Opinion
1246 KA 18-01218
12-23-2020
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Brandon J. LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
CARA A. WALDMAN, FAIRPORT, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
CARA A. WALDMAN, FAIRPORT, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JAMES B. RITTS, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CANANDAIGUA (V. CHRISTOPHER EAGGLESTON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, WINSLOW, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree ( Penal Law § 220.39 [1] ), arising from two separate incidents in which defendant sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant. Defendant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we reject that contention (see generally People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). In addition to the testimony of the confidential informant who purchased the crack cocaine from defendant on both occasions, the People presented audio recordings of the transactions, text messages between the informant and defendant, the testimony of two law enforcement officers who supervised the informant and monitored those transactions, a video surveillance recording of one of the transactions, and evidence from an expert in the field of forensic chemistry who tested the substance sold on each occasion and confirmed that those substances contained cocaine (see People v. Reid , 173 A.D.3d 1663, 1664-1665, 101 N.Y.S.3d 793 [4th Dept. 2019] ). Thus, to the extent that the informant's credibility was a significant factor in the jury's determination of the counts of conviction, "[t]he credibility determination is a task within the province of the jury and its judgment should not be lightly disturbed" ( People v. Harris , 15 A.D.3d 966, 967, 788 N.Y.S.2d 745 [4th Dept. 2005], lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 831, 796 N.Y.S.2d 586, 829 N.E.2d 679 [2005] ; see People v. Coleman , 278 A.D.2d 891, 891, 718 N.Y.S.2d 504 [4th Dept. 2000], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 798, 726 N.Y.S.2d 376, 750 N.E.2d 78 [2001] ). Furthermore, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, any error in Supreme Court's refusal to suppress defendant's statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see generally People v. Crimmins , 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 [1975] ).
Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.