Opinion
No. 1-13-2505-U
07-28-2014
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALTER MCDAVID, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
No. 11 CR 13201 01
Honorable Joseph M. Claps, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Connors concurred in the judgment.
Justice Delort specially concurred.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred in suppressing the defendant's statements on the basis that they were not knowing and voluntary, where he was first given his rights under Miranda, stated that he understood those rights, was accompanied by a concerned adult, and was not coerced or otherwise mistreated by the police or Assistant State's Attorney.
¶ 2 The State appeals from an order suppressing the statements of the defendant, Walter McDavid, age 16, on the basis that they were not knowingly and voluntarily given. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
¶ 3 The defendant was charged by indictment with committing various acts of sexual assault and abuse against his three-year-old niece, A.H. At the time of the alleged offenses, A.H. resided with the defendant and his mother, Lonetta Renee Smith, who was A.H.'s grandmother. In early July 2011, as a result of the charges, the defendant was placed in the residence of his maternal aunt, Georgeann Watt. On the afternoon of August 1, 2011, the defendant was arrested for the alleged offenses and was transported to the police department accompanied by Watt. While in custody, the defendant gave an oral statement to two police officers. Shortly thereafter, he was interviewed by an Assistant State's Attorney (ASA), and executed a written statement.
¶ 4 The defendant moved to suppress both statements on the basis that he did not have a full understanding of his Miranda rights. He further claimed that the police never attempted to contact Smith after his arrest, and that, in making the statements, he was influenced by Watt, who had conflicting interests because she was also the great-aunt of A.H.
¶ 5 At the hearing on the motion, the defendant offered his own testimony and that of Smith, and the State presented the testimony of Officer Mark DiMeo, one of the two officers who arrested and took a statement from the defendant. The evidence established that the defendant had turned 16 years old a week prior to the arrest, that he received very high grades in his high school, and that he was currently an honors student. Prior to the alleged offenses, he had never been arrested nor questioned by the police for any reason.
¶ 6 The defendant testified that, after he arrived at the youth office that afternoon, he was handcuffed to a bench for about 3 ½ hours before the two officers came in. He described the temperature in the room as cold, and stated that he felt "helpless, nervous, [and] sick." When he spoke with the officers, he was crying. The defendant admitted that, before the officers interviewed him, they read him each of his Miranda rights, and he told them that he understood
those rights. He testified, however, that he did not actually understand what his rights meant because he had "never been in this situation before." According to the defendant, he did not see Smith during this period and was not told whether she was at the station. The defendant first saw Smith about 7 p.m., when she came into the interview room and gave him something to eat. He denied being given the opportunity to speak with Smith prior to his statement to the ASA. The defendant testified that he did talk to Watt, however, and that Watt told him to speak to the officers. When asked if he felt he had any choice, the defendant responded "no," because Watt "was my aunt and I was raised by her mostly," meaning, "I had always been around her and I was brought up to respect my elders." He acknowledged that Watt was present during his Miranda warnings, but testified that he did not understand what any of the rights meant. On cross examination, the defendant acknowledged that he had the utmost respect for Watt, and that Watt told him to give a statement but did not instruct him on what to say. He further acknowledged that the officers offered him food and drinks while he was in custody, but he declined their offer.
¶ 7 On further examination by the court, the defendant testified that Watt was in and out of the room the entire time he was awaiting questioning, and was present during questioning. He also stated that he had told the officers that he understood his Miranda rights, even though he did not, because he felt he really did not have a choice.
¶ 8 Smith testified that, on the day of the defendant's arrest, Watt notified her at about 5 p.m. that he had been taken to the police station. Smith picked up food for the defendant and arrived at the station about 6 p.m., proceeding into the youth office where the defendant was being held. Smith found the defendant lying on a bench, not handcuffed, and accompanied by Watt. She attempted to speak with the defendant, but he did not respond. Smith testified that she was
unaware of what was happening, so Watt explained to her "what was questioned [and] what was said" and Smith became very upset, "to the point of an asthma attack." Smith denied telling anyone, including Watt, that she did not want to be present when the defendant was interviewed by the police, and testified that she was angry that the questioning had taken place in her absence. However, Smith also testified that, when the ASA then came in to take the defendant's written statement, she was present in the room, but walked out. According to Smith, Watt saw that she was upset, and she suggested that Watt should sit in for the statement since she had already been present for the detectives' questioning. At that point, Smith left the room. Smith denied that she was pressured to leave by the detectives or by the ASA.
¶ 9 Officer DiMeo testified that Watt was present when the officers arrived to make the arrest, that she accompanied the defendant to the station, and that she remained in the room during the initial statement. The defendant was handcuffed when brought into the office, but the cuffs had been removed by the time he was questioned. When the defendant first arrived, Officer DiMeo read him his Miranda rights and the defendant indicated he understood each right. The questioning lasted about 45 minutes, and the defendant answered each question "properly." Officer DiMeo testified that he did not coerce the defendant or promise him anything in exchange for his statement. During his initial statement, the defendant was visibly upset and crying. However, Officer DiMeo acknowledged that crying was not unusual even for adult suspects. Officer DiMeo advised the defendant that food or a drink was available to him and that he could use the bathroom if necessary.
¶ 10 According to Officer DiMeo, the defendant's mother was present at the station during the initial interview but chose to remain out of the room because it was too upsetting for her. He further testified that the defendant never asked to see his mother. On cross-examination,
however, Officer DiMeo admitted that, in his written report about the case, he had made no mention of the fact that Smith was present at the station during his interview or that he had conversed with her.
¶ 11 Officer DiMeo corroborated Smith's testimony that, when the ASA arrived at about 6:30 p.m., both Smith and Watt were in the room with the defendant. Smith then stated that she did not want to be present for the interview because she did not want to hear the topic of conversation.
¶ 12 Following arguments, the court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were involuntary. In its findings, the court noted that the defendant had just turned 16, had no prior involvement with the police, and had no youth officer present during his statements. The court rejected Officer DiMeo's testimony that Smith had been in the police station during the defendant's first statement, and concluded that the defendant's indication that he understood his Miranda rights, along with his statements to the police and to the ASA, were given solely because he was instructed to do so by Watt, who failed to properly inform him about his constitutional rights and ensure that he understood them. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied, and now appeals under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).
¶ 13 In reviewing the voluntariness of a juvenile confession, we afford great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Murdoch, 2012 IL 112362 ¶ 29, 979 N.E.2d 74; In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000). However, the ultimate question of whether the confession is voluntary, based upon an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, is subject to de novo review. Murdoch, 2012 IL 112362 ¶ 29; In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 49. The "totality
of the circumstances" test balances such factors as the juvenile's age, intelligence, background, experience, education, mental capacity, and physical condition at the time of questioning. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54. Additional factors include the length and legality of the detention and the duration of questioning, as well as any mental or physical abuse by the police, including the existence of threats or promises by the police to obtain the confession. Id. No single factor is dispositive. Id; see also People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 437, 758 N.E.2d 813 (2001).
¶ 14 In the case of confessions involving minors, the court has recognized an additional factor known as the "concerned adult" factor, which considers whether the juvenile, either before or during the interrogation, had an opportunity to consult with an adult interested in his welfare. In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d at 54-55. The presence of a "concerned adult" is especially significant where the juvenile has demonstrated trouble understanding the interrogation process, asks to speak with a "concerned adult," or where his parents are prevented by the police from speaking with him. Id. at 55. Further, the Juvenile Court Act requires that the arresting officer make a "reasonable attempt" to notify the minor's parent or the person with whom he resides regarding his arrest, and to take the minor to a juvenile officer without unnecessary delay. See 705 ILCS 405/5-405(2) (West 2010). However, the absence of a youth officer, parent, or other concerned adult, while a factor in assessing the voluntariness of the minor's statement, does not per se render the statement involuntary. In re G. O., 191 Ill.2d at 55; People v. Fuller, 292 Ill. App. 3d 651, 665 (1997).
¶ 15 In In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 56, the supreme court considered the factors that weighed against the admission of the minor's statement, including the respondent's young age (13 years old) and the fact that he had no previous contact or experience with the justice system. While the court acknowledged that the minor was not provided with an opportunity to confer with an adult,
the court noted that the minor never requested to do so and the police never frustrated any attempt by the minor's mother to confer with him. Id. The supreme court then considered the factors that weighed in favor of admission of the minor's statement, namely that: the minor's detention was valid, the police repeatedly informed the minor of Miranda and the minor stated that he understood those rights, the period of questioning was brief, and there was no evidence revealed no threats or promises. Id. The court acknowledged that "the taking of a juvenile's confession is a sensitive concern and that care must be taken to ensure that the confession is voluntary," but the court believed that the totality of the circumstances indicated that the respondent's confession was voluntary, and not the "result of compulsion or his will being overborne." Id. at 56-7.
¶ 16 Likewise, in this case, we cannot conclude that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were involuntary or the "result of compulsion or his will being overborne." We recognize the court's findings that he was barely 16 and had no prior experience with the justice system. However, he was also intelligent, a very good student, and was thoroughly apprised of his Miranda rights, which he professed he understood, prior to both statements. The record indicates that the period of questioning for each respective statement was less than one hour, that the defendant was unrestrained, and that he was accompanied by Watt, whom he testified that he respected and whom played a substantial role in his upbringing. Officer DiMeo testified that the defendant answered all questions "properly," and there is no argument here that he suffered confusion or undue stress during the interview process. His detention was legally justified, his physical needs were met, and his statements were not the product of promises, coercion, or deception (see People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996)).
¶ 17 The defendant places much reliance on the finding that the police made no effort to contact Smith or a juvenile officer prior to or during his initial interrogation. However, as stated above, the absence of a parent or juvenile officer alone is insufficient to render a juvenile's statement involuntary. Particularly where, as here, the defendant was accompanied by his custodial guardian throughout the interview process, and there was no indication that he was mistreated or frustrated in his efforts to see his mother. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that the defendant never requested to see Smith or another adult. Further, after spending time in the interview room with Smith, the defendant nonetheless proceeded with his statement to the ASA without objection, even after Smith left the room. Finally, for her part, Smith voluntarily left Watt to oversee the giving of the statement to the ASA, and denied being requested to leave by the police.
¶ 18 The defendant also argues that he felt pressure from Watt to make a statement to the police because he was raised to obey his elders. Further, he maintains that Watt failed to ensure that he properly understood his constitutional rights. Even assuming that Watt ultimately recommended that the defendant talk to the police, this does not mean that she never had a meaningful discussion with him about his predicament during the time they were together in the interview room. The fact that he gave an incriminating statement, standing alone, does not prove he was unaware of his rights, particularly where he was read each of his rights on more than one occasion. Further, there is no evidence that Watt harbored hostility or bias against the defendant or that she was motivated by anything other than his best interests. Thus, she adequately fulfilled the role of a concerned adult. Accordingly, considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court erred in determining that the defendant's statements were unknowing or involuntary.
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 20 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 21 JUSTICE DELORT, specially concurring:
¶ 22 In In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000), our supreme court considered a factual scenario almost identical to that presented here, and determined that the juvenile's statement should not be suppressed. Justice McMorrow dissented, noting that the "constellation of facts in the instant case does not demonstrate that G.O., under the totality of the circumstances, confessed either voluntarily or with an understanding of the consequences of his confession." Id. at 64 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow also determined that "[i]ndividuals of greater age and experience could find these same circumstances overwhelming and coercive. To a boy of G.O.'s youth and presumed naivete, these circumstances could be sufficiently overpowering as to raise a genuine doubt whether any confession made in this atmosphere would be the product of free will." Id. at 67 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). I believe Justice McMorrow's viewpoint is quite sound and more accurately represents how courts should analyze juvenile confessions. Therefore, I would be inclined to affirm the court below. However, because In re G.O. is binding on us under the principle of vertical stare decisis, we must allow the juvenile's statement and reverse the judgment below. I must therefore reluctantly join in the judgment and analysis set forth in the panel opinion. See O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (holding that lower courts must follow decisions of higher courts).