Opinion
F075757
06-06-2018
In re K.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.V., Defendant and Appellant.
Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 17JQ0030)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kings County. James T. LaPorte, Judge. Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, appellant K.V. took her mother's vehicle one night without permission and she drove two teenaged friends. She only had a learner's permit at the time. She lost control of the vehicle, ran off the road and the car suffered major damage. One of appellant's passengers, a lifelong friend, died from the crash.
In 2017, an original juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that appellant committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2); count I) and misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count II). She admitted these allegations before the juvenile court, which declared her a ward of the court. She was committed to nine months of GPS monitoring, not to exceed one year, with credit for 45 days served, and she was ordered to comply with "rules 1 through 25" of the GPS monitoring program. Various other terms, fines and restitution were imposed.
On appeal, appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing the GPS monitoring for nine months. She also claims that the monitoring rules were unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court's order.
BACKGROUND
I. A Relevant Summary Of The Facts Leading To Appellant's Wardship.
On May 13, 2016, appellant was involved in a solo car accident while she was driving her mother's vehicle at night. Two teenaged passengers were in the car. At the time, appellant had a learner's permit, which required her to operate the vehicle with an adult present. Appellant had taken her mother's car without her mother's permission or knowledge. No adult was present when appellant drove and crashed the car.
Appellant's mother declined to press charges for theft of the vehicle.
The accident happened when appellant was driving too fast through a curved section of roadway. Appellant later admitted she had not seen a sign warning drivers of impending curves in the road, and she had assumed the road remained straight. The posted speed limit for that road was 45 miles per hour, and the posted suggested safe speed for the curves was 35 miles per hour. Appellant drove off the road, striking a telephone pole, two trees, and a fence. The vehicle suffered major damage. One of her teenaged passengers, a lifelong friend, died as a result of injuries she suffered in the crash. The other teenaged passenger was also injured.
After the accident, appellant estimated that she had been traveling 60 miles per hour when she ran off the road.
II. A Relevant Summary Of The Juvenile Court Proceedings.
On March 27, 2017, an original juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that appellant committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2); count I) and misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count II).
The prosecutor explained that the delay in filing this petition occurred because of ongoing investigation. It was "a close call whether the People would file a misdemeanor or felony." There were initial concerns that appellant had been racing when this accident occurred, which would have prompted a felony charge. The People's investigation, however, determined that appellant had not been racing.
At the initial hearing on April 17, 2017, appellant denied the allegations. The juvenile court placed her on electronic monitoring at home. She was ordered to comply with the terms and conditions of GPS home detention. She was authorized to attend school, work, church and medical appointments.
On May 2, 2017, appellant appeared before the juvenile court and admitted the allegations set forth in the petition. The maximum period of confinement was one year two months. A probation officer submitted a disposition report which recommended, in part, that appellant should be placed on probation without wardship for a period not to exceed six months. It was noted in the disposition report that appellant was an above- average high school student, she had no prior criminal record, she had received two offers to attend universities, she had undergone counseling, and she had a supportive family.
Disposition occurred on May 31, 2017. During that proceeding, the parties disputed whether appellant should be declared a ward of the court. The prosecutor requested wardship and GPS monitoring for three months. In contrast, appellant's counsel asserted that three months of GPS monitoring would not be appropriate; appellant was a very good student who was planning on attending college in the fall, she was devastated by these events, and she was trying to move forward.
The father of the deceased victim made an impact statement and that victim's advocate read letters from the victim's mother and sister. The victim's family asked the juvenile court to give the maximum time allowed under the law.
The juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court. She was committed to nine months of GPS monitoring, not to exceed one year, with credit for 45 days served. The court ordered her to attend school without absence; return home after school each day and not leave anytime thereafter unless accompanied by her parent; and to be at her residence between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. unless accompanied by her parent or other adult having legal custody. The juvenile court ordered appellant to not drive unless properly licensed and insured, and to comply with "rules 1 through 25" of the GPS monitoring program. She was prohibited from attending her high school graduation. Various other terms, fines and restitution were ordered.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Regarding GPS Monitoring.
Appellant asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing her on GPS monitoring.
A. Standard of review.
We review the juvenile court's commitment decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Oscar A. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 750, 755.) An abuse of discretion is present if the court exceeds the bounds of all reason based on the circumstances. (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) An appellate court will not disturb the juvenile court's findings if substantial evidence supports them and we examine the record presented at the disposition hearing to analyze substantial evidence. (Ibid.) To determine substantial evidence, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in support of the juvenile court's order and we review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determinations. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
B. Analysis.
Appellant notes she was an above-average high school student in the 12th grade who had received two college scholarships. Numerous teachers submitted letters of support to the juvenile court on her behalf. She participated in counseling therapy and she has a supportive family. She claims that the court's ruling negatively impacted her ability to achieve her goals. She maintains that the court's disposition does not advance "the spirit" of the juvenile court law. Without citing to the record, she maintains she cannot work to pay restitution (or any presumed civil judgment against her), and she cannot attend college. She contends the length of her sentence served no rehabilitative purpose and substantial evidence does not support the court's ruling. We find these arguments unpersuasive.
The general purpose of the juvenile court law is to protect both the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and to preserve and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).) As a result of delinquent conduct, minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court must receive the care, treatment, and guidance that holds them accountable for their behavior, is appropriate for their circumstances, and conforms with the interest of public safety and protection. (Id. at subd. (b).)
The juvenile court law holds juveniles accountable for their delinquent conduct, which includes "punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) A juvenile court must look to the minor's best interests in all deliberations, but it shall also consider the public's safety and protection, as well as the importance of redressing injuries to victims. (Id. at subd. (d).) Under the juvenile court law, "punishment" does not include "retribution" but "means the imposition of sanctions." Such sanctions may include "[l]imitations on the minor's liberty imposed as a condition of probation or parole." (Id. at subd. (e).)
Here, although appellant's crimes were only misdemeanors and this was her first offense, her poor judgment had devastating and long-lasting consequences. She took her mother's vehicle without permission. Despite having only a learner's permit, appellant drove at night without an adult present. She drove well above the posted speed limit and failed to see a warning sign of impending curves in the road. She lost control of her vehicle and ran off the road. One of her teenaged passengers died and the other sustained injuries.
The deceased's parents and sister gave statements detailing the impact of the victim's death. These family members asked the juvenile court to impose the maximum sentence allowed by law. The maximum sentence possible was one year two months. At the dispositional hearing, appellant presented no evidence that continued GPS monitoring would prevent her from working or attending college. She also failed to argue that continued GPS monitoring would negatively impact her ability to rehabilitate.
As a result of appellant's delinquent conduct, the juvenile court was tasked with providing the care, treatment, and guidance that held her accountable for her behavior, was appropriate for the circumstances, and conformed to the interest of public safety and protection. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) In light of appellant's excessively poor choices and the devastating death that she caused, the juvenile court acted within its statutory authority when ordering appellant to remain on GPS monitoring for nine months. (Id. at subd. (e) [a minor's liberty may be limited as a condition of probation].) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings. (See In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) The court's determination did not exceed the bounds of reasons. (See In re Khalid B., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1288.) As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and this claim fails.
II. Appellant Has Forfeited A Claim That The Imposition Of The GPS Monitoring Rules Was Unconstitutionally Vague And This Claim Fails On Its Merits.
As a condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered appellant to comply with "rules 1 through 25" of the GPS monitoring program. Appellant argues that this condition was unconstitutionally vague and nothing indicates she was made aware of these regulations. She contends this matter must be reversed and remanded.
A. Standard of review.
Constitutional challenges to probation conditions are reviewed de novo. (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) To withstand a vagueness challenge, "a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition." (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 (Hall).)
B. Analysis.
Appellant argues that the GPS "rules and regulations" imposed against her are not found in the appellate record. She claims she had "no way of knowing" what conduct was or was not prohibited. She relies on In re Ana C. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 333 (Ana C.), disapproved on other grounds by Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 503, fn. 2, to establish error. We find appellant's arguments and her cited authority unpersuasive.
1. Appellant has forfeited this issue on appeal.
As an initial matter, appellant has forfeited this issue on appeal. During the dispositional hearing, appellant did not object to the imposition of this probation condition. The failure to object to a probation condition in the lower court waives the claim on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235; accord People v. Gardineer (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 148, 151.) "A timely objection allows the court to modify or delete an allegedly unreasonable condition or to explain why it is necessary in the particular case. The parties must, of course, be given a reasonable opportunity to present any relevant argument and evidence. A rule foreclosing appellate review of claims not timely raised in this manner helps discourage the imposition of invalid probation conditions and reduce the number of costly appeals brought on that basis. [Citation.]" (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235.)
To overcome forfeiture, appellant asserts that the probation condition is unconstitutionally vague on its face. A defendant may contend for the first time on appeal that a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague on its face if the challenge presents a pure question of law. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888-889.) However, a pure question of law is not present if the issue cannot be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the lower court. (Id. at p. 889.)
We reject appellant's claim that this probation condition presents a pure question of law. "An alleged constitutional defect that is 'correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to the trial court for further findings' is not a facial constitutional challenge, and traditional forfeiture principles apply. [Citation.]" (In re I.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 261.) A timely objection in the juvenile court would have called the court's attention to the issue and allowed the court to address it. The court could have modified or deleted the condition, explained why it was necessary in the particular case, or explained these rules in greater detail. (See People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235 [timely objections must be raised in the lower court to eliminate invalid probation conditions and reduce number of costly appeals].)
Here, appellant does not claim that the disputed rules and regulations are ambiguous or confusing. Instead, she asserts it is unclear whether she was given adequate notice of them. This issue cannot be resolved without examining the record developed below. As such, this issue does not present a pure question of law and the traditional rule of forfeiture applies. Thus, because appellant failed to preserve this issue by raising it below, she has forfeited this claim on appeal. In any event, we also reject this claim on its merits.
2. The probation condition was not unconstitutionally vague.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), a juvenile court may impose "any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." However, a probation condition must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him and for the court to determine whether a violation has occurred. (People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1350.) By failing to clearly define the prohibited conduct, a vague condition of probation allows law enforcement and the courts to apply the restriction on an "'"ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application." [Citation.]'" (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) To analyze whether a probation condition is unconstitutionally vague, an appellate court may consider the juvenile court's "additional oral or written comments clarifying" the condition. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 891.)
Here, based on the juvenile court's comments to appellant throughout these proceedings, it is clear that she was sufficiently apprised of the GPS rules and regulations.
Appellant was arraigned on April 17, 2017. At that hearing, the juvenile court made the following relevant comments:
". . . . The Court is going to confine her on electronics, not in custody at this point in time. There are 25 specific rules that she's required to follow when she's on electronic monitoring. If she violates any rules, she'll go back in custody. She'll need to fill out the paperwork. Make sure you go to the Probation Department with reference to potential release on electronics. Again, the explanation of the rules and regulations with reference to being out on a GPS program will be explained to you at the
time that you are placed on cuff. Essentially, what you're going to have to do is go to school and come home. I guess you can go see your lawyer as well."
Appellant subsequently sought permission from the juvenile court to go to work at a new job near her high school. In addition, the probation department requested permission for appellant to attend church and medical appointments, which was granted. The juvenile court further explained that appellant was not allowed to remove the cuff, and she could not travel without the probation department's permission.
During the pretrial conference, appellant informed the court that she "didn't get" the job near her high school and that employer did not need workers anymore. --------
On May 2, 2017, after appellant admitted the allegations set forth in the petition, the juvenile court declared her a ward of the court and ordered nine months of GPS monitoring. The court asked the probation officer if appellant was in compliance with all 25 rules of the GPS monitoring program. The probation officer confirmed that appellant had been in compliance. At no time did appellant raise any issue regarding the rules or claim that the probation department had failed to explain those requirements to her.
Based on this record, it is clear that appellant was advised of the GPS monitoring rules, and she was in compliance with them until the time of her disposition hearing. This record leaves no doubt that she received adequate notice regarding the terms of this condition of probation.
Appellant's reliance on Ana C., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th 333, is misplaced. There, the minor admitted two misdemeanors and she was declared a ward of the court. (Id. at p. 337.) The minor was placed on probation in her mother's custody and she was directed to obey all rules and regulations of electronic monitoring. (Ibid.) While she was subject to electronic monitoring, the probation department was given discretion to detain her for up to five days for any violation of court orders or for violating the electronic monitoring agreement. (Ibid.) The minor subsequently violated probation on at least two occasions. The juvenile court removed her from her mother's custody and ordered her to a girls' camp. (Id. at p. 338.) The court reinstated electronic monitoring. The probation officer was given discretion to extend the electronic monitoring, and to detain her temporarily at the girls' camp for violating the electronic monitoring program. (Id. at p. 339.)
On appeal, the Ana C. court held that the electronic monitoring condition was unconstitutionally vague on its face. (Ana C., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 351.) Nowhere in its appellate record were these rules or regulations set forth or summarized. (Ibid.) Nothing indicated that the minor was apprised of the rules and regulations, or that any steps were taken to ensure that she understood them. (Ibid.) It was further held that this condition of probation was facially vague because it had no content and potentially exposed the minor to arbitrary deprivations of her liberty. (Id. at p. 352.) Consequently, this probation condition was modified to specify that the minor shall "'obey all rules and regulations of the Electronic Monitoring Program, as posted on the probation department's website, as approved by the court, and as explained to her by her probation officer.'" (Ibid.)
Here, unlike in Ana C., the juvenile court did discuss the rules and regulations with appellant that were part of her GPS monitoring. Appellant was directed to report to the probation department, where she would receive the GPS cuff and be advised on the 25 specific rules. After she admitted the allegations set forth in the petition, the probation officer confirmed that appellant had been in compliance with the monitoring rules. At no time did appellant raise any issue regarding the rules or claim that the probation department had failed to explain those requirements to her. Although these regulations do not appear in this appellate record, it is clear that appellant was apprised of this condition of probation. Ana C. is factually distinguishable and does not dictate reversal under these circumstances.
Based on this record, it is clear that appellant was informed of the rules and regulations accompanying the GPS monitoring. We are satisfied that this probation condition was sufficiently precise for appellant to know what was required of her and for the court to determine whether a violation had occurred. (See People v. Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Nothing indicates that either law enforcement or the court could have applied these restrictions on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application. (See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Accordingly, appellant's constitutional challenge for vagueness is without merit and this claim fails.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order appealed from is affirmed.