Opinion
1-17-0031
09-30-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. No. 99 CR 11718 Honorable Diane Cannon, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment. Justice Walker dissented.
ORDER
COGHLAN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly dismissed defendant's postconviction petition at the first stage because he failed to state the "gist of a constitutional claim."
¶ 2 At the age of 19, defendant Christopher Jones shot Jerry Lemons to death and was charged with first-degree murder. Defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to an agreed term of 105 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) with defendant to receive day-for-day credit, to be served concurrently to previously imposed consecutive sentences for first-degree murder in 99 CR 6060 (sentenced to 50 years IDOC) and attempt murder in 98 CR 26158 (sentenced to 30 years IDOC). In this appeal, defendant challenges the circuit court's first stage dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief (petition), arguing that his sentence is unconstitutional under the principles articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art 1. § 11). We affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On December 10, 2003, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, withdrawing his not-guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of 105 years in the IDOC with day-for-day credit to run concurrent to the consecutive sentences of 50 years in the IDOC for the first-degree murder of Johnnie Brown (99 CR 6060) and 30 years for the attempt murder of Tillman Williams (98 CR 26158). As part of the factual basis for defendant's guilty plea, the parties stipulated that at about 2:30 a.m. on May 30, 1998, defendant approached Lemons, who was in the driver's seat of a van near 229 south Western Avenue. Defendant pulled a gun from his waistband, fired the gun at Lemons, and ran away. Lemons died of multiple gunshot wounds. Several individuals witnessed the shooting, including defendant's then girlfriend who saw him running from the van with the gun in his hand. Nine days later, defendant was arrested for a different offense (98 CR 22791) and charged with armed violence, delivery of a controlled substance, and unlawful use of a firearm by a felon. At the time of his arrest, he was in possession of the .38 caliber gun he used to murder Lemons. On April 15, 1999, defendant confessed to murdering Lemons in a recorded statement.
On September 13, 2002, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder in case number 99 CR 6060.
¶ 5 During the plea hearing, defendant stated that he understood he could face natural life in prison for this charge should he elect to go to trial. He chose not to say anything before sentencing and waived updating his presentence investigation report (PSI). The circuit court accepted defendant's guilty plea and imposed the negotiated sentence. Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or file a direct appeal.
The State withdrew its recommended death penalty sentence during plea negotiations.
A PSI was prepared for defendant's first-degree murder conviction in case number 99 CR 6060.
¶ 6 On June 1, 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was a de facto life sentence imposed without any consideration of his "age and lack of mature brain development as mitigating factors in sentencing." On August 22, 2016, the circuit court summarily dismissed his petition, finding that his claims were "frivolous and patently without merit." On September 22, 2016, defendant filed a motion to reconsider, providing additional mitigating information about his background and relying on "recent research and articles" to argue that "the brain doesn't finish developing until the mid-20s." The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider.
Defendant also argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea proceedings because counsel failed to secure the allegedly originally offered "50 years at 50%" that he was under the impression he agreed to when he accepted the plea. Defendant did not address those claims in this appeal.
Defendant stated in his pro se petition that "at the time of the offense [he] was 18 years of age." However, the parties agree and the record reflects that defendant was 19 years old.
¶ 7 ANALYSIS
¶ 8 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/100 et seq. (West 2016)) provides a procedural mechanism for a criminal defendant to assert violations of his constitutional rights at sentencing under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois or both. People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 31; People v. Gomez, 2020 IL App (1st) 173016, ¶ 23. A petition is summarily dismissed at the first stage of postconviction proceedings if it is "frivolous or is patently without merit," meaning it "has no arguable basis either in law or in fact." People v. Hatter, 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 23. A petition lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if it is" 'based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.'" Id. (quoting People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 16 (2009)). The threshold for a petition to survive first stage summary dismissal is low and a petition is viable where it merely states "the gist of a constitutional claim." Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. We review the dismissal of a petition at the first stage de novo. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 9 Defendant argues that his "as-applied challenge under the Eighth Amendment and Proportionate Penalties Clause" of the Illinois Constitution to his" de facto life sentence" for an offense he committed as a "young adult" raised an arguable basis in law and fact.
¶ 10 "The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments' (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV)." Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 37. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment "forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders." 567 U.S. at 479. Millers eighth amendment protections extend only to juveniles and "[c]laims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older have been repeatedly rejected." People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61; see People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 49; People v. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001, ¶ 28. Therefore, defendant's eighth amendment challenge fails because he was 19 years old and not a juvenile when he committed the first-degree murder. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001, ¶ 28.
¶ 11 Defendant's proportionate penalties challenge also fails. The Illinois proportionate- penalties clause provides that" [a] ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11. A defendant prevails on a proportionate penalties claim where he shows "that the penalty imposed is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community." People v. Klepper, 234 Ill.2d 337, 348 (2009). An imprisonment sentence greater than 40 years imposed on a juvenile constitutes a de facto life sentence. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.
¶ 12 Defendant raises an as-applied, youth-based challenge to his sentence relying on the principles articulated in Miller to claim that his sentence "is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community." Klepper, 234 Ill.2d at 348. By definition, an "as applied" challenge "is dependent on the particular circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner." People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37.
¶ 13 In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to shooting and killing Lemons in exchange for receiving 105 years in the IDOC with day-for-day credit, to be served concurrently to previously imposed consecutive sentences of 50 years for first-degree murder and 30 years for attempt murder. The discretionary, concurrent sentence imposed for committing a second murder at the age of 19 was not "so wholly disproportionate that it shocks the moral sense of the community." See Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 62, 65 (day-for-day credit should be factored in when determining whether a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole had been imposed on a juvenile for challenges under the eighth amendment). In this regard, defendant's case is analogous to People v. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001, ¶ 30, and People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, where this court rejected a defendant's attempt to extend Miller via. the proportionate penalties clause to young adults for crimes they personally committed.
¶ 14 In Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001, ¶¶ 3, 4, the 19-year-old defendant entered the apartment of a 69-year-old woman and stabbed her to death. He was convicted of residential burglary and murder and sentenced to 55 years' imprisonment. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant sought, and was denied, leave to file a successive postconviction petition on the basis that his 55-year sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated the proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶ 21. We affirmed, finding that his "55-year sentence for residential burglary and a senseless murder, which he committed as the principal at the legal age of adulthood, does not shock the moral sense of the community and thus is not cruel or degrading." Id. ¶ 30.
¶ 15 Similarly, in Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213, ¶¶ 37, 40, the 18½-year-old defendant was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment for home invasion, armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Id. ¶ 37. This court rejected defendant's Miller claim, explaining:
"Whether a defendant physically committed the offense is a significant consideration for courts tasked with deciding whether to extend Miller principles to a young adult under the proportionate penalties clause. [Citations.] Here, we cannot overlook defendant's active participation where he invaded the victims' house with the codefendants, held a gun to Mr. W.'s head to prevent him from interfering while the codefendants robbed and attacked his family and kidnapped his young daughter, and then actively participated in the gang rape."Id. ¶ 40 (citing People v. Pittman, 2018 IL App (1st) 152030, ¶ 38 (not extending Miller principles where the 18-year-old defendant was the perpetrator of the violent stabbing deaths of three victims); Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶ 34 (not extending Miller principles where the 18-year-old defendant was the shooter and his convictions were based on his own actions instead of accountability for the acts of another); People v. Ybarra, 2016 IL App (1st) 142407, ¶ 27 (not extending Miller principles where the 20-year-old defendant was the one who "pulled the trigger")).
¶ 16 Likewise, in this case, we cannot overlook defendant's personal culpability in murdering Lemons by shooting him multiple times, anymore than we can overlook the fact that defendant had a previous conviction for an unrelated murder.
¶ 17 Defendant's reliance on People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 46, 64, appeal allowed, 140 N.E. 3d 231 (Ill. 2020), is misplaced. In Harris, the defendant received a mandatory 76-year sentence for a murder and attempt murder he committed at the age of 18. Id. ¶ 16. At sentencing, the trial court stated, "I'm sorry that the sentencing parameters are such that my options are somewhat limited." Id. Our supreme court rejected defendant's proportionate penalties claim on direct appeal, finding it "premature," but reiterated that defendant was "not necessarily foreclosed" from raising his claim in a postconviction petition." Id. ¶¶ 46, 48.
¶ 18 A year later, in House, we vacated a mandatory natural life sentence for a 19-year-old who acted as a lookout while his fellow gang members committed a murder. Id. ¶¶ 64, 65. In doing so, this court found that the trial court's "ability to take any [mitigating] factors into consideration was negated by the mandatory nature of defendant's sentence." We also found that "[g]iven defendant's age, his family background, his actions as a lookout as opposed to being the actual shooter, and lack of any prior violent convictions, *** [his] mandatory sentence of natural life shocks the moral sense of the community." Id. ¶ 64.
¶ 19 Here, unlike in Harris and House, mandatory sentencing provisions were not implicated, nor was defendant convicted for a crime in which he lacked personal involvement. Although defendant was eligible for a natural life prison sentence, the trial court exercised its discretion and imposed the negotiated sentence of 105 years with day-for-day credit (52.5 years), which is being served concurrent with his separate convictions for the first-degree murder of Johnnie Brown and the attempt murder of Tillman Williams. Given the seriousness of these offenses, defendant cannot show that the discretionary and agreed to sentence imposed for murdering Lemons was cruel and degrading under the proportionate penalties clause, notwithstanding the evolving standards of decency afforded to young adults. See People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 12406, ¶ 33 ("[t]he constitutional flaw with mandatory life sentences is their mandatoriness"); People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 214 (2010) (defendant's rehabilitative potential should not be afforded greater weight than the seriousness of the offense); People v. Henderson, 211 Ill.2d 90, 103 (2004) ("A circuit court may reject a plea in the exercise of sound judicial discretion"); People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill.2d 494, 513 (1992) ("[a] sentence does not offend the requirement of proportionality if it is commensurate with the seriousness of the crime and gives adequate consideration to the rehabilitative potential of the defendant"); People v. Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043, ¶ 33 (a reviewing court may not substitute our judgement for that of the sentencing court). Accordingly, defendant's petition lacks an arguable basis as a matter of law.
As a result of this offense, Tillman Williams is now disabled.
¶ 20 Even assuming arguendo that Miller applies, defendant is not entitled to further postconviction proceedings for an as-applied challenge to his sentence based on a consideration of his youth and specific circumstances of his life. Relevant "youth and attendant circumstances" include, but are not limited to: "(1) the juvenile defendant's chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant's degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressure that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant's incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant's prospects for rehabilitation." People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46.
¶ 21 At defendant's plea hearing, the trial court considered the PSI, which included details addressing his age, difficult childhood "because of the gang related shootings in his neighborhood," tenth grade education, gang involvement, daily marijuana use since the age of thirteen, and history of convictions. Defendant elaborated on those factors during the postconviction proceedings, stating that he "faced far greater challenges in his life that influence his decision making and choices" citing his gang involvement and pressures from gangs. But in this case, as stated, the court was not bound by a mandatory sentencing scheme and defendant received a reduced punishment through his negotiated sentence. See People v. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151, ¶ 80 (quoting Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27) ("a defendant seeking relief under the Miller line of cases 'must show that *** the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics'-a showing that, one might think, would entail more than observing that the court did not explicitly recite the Miller factors."). Therefore, defendant's petition fails to explain, in any meaningful way, how his reduced and negotiated sentence was disproportionate as applied to him.
¶ 22 We acknowledge that a number of recent panels of this court have held that 18 and 19- year-old defendants who received discretionary life sentences (de facto or otherwise) for murder were entitled to raise Miller claims in postconviction proceedings, but we do not find those cases persuasive under the facts of this case. As discussed, we find Carrion, Handy, and the cases cited therein to be more persuasive on the issue of discretionary sentences for young adult defendants who are personally culpable for their crimes, particularly based on defendant's violent and extensive criminal history.
See Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶¶ 33, 59 (life without the possibility of parole imposed on the defendant who was 18 years old at the time of the murder and had no prior convictions); People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶¶ 6, 33 (natural life in prison without the possibility of parole imposed on a defendant who was 18 at the time of the murder with mental health conditions); People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶ 6 (discretionary natural life sentence imposed on the defendant who was 19 at time of the murder); People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶¶ 17, 18 (discretionary 40-year sentence imposed on the defendant who was 18 at time of the murder); People v. Carrasuillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶¶ 1, 11 (indeterminate sentence of 200 to 600 years' imprisonment imposed on the defendant who was 18 years old at the time of the murder with no prior record); People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541, ¶¶ 2, 13 (sentence of 50 years' imprisonment imposed on a defendant who was 19 at the time of the murder with no violent criminal history or gang affiliation).
¶ 23 Even under the lower "gist of a constitutional violation" standard applied at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, we find that defendant's petition is "based on an indisputably meritless theory" and lacks an arguable basis in law and fact. For all the reasons set forth herein, the summary dismissal of defendant's petition is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
¶ 25 JUSTICE WALKER, dissenting:
¶ 26 I respectfully dissent because at the first stage, the purpose of the proceedings is to offer evidence from outside the record to support constitutional claims, and a petitioner needs only satisfy low pleading requirements. People v. Brown, 236 Ill.2d 175, 184, 923 N.E.2d 748, 337 Ill.Dec. 897 (2010). Here, Jones has alleged the gist of a constitutional claim by pleading that his de facto life sentence of 105 years for a crime committed at age 19 is unconstitutional where the trial judge did not consider the characteristics attendant to youth. Jones's pro se petition also alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea proceedings because trial counsel did not secure the original offer of 50 years at 50% to which Jones agreed. I would find the pleadings show Jones may provide information that was not presented to the trial court at the original sentencing hearing that could cast doubt on the propriety of the de facto life sentence. Accordingly, I would allow that claim to move forward for adversarial testing.
¶ 27 As the majority correctly states, an "as applied" challenge "is dependent on the particular circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner." Supra at ¶ 12, citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. However, the majority concludes that the challenge here fails on two grounds. First, the majority analogizes the facts of this case to People v. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001 and People v. Handy, 2019 IL App (1st) 170213 and rejects the claim because Jones actively participated in the offense. Because I disagree with the analyses in Carrion and Handy, I likewise reject the majority's reasoning.
¶ 28 Jones shot Jerry Lemons to death and pleaded guilty in exchange for receiving 105 years in the IDOC with day-for-day credit, to be served concurrently to previously imposed sentences for first-degree murder and attempt murder. He was no angel, but bad acts do not preclude Miller protection. "[O]ne of the most fundamental aspects of the Supreme Court's Miller line of cases insists that juvenile sentencing considerations apply even to those who commit heinous crimes- extending constitutional protections to juveniles who commit murder." People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶ 38. Consequently, if Jones can show that Miller applies to him, it would not matter that he acted as the principal as opposed to the lookout. Additionally, the challenge does not require, or even request, that this court "overlook [his] personal culpability," only that the trial court consider his youth and the specific circumstances of his life.
¶ 29 In a similar vein, the majority is also wrong in its second reason for rejecting the challenge: the discretionary nature of Jones' sentence. The majority distinguishes People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B from this case because those cases involved mandatory sentences. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has extended Miller protections to juveniles who receive discretionary life sentences. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 27. Again, if Jones can show that Miller principles apply to him as a young adult, the discretionary nature of his sentence will not preclude those protections.
¶ 30 The issue in this case is whether Jones can show that Miller principles apply to him. In his pro se post-conviction petition and motion to reconsider, Jones cited scientific findings on human brain development and argued that because he was only 19 years old at the time of the incident, his brain was not fully developed, and he should be considered a juvenile for the purposes of sentencing. The petition also described his traumatic personal history, including gang competition that led to the murder of his mother and someone trying to decapitate his young brothers. Because of these tragic and unique circumstances, Jones may have suffered stunted mental development and maturity. We do not know for sure because none of the factors set forth in Holman were presented to the trial court at Jones's sentencing hearing.
¶ 31 The majority states that the Holman factors were considered because at the plea hearing, "the trial court considered the PSI, which included details addressing his age, difficult childhood 'because of the gang related shootings in his neighborhood,' tenth grade education, gang involvement, daily marijuana use since the age of thirteen, and history of convictions." Supra at ¶ 21. However, Jones was sentenced pre-Miller and since his sentencing, the science has evolved to show that the brains of young adults continue to develop into their mid-20's. The trial court could not have contemplated this fact as it was not widely known at the time. Additionally, the trial court could not "have viewed the relevant sentencing facts in their proper constitutional scope when the law applying Miller principles to young adults through the proportionate penalties clause was and still is not settled." People v. Thompson, 2021 IL App (1st) 180297-U, ¶ 49 (Justice Hyman, dissenting). Our supreme court observed that further development was needed where the record was lacking evidence of how the evolving science of juvenile maturity affected young adult offenders and where it "include[d] only basic information about defendant" from the presentence report. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46. Here, Jones did not have the opportunity to present the evolving science of juvenile maturity, and he deserves that opportunity.
¶ 32 This court should be asking two questions. First, are the factual allegations Jones makes "fantastic or delusional"? (People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 25) They are not. Presuming the factual claims to be true and construed liberally, the claims depend on information outside the record. Second, is the legal claim "indisputably meritless"? Id. Until our supreme court weighs in on the legal arguments for applying Miller principles to a young adult offender, the claims are not indisputably meritless.
¶ 33 Accounting for the extra-record evidence and the proper standard of first stage review, Jones's petition states the "gist" of a constitutional claim. Jones should be permitted to test that claim in further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.