Opinion
D058719 Super. Ct. No. SCD194246
02-07-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LEE ROY LYNCH, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Theodore M. Weathers, Judge. Affirmed.
Lee Roy Lynch shot his girlfriend in the chest. When the girlfriend recovered, hey moved to Arizona and married. About five years and four months after the shooting, Lynch was arrested and charged with attempted murder (count 1) and several other felonies arising from the shooting (counts 2 through 6). A jury convicted Lynch of the charged crimes, and the court sentenced Lynch to prison for 17 years.
This is Lynch's second appeal. In his first appeal, Lynch challenged his conviction on numerous grounds, including that the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motion to dismiss counts 2 through 6 as barred by the three-year limitations period. (People v. Lynch (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1262 (Lynch I).) We rejected each of these contentions, except that we remanded the case "to the trial court for the limited purpose of holding a hearing to determine whether Lynch's prosecution on counts 2 through 6 was time-barred." (Id. at p. 1265.) On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found Lynch's prosecution on these counts was timely because the statute of limitations was tolled while Lynch lived in Arizona. The court then reinstated the judgment as to counts 2 through 6.
In this appeal Lynch challenges the trial court's factual finding that he was outside California for a sufficient time to toll the limitations period. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual finding and affirm the order reinstating Lynch's conviction.
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURE
The underlying facts are detailed in Lynch I. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 1262.) In this opinion, we discuss only those facts relevant to the limitations issue.
A. Background
On December 8, 2001, Lynch shot his girlfriend, Latoya Younger, in the chest. Younger sustained life-threatening injuries, but survived the shooting. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1265-1266.) After she was released from the hospital, Lynch and Younger moved to Arizona and married. (Id. at pp. 1267, 1268.)
About four years and five months after the shooting, on May 8, 2006, the district attorney filed an information alleging Lynch committed attempted murder (count 1), assault with a firearm (count 2), corporal injury to a cohabitant (count 3), negligent discharge of a firearm (count 4), being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 5), and being a felon in possession of ammunition (count 6). (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1268-1269.) All of the counts were allegedly committed on December 8, 2001. (Id. at p. 1269.)
Although counts 2 through 6 are governed by a three-year limitations period (Pen. Code, § 801), the information did not include tolling or other allegations explaining the delay in filing the charges. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1269-1270, 1271.) Additionally, neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel raised the limitations issue at trial. (Id. at pp. 1269-1271.) Lynch testified at trial that he and Younger lived in Winslow, Arizona for about "a year and a half" after the shooting, but the record was unclear as to the actual dates that Lynch lived outside of California. (Id. at pp. 1268, 1270.) The jury convicted Lynch as charged. (Id. at p. 1269.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
At the hearing on his new trial motion, Lynch raised the issue for the first time that charges 2 through 6 were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, and requested that the court dismiss these counts. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1270-1271.) The court denied the motion. (Id. at p. 1271.)
Lynch appealed his conviction on various grounds, including that the prosecution of counts 2 through 6 was untimely. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1264-1265.) Lynch argued his conviction on these counts must be reversed because the information was untimely on its face and the prosecutor did not present evidence at trial supporting a tolling theory. (Id. at pp. 1269-1277.) In response, the Attorney General conceded that the charging document, on its face, showed counts 2 through 6 were outside the limitations period and that the timeliness issue can be raised at any time. (Id. at pp. 1265, 1269, 1271.) The Attorney General also acknowledged that the evidence at trial was unclear as to whether the limitations period was tolled. (Id. at pp. 1269, 1272.) The Attorney General, however, disagreed with Lynch's requested reversal remedy. The Attorney General instead urged this court to remand for a determination as to whether the statute was tolled for the period Lynch was out of the state. (Id. at pp. 1265, 1269.)
We agreed with the Attorney General's position. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275, 1278.) We relied on People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335. In Williams, the defendant had pled guilty, but on appeal argued for the first time that the information filed against him was untimely on its face. (Id. at p. 338.) The Court of Appeal found it was unable to determine from the record whether the prosecution was timely and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to make that determination. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if "the court cannot determine from the available record whether the action is barred, it should hold a hearing or, if it is an appellate court, it should remand for a hearing." (Id. at p. 341.)
We rejected Lynch's arguments that his case was distinguishable from Williams and that the People had forfeited the opportunity to litigate the factual issues related to the statute of limitations. (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1273-1277.) We thus remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether counts 2 through 6 were prosecuted within the statute of limitations. (Id. at pp. 1277, 1278.) We also concluded that Lynch did not have a right to a jury trial on the statute of limitations question because he did not raise the issue until after he was convicted of the offense. (Id. at pp. 1275-1277.)
In our Disposition section, we stated: "Lynch's conviction for attempted murder is affirmed. The judgment with respect to counts 2 through 6 is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a determination as to whether the prosecution of counts 2 through 6 was time-barred. Following such determination, the court shall reinstate the judgment of conviction as to each timely count." (Lynch I, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.)
B. Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing on remand, the prosecutor argued that the charges on counts 2 through 6 were timely because: (1) Lynch committed the crimes on December 8, 2001; (2) on May 8, 2006, Lynch was arraigned on an information alleging these felony counts; (3) the governing limitations period required the prosecution to commence the case within three years from the date the crimes were committed; (4) although the time between the commission of the crimes and the arraignment was about four years and five months (17 months beyond the three-year statutory period), the limitations period was tolled for 22 months because Lynch lived in Arizona for this time period.
To support its argument that Lynch lived in Arizona for 22 months after committing the crimes, the prosecutor presented facts showing that Lynch lived in Winslow, Arizona from March 15, 2002 until June 30, 2003 (about 15 and one-half months) and he lived in Glendale, Arizona from June 30, 2003 through January 22, 2004 (about six and one-half months). This evidence was as follows.
First, the prosecutor presented a portion of Lynch's trial testimony in which Lynch said that after Younger was released from the hospital from her gunshot wound, the two moved in together behind her "granddaddy['s] house." Lynch said they then moved to Winslow, Arizona and stayed with Lynch's father for a few months. Lynch testified the two were then "able to get a place out there [in Arizona] of our own." Lynch said that they moved back to San Diego "[a]bout a year and a half" later as Younger did not like Arizona because "Everybody out there is my kinfolk. Small, little town. So she didn't have no freedom."
Second, the prosecutor called witness Clifford Renfro, who testified that in March 2002 he rented an apartment to Lynch and Younger in Winslow, Arizona. Renfro personally collected the rent each month and would generally see Lynch at those times. Lynch told Renfro he had a job in a nearby town, and Renfro sometimes saw Lynch coming home dressed in a manner consistent with having been at work. Renfro said that he knew that Lynch's father also lived in Winslow. On June 30, 2003, Renfro saw Lynch leaving the apartment in a U-Haul truck and Lynch told him he was moving out. Renfro checked the apartment and found several employment pay check stubs in Lynch's name.
Third, the prosecutor presented the testimony of a financial manager (Veronica Jimenez) of a large apartment complex in Glendale, Arizona. The financial manager authenticated a computer-generated document entitled "Resident Ledger," showing that Lynch (along with Younger and Younger's mother (Yvonne Pradd)) were the named tenants of an apartment unit at the Glendale apartment complex. The ledger shows that the "Move In" date was June 30, 2003 and the "Move Out" date was January 22, 2004. The ledger also shows the payment history for the unit, including that the rent was paid on Lynch's apartment unit for five months from June 30, 2003 through November 2003, and the account was sent to collections on January 27, 2004.
During cross-examination, Jimenez said she had no personal knowledge of when Lynch moved in or out of the apartment unit, and there was no information on the ledger as to who made the rental payments. She also stated it was possible that Lynch had moved out of the apartment and left his wife living there, but there was no indication in the records that this had occurred.
At the evidentiary hearing, Lynch did not present any affirmative evidence other than requesting the court take judicial notice of the probation report, but argued the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof.
After allowing the parties to submit written briefs and present oral argument, the court found the prosecution proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lynch lived in Arizona from March 15, 2002 until January 22, 2004. The court thus ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled for the 22-month period that Lynch was living in Arizona and thus counts 2 through 6 had been timely filed.
The court stated: "Four years and five months [after the crimes were committed], the defendant was arraigned on the information charging the defendant with attempted murder and various other crimes which occurred on December [8], 2001. [¶] This court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant left the state of California and resided in the state of Arizona from March 15, 2002, through January 22nd, 2004, a period of 22 months. [¶] During those 22 months, the defendant was outside of the State of California. Therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled for those 22 months. And the court finds that the charges in counts 2 through 6 were not time barred by the statute of limitations."
DISCUSSION
Lynch contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that counts 2 through 6 were filed within the statute of limitations.
I. Legal Principles
Under section 801, a three-year limitations period applies to the charges filed under counts 2 through 6 in this case. Under this statute, the case must be "commenced within three years" after the crime was committed, unless the time period is tolled. (§§ 801, 803.) For purposes of this case, the parties agree the case was "commenced" on the date the information was filed, May 8, 2006. (See § 804, subd. (a).) Under section 803, subdivision (d), the limitations period is tolled while "the defendant is out of the state when or after the offense is committed . . . ."
Section 803, subdivision (d) states: "If the defendant is out of the state when or after the offense is committed, the prosecution may be commenced . . . within the limitations of time prescribed by this chapter, and no time up to a maximum of three years during which the defendant is not within the state shall be a part of those limitations."
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The prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the criminal action was commenced within the applicable limitations period and/or that a statutory tolling period applies. (People v. Castillo (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 364, 369.) On appeal, we review the court's factual findings under the substantial evidence review standard. (Ibid.) Under this standard, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the finding belowto determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could [make the finding]." [Citation.]' [Citations.] 'Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] We ' " 'presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942-943.)
II. Analysis
On the record before it, the trial court had a reasonable basis to conclude the matter was timely filed because the evidence showed Lynch lived outside of California for at least 20 months between the time he committed the offenses and the time he was arraigned on the charges.
The testimony of Lynch's landlord (Renfro) in Winslow, Arizona supported that Lynch lived in Winslow from March 15, 2002 until June 30, 2003, approximately 15 and one-half months. Renfro testified he had personal knowledge that Lynch moved into the apartment on March 15, 2002, and he would see Lynch every month when rent was collected. Renfro saw Lynch move out on June 30, 2003, leaving in a U-Haul truck. Additionally, Renfro occasionally saw Lynch in work clothes while he was living in Winslow and he found copies of Lynch's pay stubs shortly after Lynch moved out of the apartment.
The record also shows that on the same day they left Winslow, Arizona (June 30, 2003), Lynch and his wife rented an apartment about 200 miles away in Glendale, Arizona. The record shows rent was paid for this apartment through November 2003, and the official move-out date was January 22, 2004. Although there was no evidence that anyone saw Lynch actually living in this apartment, the fact that he rented the apartment on the same day he moved out of the Winslow apartment and that rent was paid on this apartment through November 2003 creates a reasonable inference that Lynch was in fact living in this apartment at that time.
In reaching this conclusion, we are aware that although the official move-out date was January 22, 2004, the financial manager acknowledged this date merely reflected the date that the landlord retook possession of the property. Thus, because rent was paid through November 2003, it is reasonable to conclude only that Lynch lived in the Glendale, Arizona apartment complex until November 2003. However, even with this finding, the record shows that Lynch lived in Glendale, Arizona for five months.
Considering all of the evidence presented at the hearing together with Lynch's testimony at trial that he lived in Arizona for about one year and a half after Younger was shot, the trial court had a reasonable basis to find that (1) Lynch lived in Winslow, Arizona for at least 15 months (March 15, 2002 through June 30, 2003); and (2) Lynch lived in Glendale, Arizona for at least five months (June 30, 2003 through November 30, 2003). The 15 months in Winslow, Arizona and five months in Glendale, Arizona equals 20 months in Arizona between the time Lynch committed the crimes and the time he was arraigned. The information was filed 17 months beyond the three-year statutory period. On this record, the court had a sufficient basis to conclude the limitations period was tolled for at least 20 months and thus the matter was timely.
Lynch's arguments challenging this conclusion are unpersuasive. First, Lynch argues that "[m]aintaining a residency in another state" does not necessarily establish that Lynch was not in California during the time period. We agree with this general proposition, but it does not undermine the court's factual finding in this case. The record supports that Lynch moved to Arizona with his girlfriend (later his wife) soon after his girlfriend was released from the hospital after being treated for gunshot injuries caused by Lynch shooting her in the chest. The record also shows that Lynch and Younger lived with Lynch's father for a couple of months in Arizona and later rented two places in Arizona. The prosecution presented evidence showing Lynch was working in Arizona while he lived in the Winslow apartment. The evidence also shows that he (or someone on his behalf) was paying rent on the Glendale apartment until November 2003. Lynch did not testify at the hearing or present any evidence disputing the facts that he lived in Arizona during this time period, nor did he present any evidence that he returned to California during this time.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that Lynch was in Arizona during at least a 20-month period and did not return to California. Although this may not have been the only inference, it was one reasonable inference based on the evidence. The prosecution was required to prove the tolling facts by a preponderance of the evidence. The court did not err in concluding that the prosecution met its burden in this case.
Lynch also argues the evidence does not support that he was a named tenant on the Glendale apartment lease. However, we have examined the submitted documents and find they support that he was a named tenant of the apartment unit. The computer generated "Resident Ledger" document identifies the tenants as: "Yvonne Pradd Lee R. Lynch Jr., Latoya Younger, &." Viewing this document in the light most favorable to the court's findings, the court had a reasonable basis to conclude that three names were listed on the lease: Yvonne Pradd (Younger's mother), Lee R. Lynch, Jr. (the defendant here), and Latoya Younger. Although there was no comma between Yvonne Pradd's name and Lynch's name, it is reasonable to infer this was simply a clerical error occurring when the apartment staff inputted these names into the computer. The fact that Pradd's name is also on the lease (along with Lynch and Younger) appears to show that she was a cosigner on the lease for her daughter and son-in-law.
In arguing the evidence did not show his name was on the lease, Lynch directs us to the testimony of the Glendale apartment's financial manager wherein the prosecutor asked the manager to "tell us the name of the tenant that this resident ledger applies to," and the financial manager (looking at the Resident Ledger document) responded: "That would be [Y]vonne Pradd Lynch, Jr., and Latoya Younger." The fact that the financial manager inadvertently read the ledger as if there were two names rather than three does not show the court erred in finding Lynch's name was on the lease. The name "Yvonne Pradd Lynch, Jr." was an obvious misreading of the document because it merged Lynch's name with his mother-in-law's name: Pradd is Younger's mother's name and Lee Lynch is the defendant's name.
The record supports a finding that the statute of limitations was tolled for at least 20 months while Lynch was living in Arizona. Because the statute was tolled for the amount of time Lynch was living in Arizona, counts 2 through 6 were brought within the statute of limitations. Thus, the court did not err in reinstating the conviction on these counts.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
IRION, J.