Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SRD07015, David M. Gill, Judge.
IRION, J.
Penal Code section 4852.01 permits a person convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors to petition for a certificate of rehabilitation in the superior court. An offender is only eligible to file such a petition if, among other things, he or she exhibits "good moral character" (§ 4852.05) and, as applicable here, demonstrates a 10-year "period of rehabilitation" commencing upon the petitioner's "discharge . . . from custody due to" the "completion of the term to which he or she was sentenced or upon his or her release on parole or probation, whichever is sooner" (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
In this appeal, we review the trial court's rejection of Robert Gregory Lugo's petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, filed 10 years after his release on bail (after having been charged with a crime and having served 276 days in pretrial detention) but only seven years after he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to time served. The trial court determined that Lugo's petition was premature because he had not completed the 10-year rehabilitation period, calculated from the time of sentencing. Lugo contends that the trial court erred because, under the terms of the statute, Lugo's period of rehabilitation began when he was released on bail, i.e., "discharge[d] . . . from custody," three years prior to his sentencing. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a).) We reject Lugo's contention and affirm.
The procedural history as set forth here is derived primarily from Lugo's petition, which we assume to be accurate for purposes of this appeal. The district attorney did not dispute Lugo's summary of the procedural history in the proceedings below, and the Attorney General does not do so on appeal. We also take judicial notice of the relevant portions of the clerk's transcript in his underlying case, pursuant to Lugo's December 19, 2007 request.
In July 1995, Lugo was arrested in Yolo County and subsequently charged in a 22-count information alleging, among other things, eight counts of forcible rape. In April 1996, after spending 276 days in pretrial detention, Lugo was released on bail pending trial.
Trial commenced in July 1997. In August, the jury returned a not guilty verdict on seven counts of the information, and the trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining 15 counts. Lugo was subsequently charged in a 14-count information and a second trial was conducted in September 1998. At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial.
In August 1999, in lieu of a third trial, Lugo pleaded no contest to four counts of sexual battery pursuant to a plea agreement with the Yolo County District Attorney's Office. (§ 243.4, subd. (a).) The terms of the agreement were summarized on the plea form in relevant part as follows: "I will plead no contest to four counts of violation of 243.4(a)PC, felony, as a stipulated and negotiated plea, the stipulation is that I will be sentenced as follows: No probation and credit for the time served. I understand that I must register under Penal Code section 290[.]" Immediately after entering his plea, Lugo was sentenced to time served.
In October 2003, Lugo filed a motion in Yolo County Superior Court to withdraw his plea and dismiss the accusatory pleading pursuant to section 1203.4a. The trial court denied the motion because section 1203.4a applies only to misdemeanor offenders, and Lugo explicitly pleaded guilty to "felony" violations of section 243.4, a so-called "wobbler" offense that can be either a felony or a misdemeanor. In an unpublished opinion, our colleagues in the Third District reversed that ruling. The Third District held that " 'when a crime is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or in the discretion of the court by imprisonment in the county jail, the actual punishment ordered is the test ' " for determining whether an offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. (People v. Lugo (Apr. 27, 2005, C046790) [nonpub. opn.], quoting Meyer v. Superior Court (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133, 137.) As Lugo was sentenced to less than a year in county jail, the court reasoned, he received a misdemeanor sentence and his offense was a misdemeanor. (People v. Lugo, supra, C046790.) On remand, the trial court (apparently) awarded Lugo the relief sought under section 1203.4a.
Section 1203.4a applies to any defendant "convicted of a misdemeanor and not granted probation" who, "after the lapse of one year from the date of pronouncement of judgment," has "lived an honest and upright life and has conformed to and obeyed the laws of the land." (§ 1203.4a.) The section allows such a person to withdraw his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere (or have a guilty verdict set aside), and requires the court in such a case to "dismiss the accusatory pleading against the defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in Section 12021.1 [certain firearm restrictions] of this code or Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code [drivers license suspension/revocation]." (Ibid.) Section 1203.4 provides similar relief to persons who were convicted of either misdemeanors or felonies and placed on probation.
In his appellate brief, Lugo represents that the trial court granted the relief requested and the Attorney General does not dispute this representation. The record on appeal does not include any documentation of the court's ruling.
On March 19, 2007, Lugo filed a motion "for judicial determination of statutory application to defendant's situation regarding this application for certificate of rehabilitation and pardon" in the Superior Court of San Diego County. (§ 4852.06 [petition for certificate of rehabilitation to be filed in the county where the petitioner resides].) Lugo asserted in the motion that he had submitted notice of his request for a certificate of rehabilitation to the San Diego County District Attorney's Office, but had been informed by that office that he was not eligible to file such a petition because the 10-year period of rehabilitation had not yet elapsed.
The motion appears to be styled in this fashion pursuant to the local practice of the superior court for processing petitions for certificates of rehabilitation.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Lugo's motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled that Lugo was ineligible to seek a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. The court noted that Lugo appeared to be "well on the way to rehabilitating himself," but ruled he "simply hasn't met the qualifications" for filing a petition. (See § 4852.03, subd. (b) [rendering a petitioner "ineligible to file . . . for a certificate of rehabilitation" "[u]nless and until the period of rehabilitation . . . has passed"].) Adopting the district attorney's argument, the court reasoned that "the whole scheme applies to people who have been convicted," and Lugo's release on bail could not have commenced the period of rehabilitation because at the time of his release he had not yet been convicted.
DISCUSSION
Lugo contends that the trial court misinterpreted the statutory prerequisites to the filing of a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation. Our review of this question is de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.)
The role of the courts in construing a statute is to " 'ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' " (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 92 (Wright).) " 'Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.' " (Ibid.) " '[I]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.' " (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227; People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 728 [" '[I]f " 'the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it' " ' "].) If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous or reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we will "examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes," and we can " ' "look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part." ' " (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94 (Jefferson).)
The statutory language at issue here is contained in section 4852.03, subdivision (a), which states "[t]he period of rehabilitation" begins to run upon "the discharge of the petitioner from custody due to his or her completion of the term to which he or she was sentenced or upon his or her release on parole or probation, whichever is sooner." (§ 4852.03, subd. (a).) Lugo contends that this statutory text unambiguously dictates that the period of rehabilitation commenced upon his release on bail (i.e., discharge from custody) in 1996.
We do not believe that the statutory text, or legislative intent, fairly supports Lugo's interpretation. Lugo's 1996 "discharge . . . from custody," over a year before his first trial, was due to his successfully posting bail and not "due to his . . . completion of the term to which he . . . was sentenced." (§ 4852.03, subd. (a); cf. § 2900.5 [requiring pretrial custody to be counted toward a criminal defendant's later sentence].) As Lugo had not yet been convicted of a crime or sentenced at the time he was released on bail, the statutory text which begins the period of rehabilitation at the completion of the term to which an offender was sentenced is inapplicable.
It is true as well, under the unique facts of this case, that after Lugo pleaded guilty he was never placed on parole or probation, and thus, the statutory text which commences the rehabilitation period upon the petitioner's "release on parole or probation" also is not applicable. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a).)
Consequently, we are presented with a factual scenario that does not fit squarely within any of the three specified situations triggering commencement of the period of rehabilitation. Therefore, in interpreting section 4852.03 as applied to the circumstance presented, we must attempt to " 'ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' " (Wright, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 92.) In so doing, we can " ' "look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history[,] the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part" ' " and adopt the construction that " 'best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.' " (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94.)
Neither party cites, and we have not found, any relevant legislative history that sheds light on the Legislature's intent in this unusual situation — where an offender is sentenced solely to pretrial time served. However, we believe that the other " ' "extrinsic aids" ' " to discerning Legislative intent indicate that the period of rehabilitation in such a case runs from the time of the pronouncement of judgment (i.e., sentencing), rather than, as Lugo contends, from pretrial release on bail. (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94.) We reach this conclusion for three reasons.
First, in a closely related statute (§ 1203.4a) that concerns the period of rehabilitation for obtaining relief from certain collateral effects of a misdemeanor conviction for which a defendant is "not granted probation" (such as Lugo's offense), the Legislature ran the period of rehabilitation from "the date of pronouncement of judgment." (§ 1203.4a.) We can discern no reason, and the parties suggest none, why the period of rehabilitation for the same offense under section 1203.4a would commence from a different starting point than is required under section 4852.03. Both statutes have the same policy goal, namely, to require an adequate period of rehabilitation prior to the provision of any relief from the collateral effects of a criminal conviction. Thus, a construction of section 4852.03 that begins Lugo's period of rehabilitation from the pronouncement of judgment "harmonizes the statute . . . with related statutes" (i.e., § 1203.4a) and is, thus, preferred to Lugo's interpretation, which would create incongruity between the two statutes. (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94.)
While both section 1203.4a and section 4852.03 provide relief from the collateral effects of a criminal conviction, relief from section 290's sex offender registration requirement is not available through section 1203.4 or (presumably) section 1203.4a. (See § 290.007 [stating that "[a]ny person required to register pursuant to any provision of the Act shall register in accordance with the Act, regardless of whether the person's conviction has been dismissed pursuant to Section 1203.4, unless the person obtains a certificate of rehabilitation and is entitled to relief from registration pursuant to Section 290.5"]; § 290.5.) In addition, certain sex offenders are not relieved of the duty to register even after obtaining a certificate of rehabilitation, including persons who violated section 243.4 (sexual battery) if "the offense is a felony." (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2)(C).)
Second, in evaluating Lugo's situation with reference to each of the three statutory scenarios triggering commencement of the period of rehabilitation under section 4852.03 (release on probation, release on parole and discharge from custody due to the completion of the term to which he was sentenced), a sentence of time already served is most analogous to release on probation. A sentence of time served, like release on probation, " 'is a form of leniency' " — a judicial determination that despite the commission of a criminal offense, the offender should be returned directly to the community without any prison commitment. (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1087.) To "harmonize[] the statute internally," the period of rehabilitation for an offender sentenced to time served should commence at the same time as that of an offender sentenced to straight probation — in both circumstances, from the pronouncement of judgment. (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94.) Were we to adopt a contrary position, the statute arbitrarily would favor a defendant who, despite conviction of an offense of equal or greater severity, was held in pretrial detention over a defendant who was not.
Third, commencing the period of rehabilitation from the pronouncement of judgment best serves " ' "the ostensible objects to be achieved" ' " by the statute, namely, that the offender have a sufficient time, after conviction, to reflect on his crime and undergo rehabilitation. (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94.) At the time of his release on bail, Lugo was presumed innocent and thus, in the eyes of the law, without need of any rehabilitation. It would make little sense to give such an offender credit for a period of rehabilitation that began prior to his conviction of any crime. (Cf. People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875 ["the certificate of rehabilitation procedure is available to convicted felons who have successfully completed their sentences, and who have undergone an additional and sustained 'period of rehabilitation' in California"].) It was only later, upon his plea of guilty and the court's pronouncement of judgment, that Lugo was made aware of his debt to society and subsequent need for rehabilitation.
For the above reasons, running the period of rehabilitation from the pronouncement of judgment is most consistent with " ' "the ostensible objects to be achieved" ' " by the statute and " 'best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.' " (Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 94; see also § 4 [Penal Code is "to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice"].) Consequently, we believe that the interpretation of the statute adopted by the trial court, in these unique circumstances, best conforms to the Legislative intent.
While we conclude that Lugo is currently ineligible to file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, this is not a comment on the substantive merits of his request, and means only that Lugo must await the expiration of the statutorily mandated 10-year period from the pronouncement of judgment to again petition the trial court for relief under section 4852.01. The question of whether Lugo is, in fact, entitled to a certificate of rehabilitation will then be decided by that court. (See People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 227 [a trial court's ruling on the merits of a petition is left to its discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal "absent a clear abuse of that discretion"].)
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. NARES, J.