Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FSB045935 Brian S. McCarville, Judge.
Mark L. Christiansen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Gil Gonzalez and Garrett Beaumont, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Christopher Richard Lanteigne appeals from his conviction of three counts of first degree murder with kidnap, robbery, and multiple murder special circumstances (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (17)(A), 17(B)) following his entry of a plea of guilty pursuant to a “package deal” plea agreement with two codefendants. Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because the trial court misconceived the law, failed to exercise discretion, and failed to make the required inquiry in taking the plea. We find no prejudicial error, and we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Summary of Charges
Defendant was charged with the murders (§ 187, subd. (a)) of Kareem Mohamed Radwan (count 1) and Clayton Lance McCobb (count 2), with robbery and kidnapping special circumstances (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), (17)); the murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) of Scott Bernard Fisher (count 3) with multiple murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)); robbery (§ 211) of Radwan (count 4), McCobb (count 6), Fisher (count 8), and Steven Michael Dehaan (count 10); kidnap (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) of Radwan (count 5) and McCobb (count 7); assault with a club (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) of Dehaan (count 9); and attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)) of Dehaan (count 11). The information also alleged various firearm, bodily injury, and prior serious felony enhancements. (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), 667.5, subd. (c).) The prosecutor announced his intention to seek the death penalty as to codefendant Christopher Weaver and Lanteigne, but not codefendant Camille Marie Vredenburg.
Codefendant Christopher Weaver was also charged with counts 1 through 11. Codefendant Camille Marie Vredenburg was charged with counts 1, 2, 4 through 7, and 9 through 11.
B. Pre-plea Proceedings
January 14, 2008, was the first day of trial. Various motions and jury selection for defendant and Weaver took place up to February 28, 2008; but jury selection had not yet begun as to Vredenburg. Meanwhile, on February 25, the trial court stated, “Mr. Lanteigne, Mr. Weaver, there was an indication that there may be an attempt to resolve the case, gentlemen. I just wanted to let you know what the Court’s perspective is on that. That’s your decision, and you can consult with your attorneys and family. It’s something that has to be arrived at and agreed upon by all parties.” The trial court asked if any of the defendants were in lockdown, and defendant responded that he was. The trial court stated that it could nonetheless “have [defendant] here, if you want to talk to somebody about it.” The trial court then stated that Vredenburg’s jury selection would start on March 3, and once her jury was selected, “we’re going to roll on with this case,” and if the defendants “want to resolve the case by some type of negotiated settlement that encompasses... you and her case, it needs to be done as quickly as possible. It’s your call.” The court offered to have defendant’s family present on Wednesday, February 27, but defendant responded, “No, thank you, your Honor.”
C. Entry of Pleas
The plea hearing took place on March 5, 2008. The trial court informed the defendants of the charges against them and ascertained that they understood those charges and the possible punishments. Each defendant verified his or her initials and signatures on the plea forms and confirmed having read the forms carefully with his or her attorney. Each defendant confirmed that the trial court had correctly recited the crimes to which he or she was pleading. Each defendant confirmed the trial court had correctly set forth the agreement and each had had enough time to consult with his or her attorney.
The trial court advised the defendants of their rights as to both the charges and allegations and asked if they wanted to waive their rights. Defendant agreed to waive his rights “aside from small matters with the district attorney, the restitution.” When asked if he wanted to stop and talk to his attorney about anything, he replied, “I guess that would depend [on] what we’re going to be doing next.” The trial court responded it would next be taking a plea of guilty, and defendant said, “No. I’m fine.” The other defendants indicated the same. The defendants’ attorneys confirmed they had reviewed the declarations, had explained the consequences and defenses, and had sufficient time to go forward with the trial if the case had not resolved. Each confirmed the court had correctly set forth the negotiated agreement.
Each defendant then personally pleaded guilty and admitted the special circumstances as specified on the forms. Defendant and Weaver each pleaded guilty to the three murder counts and admitted the special circumstances; their plea agreements called for a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole and dismissal of all remaining counts and allegations. Vredenburg pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter; her plea agreement called for a concurrent six-year middle term sentence for each count and the dismissal of all remaining charges and allegations.
The trial court found the pleas complied with Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. The trial court found that the defendants had read and understood the declarations, understood the nature and consequences of their pleas and admissions, and had “understandingly, intelligently waive[d] their constitutional rights.”
On the stipulation of the parties, the trial court relied on the motions, preliminary hearing transcript, statements, and reports, which the trial court had reviewed, as a factual basis for the plea.
D. Factual Basis for Pleas
1. Crimes against Fisher
Fisher’s body was discovered in the bedroom of his apartment on August 24, 2004. He had been shot multiple times with a.38- or.357-caliber bullet; both types of bullets can be fired from the same weapon. Defendant told Vredenburg he had been present when Weaver had pulled out a gun and shot Fisher. He said Weaver had told him to park Fisher’s car down the street so Weaver could later dump it somewhere. The car was later found abandoned in a remote area. Weaver’s DNA was found on the gear shift and steering wheel.
A few days before Fisher’s death, a witness saw defendant showing Weaver a revolver. After the murder, defendant told a witness he wanted to get rid of a.38-caliber gun, saying the gun had been “used.” Defendant asked another witness for help in concealing the gun. Later, defendant told the witness he had used a drill to try to rework the gun barrel “so the cops couldn’t match up any bullets.” Defendant tried to sell the gun to a third witness. The gun was never recovered.
Detectives found the stub of a work check in Fisher’s name in a kitchen cabinet in the apartment defendant and Weaver shared.
2. Crimes against McCobb
In her interview with the police, Vredenburg stated that on September 8, 2004, defendant complained he was hungry; there was no food in the house, and he did not have any money. Weaver replied, “Let’s go do a robbery, dog.” Defendant told Vredenburg to drive him and Weaver to Beaumont, where she dropped them off at a bank. Vredenburg waited five minutes as she had been told to do, but defendant and Weaver did not return, so she started to drive home. On the way, she saw police and caution tape on the freeway. When she got home, defendant was already there; he told her Weaver had borrowed a truck at gunpoint, and they had dropped the owner off on the freeway. Weaver was driving McCobb’s truck, and they went to get rid of it. Defendant told Vredenburg that Weaver had given him $75 and some credit cards. Vredenburg and Weaver used the money to buy dope and gamble at a casino. They were videotaped using McCobb’s credit card to buy items at an outlet mall; those credit cards were later found in defendant’s possession.
A witness reported seeing a man matching Weaver’s description standing beside McCobb’s truck and pointing a gun at McCobb as McCobb stepped back and fell down. McCobb’s truck was later found burned out in a park in San Bernardino. McCobb had been carrying $300 in cash and various credit cards, none of which were found on his body. A criminalist testified that the same gun could have been used in both the Fisher and McCobb murders.
3. Crimes against Radwan
In the evening of September 10, 2004, Vredenburg drove defendant and Weaver to Colton to rob a tire store, but they discovered the store was too close to a police substation. She instead dropped them off near Mountain View and Redlands Boulevard in Loma Linda, two or three blocks from where Radwan lived. At about 8:30 that night, Radwan’s body was found in an orange grove about a mile and a half from that intersection. He had been shot several times in the head. Shoe prints of two assailants were found near the body; one set of prints matched shoes of a brand defendant was known to wear, and the other set was consistent with Weaver’s shoes.
Radwan had last been seen, before his death, driving a Mercedes. He had been carrying $250 to $300 in cash, which included two $100 bills, as well as various credit cards and two checks made out to him. His key chain contained Mercedes keys and a mini-Leatherman tool.
Radwan’s credit card was used at 7-Eleven store in San Bernardino and was later used at a Wal-Mart in Victorville; that store’s surveillance tapes showed defendant and Vredenburg making the purchase. Defendant met with a witness, Karen Gibson, and Vredenburg in a drugstore parking lot, where he gave Gibson a $100 bill. A few hours later, defendant called Gibson and asked her to find his cell phone, which he had dropped near a 7-Eleven store; he told her that if she found it, she should not turn it on or answer it because there was “incriminating evidence against him.” Gibson found the cell phone; she noticed it had blood on it, and she turned it in to the sheriff’s office. The cell phone was identified as belonging to Radwan. The blood was identified as defendant’s.
Another witness was having a conversation with defendant and Weaver, when he saw Weaver tossing a Mercedes key in the air. Weaver asked the witness if he knew anyone who wanted a Mercedes; he said the Mercedes had been stolen in Loma Linda. A small Leatherman tool was recovered from Weaver’s girlfriend’s apartment; the tool was later identified as belonging to Radwan.
A criminalist testified that the same gun could have been used in all three murders.
4. Crimes against Dehaan
On August 22, 2004, two men and a woman in defendant’s white pickup truck drove up close to Dehaan’s van at a self-service car wash in San Bernardino. The two men got out of the truck. The passenger, Weaver, went to Dehaan’s van, started it, and put it into reverse, while the driver of the pickup hit Dehaan several times on the head and body with a metal rod, breaking Dehaan’s jaw, arm, and nose. Money, cigarettes, and a lighter were removed from Dehaan’s pockets. A broken segment of a collapsible metal baton was recovered at the scene. Defendant had demonstrated such a device to a witness in August 2004.
E. Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Plea
Defendant’s sentencing was set for March 28, 2009. On that date, defendant’s attorney, Arthur Katz, indicated defendant wished to withdraw his plea and Katz had a conflict. The trial court appointed Sean O’Connor to represent defendant for purposes of the motion to withdraw the plea.
On November 6, 2008, O’Connor filed a written motion to withdraw the plea. The motion asserted, among other things, that the trial court had failed to make inquiries and determinations required for “package-deal” plea bargains. Defendant filed a declaration in support of the motion, but withdrew the declaration after the trial court ruled it would be excluded unless he took the stand and was subject to cross-examination.
The trial court heard the motion on November 7, 2008. It was stipulated that Katz would testify he had approached the prosecutor on a few occasions with an offer to settle, including the occasion that ultimately resulted in defendant’s plea. The prosecutor had not made an offer and had taken a position that no plea would be entertained unless all defendants pleaded. Because of the nature of the case, including the intertwining testimony and the likelihood that if one codefendant settled, he or she might testify in favor of the remaining defendants, the prosecutor would consider only a package deal. Katz had told the prosecutor that the offers he reported were coming from defendant.
The prosecutor represented to the court that a week or week and a half before the plea, Katz and Weaver’s attorney had approached him and indicated their clients would be willing to plead to a penalty of life without parole. The prosecutor told them they would have to write up the pleas on plea forms to present to his office and to family members of the victims, and those pleas would be seriously considered.
Apart from the stipulation, no evidence was presented at the motion. O’Connor asked the court to rule on the basis of the plea bargain itself and the transcript of the plea. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a consecutive sentence of life without the possibility of parole for each of the three counts as to which he had pleaded guilty.
Additional facts are set forth below as relevant in the discussion of the issues.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court misconceived the law, failed to exercise discretion, and failed to make the required inquiry.
A. Standards for Motion to Withdraw Plea
“On application of the defendant at any time before judgment... the court may,... for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” (§ 1018.) However, a plea may not be set aside simply because a defendant has changed his mind. (In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1143.) Rather, in bringing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant must establish by clear and convincing evidence that mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or some other factor overcame his exercise of free judgment when making the plea. (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) The grant or denial of such a motion is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we uphold the trial court’s exercise of that discretion unless an abuse of discretion is clearly demonstrated. (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.) We accept all factual findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.)
B. Entry of “Package Deal” Plea
In In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277 (Ibarra), disapproved on another ground in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175-1178, our Supreme Court held that when a defendant enters a guilty plea under a “package deal” with other defendants, the trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea. The court recognized that, although a package plea is not per se coercive, it may be so under a totality of the circumstances. (Ibarra, supra, at pp. 286-288.) The court set forth a nonexhaustive list of factors for the trial court to consider. (Id. at p. 288-290.)
First, the trial court “must determine whether the inducement for the plea is proper. The court should be satisfied that the prosecution has not misrepresented facts to the defendant, and that the substance of the inducement is within the proper scope of the prosecutor’s business. [Citation.] The prosecutor must also have a reasonable and good faith case against the third parties to whom leniency is promised....” (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 288-289, fn. omitted.)
Second, the trial court must consider the factual basis for the guilty plea, which may indicate the inducement was more likely to be improperly coercive. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289.)
Third, the trial court must examine the nature and degree of coerciveness: “Psychological pressures sufficient to indicate an involuntary plea might be present if the third party promised leniency is a close friend or family member whom the defendant feels compelled to help. ‘[T]he voluntariness of a plea bargain which contemplates special concessions to another-especially a sibling or a loved one-bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court conscious of the psychological pressures upon an accused such a situation creates.’ [Citation.] If the defendant bears no special relationship to the third party promised lenience, he may nevertheless feel compelled to plead guilty due to physical threat. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289.)
Fourth, the Supreme Court stated that “a plea is not coerced if the promise of leniency to a third party was an insignificant consideration by a defendant in his choice to plead guilty. For example, if the motivating factor to plead guilty was the realization of the likelihood of conviction at trial, the defendant cannot be said to have been ‘forced’ into pleading guilty, unless the coercive factors present had nevertheless remained a substantial factor in his decision. [Citations.]” (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 289-290.)
C. Adequacy of Trial Court’s Inquiries
The first factor requires the court to determine whether the inducement for the plea was proper, which requires, among other things, that the prosecutor has probable cause to believe the codefendants had committed the charged crimes. In this case, there can be no doubt the prosecutor had “a reasonable and good faith case against the third parties to whom leniency [wa]s promised.” (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289.) If anything, the case was stronger against Weaver as the actual shooter, at least in the murder of Fisher. Vredenburg’s own admissions established her liability as the driver in connection with the crimes against McCobb and Radwan. The evidence at the preliminary hearing tied all three defendants closely to the crimes. The first factor also requires the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor had a proper inducement for the plea. (Ibid.) Here, the proper inducement was apparent-in the absence of a joint plea, it was likely that a settling defendant would later testify in favor of the other defendants.
The second factor requires the trial court to consider the factual basis for the guilty plea. Here, that factual basis is amply apparent from the record on which the trial court relied, as summarized above in our statement of facts. The bargained-for sentence of life without the possibility of parole was clearly not “disproportionate to the accused’s culpability” for defendant’s brutal crime spree. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 289.)
The third factor requires the trial court to examine the “nature and degree of coerciveness,” which may come into play if the defendant has a close relationship to the other defendants or if another party has threatened the defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 127 [defendant had received threats].) Here, defendant has not suggested that any threat was made to compel him to plead guilty. He does, however, note that he and Weaver were friends and that Vredenburg was his girlfriend. The trial court was well aware of the relationships among the three defendants. At the preliminary hearing, two of defendant’s cousins and another witness identified Weaver as defendant’s friend and Vredenburg as defendant’s girlfriend. In a motion to set aside the information filed in July 2006, defendant’s attorney noted that defendant, “along with his ‘girlfriend,’ co-defendant Camille Vredenburg and their friend, co-defendant Christopher Weaver,” had been jointly charged with the offenses. Similarly, the People’s points and authorities in opposition to that motion identified Vredenburg as defendant’s girlfriend. The parties stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript and the motions, among other things that the trial court had reviewed, formed the factual bases for the plea.
Moreover, the plea form stated, “No one has used any force or violence or threats or menace or duress or undue influence of any kind on me or anyone dear to me to get me to plead guilty....” Defendant adopted that statement as his own by initialing box 12 of the plea form on February 29. 2008. In open court, he inspected the completed form and acknowledged that he had carefully read and reviewed it and initialed and signed it. That statement incorporates the concerns the Supreme Court addressed in Ibarra with respect to possible threats or inducements based on personal relationships.
The fourth factor requires consideration as to whether any promise of leniency to a third party was an insignificant consideration by a defendant in his choice to plead guilty. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 288-290.) Here, the record reflects that defendant’s counsel and Weaver’s counsel approached the deputy district attorney to discuss the possibility of their clients’ guilty pleas in exchange for sentences of life without the possibility of parole rather than the capital punishment they faced.
Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude the trial court’s inquiry was adequate under Ibarra.
D. Prejudice
Even if we were to assume, for purposes of argument, that the trial court should have conducted a more specific inquiry into the Ibarra factors, we further conclude that defendant has failed to show prejudice. As the Ibarra court stated: “In seeking to set aside a plea as involuntary under the standards discussed in this opinion,... an appellant must point to facts to show not only the lack of an inquiry but also the involuntary character of his plea.” (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 290, fn. 6.)
To support his claim that his plea was involuntary, defendant argues, “The form was not filled out correctly, including the portion regarding the specific reasons or inducements, and it generally showed that even counsel was casual because he surely knew the [Cruz and Vargas] waivers were inapplicable. The fact the defendant initialed those also demonstrates that he was uncertain or inadequately counseled in his understanding. Additionally, though, it was not completed at the time it was first filled out-the initials and date on the third page are different than those on the other two. This strongly indicates the defendant was reluctant to commit to a plea.”
Defendant continues, “Rushed and reluctant, but pressured by the fact his reluctance could cost his girlfriend her chance at a short term and his friend his very life, the character of the plea was involuntary. This was made even more apparent during the taking of the plea. Mr. Lanteigne was the only one who evidenced hesitancy: he had difficulty affirming his initials, he was satisfied except for some matters about which he wanted to talk to the district attorney but there was no need to interrupt the plea taking.”
With respect to defendant’s alleged “hesitancy” and “difficulty affirming his initials,” the record contains the following exchange:
“THE COURT: Mr. Lanteigne, I’m holding up two pieces of paper. Do you see them, sir?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: I’m going to assume so, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Don’t assume. Stand up. Get close enough so you can see.
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: I don’t have my glasses. No way I will be able to see that.
“THE COURT: Can you see from there, Mr. Weaver?
“DEFENDANT WEAVER: Yes.
“THE COURT: We’ll do one at a time. I want you to look them over. On the first page are those your initials, Mr. Lanteigne?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Second page, your initials?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Third page, your initials and signature?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: Yes, your Honor.
“THE COURT: Did you review all three pieces of paper carefully?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: I did.
“THE COURT: Did you do that with the aid and assistance of your attorney, Mr. Katz?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: Yes, I did.
“THE COURT: Can you read okay?
“DEFENDANT LANTEIGNE: Yes, I can.”
This record makes clear that defendant initially “had difficulty affirming his initials” because the trial court was holding the documents, and defendant did not have his glasses. Once the documents were provided for him “to look them over,” he did not hesitate in affirming his initials and signature on the documents. The exchange provides no support whatsoever for defendant’s contention that he was coerced in the plea proceedings.
With respect to the differences in the initials and dates on the various pages, we note that the second page was dated February 29, 2008, and the third page was dated March 5, 2008. On the first two pages, defendant used the initials “CRL”; whereas on the third page, he used the initials “CL.” As noted above, defendant affirmed in open court that both sets of initials were his own. Defendant contends the differences in date and form “strongly indicate” he was reluctant to enter the plea. We disagree. Defendant had the burden of proving involuntariness by clear and convincing evidence, but he has provided nothing more than rank speculation. In our view, the differences indicate not reluctance or coercion, but that defendant was given ample time to reflect on and consider the plea bargain, not that he was coerced into entering the plea bargain.
Moreover, the record of the plea hearing indicates defendant was alert and responsive to the trial court’s inquiries. At one point, the trial court stated, “Now, having those rights in mind, did you wish to waive them? That means give them up, plead guilty to these three felonies. Mr. Lanteigne and Mr. Weaver, admit those special circumstances. Mr. Lanteigne, Mr. Weaver and Ms. Vredenburg, plead guilty to these two lesser related homicide offenses. This is what you want to do?” Defendant responded, “I do, aside from small matters with the district attorney, the restitution.” That exchange demonstrates defendant did not feel confused or intimidated by the proceedings, but rather was attentive and engaged.
In summary, we note this case is completely unlike Ibarra, in which the defendant’s attorney approached the defendant with the district attorney’s offer and told the defendant to take it and to sign the plea form quickly-the whole discussion was completed in 15 minutes. (Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 282.) Here, in contrast, the possibility of a plea arose on February 25, 2008, at the instigation of defendant’s and Weaver’s counsel. The trial court, which had long familiarity with the case, offered to allow defendant an opportunity to meet with his family to discuss the plea; defendant declined. Defendant initialed and signed the first two pages of the plea form on February 29. He initialed and signed the last page on March 5. He confirmed in open court that he had had sufficient time to discuss the plea with his counsel, that he understood what he was doing. Defendant has failed to show that the plea was involuntary.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KING J., MILLER J.