Summary
holding that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause for an arrest
Summary of this case from People v. AlbrittonOpinion
April 1, 1996
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Wexner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The People established that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant. Probable cause may be supplied, in whole or in part, through hearsay information ( People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342, 345; People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423; People v. Cruz, 191 A.D.2d 507, 508). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli rule ( see, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410), when probable cause is predicated in whole or in part upon the hearsay statement of an informant, it must be demonstrated that (1) the informant disclosed a sufficient basis for his or her knowledge, and (2) the informant was reliable (see, People v. Parris, supra). Further, the basis-of-knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli are analytically independent and each must be satisfied separately ( see, People v. Chase, 85 N.Y.2d 493; People v. DiFalco, 80 N.Y.2d 693, 696; People v. Bigelow, supra; People v Brown, 205 A.D.2d 791). "[I]nformation provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest" ( People v. Phillips, 120 A.D.2d 621; see, People v Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 403; People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90).
In the instant case, the disclosed informant was an individual who admitted to using a credit card stolen by the defendant from one of the defendant's victims. Since his statement not only subjected him to a potential penalty for providing the police with fabricated information ( see, Penal Law § 240.50; People v McCain, 134 A.D.2d 623; People v. Phillips, supra) but also admitted his own criminal conduct ( see, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573; People v. Johnson, supra, at 402; People v Greene, 153 A.D.2d 439, 444, cert denied 498 U.S. 947), we find that the prosecution established this witness's veracity.
The "basis-of-knowledge" prong of the test may be satisfied upon a showing that the information furnished is so detailed as to make it clear that it must have been based upon personal knowledge ( see, People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 424, supra; People v. Isaac, 206 A.D.2d 545). In order to satisfy the "basis-of-knowledge" prong, it is not necessary that the informant have personally viewed the criminal activity ( see, People v. Greene, supra, at 444; United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 324, n 6; United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866; United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, cert denied sub nom. Yassen v United States, 414 U.S. 1129; United States v. Fiorela, 468 F.2d 688, cert denied 417 U.S. 917). This informant, who was with the defendant prior to and immediately after the crime, explained in detail how the defendant planned the crime, took a gun from where it had been secreted, left to commit the robbery, returned with the fruits of the robbery, and talked about the details of the robbery. The information provided by the informant was consistent with the details already learned by the police during their investigation. "`What is required is information of such quality, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into possession of the informant, that a reasonable observer would be warranted in determining that the basis of the informant's knowledge was such that it led logically to the conclusion that a crime had been * * * committed'" by the defendant ( People v. Reid, 184 A.D.2d 668; People v. Greene, supra, 153 A.D.2d, at 444; People v. Restrepo, 87 A.D.2d 320, 323-324). Based on the evidence before the hearing court, we are convinced that the People established the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge.
Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Rosenblatt, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter and Goldstein, JJ., concur.