all the parties rested without the further presentation of evidence. The trial court began its ruling by noting that the State bore the burden of proving the allegations in its petition by a preponderance of the evidence. It noted that the supreme court has "repeatedly defined 'neglect' as the failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand." It may be willful or unintentional. The trial court then noted that the fact that respondent admitted the allegations with regard to Angelina did not necessarily mean that she had neglected Anthony, though it did constitute evidence the court could consider relative to Anthony. The trial court found that there was evidence that respondent would get angry, yell, and call names; however, the trial court also observed that people get angry in most households. Also, according to the trial court, there are "battles about doing chores." Further, the court continued, fault was not particularly relevant, as the ultimate question was whether Anthony was in an injurious environment. ¶ 35 The trial court answered that question affirmatively. The trial court explained that, even accepting respondent's testimony on its face, it was apparent that Angelina's behavior overwhelmed respondent. The court then reasoned, if a child's environment can be found injurious based on the behavior of a "uncle, stepfather, or whatever," the same should be true if Angelina's behavior adversely affected Anthony's environment. The trial court emphasized that it was not blaming Angelina; rather, it was saying that even if respondent's testimony was entirely true, it could still find Anthony's environment injurious. The trial court then noted the many incidents, such as candles being thrown and people being pushed and shoved, which it found was a "continuous pattern" of behavior. It further found that this environment-to which Anthony was exposed-threatened him with physical and emotional injury. In fact, Anthony was a victim of domestic violence on two occasions. ¶ 36 The trial court found respondent's testimony to lack "some" credibility. It noted the condition of the house, which was observed during the many police contacts. The court also mentioned the rotted meat in the garage and stated that it did not matter why the meat was there. The court also noted that there was considerable evidence, including Partin's testimony, that the children were often unsupervised. Therefore, in light of the "violence in the house," the "dirty, filthy conditions," and "the fact that the kids are not being watched as closely as they should be," the trial court concluded that the State had carried its burden. Finally, the court observed that the fact that Angelina had now been removed from the house might ameliorate some of these problems. However, the trial court explained, that consideration would more appropriately be addressed during the dispositional hearing. The trial court also found that there was a sufficient factual basis to conclude that Angelina was also neglected. A dispositional hearing regarding Anthony was held on September 4, 2012 (approximately seven months after the adjudication of neglect). The court found respondent a willing parent, but unfit and unable, and Anthony's father fit and willing, but unable. The trial court further found that it was in Anthony's best interest to be removed from respondent's custody and that guardianship and custody be granted to Anthony's father. Following the denial of a motion to reconsider, respondent initiated the instant appeal.

¶ 37 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 38 On appeal, respondent raises three main issues. First, she contends that the trial court erred in adjudicating Anthony neglected. Second, she asserts that the trial court failed to make certain necessary predicate findings before it removed Anthony from her residence at the temporary custody hearing. Third, she argues that the trial court "exceeded its jurisdiction" when it conducted the dispositional hearing outside of the time limits specified in the Act. In reviewing these issues, we are not bound by the trial court's reasoning and may affirm on any basis apparent in the record. Mutual Management Services, Inc. v. Swalve, 2011 IL App (2d) 100778, ¶ 11. We find none of these arguments persuasive.

¶ 39 A. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Finding Anthony Neglected

¶ 40 Respondent first challenges the trial court's determination that Anthony was a neglected minor. The State's neglect petition alleged that Anthony's environment was injurious to his welfare. We review this issue using the manifest-weight standard of review, so we will reverse only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000). That is not the case here. ¶ 41 The term " 'neglect' is not static; it has no fixed and measured meaning, but draws its definition from the individual circumstances presented in each case." In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220, 234 (2002). "Neglect" has been defined as the lack of care justly demanded under the circumstances. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004). It may be willful or unintentional. Id. An "injurious environment" is a similarly "amorphous concept not readily susceptible to definition." J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 234. Typically, it involves a "breach of a parent's duty to ensure a 'safe and nurturing shelter' for his or her children." N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346, quoting In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995). ¶ 42 In this case, there was adequate evidence supporting the trial court's determination that Anthony's environment was injurious to him. Police officers who testified confirmed that respondent's house was filthy and that Anthony was often present during the many domestic disputes that occurred at respondent's residence. Kowal testified that the house was filthy and that Anthony was present during his visit. Rink testified that he could smell urine as he approached the residence. Wagner testified that the house was filthy and noted spoiled food in several locations, maggots, and a strong odor. When Anderson visited, Anthony was present. The house was in disarray. Respondent told Anderson that Angelina had kicked Anthony in the back. Anthony had observed a fight between respondent and Angelina. Koziol noted "clutter" when she was dispatched to the residence. Anthony was present. Respondent reported that Angelina had been "wailing on" Anthony at a restaurant and subsequently at a gas station. Respondent told Angelina to stop, but did not call the police until they arrived home. When Koziol visited the residence a few weeks later, it was still cluttered and difficult to walk through. Angelina had pushed Anthony out of the way to get an alarm clock. Anthony was also present when Driscoll was sent to the residence. The house was "overwhelmingly cluttered." ¶ 43 Social workers provided additional evidence. Swanson testified that the house was cluttered and cramped. According to Swanson, there were 18 contacts between the police and respondent's family during 2011. Stefango testified that respondent screamed at Anthony so loud that it caused her to jump. Homa testified that he was assigned to work with respondent's family after Angelina and Anthony had been found near Route 59 panhandling. The children informed him that they had not been eating because respondent did not make them anything to eat. Respondent thought the children were outside playing at the time. Officer McBride confirmed Homa's testimony and added that the children told her that the reason they had not eaten was that Anthony had embarrassed respondent. Also, McBride reported that Anthony was not wearing shoes. Further, McBride told respondent that it was important that a parent know where their children are at all times. Respondent replied that no parent knows where their children are all of the time. When respondent was asked what would have happened if one of her children had been injured or killed, she stated, "Shit happens." Both Swanson and Stefango testified that respondent refused to avail herself of the services they offered. ¶ 44 A neighbor, Partin, testified that he observed Anthony in the garage crying as Angelina ran across that street. Respondent had "some type of a stick" and was yelling at Angelina, calling her a "stupid bitch and other names." Respondent threatened to "beat her ass." Anthony was "standing there crying and screaming." Partin reported that this went on for "[a] good five minutes." On another occasion, it was after dark, and Anthony was walking down the street, looking between houses, and calling for Angelina. Partin stated that he fed both Angelina and Anthony over 20 times during the summer of 2011. The children asked for food a few times and told Partin that they were not being fed at home. He sometimes observed both children unsupervised at a nearby park after dark. ¶ 45 Janice Rubin, an employee of the Good Shepard Church of Naperville, testified that the children would wander about the church on multiple occasions (she estimated six to eight), despite the fact that nothing was going on at the church at the time. Sometimes, they would take food and soda from a refrigerator in the church's kitchen. On some occasions, they would return after being asked to leave. ¶ 46 Finally respondent herself testified that Anthony was often in a different room of the house during her conflicts with Angelina. She acknowledged that the house is small. Further, she stated that Anthony would become upset when Angelina started a problem. She never asked Anthony how he felt about her yelling, but acknowledged that he likely did not enjoy hearing the confrontations. ¶ 47 In short, there was ample evidence presented from which the trial court could infer that Anthony's environment was injurious to his welfare. Evidence regarding the condition of the residence ranged from cluttered to filthy. Such evidence has been found to support a finding that an environment is injurious to a minor. See In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 392 (2001). There was also evidence that Anthony was seen unsupervised in a nearby park after dark, wandering the street after dark looking for his sister, and panhandling near Route 59. This consideration also supports a finding of neglect. See In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 76. There was also evidence that Anthony and his sister were often hungry and sought to obtain food from their neighbor, the church refrigerator, and by panhandling. This, too, supports the trial court's finding. See In re M.W., 199 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1055 (1990) overruled on other grounds by In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 212-13 (2001). Moreover, Anthony was present and exposed to the chaos in the household resulting from the conflicts between respondent and Angelina. Partin's testimony that he saw Anthony crying in the garage during one such conflict provides evidence that Anthony was affected by this strife. This supports the trial court's finding as well. See In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995) (holding that parents' failure "to provide their children with [a] safe and nurturing shelter clearly falls within the concept of statutory neglect). Additionally, respondent's refusal to engage in services to improve the household situation is relevant as well. See In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220, 236 (2002). Finally, the trial court could properly consider respondent's neglect of Angelina in passing upon this question. In the Interest of L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623 (1997) ("[E]vidence that a parent has neglected or abused one child is relevant in determining whether another child may be at risk for abuse or neglect."); In the Interest of K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 736 (1997) ("A parent's behavior toward one minor may be considered when deciding whether a sibling is exposed to an injurious environment."). ¶ 48 Thus, at least six separate considerations support the trial court's decision: the condition of the house; the lack of supervision; the inadequate provision of food; the strife and conflict in the household; respondent's refusal to engage in services; and respondent's neglect of Angelina. For respondent to prevail on this argument, she would have to show that an opposite conclusion to the trial court's is clearly apparent. N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346. Given these facts, this is simply not the case. ¶ 49 Respondent contends that the majority of the evidence presented during the adjudicatory hearing concerned Angelina. She argues that the trial court misapplied the concept of anticipatory neglect in finding Anthony's environment injurious. See Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. It is certainly true, as respondent points out, that the neglect of one child does not conclusively establish that another child's environment is injurious. See In re S.R. and D.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021 (2004). However, it is also true that it is a relevant consideration. L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d at 623. As noted above, however, respondent's neglect of Angelina was but one factor supporting the trial court's determination. ¶ 50 Respondent relies heavily upon In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18 (1995). That case is distinguishable. In that case, the minors at issue (Edricka and Zemaj) were found neglected solely based on the respondent's prior neglect of other children. Id. at 20. The court expressly noted that "[t]here was no direct evidence that respondent had abused or neglected Edricka and Zemaj." Id. In this case, there was direct evidence that Anthony was neglected, notably the filthy condition, the lack of supervision, his hunger, and his exposure to the strife in the household. As such, Edricka C. provides little guidance here. Another case cited by respondent, In the Interest of Principato, 65 Ill. App. 3d 706, 709 (1978), where the children were "apparently healthy, well-fed and loved by their parents and grandparents," is plainly distinguishable. While we do not doubt respondent's love for her children, there was evidence that they were often hungry and seeking food, be it from Partin, the church refrigerator, or by panhandling near Route 59. ¶ 51 Respondent also relies on S.R. and D.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d 1017, which, she contends, "presents an almost identical situation to the case before this [c]ourt." Though there are indeed some similarities, we find a salient distinction. In S.R. and D.R., 349 Ill. App. 3d at 1022, the reviewing court, in considering whether the State had established that D.R. was neglected, observed the following:

"In this case, the record of the adjudicatory hearing contains only limited references to D.R. Foley from DCFS stated that she visited [the respondent's] home and saw a male child. Another DCFS employee testified that she had arranged visits between S.R. and D.R. since S.R. entered foster care and that these visits occurred once a week. This evidence does not suggest that D.R. was placed in an injurious environment. The only evidence of this, therefore, is [the respondent's] abandonment of S.R." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, in S.R. and D.R., the only evidence concerning whether D.R.'s environment was injurious pertained to the treatment of his sibling. Id. As explained above, in this case, the State presented direct evidence concerning Anthony. Hence, S.R. and D.R. is distinguishable. ¶ 52 Next, respondent attacks Partin's credibility. Assessing Partin's credibility was primarily a matter for the trial court, as was the weight to which his testimony was entitled. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 280-81 (2009). Respondent gives us no reason to conclude that the trial court's evaluation of Partin's testimony is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Humphries, 257 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1047 (1994). She further argues that the trial court's finding that Anthony's environment was injurious because of his exposure to the conflicts between respondent and Angelina is inconsistent with its finding that respondent "did the right thing by calling the police for assistance in handling Angelina." (Emphasis omitted). We reiterate that fault is not at issue here and that neglect can be willful or unintentional. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 463. Whether Anthony's continuing exposure to the strife in the household was harmful to him is a separate question from whether respondent responded to the strife appropriately. As such, respondent's point is not well taken. ¶ 53 We agree generally with respondent that the majority of the evidence presented by the State concerned Angelina. We point out, however, that such evidence was relevant to the question of whether Anthony was neglected. L.W., 291 Ill. App. 3d at 623. More importantly, we disagree with respondent that the evidence presented directly pertaining to Anthony, though considerably less in magnitude than the evidence pertinent to Angelina, was "exceedingly insufficient." As noted previously, the trial court's decision finds support in a number of considerations independent of respondent's treatment of Angelina. Accordingly, respondent has not established that the trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 54 B. Predicate Findings

¶ 55 Respondent next argues that the trial court failed to make certain threshold findings during a hearing regarding the temporary custody of Anthony, which, she contends, was required by statute. See 705 ILCS 405/2-10(1) (West 2010). Specifically, she asserts that the court never found that probable cause existed that Anthony was abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. As such, she continues, section 2-10(1) of the Act, which provides "If the court finds that there is not probable cause to believe that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent it shall release the minor and dismiss the petition," required dismissal of the State's neglect petition. Therefore, according to respondent, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to order a change in the temporary custody of Anthony from her to Anthony's father (which was the outcome of the hearing). The authority of the trial court to enter this order is a legal issue subject to de novo review. City of Kankakee v. Department of Revenue, 2013 IL App. (3d) 120599, ¶ 11. Respondent's argument encounters several difficulties. ¶ 56 First, we note that following the dispositional hearing, the trial court placed custody with Anthony's father. Thus, the temporary order has been superceded by the trial court's dispositional order. Even if we were to vacate the temporary order, custody would not revert to respondent. Where a court cannot order effective relief, an issue is moot. Uesco Industries, Inc. v. Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 75. Such is the case here. ¶ 57 Respondent attempts to avoid this bar by asserting that the trial court's failure to make the findings required by the statute render its subsequent adjudication of neglect void. Respondent cites no authority for this proposition beyond Section 2-10(1). However, throughout this argument, she has framed compliance with the requirements of the Act as a jurisdictional issue. Hence, we take her argument to be that, due to its alleged noncompliance with the Act, the trial court did not have jurisdiction and lacked the authority to enter the adjudicatory order. ¶ 58 For the proposition that the Act's requirements are jurisdictional, respondent relies on In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408 (2001). In that case, the supreme court set forth the following:

"Removal of a child from his parents' care based on a finding of abuse, neglect, or dependency was not known to common law or equity (People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455-56 (1916)) and, therefore, was not a justiciable matter over which the courts had original jurisdiction (see In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 63-64 (1993)). Through the Juvenile Court Act, however, the legislature conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court over such a matter and thereby created a 'justiciable matter.' 705 ILCS 405/2-1 (West 1998). Section 2-1 ofthe Act states that '[p]roceedings may be instituted under the provisions of this Article concerning boys and girls who are abused, neglected or dependent * * *.' 705 ILCS 405/2-1 (West 1998). This grant of authority by the legislature is purely statutory and the proceedings and remedies provided by the Act are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme. Piccolo, 275 Ill. at 455-56.
Because a justiciable matter is statutorily derived, the legislature may define it in such a way as to limit or preclude the circuit court's authority. 'When a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction' and the court 'must proceed within the strictures of the statute * * *.' M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. The court, therefore, has only the subject matter jurisdiction accorded to it by the statute and '[a]ny action taken by the circuit court that exceeds its jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time.' In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 193 (1999). Therefore, we must determine whether the Act confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to hear motions to remove a minor from his temporary foster placement or whether that action would exceed the jurisdiction of the court and be void." A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 415-16.

This court has previously called into question the continuing vitality of A.H. and two of the cases A.H. relied on (M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, and Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188) in light of the supreme court's subsequent holdings in Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), and People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541 (2003). See In re Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d 758, 759-63 (2007). We have explained:

"M.M. is not the only supreme court decision respondent could reasonably cite for the applicability of statutorily limited jurisdiction in general civil cases. Indeed, he cites In re Estate of Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 194-95 (1999), which endorses that principle at least as strongly as does the majority in M.M. In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 416-17 (2001), decided just five months before Steinbrecher, also unequivocally accepts the principle. We acknowledge the existence of those cases. However, we view the Belleville Toyota trio as having worked a fundamental change in the understanding of article VI. Gebis and A.H., like M.M., must now also be treated with caution." Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d at 762 n.2.

Thus, respondent's assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction lacks a firm foundation. In the wake of Belleville Toyota and its brethren, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of this state comes not from the legislature but from the state constitution. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). Whether the trial court complied with the requirements of the Act simply is not a jurisdictional issue ¶ 59 In short, the trial court's adjudicatory order (and the dispositional order) could not be rendered void by the trial court's failure to enter the findings respondent argues were necessary during the temporary custody hearing. As the trial court's noncompliance with these provisions could not undo the adjudicatory and dispositional orders it subsequently entered, any contentions regarding the temporary custody proceeding are moot. See Uesco Industries, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 75.

¶ 60 III. Timeliness of the Dispositional Hearing

¶ 61 Respondent's final contention is that the trial court's failure to conduct the dispositional hearing within the time frame specified in the statute deprived it of the jurisdiction to enter the dispositional order in this case. This presents a question of law, which we review de novo. City of Kankakee, 2013 IL App. (3d) 120599, ¶ 11. As explained in the previous section, the trial court's failure to comply with a statutory condition does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. That is, such a failure renders an order voidable rather than void. Cushing v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 100768, ¶ 103. A voidable order is simply an order that has been entered erroneously. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998). Thus, in considering the very time limit at issue in this case, the fourth district of this appellate court aptly observed:

"In light of the Belleville Toyota cases, when the legislature sets time limitations in the Act and a circuit court fails to comply with those limitations, the judgment is not void, but the judgment is potentially voidable. As this court noted in C.S., the trial court does not lose its constitutionally conferred subject-matter jurisdiction but, instead, may proceed in error." In re John C.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d 553, 569 (2008).

Thus, respondent's final argument implicates ordinary error rather than the authority of the trial court to enter the order. ¶ 62 Generally, to preserve a claim of ordinary error, it is necessary for a party to interpose a timely objection. See Palanti v. Dillon Enterprises, Ltd., 303 Ill. App. 3d 58, 64 (1999). Section 2-22 of the Act allows a court to continue a dispositional hearing so long as the hearing occurs within six months of the removal of the minor from his or her home. 705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2010). Unlike section 2-21 (705 ILCS 405/2-21(West 2010)), which requires a dispositional hearing to be set within 30 days of a finding of neglect, the trial court's ability to continue a case is not contingent on the consent of the parties.¹ Compare 705 ILCS 405/2-21(3) (West 2010) ("The time limits of this Section may be waved only by consent of all parties and approval of the court.") with 705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2010) ("On its own motion or that of the State's Attorney, a parent, guardian, custodian, responsible relative or counsel, the court may adjourn the hearing for a reasonable period to receive reports or other evidence, * * * but in no event shall continuances be granted so that the dispositional hearing occurs more than 6 months after the initial removal of a minor from his or her home."). Respondent does not indicate if and where she objected to the trial court continuing the dispositional hearing beyond the statutory six month period, and we have not located a contemporaneous objection in the record. As this issue does not implicate voidness (John C.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d at 569), the lack of an objection forfeits the issue. See In re C.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 735, 745 (2008); In re Estate of Klehm, 363 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377 (2006). ¶ 63 Moreover, even if we were to consider this argument properly preserved, it is missing an essential component. Ordinarily, an error must be shown to be prejudicial before it can be deemed to be reversible. In re Detention of Traynoff, 358 Ill. App. 3d 430, 441 (2005). In In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 674, 679-80 (2002), we held that procedural errors that result in no prejudice to a respondent do not provide a basis for reversal in cases that involve the care and custody of children. In this case, it is not apparent to us how the trial court's failure to comply with the statutory time limit prejudiced respondent in any way, and she makes no attempt to show that it did. As such, even if this argument were not forfeited, respondent has not establish that reversible error occurred. ¶ 64 In sum, that the dispositional hearing did not happen within the time frame specified in the Act did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, to prevail here, respondent had to both properly preserve the alleged error for review and establish that it prejudiced her. She has done neither; hence, we must reject her argument that the trial court's failure abide by the time limits set forth in the Act deprived it of jurisdiction.

1 We note that the dispositional hearing was held 31 days after the finding of neglect, contrary to section2-21 (705 ILCS 405/2-21(West 2010)), which states that it must occur within 30 days. Respondent consented to the waiver of this time limit. Though she initially objected, when the trial court stated that the proceeding would only be delayed by one day, respondent's attorney stated, "That's fine." Moreover, we fail to see how this brief delay prejudiced respondent.

¶ 65 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 66 In light of the foregoing, the decision of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. ¶ 67 Affirmed.