Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWF021579. John M. Monterosso, Judge.
Stephen Lathrop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Heather Crawford and Rhonda Cartwright-Ladendorf, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Larry Neil Kilpatrick pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (g)(2)). He also admitted that he had previously been convicted of the same offense of failing to register as a sex offender (§ 290, subd. (f)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) &(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). In exchange, defendant was promised a stipulated sentence of four years in state prison. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that his guilty plea must be vacated because there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I
The details of defendant’s criminal conduct are not relevant to the limited issue defendant raises in this appeal. We will recount only those procedural facts that are pertinent to the issues we must resolve in this appeal.
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to find a factual basis for his plea, and instead only made the required statement that it found a factual basis. We conclude that the court established an adequate factual basis for the plea.
We reject the People’s claim that defendant waived this issue as part of his plea agreement. The felony plea form is equivocal on whether he waived his right to appeal.
“Section 1192.5 provides that for a conditional plea of guilty or no contest, the trial court is required to ‘cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.’ While there is no federal constitutional requirement for this factual basis inquiry, the statutory mandate of section 1192.5 helps ensure that the ‘constitutional standards of voluntariness and intelligence are met.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 438, fn. omitted (Holmes).)
“[A] trial court possesses wide discretion in determining whether a sufficient factual basis exists for a guilty plea. The trial court’s acceptance of the guilty plea, after pursuing an inquiry to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the plea, will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A finding of error under this standard will qualify as harmless where the contents of the record support a finding of a factual basis for the conditional plea. [Citations.]” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.)
In Holmes, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to count 1 in the complaint filed against him, in exchange for the dismissal of another count. When ascertaining whether there was a factual basis for the plea, the court asked the defendant, “Did you do what it says you did in Count 1 on March 24th, 2000 in Riverside County?” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 437.) The defendant answered in the affirmative, and the court found that there was a factual basis for the plea. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the defendant in Holmes argued that the trial court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his plea in accordance with section 1192.5. (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 438.) This court affirmed, finding that the trial court had fulfilled its duty by its inquiry. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court agreed, noting that count 1 of the complaint to which the trial court referred “contained the charged offense, the names of defendant and the victim, the date and location of the charged offense, and a brief description of the factual basis for the charged offense.” (Id. at p. 443.) The Supreme Court found that the complaint provided a sufficiently precise factual account of the charged offense, and that “the trial court’s questioning of defendant about the factual basis in the complaint was adequate to establish that defendant was cognizant that his acts did constitute the offense with which he was charged.... [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
In the instant case, the record demonstrates that an on-the-record inquiry as to the factual basis was made by the trial court prior to accepting defendant’s guilty plea. The trial court referred to the “paperwork which indicates that you’ve reached a resolution in your case, in that you’re going to plead guilty to Count 1, a violation of Penal Code Section 290(g)(2), a felony. Within that complaint and that count there’s also an allegation of a prior conviction of a similar nature, and that you’ll admit that as well.” The complaint charged defendant with committing “a violation of Penal Code section 290, subdivision (g), subsection (2), a felony, in that on or about May 8, 2007, in the County of Riverside, State of California, he was a person who was required by section 290... to register with Riverside County Sheriff Hemet and did willfully and unlawfully fail, refuse, and neglect to register as required, said defendant having previously been convicted of the crime of ASS[A]ULT WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT RAPE in violation of Penal Code section 220 on February 10, 1989... and the crime of FAILING TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER WITH OTHER PRIOR in violation of Penal Code section 290[,] subdivision (G)[,] subsection (2), on May 31, 2001....”
The trial court asked defendant, “Then, as to Count 1, a violation of Penal Code section 290(g)(2), a felony, what is your plea?” Defendant responded, “Guilty.” The court also asked defendant, “And did you plead guilty to Count 1 because you did in fact commit the crime that’s alleged in Count 1?” Defendant responded, “Yes, sir.” Moreover, the “paperwork” or the felony plea form the court referred to included defendant’s initial to the paragraph referring to the factual basis for the plea. Defendant initialed paragraph C(6), which states, “Factual Basis: I agree that I did the things that are stated in the charges that I am admitting.”
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the court established a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Defendant’s attempts to distinguish Holmes are unavailing.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court’s on-the-record inquiry was insufficient under Holmes, any error was harmless. This record contains a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea. Defendant acknowledged in the felony plea form that he agreed there was factual basis for the plea and that he “did the things that are stated in the charges...” The complaint contained the charged offense, the name of defendant, the date and location of the charged offense, and a brief description of the factual basis for the charged offense. As in Holmes, the complaint here provided “a sufficiently precise factual account of the charged offense....” (Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 443.) Defendant decided to enter into a negotiated plea in which he received significant benefits in exchange for his guilty plea. As a result, the court conducted a hearing in which it accepted his guilty plea. This was not a trial defendant had foregone his right to a trial. While the trial court was required under section 1192.5 to inquire and ascertain a prima facie factual basis for the plea, it was not obligated to determine if defendant was guilty or not guilty of the offense, as defendant attempts to argue in his opening brief.
II
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., McKINSTER, J.
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