Opinion
08-22-2014
PEOPLE of the State of New York, and Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, Plaintiff, v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD, (LIRR) a Subsidiary and Agency of the Metropolitan Authority (MTA), Defendant/s.
Howard O'Rourke, Esq., Village Prosecutor, Valley Stream. Cheryl Hartell, Esq., General Counsel, Jamaica.
Howard O'Rourke, Esq., Village Prosecutor, Valley Stream.
Cheryl Hartell, Esq., General Counsel, Jamaica.
ROBERT G. BOGLE, J.
Motion by the defendant Long Island Railroad, a subsidiary and agency of the Metropolitan Transit Authority to dismiss the summons and informations pursuant to CPL 170.35 and 170.40, by counsel, is determined as hereinafter provided.
The defendant Long Island Railroad (LIRR) is charged with several violations of Village Code of the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream. Two of the violations are for high grass and weeds (V.S.Code 64–81(c)). One summons of having a large amounts of debris, including bottles and cans on the Long Island Railroad property. (V.S.Code 50–11); one change of excessive growth from trees overhanging the railroad properties. (V.S.Code 64–81(c) and two (2) charges of graffiti on property owned by the Long Island Railroad (V.S.Code 21–2(f)).
The defendant, by counsel, now moves to dismiss on two specific grounds. The first is under CPL 170.30(a), stating that the People have failed to establish a cause of action, on the alleged grounds that the village lacks jurisdiction over the defendant LIRR, specifically as a result of an alleged statutory exemption from local laws under Public Authority Law 1266(8). Secondly, the defendant moves to dismiss in furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL 170.30(g) and CPL 170.40. The People will consent to a dismissal in furtherance of justice due to the fact that the violations for which the defendant corporation was accused has been subsequently remedied. However, the People oppose a dismissal under the jurisdictional grounds and claim the summons were properly issued. The People note this is an on going problem over the last twenty years, where the village is forced to issue summons due to the defendant's neglect, and the violations are routinely dismissed after the railroad remedies the violations.
The Long Island Railroad (a/k/a LIRR) is a subsidiary and agency of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (a/k/a the MTA). The MTA took ownership of the LIRR under powers granted under Title 11 Article 5 of the Public Authorities Law (L.1965, CH.324 Section 3) Bujosa v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 44 A.D.2d 849, 355 N.Y.S.2d 800 (2nd Dept.1974). The MTA and LIRR are governed under Title 11 of the Public Authorities Law sections 1260 through and including 1270–b. The defendant specifically notes Public Authorities Law Section 1266(8), which states that no municipalities shall have jurisdiction over any facilities of the authority or any of its activities or operations, subject to certain limitations. The section also states that local laws and ordinances of a municipality shall not be applicable to the authority the exception being such facilities that are devoted for purposes other than transportation or transit purposes. (Emphasis added). Based on this analysis the defendant argues that the summons and informations should be dismissed.
The People, however, take exception to this interpretation of the statute and argue that the charges are valid under two specific grounds: (1) The activity for which the defendant is charged is strictly proprietary in nature and not related to its official purpose and (2) by way of contractual obligation with the Village of Valley Stream, the LIRR is obligated to maintain its property free and clear of certain violations. The Court shall now discuss these issues.
As a general rule, in terms of liability, it is important to initially determine whether the authority's questioned activity is proprietary or related to its public purpose at the time the situation occurred. Applewhite v. Accuhealth, 21 N.Y.3d 420, 972 N.Y.S.2d 169, 995 N.E.2d 131 (2013). Defendant's position focuses on the powers and responsibilities to provide mass transportation and that a charge under a local ordinance would frustrate their continued effectiveness. However, this Court finds it strains credulity to believe that graffiti of a building or garbage roadside or high grass and weeds would harm the effective transportation ability of the LIRR. Indeed, the cases that have been cited by the defendant focus on the public purpose responsibilities of the railroad as opposed to the proprietary function, which distinguishes them from the case at bar. In Metropolitan Transp. Authority v. Village of Tuckahoe, 67 Misc.2d 895, 325 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup.Ct., Westchester County 1971) the Court held that a village was prohibited from denying the commuter railroad the opportunity to expand and build a bridge to accommodate 80 new passenger cars. Clearly, a public function of the Metropolitan Transit System. In People v. Long Island Railroad, 90 Misc.2d 269, 397 N.Y.S.2d 846 (App.Term, 2nd Dept.1976) the Court held that the railroad was exempt from town's sanitary code for operating fuel emitting diesel trains. Once again, clearly a public function of the Public Authority. Lastly, in People v. Metro–North Commuter Railroad, 132 Misc.2d 1072, 506 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Crim.Ct., Bronx County 1986) the MTA subsidiary area was held exempt from the city's sanitary laws due to the fact that providing fuel for the railroad (by highly flammable fluids being transported by trucks), was an activity clearly related the function of the railroad and not of a proprietary nature. Indeed, the Court concluded that the law grants the defendant Public Transportation Authority the ability to do all things it deems are necessary, convenient or desirable to manage, control and direct its transportation responsibilities. Each of these three decisions focuses on that point. However, the case at bar focuses on secondary or proprietary purposes. A good example is People v. Witherspoon, 52 Misc.2d 320, 275 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Dist.Ct., Suffolk County 1966). In Witherspoon the Court held that the defendant was not exempt from local zoning authority where an advertisement was placed on a bill board on the Public Authority's property. The Court ruled this was a proprietary activity, and not related to transportation. Similarly, in the instant case a state authority should not be exempt where graffiti is placed upon the walls of its Public Authority owned property. In an opinion of the New York State Comptroller (OP. N.Y. Comptroller 1979. NO.79–2) the Comptroller's office held the MTA responsible for appropriate zoning laws when it constructed an industrial complex which is not directly related to the commuter transportation, and merely housed offices. Clearly, in the instant case, walls and debris and grass are not connected to the purpose of transportation, and thus the public corporation should be deemed responsible and liable under local laws and justice court jurisdiction. Huerta v. New York City Transit Authority 290 A.D.2d 33, 735 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1st Dept.2001). Accordingly, the Court holds that the charges against the LIRR are proprietary and not public in nature, and do not relate to its transportation purposes.
The second issue presented by the Village Prosecutor relates to the contractual responsibilities and obligations of the MTA and its subsidiary, the LIRR. Public Authorities Law Section 1265(6)(a) authorizes the MTA and it subsidiaries to enter into contracts and execute all instruments necessary when convenient. LIRR v. Public Service Commission of the New York State, 30 A.D.2d 409, 292 N.Y.S.2d 167 (2nd Dept.1968). Sometimes these contracts can even be inferred Javeline v. LIRR, 106 Misc.2d 814, 435 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Queens County Civil Court 1981). Here, the People rely on the transfer of real property between the LIRR and the Incorporated Village of Valley Stream dated August 23, 1962. This document was duly recorded in the Nassau County Clerk's Office at Liber 7068, page 336 on September 17, 1962. The agreement provides the Village of Valley Stream with certain properties connected to the LIRR. In the real property agreement, the LIRR shall have a perpetual easement for a variety of purposes, not the least of which to continue and maintain the properties and facilities as may be required. The agreement specifically and exclusively requires that maintenance be maintained by the LIRR and its successors. Following a review of this document, this Court declares that responsibly for maintenance is not shared and remains exclusively in the control of the LIRR. And so, this leads this Court to ask the next and final question, if the LIRR, although contractually bound, chooses not to maintain the property, then who shall be responsible to maintain the property? Obviously, the responsibility remains and is invested in the Long Island Railroad and it is therefore their responsibility pursuant to law and contract.
Therefore, it is proper to hold the LIRR responsible under these local ordinances. Although local laws have long been referred to as "quasi-criminal" in nature, it is also by logic, "quasicivil" in nature as well. Villages are charged with power of governance of the public health, safety and welfare of the public. NY Court. art 9 sect 2(c)(10); Albany Area Builders v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 546 N.E.2d 920 (1989). The Village imposition of a fine for failure to comply with local law fall well within that authority. Municipal Home Rule Sec 10(4)(b): People v. Hacker, 76 Misc.2d 610, 350 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Suffolk Co. Dist.Ct.1973).
Lastly, the Court will consider the motion to dismiss to furtherance of justice under CPL 170.30(g) which has been consented to by the People. Before dismissing in furtherance of justice, the Court is obligated to review CPL 170.40, which details the circumstances for the Courts to consider when reviewing such a motion. Under Section 170.40(f) the Court may dismiss if the purpose of imposing a sentence for the offense would not serve a useful purpose. Here, it would serve no useful purpose due to the fact that the violations have been corrected, although repeated actions might result in a different result in the future. People v. Beecher, 153 Misc.2d 247, 580 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Valley Stream Just.Ct.1992) : People v. Saito, 149 Misc.2d 342, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (N.Y. City Ct.1990).
In conclusion, the Court holds that the defendant LIRR and MTA are contractually and legally obligated for the responsibility of removing graffiti, garbage, debris and high grass and weeds on their property and that the actions are proprietary in nature and not related to its public transportation purpose and as a result, this court maintains jurisdiction over the violations of law. However, the violations are dismissed in furtherance of justice on the consent of the People. Accordingly, the summons and informations are dismissed.
This determination shall constitute the decision and order of the Court.