Summary
noting that, although "evidence of flight alone is insufficient to justify an arrest," "when combined with other indicia of criminal activity, evidence of flight weighs heavily in determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest"
Summary of this case from Parker v. BulikOpinion
March 25, 1991
Appeal from the County Court, Westchester County (LaCava, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We agree with the County Court's determination that the defendant's arrest was predicated upon probable cause (CPL 140.10 [b]). Two police officers observed the defendant late at night, fleeing from behind a darkened store, the burglar alarm of which was ringing. Acting upon their reasonable suspicions (see, People v De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210), the officers stopped the defendant for a brief, investigatory, non-custodial interrogation (see, People v Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29). The defendant provided evasive and unlikely responses to the officers' routine questions and after they confirmed that there had in fact been a burglary, the officers arrested him.
The sight of a running individual alone certainly does not provide probable cause for a forceable seizure (see, People v Ross, 67 A.D.2d 955) and evidence of flight alone is similarly insufficient to justify an arrest (see, People v Diaz, 103 A.D.2d 82). However, when combined with other indicia of criminal activity, evidence of flight weighs heavily in determining whether probable cause exists to make an arrest (see, People v Valo, 92 A.D.2d 1004; see also, People v Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, affd sub nom. Sibron v New York, 392 U.S. 40; People v Simmons, 114 A.D.2d 476; People v Medina, 107 A.D.2d 302). In the instant case, the defendant's flight from a crime scene, combined with his improbable responses and all of the surrounding circumstances, gave rise to a reasonable belief that it was more probable than not that a crime had been committed and that the defendant had committed it. Since his arrest was based upon probable cause, the defendant's motion to suppress his inculpatory statements and physical evidence as the fruits of an illegal arrest was properly denied.
Similarly without merit is the defendant's alternative argument that his statement was subject to suppression due to coercive police interrogation tactics. The record establishes, without controversion, that the defendant was twice advised of his constitutional rights, that he waived them, and that he signed a waiver form without ever uttering a protest. He made an inculpatory statement after 20 minutes of questioning which was designed only to elicit pedigree information. The defendant's waiver was clearly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and was not rendered less so merely because the interrogating officers confronted him with compelling evidence of his guilt (see, People v Glasper, 160 A.D.2d 723; People v Dyla, 142 A.D.2d 423; see also, People v Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1). Suppression was thus properly denied on this ground as well.
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see, e g., People v Gardner, 150 A.D.2d 722; People v Tuttle, 141 A.D.2d 584; People v Grady, 110 A.D.2d 780). Thompson, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.