Summary
In People v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 199, 564 P.2d 116 (1977), we invalidated the theft by receiving statute because it imposed liability on a person who disposed of an item "having reasonable cause to believe" that the item had been stolen.
Summary of this case from People v. FordOpinion
No. 27291
Decided May 16, 1977.
Defendant was convicted of theft by receiving of five rifles for $75 each, which rifles were valued by their owner at about $1125.
Reversed
1. THEFT — By Receiving — Statute — Mental State — Unconstitutional — State of Mind — Reasonably Prudent Man — Negative. Portion of theft by receiving statute defining the mental state as including "having reasonable cause to believe" is unconstitutional by reason of overbreadth; the standard of culpability, in order to be constitutional, must be what the state of mind of the particular defendant was, not what a jury concludes might be that of a fictional reasonably prudent man.
2. CRIMINAL LAW — Negligence — Ordinary Prudent Man — Conviction — Constitutional Proscription. There is a constitutional proscription against conviction of a defendant charged with felony by theft if it is predicated upon his negligence or his failure to exercise the intelligence of an ordinary prudent man.
3. THEFT — Receiving — Belief — Stolen — Specific Intent — Conviction — Constitutional. If a defendant receives a thing of value believing it to have been stolen and with the specific intent to deprive the owner of the article permanently, his conviction of theft by receiving does not violate the constitution.
Appeal from the District Court of El Paso County, Honorable Patrick M. Hinton, Judge.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy, Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, David K. Rees, Assistant, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy, Peter Schild, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.
Five rifles, valued by their owner at about $1,125, were taken in a burglary of the owner's residence. Defendant purchased these rifles for $75 each. In a trial to the court he was convicted of theft by receiving. Section 18-4-410(1) and (2), C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Supp.). We remand for further findings.
The above cited statute provides:
"(1) A person commits theft by receiving when he receives, retains, loans money by pawn or pledge on, or disposes of anything of value of another knowing or believing or having reasonable cause to believe that said thing of value has been stolen and intends to deprive the lawful owner permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value.
"(2) Where the value of the thing involved is two hundred dollars or more, theft by receiving is a class 4 felony." (Emphasis added).
If the court had found that the defendant knew that the rifles were stolen, we would affirm the conviction. The court, however, found him guilty for another reason or reasons. Specifically, the court stated:
"In fact, as far as this Court is concerned, it is not beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that these were stolen . . . but he no doubt believed and he had reasonable cause to believe that they were stolen.
* * * *
"Mr. Johnson, you are guilty. . . ."
As the court found that knowledge of the theft was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we must pass upon the question of whether either of the elements of belief that an article was stolen or having a reasonable cause so to believe passes constitutional muster.
[1,2] We hold that that portion of the statute defining the mental state as including "having reasonable cause to believe" is unconstitutional by reason of overbreadth. In order for a statute such as this to be constitutional there must be a knowledge or belief by the defendant that the goods were stolen. There is a constitutional proscription against conviction of a defendant charged with felony by theft if it is predicated upon his negligence or his failure to exercise the intelligence of an ordinary prudent man. The standard of culpability, in order to be constitutional, must be what the state of mind of the particular defendant was, not what a jury concludes might be that of a fictional reasonably prudent man. See Von Sprecken v. State, 70 Ga. App. 222, 28 S.E.2d 341 (1943); Commonwealth v. Boris, 317 Mass. 309, 58 N.E.2d 8 (1944); and Annot. 147 A.L.R. 1058 and supplements thereto.
The statute contains the following elements:
(1) Receiving a thing of value;
(2) (a) knowing or
(b) believing or
(c) having a reasonable cause to believe that the article had been stolen;
(3) with specific intent to deprive the lawful owner thereof permanently.
The matter of "knowing" is not the subject of constitutional attack. As we have already stated, "having a reasonable cause to believe" is unconstitutional. This leaves remaining the element of "believing."
[3] There are two lines of authority on the element of believing. See State v. Beale, 299 A.2d 921 (Me. 1973). One line of authority would equate "belief" with "knowledge," i.e., treat knowledge and belief as synonomous. See State v. Redeman, 9 Or. App. 329, 496 P.2d 230 (1972). Particularly by reason of the necessity of finding a specific intent on the part of the defendant to deprive the lawful owner of the article permanently, we follow the rule that, if a defendant receives a thing of value believing it to have been stolen and with the specific intent just mentioned, his conviction of theft does not violate the constitution. See Von Sprecken v. State, supra, and Commonwealth v. Boris, supra.
We do not have a situation in which the property was not in fact stolen. Therefore, we do not reach the question of constitutionality of a conviction of a defendant who believes unstolen property was stolen.
The trial judge stated that the defendant "no doubt believed and he had reasonable cause to believe that [the rifles] were stolen." We are unsure whether there were two distinct findings, one of belief and the other of reasonable cause to believe. Therefore, we must remand this cause to the trial judge for more specific findings. If he finds that the defendant believed the goods to have been stolen, then the defendant's conviction stands affirmed. If he cannot make such a finding, then he should render judgment of acquittal.
The cause is remanded with directions to proceed as indicated above.
MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON specially concurs.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY dissents.