Opinion
0001423/1991.
November 3, 2006.
HON. THOMAS SPOTA, III, Suffolk County District Attorney, By: MICHAEL MILLER, ESQ., Riverhead, New York.
VICTOR M. MEDINA, JR., Defendant Pm Se, C/O Sing Sing Correctional Facility, Ossining, New York.
The above named defendant has moved this Court for an order pursuant to CPL § 440.10 vacating his judgment of conviction on the grounds that a recent Court of Appeals decision [People v. Feingold, 7 NY3rd 288] re-defined the definition of Depraved Mind Murder [PL§ 125.25(2)] and that such definition should be retroactively applied to his 1996 conviction under the above indictment, resulting in the Court vacating his conviction and ordering a new trial.
The District Attorney has filed an Affidavit and Memorandum of Law with the Court opposing such relief. The matter was thereafter marked submitted, decision reserved, on October 13, 2006.
Essentially, the defendant contends that his motion should be granted and a new trial ordered due to a re-defining of a Penal Law statute by the Court of Appeals in Feingold, supra relative to the crime of Depraved Mind Murder [PL§ 125.25(2)] for which he was convicted in 1996. The defendant claims, that under the new definition, which now makes "depraved indifference" a culpable mental state and an element of the crime, his conduct would not constitute Murder in the Second Degree under PL § 125.25(2) and that such re-definition should be retroactively applied to defendant's case.
After considering the respective arguments of the parties in conjunction with the applicable law, it is the determination of the Court to DENY defendant's application in all respects.
Contrary to the contentions of the defendant, the Court's holding in Feingold, supra, re- defining Depraved Mind Murder should not, in the opinion of this Court, be retroactively applied to the defendant's situation. And further, relying upon the facts developed at trial, assuming arguendo that this Court were to retroactively apply the Feingold holding here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that a different or more favorable verdict would have resulted.
Subsequent to a non-jury trial, the defendant, Victor Medina, was convicted of, inter alia, Depraved Indifference Murder [PL § 125.25(2)] and was sentenced on March 12, 1996 to a concurrent indeterminate term of imprisonment of twenty (20) years to life. Since that time, the defendant has exhausted his direct appeals and has, on more than one occasion, unsuccessfully collaterally attacked his judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL Article 440.
By this application, the defendant again moves for coram nobis relief pursuant to CPL Article 440 claiming that the recent decision by the Court of Appeals in People v. Feingold, 7 NY3d 288 in re-defining the crime of Depraved Indifference Murder [PL § 125.25(2)], by making depraved indifference to human life a culpable mental state and an element of the crime, removes his conduct from criminal liability. The defendant further contends that the new standard should be retroactively applied to his case.
It is well established by the Court of Appeals that a bright line rule exists for determining whether a new rule will apply retroactively [See, People v. Mitchell, 80 NY2d 519; People v. La Mendola, 206 AD2d 707]. If the new rule involves Federal constitutional principles it must receive retroactive application [See, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 US 314]. However, if a new rule is based solely upon state law and Federal constitutional principles are not involved, the Court must then examine three separate factors in order to determine whether to apply the new rule either retroactively or prospectively [ People v. Pepper, 53 NY2d 213].
Initially, this Court must decide whether the new rule enunciated in Feingold, supra includes Federal Constitutional principles or is it based solely upon state law.
Contrary to the contentions of the defendant, in the opinion of this Court, the holding in Feingold does not concern Federal constitutional principles but is based solely upon state law. In this regard, the Court's re-defining of a current penal law statute by adding a mens rea element not previously required is merely a modification of an existing criminal statute and, as such, it is manifestly apparent that it was decided as a question of state law not encompassing Federal constitutional principles [See, People v. Douglas, 205 AD2d 280].
Upon resolving this issue, the Court will now address the three pronged test set forth in People v. Pepper (supra) to decide whether the rule enunciated in Feingold should be applied retroactively or prospectively. In Pepper, the Court of Appeals held that the issue of retroactivity of a new rule is to be evaluated by considering three separate factors: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.
Upon considering the above principles both individually and collectively, under the circumstances presented in this case, it is the determination of the Court, for the reasons that follow, that the Feingold rule should be applied only prospectively.
First, an arguable and discernible purpose to be served by the Feingold rule would be to more specifically define the crime of Depraved Indifference Murder by making depraved indifference to human life a culpable mental state. The ruling has the effect of narrowing down and limiting prosecutions under the statute [PL § 125.25(2)] to only those rare category of cases that fit within the new mens rea requirement. Clearly, the purpose is to more narrowly define the crime of Depraved Indifference Murder in an effort to ensure that the conduct and mind set meets the crime charged. Such purpose in re-defining and clarifying an existing statute does not require retroactive application.
Second, with respect to the extent of reliance on the old rule prior to Feingold, it is indisputable and undeniable that the Courts have substantially relied upon the pre-Feingold formulation of Depraved Indifference Murder. It was all the Courts had to go by. It was the law and it was unquestionably universally followed.
Thirdly, were the Court to apply the Feingold rule retroactively, there is no question in the mind of this Court that it would create an overwhelming and substantial burden on the administration of justice. It is incontrovertible that there exists a large number of applicable closed cases, that is, cases that have exhausted their direct appeals. To permit reconsideration of those cases by retroactive application of the Feingold rule, through a collateral attack on their judgments, would clearly create a substantial hardship on the administration of justice, overburden the system and would not have any beneficial effect upon the integrity of the truth seeking process.
Based on consideration of the foregoing factors, this Court sees no compelling reason to apply the new rule enunciated in Feingold retroactively to the defendant's situation. Accordingly, defendant's application in that regard is DENIED.
This determination notwithstanding, the Court has nonetheless examined the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct as set forth in the Court record at trial. Upon doing so, the Court was unable to reach the conclusion that the defendant's conduct did not reach the level of depraved indifference to human life according to Feingold. It is not hard to see how the defendant's actions, inter alia, in brandishing a loaded shotgun within the confines of a small car which seated three people, would satisfy the Feingold rule of acting with the mens rea of depraved indifference to human life. The trier of facts conclusion in this regard must be given great deference and there was nothing in the way the verdict was announced that would refute that the defendant's conduct displayed an utter disregard for the value of human life; a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results or not [ People v. Feingold, supra; People v. Campbell, 2006 NY Slip Op 7367, App Div 2nd Dept, Oct. 10, 2006]. Under the facts presented at trial, the defendant's case appears to fit within the narrow category of cases where Depraved Indifference Murder properly applies. The trier of facts' determination that the defendant possessed the culpable mental state necessary to convict was, in the opinion of this Court, supported by the record.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the defendant's application for an order, pursuant to CPL § 440.10, vacating his judgment of conviction is DENIED in all respects.
The Court has considered defendant's remaining contentions and has determined them to be without merit.
The above memorandum constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
SO ORDERED: