Opinion
Oct. 22, 1974.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 930
Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., David H. Zook, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for plaintiff-appellee.
Millen C. Clawson, P.C., Colorado Springs, for appellant.
VanCISE, Judge.
Vincent L. Rothe, d/b/a Brook Bail Bonds, appeals from a $2,500 judgment entered against him on a bail bond forfeiture. We affirm.
In July of 1972, Rothe posted bond in the amount of $2,500 for one Richard Allen Marshall then in jail and charged with possession and sale of a narcotic drug. On the date set for trial, September 22, Marshall entered a guilty plea to possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana. The plea was accepted and, without the written consent of Rothe, the bond was continued until November 10, 1972, for sentencing or other disposition.
Marshall, being sick and confined in the Air Force Academy hospital, failed to appear on that date, but Rothe was present. The court ordered the bond forfeited and issued a bench warrant and citation to the bondsman to show cause why judgment should not be entered on the bond. The matter was continued to November 22, and Marshall was still sick.
On that date, the court advised Rothe that Marshall had entered a guilty plea to one charge and asked whether he was willing to continue as surety on the bond. Rothe stated that he wanted to check his office records. The court then directed Rothe to inform the court in writing what he wanted to do. No answer, in writing or otherwise, was ever given in response to the court's request.
The matter was then put over to January 5, 1973. Again Marshall failed to appear for sentencing. Thereafter, following a hearing, judgment was entered against Rothe in the amount of the bond.
Conditions of the bond signed by Rothe were:
Rothe claims that the continuation of the above bond without his written consent after acceptance of the guilty plea and before sentencing was contrary to Colo.Sess.Laws
1972, Ch. 44, at page 209, enacting 39--4--201 which provides that:
He contends that he was no longer liable on the bond and that the judgment thereon cannot be sustained. We do not agree.
The bail bond is a contract and is subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts generally. 8 Am.Jur.2d Bail and Recognizance s 59; See U.S. v. Jackson, 465 F.2d 964; U.S. v. Kelley, 38 F.R.D. 320. The bond itself bears the written consent of the surety Rothe, covers the period following conviction to and including 'the final sentence or order of the Court,' and therefore complies with the statute, if it is applicable. There is nothing in the bond calling for separate consents at various stages in the proceedings.
Judgment affirmed.
RULAND and KELLY, JJ., concur.