Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 06F08729
RAYE , J.Defendants Rudy Mamaril and Murray Stanford were accused of conspiracy to sell rock cocaine (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) between September 23, 2006, and October 3, 2006. Mamaril was alleged to have two prior convictions under the “three strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and to have served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Stanford was alleged to have a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), six strikes (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The information alleged five overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy “on or about and between September 23, 2006, and October 3, 2006”: (1) Stanford directed Mamaril to “pick up his work (cocaine base aka rock cocaine)”; (2) Mamaril picked up cocaine base for Stanford; (3) Mamaril brought cocaine base to Taneshia Carter; (4) Stanford called Carter from jail and discussed selling cocaine base; and (5) Carter sold cocaine base for Stanford.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
A jury convicted defendants of conspiracy. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury then found true the strike and prison prior allegations against Mamaril. The trial court sentenced him to 26 years to life in state prison (25 years to life under the three strikes law on the present offense and one year, to be served consecutively, for one of the prior prison terms; sentence on the other prior prison terms was stayed).
In a separate bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that the prison prior allegations against Stanford constituted a single enhancement, and the remaining prior conviction allegations were true. After denying Stanford’s motions for a new trial and to strike prior convictions, the court sentenced him to 29 years to life in state prison (25 years to life under the three strikes law on the present offense; three years, to be served consecutively, for the prior drug conviction; and one year, to be served consecutively, for the prior prison term).
Defendants contend that insufficient evidence supports their convictions because the testimony of Taneshia Carter, an accomplice, was not corroborated. Stanford additionally contends that two of the five alleged overt acts in support of the conspiracy were improperly pled because they went to the formation of the purported agreement, not to its execution. Mamaril additionally contends (1) the trial court erred by staying, rather than striking, sentence on two prior prison terms, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike one of his two strikes. Each defendant joins in the other’s contentions so far as they benefit him.
Agreeing with Mamaril that the trial court could not properly stay sentence on two of his prior prison terms, we shall remand the matter with directions that the court either impose sentence on those terms or strike them. In all other respects, we shall affirm defendants’ convictions and sentences.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Case
The prosecutor asserted the following in his opening statement.
Defendants and Taneshia Carter, who had pled guilty to the crime charged here, jointly schemed to sell rock cocaine. Stanford (also known as “Sneak”), in jail and expecting transfer to prison, devised the scheme to raise money for his prison account. Mamaril, an old friend, and Carter, a street-level dealer, were to sell drugs obtained from other Stanford associates, put a share of the proceeds on his books, and keep the rest. The conspirators discussed and implemented the scheme through coded conversations, which Carter and an investigating officer would translate for the jury. Mamaril and Carter obtained and sold drugs in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The jury did not learn that only Carter visited Stanford in jail because Mamaril, under investigation along with Stanford on an unrelated homicide, was not allowed to do so.
Carter’s Testimony
Carter testified that she was arrested for conspiracy to sell rock cocaine on October 5, 2006. She had passed counterfeit checks in 2002 and had appropriated money to pay bills in 2005. In return for pleading guilty and testifying truthfully, she had been promised a maximum sentence of one year in county jail and five years of probation.
This arrest was not for the conspiracy charged in this case.
Carter met Stanford in September 2006 while selling rock cocaine on Nina Way in Sacramento County. By the time of his arrest, they were “together.”
As a drug seller, Carter had learned terms used in the business. For example, rock cocaine was “work,” an ounce was a “zip,” and a thousand dollars was a “rack.”
After his arrest on September 23, 2006, Stanford called Carter from jail. Between September 23 and October 5, she visited him there three times and they spoke on the telephone more than five times. Knowing that jail conversations were recorded, they often used coded language.
Carter did not know Mamaril well before September 23. After that date, they spoke often in person and on the telephone. She called him to relay messages from Stanford or to get drugs. Sometimes she would simultaneously speak to Stanford on her cell phone and Mamaril on her home phone.
Carter promised Stanford that when she sold drugs for him, she would put half of the proceeds on his books. However, she was arrested before she could do so; all she ever put on his books was one dollar, which allowed her to check his balance.
Between September 23 and October 3, Mamaril twice delivered uncut chunks of rock cocaine to Carter’s home without charge, which she cut up and sold. She thought it was Stanford’s and that he had arranged for Mamaril to give it to her. Mamaril said he got it from “Maresha” in “apartment two” on Nina Way, a former girlfriend of Stanford whom Carter had met when selling drugs there.
The first time Mamaril delivered drugs to Carter, he also wrote a note for her to take to Stanford, asking the others to call him “Relative” in conversations. Since the note was too large to show openly at the jail, she tore off a piece and copied the note out on it. After showing the copy to Stanford, she swallowed it. But she forgot to dispose of the original, which was found at her apartment after her arrest.
Carter also obtained rock cocaine from “LV” at Stanford’s direction. She called LV three times between September 23 and October 5, 2006; she also relayed messages between LV and Stanford. LV delivered the drugs, which Carter then sold, at a rendezvous designated by Stanford.
The Recorded Conversations
The People played the taped jail conversations, with transcripts furnished to the jury, and Carter testified about their contents.
The People also put Carter’s cell phone records in evidence, and she identified the numbers called. All explanations of terms in this section are Carter’s.
According to Carter, in the first recording, from the morning of September 23, 2006, Stanford and Mamaril said “the little broad in apartment two” (Maresha) had Stanford’s “work” (rock cocaine). Stanford said his wife, Rose, had gone to get it but failed.
Stanford later told Carter during a jail visit that Mamaril would get the “work” from Maresha.
Later that morning, Stanford spoke to his wife and Maresha as well as to Mamaril and Carter. Mamaril told Stanford: “Blood, I put all your shit on your books. Just tell me. Hey, Rose trying to get your shit, Blood, too.” (“Shit” here meant rock cocaine.) When Stanford’s wife came on the line, he told her: “[M]y home boy got my shit.” Later, Maresha came on the line. Stanford also talked about calling LV. Someone spoke of “keeping somebody on line,” which meant “[t]o keep them supplied with dope.” Someone used the term “knock all that down”; this meant “[t]o cut [the dope] down.” Stanford said “give him the nine and the other big pieces”; this meant a nine-millimeter gun and pieces of rock cocaine. Someone said “dump it for me”; this meant to “get rid of it, to sell it.” Mamaril said “just watch what you put on this”; this meant “[w]atch what you say over the phone.”
In the next recording, a jail call from Stanford to Carter on September 24, he spoke of Mamaril as his brother and as “road dog,” meaning “[a] really good friend.” He said, “little brother is going to pick up his shit,” meaning Stanford’s dope.
In the next recording, also from September 24, Stanford, Mamaril, and Carter were all on the line, with Stanford on Carter’s cell phone and Mamaril on Carter’s home phone. Carter asked Mamaril if he was a “success” (i.e., whether he had picked up the drugs from Maresha); he said he was. Carter gave Mamaril her home phone number.
In the next recording, also on September 24, Stanford told Carter that Mamaril was “going to knock all that down for me, put money on [my] books” (i.e., sell drugs to put money on his books). Stanford said that when he got to “Tracy,” he would need $90.
In the next recording played, from September 23, Stanford told Carter that after Mamaril “drop me off” (i.e., sell the rock cocaine), he would put $50 on her cell phone so that she could continue to receive Stanford’s calls. Carter testified that she cautioned Stanford to call Mamaril “Relative,” as he had instructed.
In the next recording played, from September 24, Carter asked Stanford if LV was his “connect,” meaning his drug supplier. Stanford said yes, but “that person’s strange at times” -- meaning “[s]ometimes he’ll come through and sometimes he won’t.”
In the next recording played, also from September 24, Stanford told Carter that “Rudy went and got all that shit.” He added, “that’s my money for him to... twist,” which meant “[t]o sell it and to re-up,” i.e., “[t]o buy some more and then flip it again,” i.e., to split the proceeds down the middle, one-half to buy and sell more drugs, and one-half as profit. Stanford said Mamaril was “going to blast it to me on my books,” (i.e., “to put money on his books”) and then to “have... you [Carter] blast him some shit” (i.e., to bring her some dope).
In the next recording, from a jail visit by Carter on September 25, she told Stanford that she had talked to “Relative” that day. She held up her copy of Mamaril’s note against the glass for Stanford to read.
In the next recording, from the same visit, Stanford said to tell “Relative” that Stanford needed the money as soon as possible. (Carter testified that she let Mamaril know that Stanford “needed the $300 put on his books before he went to the pen.”)
In the next recording, from a jail visit on September 25, Stanford asked Carter about the “junk,” meaning the rock cocaine. He asked whether someone (i.e., Mamaril) “went and picked it up.”
In the next recording, from the same visit, Carter told Stanford that whatever money he got, the prison authorities would take something out for restitution. Stanford told her to tell Mamaril to “blast” the “money and shit” (dope) to her as soon as possible. Then he said: “[T]ell that fool I know he can’t do it though” -- i.e., Mamaril could not put the money on Stanford’s books; therefore, Mamaril should bring it to Carter so that she could. According to Stanford, “it should be like two [i.e., $200] and some change.” She was to put that sum on his books, except for $50 to put on her phone.
In the next recording, a phone conversation from September 28, Stanford told Carter to “[b]op down” -- i.e., to cut the dope. Carter said Mamaril “gave me some work and I got most of it done” -- i.e., he gave her some dope and she sold most of it. However, he didn’t give her everything Maresha had given him, but only what he had on him at the time; he had told Carter that he was at work when she called him before and she should call back when she needed more. She said Mamaril had given her “maybe like a bill if that” -- i.e., worth $100 or less. Some was “bopped down,” but she had “chopped some of it down a little bit.” Finally, she told Stanford she was going to put $40 on his books from her proceeds.
In the next recording, also from September 28, she repeated that Mamaril had not given her everything he had. Stanford confirmed that Mamaril had picked up more than he gave her. Carter said she “need[ed] to get the last couple off” -- i.e., to sell the last few pieces.
In the next recording, from the same date, Stanford again told Carter to tell “the homey” (Mamaril) that Stanford wanted at least $300 on his books when they sent him to “the pen.” Stanford said to tell him “if there’s any way possible to try to help, you know, make that happen.”
In the next recording, a jail call on September 29, Carter was simultaneously speaking to Stanford and to a customer, trying to sell him drugs she had gotten from Mamaril. Stanford asked her if she got “the rest of that junk from him then” -- i.e., the rest of the dope from Mamaril. He asked if she had “talked to him about the money situation” -- i.e., Stanford’s need for $300 on his books. Later, Mamaril came into the conversation; she spoke to him on her house phone and to Stanford on her cell phone. Mamaril wanted Carter to tell Stanford to stay positive; Stanford said, “tell Blood I love him.” After Mamaril hung up, Carter told Stanford that Mamaril had not given her the rest of “that stuff” (the drugs).
In the next recording, a jail call later that day, Carter interrupted Stanford with “Relative” as he was about to say Mamaril’s name. Carter promised to put money on Stanford’s books on Tuesday. Stanford told her to “flip” the rest of the drugs she had (i.e., use the sale proceeds to buy more drugs). He asked her if she knew how to “bop it down” (i.e., cut it down). Then he asked her to call LV; she did so on her house phone.
Stanford told Carter to let LV know she was calling for “Sneak.” Stanford then told her to tell LV that Stanford needed “like a dollar/25 [sic]” (i.e., $125 worth of rock cocaine, or a quarter-ounce or “quay”) -- i.e., LV should furnish her that amount gratis. At Stanford’s request, Carter told LV that she was Stanford’s “woman.” Stanford asked her to ask LV “when will it be possible for... you to come pick up so you can put everything together for me” -- i.e, when could she come pick up the drugs from LV? LV wanted to know whether to give her the “bill” or the “other” (i.e., money or drugs). She told Stanford she preferred “the other.” It was agreed that this would happen the next day. (However, she could not be sure about which day it happened, only about where they met.)
Stanford told her to put some of the “other little change” (the drug sale proceeds) on her phone, to keep some for herself, and to buy her son something. He said “it don’t stop because [the ‘N’ word] got popped” (i.e., his drug-selling business did not stop because he was in jail). He added: “[H]er dip set [a private nickname for Stanford] is still handling” (i.e., still at it). He urged her to “make sure tomorrow go get that, do not be playing” (i.e., be sure to get the drugs). He advised her to call LV around 10:00 or 10:30 a.m. to set up the meeting. He assured her that LV “fucks with it and he’s going to make sure it’s right” -- i.e., that LV also sells dope and he would make sure to give her a good amount. She replied, “we’re trying to eat” (i.e., make our money). LV provided her a chunk of rock cocaine without charge. She cut it down and sold it.
In the next recording, from a jail call on October 1, Carter and Stanford discussed her coming transaction with LV. He told her to make sure LV put money on his phone so Stanford could call him.
In the next recording, from the same date, Stanford asked if Carter had been “back on the turf” (i.e., Nina Way). She said she would go there that night.
In the next recording, from the same date, Carter told Stanford that she had brought her drug-processing equipment to work so she could cut up the drugs from LV as soon as she got them. Stanford said it “should be [a] quay” (i.e., a quarter-ounce).
In the next recording, from the same date, Stanford asked Carter whether she was “re-up[ping]” (buying more drugs) with the $60 he had said she could keep. She said she had.
In the next recording, a jail call on October 2, Stanford told Carter again to “hit the homey and make sure you get to Relative,” whose “assistance” he was going to need “in all ways”; he needed to “go to the penta” with “at least three.”
In the last recording, a jail call on October 3 following a visit, Carter said she had set drug proceeds aside to put on Stanford’s books, but then discovered that someone had stolen $500 from her account by purloining her county-issued welfare “electronic benefits card.” However, she still had $200 and unsold rock cocaine from Mamaril. Stanford told her to “knock[] off the little sack” -- i.e., sell the remaining dope. She said she had already sold it. He also told her to take the $200 and “get a zip [or zipper] from LV” -- i.e., an ounce of rock cocaine. A “zip” went for $500 on the streets, but he was sure LV would give it to her for $200. He said “you can damn near make a rack” (i.e., $1,000) by cutting it into smaller-than-usual pieces. (According to her testimony, she followed Stanford’s instructions, got drugs from LV, and immediately sold them in Oak Park.)
Other Prosecution Evidence
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Sergeant Jose Whitfield, an undercover narcotics investigator, called Carter on October 5, 2006, to arrange a drug deal, saying “Sneak” had given him her name. Using common street terms, he asked for a “zip” of “work” -- i.e., an ounce of rock cocaine. She referred him to Latoya Brown, with whom he set up a meeting. After Brown’s arrest, he searched Carter’s apartment, finding contraband and a handwritten note with a piece torn off (evidently the note left by Mamaril). Carter was then arrested.
He did not know about the conspiracy charged in this case. He had been told only that “Sneak” was Carter’s associate.
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Detective Jason Cvitanov interviewed Carter three times in custody. The first time, on October 6, 2006, they discussed only the case stemming from her arrest. The second time, on the same date, she spoke “[a] little bit” about the conspiracy involving defendants. On March 19, 2007, in her last interview with Detective Cvitanov, she still talked about the conspiracy only a “little bit.” However, on the same date, she spoke about it in depth with a drug expert in the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Sergeant Aaron Tarver.
At some point, unknown to Carter, Detective Cvitanov began to review her recorded conversations. By the time of trial, he had heard them all. When he listened to them, he thought the speakers were talking about selling drugs: “[I]n my experience and with the words being used and the codes being used, um, it was pretty easy to figure out.”
Sergeant Tarver had ten years of experience in the department’s narcotics division, including three years as an undercover officer buying and selling drugs on the street. In that time, he learned the code language of street-level drug dealers, particularly rock cocaine dealers. He had listened to the recorded conversations in this case.
In the course of his training and experience, before this case Sergeant Tarver had heard the terms “work,” meaning rock cocaine, at least 20 times; “zip,” meaning an ounce of narcotics, at least 50 times; and “rack,” meaning a thousand dollars, at least 20 times. He had also heard the terms “keep somebody on line,” meaning to keep someone supplied with drugs for sale; “shit” and “junk,” meaning narcotics; “bill,” meaning money; “bop down,” meaning to break a chunk of narcotics into smaller pieces; “flip it,” meaning to take the money from drug sales and buy more drugs; “connect,” meaning drug supplier; and “nine,” meaning a nine-millimeter handgun.
The recorded conversations were played again during Tarver’s testimony. Based on his training and experience and on his work in investigating this case, Tarver opined that the conversations were about drug dealing. Although Carter had defined the key terms for him, he already knew their meanings independently.
Defense Case
Defendants posited through cross-examination, argument, and the testimony of Carter’s ex-cellmates that (1) the recorded conversations were ambiguous, and (2) Carter’s explanations could not be believed because she had progressively changed her story and was generally not credible. However, defendants did not attempt to explain what the conversations were about if not drugs. Neither defendant testified.
In closing argument, Mamaril’s counsel asserted that Carter’s testimony was uncorroborated: the conversations did not corroborate her because she interpreted them to begin with and the officers merely echoed her, and no other objective evidence showed that defendants had conspired to commit any crime.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendants argue again that because Carter was an accomplice and her testimony was uncorroborated, their convictions must be reversed. They also argue that no evidence aside from Carter’s testimony showed that they committed any of the alleged overt acts. We disagree.
Standard of Review
In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we ask whether, when viewing the evidence (including the reasonable inferences from it) most favorably to the prosecution, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence -- that is, whether a rational trier of fact could have found the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)
Conspiracy
“Criminal conspiracy is an offense distinct from the actual commission of a criminal offense that is the object of the conspiracy.” (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 416 (Morante).) Therefore, the People do not have to prove that the defendants committed the crime that was the object of the conspiracy. (Id. at pp. 416-417.)
The People must prove that the defendant and another person specifically intended to agree or conspire to commit an offense, including its elements, and that at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was done by one or more of the parties to the agreement. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1131, 1134.) However, they do not have to prove that any particular conspirator committed any particular overt act, because “‘“‘the act of one [conspirator] is the act of all.’”’ [Citations.]” (Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 417.)
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 415 that the People had to prove as to each defendant:
“1. The defendant intended to agree and did agree with the other defendant or Taneshia Carter to sell, furnish, transport or offer to sell, furnish, transport or attempt to sell, furnish or transport cocaine base;
“2. At the time of the agreement, the defendant and the other alleged members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would sell, furnish, transport or offer to sell, furnish, transport or attempt to sell, furnish or transport cocaine base;
“3. One of the defendants or Taneshia Carter committed at least one of the following overt acts to sell, furnish, transport, or offer to sell, furnish or transport or attempt to sell[,] furnish or transport cocaine base: on or about and between September 23, 2006 and October 3, 2006: Overt act 1: Murray Stanford directed Rudy Mamaril to pick up his work; Overt act 2: Rudy Mamaril picked up cocaine base for Murray Stanford; Overt act 3: Rudy Mamaril brought cocaine base to Taneshia Carter; Overt act 4: Murray Stanford called Taneshia Carter from jail and discussed selling cocaine base; Overt act 5: Taneshia Carter sold cocaine base for Murray Stanford;
“AND
“4. At least one of these overt acts was committed in California.”
Accomplice Law
“Section 1111 provides, in pertinent part, that ‘a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.’ In People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756 at page 769 [], this court reviewed the standard by which the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is to be measured: ‘To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must produce independent evidence which, without aid or assistance from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged. [Citation omitted.] “The evidence need not corroborate the accomplice as to every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does not require interpretation and direction from the testimony of the accomplice yet tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense is such a way as reasonably may satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the crime but it is not nece[s]sary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged.” [Citations omitted.]... “[T]he corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.” [Citations omitted.]’ (Accord, People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 27 [].)” (People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1206 (Bunyard); accord, People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 541.) Corroborating evidence may be entirely circumstantial (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1271; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1128 (Rodrigues)) and “‘“slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone[]” [Citations.]’” (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 534-535, quoting People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 100). “‘Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it substantiates enough of the accomplice’s testimony to establish his credibility [citation omitted].’ [Citation.]” (Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1206-1207, italics added; accord, Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 335:
“If the crime of conspiracy with intent to sell, or furnish, or transport cocaine base was committed, then Taneshia Carter was an accomplice to that crime.
“You may not convict the defendants of conspiracy with intent to sell cocaine base based on the testimony of an accomplice alone. You may use the testimony of an accomplice to convict the defendants only if:
“1. The accomplice’s testimony is supported by other evidence that you believe;
“2. That supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s testimony;
“AND
“3. That supporting evidence tends to connect the defendants to the commission of the crime.
“Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough, by itself, to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it does not need to support every fact about which the witness testified. On the other hand, it is not enough if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.
“The evidence needed to support the testimony of one accomplice cannot be provided by the testimony of another accomplice.
“Any testimony of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however, arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that testimony the weight you think it deserves after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.”
Mamaril cites former CALJIC No. 3.12, which stated in part: “In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” (CALJIC (Fall 2006 ed.) p. 113, italics added.) The current instruction, with which defendants do not quarrel, tells the jurors the same thing in terms of “supporting” evidence (rather than “remaining” evidence), without also telling them to go through the mental gymnastics of trying to disregard the chief evidence in the case.
Stanford’s Arguments
Stanford asserts that insufficient evidence supports his conviction because: (1) overt acts numbers 1 and 4 (Stanford directed Mamaril to pick up his “work”; Stanford called Carter from jail and discussed selling cocaine base), even if proved, “simply involved the alleged agreement or plan to sell cocaine base[,]” not acts in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (2) the only evidence as to overt acts numbers 2, 3, and 5 (Mamaril picked up cocaine base for Stanford; Mamaril brought cocaine base to Carter; Carter sold cocaine base for Stanford) was the uncorroborated testimony of Carter. We are not persuaded.
To take these arguments in reverse order, Carter’s testimony was not uncorroborated. It was strongly corroborated by the conspirators’ recorded conversations and by the investigating officers’ opinions, including definitions of the conversations’ key terms independently derived from the officers’ training and experience, that the conversations concerned drug dealing; it was also corroborated by the fact that a note fitting Carter’s description of the note left by Mamaril was found in her apartment. Corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony need not confirm every point therein: it need only “‘“substantiate[] enough of the accomplice’s testimony to establish his credibility [citation omitted].”’” (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1128, quoting Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1206-1207.) The recordings showed a consistent pattern of conduct by defendants and Carter over the period alleged in the information, which jibed with her narrative. The officers’ opinions corroborated Carter’s accounts of the conversations and their terminology. Lastly, Mamaril’s note was physical evidence that bore out Carter’s testimony on that point and helped tie him into the conspiracy. Thus, this evidence collectively established Carter’s credibility. This was sufficient corroboration.
Stanford asserts that the People did not produce physical evidence of any rock cocaine bought or sold, the testimony of Maresha or anyone else who provided the drug to Carter or bought it from her, eyewitness testimony as to such sales, or evidence that Carter actually put money on Stanford’s books. However, in light of the evidence we have set out above, such additional evidence was not needed to corroborate Carter’s testimony. And whether Carter put money from drug sales on Stanford’s books is irrelevant because a conspiracy is distinct from the offense at which it aims. (Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 416-417.)
Because Stanford concedes that overt acts 2, 3, and 5 properly alleged acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and Carter’s testimony, which described the parties’ acts, was corroborated, we need not decide whether overt acts 1 and 4 also constituted acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Mamaril’s Arguments
Mamaril asserts there is no evidence he entered into an agreement to commit the charged object of the conspiracy with the specific intent to do so. We are not persuaded.
Construing the evidence most favorably to the judgment, at Stanford’s behest Mamaril agreed to pick up drugs from at least one person who was holding them for Stanford and to deliver them to Carter, and thereafter did so. The jury could reasonably have inferred that Mamaril acted thus with the specific intent of furthering Stanford’s scheme -- especially since the record does not suggest any other reason why Mamaril would have agreed to get illegal drugs from an acquaintance of Stanford and pass them on gratis to another acquaintance of Stanford whom Mamaril knew to be a dealer in such drugs. Finally, the jury could have inferred from Mamaril’s insistence on being called “Relative” by Carter and Stanford in conversations likely to be recorded that he was a full and sophisticated participant in their scheme, since no other reason for this subterfuge appears.
Mamaril also asserts that there is insufficient evidence he performed any of the alleged overt acts. However, this claim depends on the erroneous premise that Carter’s testimony, which ascribed several overt acts to him, was uncorroborated. In any event, the People did not need to prove that he personally did any particular overt act: if he participated in the conspiracy, any act done by his coconspirators became his act as a matter of law. (Morante, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 417.) Therefore we need not further discuss Mamaril’s specific contentions under this heading.
Conclusion
Defendants’ claim of insufficient evidence fails.
II
Mamaril contends that the trial court could not lawfully stay the imposition of sentence on two of his three prior prison terms, which should be stricken instead. The People agree that the trial court lacked authority to stay the terms, but contend that it could properly either have stricken them or imposed sentence on them. Agreeing with the People, we shall remand the matter for resentencing with directions that the trial court exercise its discretion as to the prior prison terms.
As noted above, the jury found true all three prior prison term allegations as to Mamaril. (§ 667.5, subd. (b) (hereafter § 667.5(b).) The trial court imposed a consecutive one-year term for the first of those priors but purported to stay the other two. This was an unauthorized sentence.
“Section 667.5(b) provides for an enhancement of the prison term for a new offense of one year for each ‘prior separate prison term served for any felony,’ with an exception not applicable here.... Once the prior prison term is found true within the meaning of section 667.5(b), the trial court may not stay the one-year enhancement, which is mandatory unless stricken.” (People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241 (Langston), italics added.)
Because the trial court lacked authority to stay sentence on Mamaril’s second and third prior prison terms, we shall remand the matter with directions that the court resentence in keeping with Langston, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1241. If the court exercises its discretion to strike any mandatory prior prison term enhancement, it shall provide a statement of reasons for doing so. (§ 1385, subds. (a), (c)(1); People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 368.)
III
Mamaril contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request under section 1385 to strike his 1992 robbery conviction in the interest of justice. Anticipating that we might find the issue forfeited because trial counsel acknowledged that defendant “did not fall strictly within the guidelines of People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and People v. Williams (1988) 17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams),” defendant further contends that this concession was ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion and counsel was not ineffective.
Counsel argued that the trial court should strike Mamaril’s 1992 robbery conviction, thus reducing his record for sentencing purposes from two strikes to one, because he played a smaller role in the present offense than did Stanford or Carter; to imprison him for 25 years to life would be disproportionate to his conduct and would constitute disparate treatment compared to Carter’s one-year sentence. Instead, the court should impose the upper term, doubled for Mamaril’s remaining strike, and enhance the sentence for his prior prison terms, producing a total term of eight or nine years.
The prosecutor replied that Mamaril was a longtime constant lawbreaker who violated parole every time he obtained it.
The trial court denied the request to strike the prior strike, finding (1) Mamaril, now 37 years old, had been out of custody only briefly in the last 17 or 18 years; (2) every time he got out on parole, he would immediately violate parole and go back to prison; (3) though he had somehow obtained a full-time job, he allowed himself to be drawn into Stanford’s scheme; and (4) as defense counsel had admitted, there was no basis for a Romero motion because Mamaril fell “squarely within the zone of three strikes.”
When the trial court exercises its discretion not to strike a prior strike, we will reverse for abuse of discretion only if the defendant shows that the court’s decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) In this context, that could mean only that the court was not aware of its discretion to strike a strike or used impermissible factors in refusing to do so. (Id. at p. 378.) The court may properly strike a strike only if it finds that the defendant is outside the spirit of the three strikes law, which would be a truly extraordinary finding where the defendant is a career criminal. (Ibid.; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
Mamaril has not shown that the trial court lacked awareness of its discretion or used impermissible factors in making its ruling. Instead, he asserts that because another trial court exercised its discretion to strike a strike in another case on dissimilar facts, it must have been arbitrary and irrational for the court to refuse to do so here. This conclusion simply does not follow.
Likewise, Mamaril offers no reason why he should be found outside the spirit of the three strikes law. He asserts that he had “demonstrated an intent to turn his life around” because he was employed and “in compliance with his parole.” However, the trial court noted that Mamaril was employed, yet fell right back into his recidivist habits as soon as his old friend and fellow career criminal sought him out. And to claim that he was in compliance with his parole at the very time he was conspiring to sell rock cocaine is self-evidently absurd.
Finally, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a Romero/Williams argument. As the trial court found, such an argument would plainly have been insupportable. Trial counsel need not make meritless arguments merely to avoid being called ineffective by appellate counsel. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1038.)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for resentencing as to Mamaril in accordance with our directions in part II of the Discussion. In all other respects, defendants’ convictions and sentences are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON , Acting P.J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.