Opinion
March 8, 1996
Appeal from the Monroe County Court, Bristol, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Lawton, Wesley, Balio and Boehm, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant failed to preserve for review his contentions that his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree should be reversed because the term "dangerous knife" is unconstitutionally vague and because County Court failed to define that term in its jury instructions ( see, CPL 470.05; People v Iannelli, 69 N.Y.2d 684, cert denied 482 U.S. 914; People v Lipton, 54 N.Y.2d 340, 351). In any event, neither issue has merit. The term "dangerous knife" is not impermissibly vague ( see, People v Kowalczyk, 162 A.D.2d 752, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 840). Defendant testified that he used the knife to defend himself, in order to "scare" the person that was "charging" at him. Thus, defendant used the knife as a weapon ( see, Matter of Jamie D., 59 N.Y.2d 589, 592; People v Limpert, 186 A.D.2d 1005, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 764) and did not controvert its dangerous nature. Under the circumstances, the court's failure to define "dangerous knife" does not warrant reversal of the conviction.