Opinion
KA 04-01786.
February 3, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Steuben County Court (Peter C. Bradstreet, J.), rendered July 19, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial on stipulated facts, of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (two counts).
D.J. J.A. CIRANDO, ESQS., SYRACUSE (REBECCA A. CRANCE OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JOHN C. TUNNEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATH (BROOKS T. BAKER OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
Present: Kehoe, J.P., Martoche, Smith, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a nonjury trial on stipulated facts of two counts of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75 [b]). In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following the same nonjury trial of bribing a witness (§ 215.00). We reject the contention of defendant concerning the alleged invalidity of his waiver of the right to appeal. Defendant executed a written waiver of the right to appeal, and the record establishes that the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent ( see People v. Johnston, 17 AD3d 1103, lv denied 5 AD3d 829). That waiver encompasses defendant's contention regarding the severity of the sentences imposed in each appeal ( see People v. Lococo, 92 NY2d 825, 827) and, in addition, encompasses defendant's contention concerning the alleged error of County Court in conducting a bench trial on stipulated facts. Defendant specifically requested a bench trial on stipulated facts in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence, and he waived his right to appeal with respect to proceeding in that manner. In any event, there is no error in conducting a bench trial on stipulated facts ( see People v. Harler, 296 AD2d 712, 713; People v. Boateng, 246 AD2d 749, 749-750, lv denied 91 NY2d 970).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary ( see People v. Staples, 19 AD3d 1096, lv denied 5 NY3d 810; People v. Williams, 5 AD3d 1043, 1044, lv denied 2 NY3d 809). That contention is without merit in any event because defendant's waiver of the right to a jury trial was both in writing and executed in open court ( see NY Const, art I, § 2; CPL 320.10; Staples, 19 AD3d at 1096-1097), and "the record establishes that defendant's waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent" ( People v. Wegman, 2 AD3d 1333, 1334, lv denied 2 NY3d 747). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review his contentions concerning the court's failure to advise him that he was subject to a period of postrelease supervision and that he was subject to registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law § 168 et seq.; see People v. Ginter, 23 AD3d 1064), and we decline to exercise our power to review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( see CPL 470.15 [a]). Finally, contrary to the contention of defendant, he received effective assistance of counsel ( see generally People v. Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147).