Summary
In People v Johnson (30 N.Y.2d 929, 930) the court said: "Absent an articulate foundation for the entrenchment upon individual liberty and privacy which a stop and frisk entails, police suspicions remain merely `hunches' and are not reasonable within section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure [the predecessor of CPL 140.50]."
Summary of this case from People v. TinsleyOpinion
Argued June 8, 1972
Decided July 7, 1972
Appeal from the Supreme Court for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts of the Second Judicial Department, JULIUS CHINMAN, J.
G. Jeffrey Sorge, James J. McDonough and Matthew Muraskin for appellant.
William Cahn, District Attorney ( Henry P. DeVine of counsel), for respondent.
Order reversed and the information dismissed in the following memorandum: On the record before us, neither the stop nor the frisk of appellant was justified by reasonable suspicions on the part of the police. (Code Crim. Pro., § 180-a; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.) Absent an articulable foundation for the entrenchment upon individual liberty and privacy which a stop and frisk entails, police suspicions remain merely "hunches" and are not reasonable within section 180-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Cf. People v. Arthurs, 24 N.Y.2d 688; People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335.) Accordingly, the conviction of appellant should be reversed and the information dismissed.
Concur: Chief Judge FULD and Judges BURKE, SCILEPPI, BERGAN, BREITEL, JASEN and GIBSON.