Opinion
4-20-0635 4-20-0636
06-09-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRANDON McDUFFIE, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County Nos. 19CF978 20CF77 Honorable Scott D. Drazewski, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
LANNERD JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not err when it (1) denied defendant's motion to withdraw his admission to the State's petition to revoke his probation, (2) failed to sua sponte order a fitness hearing, (3) permitted defendant to proceed pro se, and (4) refused to appoint new defense counsel following a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 2 Defendant, Brandon McDuffie, appeals from the trial court's judgments revoking his probation for two counts of aggravated battery in separate cases. On appeal, defendant raises four issues for review. Defendant argues the court erred when it (1) denied him the opportunity to withdraw his admission to a probation violation, (2) failed to sua sponte order a fitness hearing, (3) permitted defendant to proceed pro se without proper admonishments, and (4) refused to appoint new defense counsel following an inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). The State responds no errors occurred and the judgments should be affirmed. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Charges and Probation Revocation Hearing
¶ 5 In February 2020, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1) (West 2020)) in McLean County case Nos. 19-CF-978 and 20-CF-77. In exchange for defendant's guilty pleas, he would receive a sentence of 30 months' probation. Before accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court informed defendant of the nature of the charges against him, the minimum and maximum penalties for each offense, and that his sentences would be required to be served consecutively. Defendant informed the court he understood, the court accepted defendant's guilty pleas, and defendant was sentenced in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement.
¶ 6 In April 2020, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant's petition on the grounds he violated his probation when he committed the offenses of aggravated battery, domestic battery, aggravated domestic battery, and resisting a peace officer as alleged in McLean County case No. 20-CF-310.
¶ 7 In July 2020, defendant admitted to violating his probation by resisting a peace officer, which was one of the charges contained in 20-CF-310. In exchange for his admission, the State agreed to (1) dismiss the charges in case No. 20-CF-310; (2) cap its sentencing recommendation for the each of the charges in case Nos. 19-CF-978 and 20-CF-77 at three years in prison, to be served consecutively; and (3) dismiss the remaining allegations in the petition to revoke defendant's probation.
¶ 8 At the revocation hearing, the trial court advised defendant that in case No. 19-CF-978, he was admitting to "violating] [his] probation by committing the offenses [ sic ] of resisting a peace officer on April 9, 2020, as further contained within the charge in McLean County case 20-CF-310." Defendant stated he did not understand, and the court explained the allegation in the State's petition again. Following the court's explanation, defendant stated that because of his attention deficit disorder (ADD) diagnosis, his mind tended to wander. When the court asked defendant if he was claiming to be unfit, defendant responded he was not unfit. Defendant ultimately indicated he understood the allegation.
¶ 9 The trial court also admonished defendant that following his admission, a resentencing hearing would be set. The court explained that the statutory sentencing range included not less than two years but no more than five years in prison. Defendant could also receive probation or conditional discharge. Regarding case No. 20-CF-77, the court repeated the nature of the alleged probation violation and the possible sentencing range, which was identical to that of case No. 19-CF-978. Defendant agreed he understood the minimum and maximum penalties for the two charges. Defendant also stated he understood he did not have to admit to the allegation and could elect to have a hearing, wherein the State would be required to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 10 When asked whether any promises had been made to him, other than those contained within his agreement with the State, defendant spoke at length about desiring to be free and returning home to his son. The trial court interrupted defendant to inform him his speech was not responsive to the court's question. The court then asked defendant whether he had reviewed the written agreement and discussed it with his attorney, to which defendant responded he had. Defendant agreed no other promises had been made to him in exchange for his admission.
¶ 11 The State recited the factual basis, and defendant's counsel, Ronald Lewis, agreed the State could present witnesses to support it. The trial court found a factual basis existed and defendant's admission was knowingly and voluntarily entered. After reducing defendant's bond, the court set the two cases for a resentencing hearing.
¶ 12 B. Postrevocation Motions and Resentencing Hearing
¶ 13 In July 2020, defendant pro se filed motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in each of the three cases (Nos. 19-CF-978, 20-CF-77, and 20-CF-310), as well as a motion to subpoena phone records from the McLean County Detention Facility.
¶ 14 At a September 2020 hearing, Lewis declined to adopt the pro se motions filed by defendant. Defendant indicated he would like to proceed pro se, and the trial court began to admonish him regarding his right to do so. The court explained the consequences and drawbacks of proceeding pro se and advised defendant of the minimum and maximum penalties for the aggravated battery charges. The court addressed defendant as "Mr. McDuffie," to which defendant interrupted to state his name was Brandon McDuffie and he did not know who "Mr. McDuffie" was. This was the first time defendant had indicated that he preferred the court to address him by another name. When asked whether he understood the minimum and maximum penalties, the following colloquy ensued:
"THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Okay. Then if you don't understand, then I can't have you represent-
THE DEFENDANT: Can I-can I-
THE COURT: I can't have you represent yourself because you've demonstrated an inability to be able to participate in these proceedings.
THE DEFENDANT: Can I explain why I don't understand?
THE COURT: You can try, Mr.-I'm sorry, Brandon McDuffie.
THE DEFENDANT: I don't understand because the word itself.
Understand means-I'm going to give you a demonstration."
The court responded it did not need a demonstration and found that based on defendant's responses, he was unable to represent himself at this time.
¶ 15 Then, the trial court commenced the resentencing hearing. Defendant offered the testimony of Vince McDuffie in mitigation. Vince testified defendant was his oldest son. According to Vince, defendant grew up in Arkansas with his mother and at various points suffered from mental health issues resulting in admission to a facility for treatment "three or four times." Defendant had issues in school with fighting and was traumatized by the death of his four-year-old brother when he was around six. Vince believed defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was prescribed medication. When asked what Vince thought would be important for the court to know regarding defendant's mental state, he replied, "Well, I personally feel right now prison wouldn't help him. I mean, anything, you know, mental evaluation, probably a facility, but prison is not-I don't feel prison is the answer."
¶ 16 Following Vince's testimony, Lewis orally moved for a fitness evaluation under section 5-3-2(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-3-2(b) (West 2020)). The State indicated it had no objection and would join in the motion if it was permitted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a written order appointing Dr. Terry Killian to conduct a fitness evaluation for defendant and submit a written report to McLean County Court Services to aid in the presentence investigation. The court continued the resentencing hearing pending the preparation of the fitness evaluation and report.
¶ 17 C. Dr. Killian's Fitness Report
¶ 18 Following defendant's September 2020 fitness evaluation, Dr. Killian filed a report with his findings. Dr. Killian concluded, in his professional opinion, that defendant was fit. Specifically, Dr. Killian found defendant did not present with any psychiatric problems that would interfere with him rationally assisting in his own defense. Defendant also demonstrated a basic understanding of legal proceedings and the roles of various court personnel. Dr. Killian opined that although defendant was capable of cooperating with his attorney in his defense, he might choose not to due to personality differences. While Dr. Killian believed defendant was capable of proceeding pro se, it would be a "mistake" for defendant to do so because he significantly overestimated the extent of his legal knowledge.
¶ 19 Dr. Killian also noted in his report that defendant wrote a letter to another judge with multiple claims, including that defendant preferred to be called Brandon or Christopher McDuffie instead of Mr. McDuffie. Dr. Killian opined that he did not believe that "what [defendant] wrote was because of a psychotic illness." During the interview, defendant had indicated a similar preference, and so Dr. Killian accommodated the request to refrain from using Mr. McDuffie. In addition, defendant admitted in his fitness evaluation that he" 't[ook] that point overboard'" when he attempted to use legal tactics promoted by supporters of the sovereign citizens movement, such as asserting the Civil Peace flag and the Sons of Liberty flag, Old Glory, are similar to the American flag, with differences along the fringes. Defendant even acknowledged he may owe the trial judge an apology for his behavior. Dr. Killian concluded that while talk of" 'sovereign citizens'" may occur with psychotic illness, he opined this was not the case with defendant. Moreover, in his report, Dr. Killian noted that he had heard the reference to a different flag and the preference to be called by a different name from another inmate the very day of his interview with defendant. Dr. Killian concluded that these ideas are discussed in the McLean County jail population.
¶ 20 D. Resentencing Hearing
¶ 21 Defendant's resentencing hearing was reconvened in October 2020. At the beginning of the hearing, and after being advised of his options regarding his representation, defendant chose to continue being represented by Lewis rather than proceeding pro se. Lewis moved to have the fitness report included as an addendum to the presentence investigation report, which the trial court allowed.
¶ 22 During arguments, the State recommended defendant be sentenced to three years in prison in each of the two cases. Lewis argued defendant should be resentenced to terms of probation. Defendant spoke in allocution and asked the court to give him a second chance at probation. He emphasized he regretted his previous actions, had made wrong decisions, and wanted to get back on the right path in life. Defendant wanted to be present for his son and to maintain his employment.
¶ 23 The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of two years in prison. The court found defendant's behavior while on probation was relevant to defendant's rehabilitative potential, and that another sentence of probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offenses and would not be consistent with the ends of justice. The court admonished defendant of his appellate rights and concluded the hearing.
¶ 24 E. Postsentencing Motions Hearing
¶ 25 In November 2020, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentences, or in the alternative, withdraw his admissions to violating his probation. Defendant argued his sentences were excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the offenses. Defendant further asserted he did not fully understand the nature of his admissions and his admissions were therefore not knowingly made. Later in November 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motions.
¶ 26 1. Pro Se Admonishments
¶ 27 At the beginning of the hearing, defendant requested to proceed pro se. Defendant believed he was "better off" representing himself because Lewis was ineffective and didn't "win" defendant's probation. Defendant claimed Lewis was working against him. The trial court began to admonish defendant about his right to proceed pro se, and the following colloquy occurred:
"THE COURT: And so what I need to relate to you is to make sure that you understand-
THE DEFENDANT: The word 'understand' again.
THE COURT: Well, [defendant], those are the words that the Illinois Supreme Court likes judges to use is a knowing and voluntary understanding.
THE DEFENDANT: Why?
THE COURT: Because that is what is in the Supreme Court Rules.
THE DEFENDANT: What does understand mean to you?
THE COURT: I am not going to answer your silly questions. All right. And that is a silly question. And, besides, I am not the defendant here. I get to ask the questions; you get to give the answers. *** So, what we need to do-
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I ain't got nothing to lose, Your Honor. My point is my-since we are going by the laws of the sea, then I would like to claim my cargo. Can you take me back to my pod, please?"
¶ 28 The trial court took a brief recess, and when the hearing was reconvened, defendant confirmed he still wished to proceed pro se. The court again began to admonish defendant and commented, "As far as the potential penalties, we talked about those previously. ***And so I will not be reminding you of those at this time because you previously have been made aware of those." Defendant was advised the only remaining issues would be the outstanding motion to reconsider his sentences or, in the alternative, withdraw his admissions. The court further explained that if defendant were allowed to withdraw his admissions, the charges dismissed by the State in case No. 20-CF-310 could be reinstated.
¶ 29 After the trial court advised defendant of his right to counsel, defendant informed the court that he felt he had no choice but to proceed pro se because Lewis refused to obtain paperwork regarding defendant's seizure disorder and did not respond to defendant's correspondence. The court responded that because defendant had raised the issue of Lewis's ineffectiveness, it needed to conduct a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 30 2. Krankel Inquiry
¶ 31 Defendant asserted Lewis had been ineffective in the following ways. First, defendant was coerced into signing the plea agreements under threat of "slavery." Defendant was on medication for his seizure disorder (which he later identified as Divalproex), which made him confused. Additionally, Lewis contacted defendant's family members to participate in the presentence investigation, which defendant believed was a violation of his privacy and his constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Lewis also discussed defendant's case in the hallway in front of the sheriff's deputy. Defendant further accused Lewis of "suppressing" jailhouse phone calls that showed defendant's wife had fabricated the charges where she was the alleged victim in order to keep defendant in jail and obtain defendant's money. Defendant also claimed Lewis refused to file a motion to reconsider his sentences and that he had a defense to the charges filed in case No. 20-CF-310. Lewis did not respond to defendant's correspondence and rarely communicated with him.
¶ 32 Lewis responded that he had not contacted defendant's wife, but rather defendant's wife had contacted him. Defendant's wife was the alleged victim in case No. 20-CF-310. Lewis explained that any contact he had with defendant's wife and father was related to gathering mitigating evidence. Lewis further refuted defendant's claim that he would not file a motion to reconsider his sentences, as he had, in fact, filed such a motion in November 2020, which was the subject of the present hearing. Regarding potential defenses in case No. 20-CF-310, Lewis did not file any subpoenas because the State had already agreed to dismiss the charges in exchange for defendant's admission to violating his probation. Although defendant repeatedly inquired whether he could "undo" the charges in case Nos. 19-CF-978 and 20-CF-77 based on his wife's statements, Lewis informed defendant that was not possible because he had already pleaded guilty, and any motion filed in those cases would have been untimely. Lewis also refuted defendant's claim he did not correspond with him. According to Lewis, he wrote defendant a letter explaining the nature of the charges, the potential penalties, his assessment of the State's evidence against defendant, and what motions he would be prepared to file on defendant's behalf. During visits, defendant would often become argumentative or abusive toward Lewis.
¶ 33 The trial court concluded that after considering defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance and Lewis's responses, it would not be necessary to appoint new counsel to investigate defendant's claims. Specifically, the court found the factual bases for defendant's claims were "conclusory, misleading, legally immaterial, and/or pertain[ed] solely to an issue or issues of trial and strategy."
¶ 34 3. Additional Admonishments
¶ 35 The trial court advised defendant of the difficulties of proceeding pro se without any formal legal training and asked defendant whether he understood that, if he proceeded pro se, he would nonetheless be required to follow the same rules required of attorneys. Defendant indicated he understood. The court explained the remaining issues in this case and the different ways in which defendant could proceed on the outstanding motions. The court reminded defendant that he had a right to counsel in these proceedings and that because the court had already found defendant indigent, it could appoint an attorney to represent him. After some discussion, defendant indicated he understood. Defendant also denied that anyone had threatened or coerced him into waiving his right to counsel. When asked whether he still wished to proceed pro se knowing the consequences of doing so, defendant indicated he did. The court found defendant's waiver of counsel to be knowing and voluntary and allowed defendant to proceed pro se.
¶ 36 F. Pro Se Motions Hearing
¶ 37 In December 2020, defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider his sentences, or in the alternative, to withdraw his admissions to violating his probation.
¶ 38 Later in December 2020, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's pro se motions. When the hearing began, defendant requested a continuance because he had not received a response to subpoenas he had filed requesting "jailhouse records for evidence proving that [he had] been assaulted by the police officer with-with a potential witness." The court explained defendant had not received a response to the subpoenas because the charges in case No. 20-CF-310 had already been dismissed. Defendant indicated he did not understand and began to explain why. The court responded, "Don't tell me why you don't understand because then what I'm going to do is find that you could or might be unfit again and then I'll go ahead and order that a fitness evaluation occur." The court advised defendant to stop interrupting and asked again if defendant understood. Defendant responded, "If your meaning is comprehend then I understand."
¶ 39 Defendant told the trial court he did not understand how he could have had his probation revoked for resisting arrest if the charge for resisting arrest had been dismissed. The court advised defendant he admitted to resisting arrest as alleged in the State's petition to revoke his probation. Defendant denied making such an admission. Defendant claimed, if allowed to subpoena jailhouse phone call records, those records would support his allegation he did not resist arrest because the arresting officer slapped him. When the court asked defendant where in the transcripts he denied admitting to resisting arrest, defendant claimed he only signed the admission because he was under threat of slavery and imprisonment by Lewis. Defendant only agreed to admit to violating his probation because he believed he could get a lighter sentence.
¶ 40 When the trial court asked defendant if he had any further arguments, defendant argued he should be allowed to withdraw his admission because he was disabled due to head injuries. The court, citing Dr. Killian's report, told defendant he had already been found psychiatrically fit for trial.
¶ 41 The State argued defendant should not be permitted to withdraw his admission to violating his probation. The State opined defendant was aware of the consequences of his admission and quoted the following statement from defendant at the admission hearing: "I already admitted that I was guilty so therefore I just want to go through the process so I understand." Defendant interrupted and requested that the "bailer" be brought in, as he wished to "claim for [his] cargo." The trial court told defendant it was going to have him leave the courtroom for three minutes. Defendant then requested to be taken back to his pod. The court asked defendant if he was electing to absent himself from the proceedings and stated it was not requiring defendant to leave. In response, defendant twice repeated he would like to "claim for [his] cargo." Following that response, the court stated, "Let the record reflect that *** [defendant is] remanded to the custody of the sheriff and his presence has been waived on *** [defendant's request for the remainder of this hearing."
¶ 42 In defendant's absence, the State continued its arguments in opposition to defendant's motion to withdraw his admissions. Following the State's arguments, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his admissions. Specifically, the court found "[d]efendant was thoroughly questioned *** that he understood not only the nature of the proceedings but the consequences of his admissions, what rights he was giving up, and *** that he knowingly and voluntary did so," and there was "no basis for holding *** that the [defendant's admissions were anything but knowingly and voluntarily made." The court also denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentences.
¶ 43 The trial court directed that notices of appeal be filed on defendant's behalf in case Nos. 19-CF-978 and 20-CF-77 to preserve his appellate rights, which this court docketed as appellate case Nos. 4-20-0635 and 4-20-0636, respectively. It further appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. In July 2021, this court allowed defendant's motion to consolidate the two cases for review.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred when it (1) denied his motion to withdraw his admissions to violating his probation, (2) failed to sua sponte order a fitness hearing, (3) permitted defendant to proceed pro se without proper admonishments, and (4) refused to appoint new defense counsel following its Krankel inquiry. The State responds the court (1) properly denied the motion to withdraw defendant's admission, (2) was not required to order a fitness hearing, (3) properly allowed defendant to proceed pro se, and (4) correctly concluded defendant was not entitled to new counsel following the Krankel inquiry. We agree with the State and affirm the court's judgments.
¶ 46 A. Withdrawal of Admission
¶ 47 Defendant first argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his admissions to violating his probation. Specifically, defendant asserts the court failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402A (eff. Nov. 1, 2003) because the record shows his admission to violating his probation by resisting a peace officer was not knowingly made. We disagree.
¶ 48 Rule 402A provides the admonitions a trial court must give a criminal defendant before the defendant admits to an allegation in a petition to revoke probation. People v. Ellis, 375 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1045, 874 N.E.2d 980, 982 (2007); People v. Hall, 198 Ill.2d 173, 181, 760 N.E.2d 971, 975 (2001). Rule 402A requires the trial court to admonish the defendant and determine that he understands (1) the specific allegations in the petition to revoke probation; (2) the defendant has the right to a hearing with defense counsel present; (3) at the hearing, the defendant has the right to confront witnesses and present evidence on his behalf; (4) the State must prove the alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence; (5) upon admitting a violation, there will not be a hearing on the petition to revoke probation; and (6) the sentencing range for the underlying offense. Ill. S.Ct. R. 402A(a) (eff Nov. 1, 2003).
¶ 49 Additionally, Rule 402A(b) states as follows:
"The court shall not accept an admission to a violation, or a stipulation sufficient to revoke without first determining that the defendant's admission is voluntary and not made on the basis of any coercion or promise. If the admission or tendered stipulation is the result of an agreement as to the disposition of the defendant's case, the agreement shall be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any coercion or promises, apart from an agreement as to the disposition of the defendant's case, were used to obtain the admission." Ill. S.Ct. R. 402A(b) (eff. Nov. 1, 2003).
¶ 50 Rule 402A requires the trial court's "substantial compliance," meaning "a specific and affirmative showing in the record that the defendant understood each of the required admonitions." Ellis, 375 Ill.App.3d at 1046. Whether the trial court substantially complied with Rule 402A is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id.
¶ 51 In support of his argument his admission was not knowingly made, defendant contends he informed the trial court he did not understand after it admonished him of the State's allegation he violated his probation by resisting a peace officer in case No. 20-CF-310. Defendant further contends he told the court he had "ADD" and his minded tended to "wander[ ]." Defendant also emphasizes instances in later proceedings wherein defendant seemed to believe he had pleaded guilty to resisting arrest in case No. 20-CF-310-which was dismissed entirely-rather than admitting to violating his probation in case Nos. 19-CF-978 and 20-CF-77.
¶ 52 Here, we conclude the trial court substantially complied with Rule 402A. The record shows the court admonished defendant under Rule 402A(a) and ensured his admission was knowingly and voluntarily entered under Rule 402A(b). See Ill. S.Ct. R. 402A(a), (b) (eff Nov. 1, 2003). Although defendant informed the court he did not understand immediately after the court explained the State's allegation he violated his probation by resisting arrest, defendant fails to acknowledge the court immediately followed up defendant's statement by providing the following additional explanation:
"[T]he State is alleging that you violated a condition of your probation which prevented you from violating any criminal statute of any jurisdiction, basically a conditional probation not to commit any more crimes by having committed a crime during the term of your probation, having committed the crime of resisting a peace officer on April 9th of 2020. That charge actually being set forth in more detail in your case 20-CF-310. So I'm just asking you about whether you understand what it is that the State is alleging that you did to violate your probation in this case right now."
Upon this further explanation, defendant stated, "Okay. Well, yes, I understand." When defendant then made a comment about having "ADD," the court confirmed defendant was not alleging he was unfit and again explained the State's allegation. When the court again asked if he understood, defendant replied, "I understand what you're telling me." Moreover, defendant's later statements at different hearings confusing the proceedings does not indicate he did not knowingly enter the admission at the revocation hearing.
¶ 53 Additionally, the State aptly notes that during the hearing on defendant's postsentencing motions, the trial court, relying on Dr. Killian's fitness report, found defendant was "just being obstinate," and that he was "not being cooperative *** and being disruptive by design." Defendant admitted in his fitness evaluation that he" 't[ook] that point overboard'" when he attempted to use legal tactics promoted by supporters of the sovereign citizens movement. Defendant even acknowledged he may owe the trial judge an apology for his behavior. The court was in the best position to assess whether defendant's purported confusion was genuine, and the record supports its determination that defendant was deliberately choosing to be uncooperative.
¶ 54 The trial court promptly responded to defendant's questions and repeatedly corrected his misunderstandings each time he expressed confusion. The court also confirmed defendant had not been promised anything-other than the promises contained within his agreement with the State-in exchange for his admissions to violating his probation. We conclude the record shows the court properly admonished defendant and that his admissions were knowingly and voluntarily made. The court substantially complied with Rule 402A and did not err in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his admissions.
¶ 55 B. Failure to Order a Fitness Hearing
¶ 56 Defendant next argues the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a fitness hearing because defendant's behavior during the proceedings raised a bona fide doubt as to his fitness. We disagree.
¶ 57 In People v. Tapscott, 386 Ill.App.3d 1064, 1075-76, 899 N.E.2d 597, 607 (2008), this court explained the impact of a criminal defendant's fitness on his constitutional due process rights as follows:
"The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states that there is a presumption of fitness to stand trial and be sentenced. [Citation.] The defendant bears the burden to show that a bona fide doubt exists as to his fitness to stand trial. [Citation.] However, subjecting an unfit defendant to trial is a violation of the defendant's substantive due-process rights. [Citations.] More specifically, a due-process violation would occur if the defendant is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings or assist defense counsel in his own defense. [Citation.] The competency standard to plead guilty or stand trial is the same, i.e., the defendant must understand the nature of the charge and purpose of the proceedings and be able to assist in his defense. [Citation.]
Although any party may raise the issue of a defendant's fitness at any appropriate time, when a bona fide doubt exists as to the defendant's fitness, the trial court must sua sponte order a determination of the defendant's fitness before proceeding further. [Citation.] Whether a bona fide doubt exists is an issue that is within the trial court's discretion. [Citation.] The trial court is in a superior position to this court to view the defendant's behavior firsthand and make a determination based on its observance as to whether a bona fide doubt exists as to the defendant's fitness. [Citation.]
'Fitness speaks only to a person's ability to function within the context of trial; it does not refer to sanity or competence in other areas. [Citation.] A person can be fit for trial although his mind may be otherwise unsound.' [Citation.] A defendant's diminished mental capacity does not, standing alone, make the defendant unfit to stand trial. [Citation.] Factors that are relevant for the trial court
to consider in assessing the existence of a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness include (1) the rationality of the defendant's behavior and demeanor at trial and (2) any prior medical opinions on the issue of the defendant's fitness. [Citations.]"
Additionally, "[e]vidence *** of extreme disruptive behavior and a sociopathic personality does not compel the conclusion that a bona fide doubt exists as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial." People v. Smith, 253 Ill.App.3d 948, 953, 625 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1993). Where no fitness hearing was held, a reviewing court will reverse a conviction and remand for further proceedings if the trial court abused its discretion by failing to act when a bona fide doubt existed regarding the defendant's fitness. See People v. Sandham, 174 Ill.2d 379, 389-91, 673 N.E.2d 1032, 103637 (1996). "An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would take the same view." People v. Vannote, 2012 IL App (4th) 100798, ¶ 24, 970 N.E.2d 72.
¶ 58 Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a fitness hearing because defendant has not shown that a bona fide doubt existed as to his fitness. Upon defense counsel's request, the court ordered a fitness evaluation when prompted by testimony from defendant's father indicating defendant had a history of mental illness. The resentencing hearing was continued until the report could be completed.
¶ 59 After the trial court reviewed Dr. Killian's report, it did not order sua sponte a fitness hearing because in the report, Dr. Killian opined defendant was fit. Specifically, the court found defendant (1) understood basic legal principles and the roles of the court and attorneys, (2) did not present with symptoms of psychosis or other mental disorders, and (3) his "insight into his current situations appear[ed] to be good, at least as far as the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him." As stated, defendant also acknowledged in his comments to Dr. Killian he had taken the sovereign citizens movement tactics too far and owed the court an apology, which showed defendant both understood his behavior was inappropriate and felt remorseful. Similarly, although defendant also requested Dr. Killian not use the name "Mr. McDuffie," Dr. Killian's report noted that this request was not indicative of a psychotic illness in this case. Dr. Killian made a similar finding as it relates to defendant's reference to the different flags.
¶ 60 The trial court was in the best position to observe defendant's demeanor and repeatedly found his disruptive behavior was not indicative of unfitness but instead a series of deliberate attempts to derail the proceedings. The record supports a finding there was no bona fide-in other words, genuine (see Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019))-doubt as to defendant's fitness. In the absence of a bona fide doubt, the court's decision not to sua sponte order a fitness hearing was not arbitrary or unreasonable, and therefore, no abuse of discretion occurred.
¶ 61 C. Pro Se Admonishments
¶ 62 Next, defendant argues the trial court erred when it allowed defendant to proceed pro se without ensuring his waiver of counsel was knowingly made and failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff July 1, 1984). The State argues defendant has forfeited this argument by failing to both contemporaneously object and raise the issue in a timely postsentencing motion. The State further asserts that even if the court excused defendant's forfeiture, the record shows defendant's waiver was knowingly made and the court complied with Rule 401. Defendant argues this issue is reviewable under the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d 177, 188, 840 N.E.2d 658, 665-66 (2005), and the plain error doctrine. We conclude the trial court substantially complied with Rule 401 and defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary.
¶ 63 Rule 401(a), which governs the waiver of a criminal defendant's right to counsel, provides as follows:
"(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court." Ill. S.Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. Jul. 1, 1984).
¶ 64 The purpose of Rule 401(a) is to ensure the defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to counsel is knowingly and intelligently made. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill.2d 204, 241, 673 N.E.2d 318, 335 (1996). Strict compliance with Rule 401 is not required, meaning defective Rule 401 admonishments do not, on their own, invalidate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. See People v. Wright, 2017 IL 119561, ¶ 41, 91 N.E.3d 826; Haynes, 174 Ill.2d at 236. Instead, "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 51, 123 N.E.3d 1060. Therefore, a reviewing court should look to the entire record in making that determination. Id.
¶ 65 Here, accepting as true defendant's assertion his claim is reviewable under Whitfield or the plain error doctrine, the record shows the trial court complied with Rule 401 and his waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. At defendant's guilty plea hearing, the court informed defendant of the nature of the charges against him, the minimum and maximum penalties, and that his sentences would be required to be served consecutively. Defendant was again advised of the nature of the charges, the potential penalties, and that his sentences were required to be served consecutively before the court accepted his admission to violating his probation. When defendant expressed his desire to proceed pro se at the postsentencing motions hearing, the court told defendant, "As far as the potential penalties, we talked about those previously. ***And so I will not be reminding you of those at this time because you previously have been made aware of those." Although the court did not state the nature of the charges or the potential penalties immediately prior to accepting defendant's waiver of counsel, the record shows defendant understood those facts when he was admonished in the prior proceedings and because he had already been sentenced. The court further admonished defendant, before accepting his waiver of counsel, that he had the right to an attorney, and because the court had already found defendant indigent, the court could appoint an attorney to represent him. Defendant indicated he understood. Defendant was admonished several times regarding (1) the nature of the offenses, (2) the potential penalties, and (3) his right to counsel. Although defendant claims on appeal he expressed "confusion" during the discussions regarding proceeding pro se, defendant had previously indicated on the record that he understood the charges, the potential penalties, and his right to counsel. Defendant further agreed no one had forced him or threatened him into waiving his right to counsel Accordingly, the court substantially complied with Rule 401 and defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary.
¶ 66 D. Failure to Appoint New Counsel
¶ 67 Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel to investigate defendant's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant asserts his pro se allegations showed Lewis's possible neglect of his case because Lewis failed to explain the consequences of his admission to violating probation, violated defendant's right to confidentiality, and did not investigate potential defenses.
¶ 68 When a criminal defendant raises pro se claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial court is to follow the procedures established by Krankel and its progeny. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11, 88 N.E.3d 732. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not automatically entitled to new counsel to investigate his claims. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29, 25 N.E.3d 1127. Instead, the "court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant's claim." People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 77-78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2003)." 'If the trial court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.'" Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29 (quoting Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 78). An ineffective assistance claim is meritless if it does not fall within the definition of ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Lawson, 2019 IL App (4th) 180452, ¶ 41, 139 N.E.3d 663. "To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was (1) deficient and (2) prejudicial." Id.
¶ 69 "The applicable standard of review depends on whether the trial court did or did not determine the merits of the defendant's pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98, 162 N.E.3d 223. "[I]f the trial court has properly conducted a Krankel inquiry and has reached a determination on the merits ***, we will reverse only if the trial court's action was manifestly erroneous." Id. "Manifest error is error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable." Id. Here, defendant does not contend the trial court's Krankel inquiry was improperly conducted, and the court reached a determination on the merits of the defendant's claims. Accordingly, we consider whether the court's decision not to appoint new counsel to investigate defendant's pro se claims was manifestly erroneous.
¶ 70 Here, the trial court found all of defendant's factual allegations against Lewis were either meritless or pertained to matters of trial strategy. We agree and address each claim in turn.
¶ 711. Failure to Explain Consequences of Admission Agreement
¶ 72 First, defendant claims Lewis" 'deceived'" him by failing to explain the nature and consequences of his admission to violating his probation. At the Krankel inquiry, defendant claimed the agreement was not "really thoroughly explained to [him] about what [he] had to do," and he "d[id]n't know what was going on." Lewis responded:
"I would indicate that I took quite a bit of time explaining the situation to him and how *** the newest case was being dismissed, and that the proceedings would be on his probation cases and what advantages would come from that. We had had a hearing where I think he had gone back and forth about whether going
pro se. But once I explained all of this to him, he agreed to the outcome and was willing to sign the document."
Lewis's response contradicted defendant's version of events and was supported by the record, which showed the parties discussed the admission agreement at length at the admission hearing. In the absence of a credible claim Lewis's performance was deficient, defendant failed to show possible neglect on this basis.
¶ 73 2. Keeping Defendant's Confidences
¶ 74 Next, defendant claims Lewis spoke to him about his case in the presence of the sheriff's deputy. At the Krankel inquiry, Lewis responded that no substantive conversations about the case occurred in front of the sheriff's deputy, explaining, "Discussions that were in the hallway, as the Court knows from day-to-day business, some discussions take place in the hallway back there. Those are pretty much left to be procedural on what's going to happen, what dates we are going to set and so forth." Defendant did not assert he and Lewis discussed more than scheduling or procedural matters in front of the sheriff's deputy. Under the facts presented, we conclude holding procedural and scheduling discussions for a defendant's case in the presence of the sheriff's deputy is not indicative of possible neglect.
¶ 75 3. Failure to Investigate
¶ 76 Finally, defendant claims Lewis failed to investigate a possible defense when he neglected to subpoena jail records showing his wife lied about the charges against him in case No. 20-CF-310. We conclude this claim is meritless because-even if such records existed and contained what defendant said they did-they would not have contradicted defendant's admission to violating his probation by resisting a peace officer. Moreover, it was also a matter of strategy because that case was to be dismissed in exchange for defendant's admission he violated his probation.
¶ 77 In sum, we agree with the trial court that none of defendant's ineffective assistance claims showed Lewis's possible neglect of the case because they were all meritless or pertained to matters of trial strategy. Accordingly, the court's decision not to appoint new counsel to investigate defendant's claims was not manifestly erroneous.
¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 79 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgments.
¶ 80 Affirmed.