Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 07NF0709, Richard W. Stanford, Jr., Judge.
Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Susan Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SILLS, P. J.
Tyson Theodore Mayfield appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction, by a jury, of mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) and battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). The jury found not true a great bodily injury enhancement allegation attached to the battery count. Following a court trial, the court found true an allegation Mayfield had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and sections 667, subdivision (b)-(i) and 1170.12 (the “Three Strikes” law). Mayfield was sentenced to a total term of nine years: He received the two-year, low term for mayhem, which was doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
On appeal, Mayfield contends the trial court prejudicially misinstructed the jury by giving an instruction defining mayhem that omitted an essential element of the crime, namely that he inflicted great bodily injury. Mayfield claims this omission violated his right to due process and a fair trial as provided for under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the mayhem conviction. We find no merit in either contention and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
On September 26th, 2006, Robert Mejorada, met his girlfriend, Ashley Harutunian, at a gas station. The couple arrived in separate cars. As they were filling Harutunian’s car with gas, two men approached them. One of the men, Gary Tayles, asked the couple for change. The other man, Mayfield, walked by them and toward a nearby convenience store. The couple told Tayles they did not have any spare change, which upset Tayles. As Mejorada and Harutunian started to argue with Tayles, Mayfield returned from the convenience store and joined the argument. Mejorada told both men that the couple did not have spare change, and Harutunian told them she was going to call the police. The couple returned to their respective cars and waited for the police to arrive. Although it looked as though Mayfield and Tayles were going to leave the gas station, Mayfield walked back to Mejorada’s car and again asked for change. Mejorada again told Mayfield he did not have any change, and Harutunian yelled at Mayfield and told him that he needed to leave because she had called the police.
Mayfield began to walk away from Mejorada’s truck, but he turned around and walked back to the driver’s side door. Mejorada thought Mayfield wanted to talk so he opened the door. As Mejorada was getting out of his truck, Mayfield punched him five or six times in the head. The first punch cut Mejorada’s lip. As Mayfield punched Mejorada, Harutunian yelled out for help, and another man at the station came and pulled Mayfield away from Mejorada. Mayfield then fled from the station. After the police arrived and took a report, the couple drove to the emergency room where Mejorada received eight stitches for the cut on his lip. He returned a week later to have the stitches removed. During that week, Mejorada could not use his mouth normally, and he had difficulty chewing food, drinking beverages, talking, or smiling.
Mayfield, who was already in police custody on an unrelated matter when he was arrested for the current crimes, was subsequently charged with mayhem and battery in the attack on Mejorada.
II
DISCUSSION
Mayfield contends that the trial court’s instruction omitted an element of the offense of mayhem. Section 203 defines mayhem as follows: “Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.” The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 801, stating, “To prove that he is guilty of this charge, the People have to prove that the defendant caused serious bodily injury when he unlawfully and maliciously slit someone’s lip. And in the meaning of this instruction, a person is acting maliciously when they intentionally do a wrongful act or when they act with the unlawful intent to annoy or injure somebody else. And the term ‘serious bodily injury’ means serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include but isn’t limited to things like a wound which requires extensive surgery – or excuse me, suturing or a serious disfigurement.”
Citing People v. Brown (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 256 and People v. Hill (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1566, Mayfield argues the trial court erred by using the term “serious bodily injury” as opposed to “great bodily injury.” However, great bodily injury and serious bodily injury have been deemed to be analogous terms. (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831, disapproved on another point in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89; People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696-697; People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375-1376, People v. Moore (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1868, 1870-1872; People v. Kent (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 130, 136.) Here, the trial court’s use of the word “serious” effectively conveyed the concept of great bodily injury to the jury sufficiently for them to reach a verdict on the mayhem count.
Mayfield’s reliance on People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11 (Taylor) is misplaced. In Taylor, a jury found the defendant guilty of battery causing serious bodily injury, but at the same time rejected an allegation under section 12022.7 that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (Id. at p. 21.) For sentencing purposes, the trial court found that the defendant’s battery conviction was a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) because it established that he personally inflicted “great bodily injury” for purposes of that statute. (Id. at p. 22.) The Attorney General argued in Taylor that the defendant’s conviction for battery with serious bodily injury must be treated as a serious felony, and that the jury’s verdict absolving the defendant of causing “great bodily injury” under section 12022.7 must be disregarded. (Ibid.)
Applying the rule that “courts must make every effort to interpret a jury’s verdict as being consistent,” the Court of Appeal rejected the Attorney General’s position. (People v. Taylor, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 23-27.) However, the court stressed that its decision was rooted in the defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of whether his current offense constituted a serious felony, and the court specifically distinguished a jury finding from the purely legal determination of whether “serious bodily injury” and “great bodily injury” were equivalent. (Id. at pp. 24-27.) Moreover, the Taylor court specifically endorsed the premise of earlier cases that, in the absence of a contrary jury verdict, a court is “justified in applying the usual assumption that ‘great bodily injury’ and ‘serious bodily injury’ are ‘essentially equivalent.’” (Id. at p. 26, quoting People v. Moore, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1871.) Thus, Taylor is distinguishable because it merely held that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of a jury finding that a “serious bodily injury” is not a “great bodily injury” when determining if a current offense is a serious felony pursuant to section 1192.7, and that principle has no application in this case.
Pointing to the not true finding on the great bodily injury enhancement attached to the battery charge, Mayfield also argues that if the jury had been properly instructed that mayhem requires great bodily injury, it would have most likely acquitted him of that count. The fact the jury convicted Mayfield of mayhem, but found not true a great bodily injury enhancement related to a different count is irrelevant. Even assuming this constitutes an inconsistent verdict, “It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense.” (United States v. Powell (1984) 469 U.S. 57, 65; see also People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656.) A defendant “is given the benefit of [his] acquittal on the counts on which [he] was acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require [him] to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted.” (United States v. Powell, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 69.) Thus, contrary to Mayfield’s contention, the use of the word “serious” to describe the extent of Mejorada’s injuries did not remove an element of mayhem from the jury’s consideration.
Mayfield also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the mayhem conviction. When faced with such claims, an appellate court must review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party “‘to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 606.) Here, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict. According to Mejorada, the injury to his lip required eight stitches, two trips to the hospital, several days of impairment, and ultimately caused a scar on his face. Section 203 expressly states that an injury resulting in a slit lip constitutes mayhem, and there is no dispute that Mejorada suffered this type of injury when Mayfield punched him. Thus, sufficient evidence supports the mayhem conviction.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, J., FYBEL, J.