Opinion
April 10, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.).
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's claim of a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.30) has been forfeited by the entry of his guilty pleas (see, People v O'Brien, 56 N.Y.2d 1009; People v Suarez, 55 N.Y.2d 940; People v Gerber, 182 A.D.2d 252) as well as expressly waived by him as part of his waiver of the right to appeal (see, People v Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273; People v Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1). Moreover, upon our consideration of the appropriate factors (see, Barker v Wingo, 407 U.S. 514; People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442), we find that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not compromised under the circumstances of this case (see, e.g., People v Allen, 203 A.D.2d 97; People v McCummings, 203 A.D.2d 656; People v Allah, 202 A.D.2d 599).
Additionally, contrary to the defendant's contention, the fact that his first trial ended in a mistrial did not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The mistrial was granted upon the motion of the defendant's counsel, and there is no suggestion that the motion was provoked by any conduct on the part of the prosecution (see, e.g., Matter of Roman v Brown, 175 A.D.2d 899; Matter of Cavaliere v Judges of Supreme Ct., 157 A.D.2d 722; see generally, People v Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388).
Similarly unavailing is the defendant's contention that the court erred in denying his application to withdraw his guilty pleas. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the court (see, People v Evans, 204 A.D.2d 346; People v Pettway, 140 A.D.2d 721), and a guilty plea will be upheld if it was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see, People v Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536; People v Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9). The court provided the defendant with a complete opportunity to set forth the basis of his motion and conducted an extensive hearing on the matter. In light of the credible evidence adduced at the hearing, and the record of the plea proceeding which demonstrated the validity of the pleas and refuted the defendant's unsubstantiated assertions of coercion and off-the-record promises, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the court's denial of the motion (see, People v Evans, supra; People v Bates, 204 A.D.2d 473; People v Howard, 138 A.D.2d 525). Sullivan, J.P., Copertino, Pizzuto and Krausman, JJ., concur.