Opinion
E079719
01-19-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEARLINE JACKSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn A. Kirschbaum and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. INF2100224 Dean Benjamini, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn A. Kirschbaum and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MCKINSTER ACTING P. J.
A court found defendant and appellant Pearline Jackson guilty of arson of a structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c), count 1), resisting arrest (§ 69, count 2), assault on a peace officer (§ 241, count 3), and trespass (§ 602, subd. (m), count 4). The court further found true allegations that the arson occurred during a state of emergency (§ 454, subd. (a)(2)), involved damage of great monetary value (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(9)), that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and that she had suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) &(e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to a term of imprisonment of 10 years. The court awarded her a total of 917 days of credit toward the sentence.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports her conviction for arson of a structure because the handicap ramps adjacent to the bus station, to which she set fire, were neither structures nor fixtures. Defendant further maintains she is entitled to an additional 244 days of conduct credit, including: (1) conduct credit for the time she served in jail awaiting transfer to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH); and (2) the time she spent in DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill No. 317 (Sen. Bill 317) (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which granted conduct credits to those committed to DSH.
The People maintain that sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction for arson. The People agree defendant is entitled to conduct credits for the time she spent in jail awaiting transfer to DSH; however, the People disagree that she is entitled to conduct credits for the time she spent at DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317. We affirm and remand with directions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 16, 2021, the People charged defendant by complaint with arson of a structure, resisting arrest, and assault on a peace officer. The People further alleged defendant committed the arson during a state of emergency, that the arson involved damage of great monetary value, that defendant had suffered a serious prior felony conviction, and that she had suffered a prior strike conviction.
On February 22, 2021, the court declared a doubt about defendant's mental competence to stand trial and suspended criminal proceedings. On May 20, 2021, the court found defendant not competent to stand trial and committed defendant to DSH.
On August 13, 2021, defense counsel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging defendant's due process and equal protection rights had been violated because she had yet to be transported to DSH. On August 30, 2021, the court ordered DSH to appear and show cause as to why defendant had not been transported to DSH for treatment.
At a hearing on November 8, 2021, defense counsel informed the court that personnel from DSH had informed him they would be transferring defendant to DSH on November 15, 2021. At a hearing on November 18, 2021, the court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice on the understanding that defendant had already been placed in DSH.
On November 18, 2021, the People filed an amended felony complaint adding a fourth count of trespass. On April 12, 2022, the court found defendant had been restored to competency and reinstated criminal proceedings. On June 16, 2022, the People charged defendant by information as charged in the amended felony complaint.
During the bench trial, the terminal manager for a Greyhound bus station in Indio testified that the structure was "a double-wide mobile home" located on a parking lot. Defendant had arrived at the Indio station but was upset when she was required to get off the bus in order to board a connecting bus, which she refused. She began camping in the parking lot.
The manager approached defendant with the intent of helping her catch a connecting bus; he "was willing to waive the change of itinerary fees so that she could complete her trip." She thanked him but did not board any of the next few connecting buses.
Defendant continued to camp on the property, initially in front of the bus stop, for about two weeks. The manager unsuccessfully encouraged her numerous times to complete her journey; he repeatedly told her she could not camp at the station. Defendant eventually relocated to the north side of the building. The manager told her she could not camp in the new location either; defendant became upset. The manager told her if she did not leave, he would call the authorities.
The manager called the police. The police attempted to help facilitate defendant's transfer to a new bus. The manager issued her a new ticket. However, defendant never boarded the bus.
The manager called the police again. Officers arrived and placed defendant under arrest for trespass. Defendant "said she was going to blow this place up ...." "I just recall her saying, 'I'm going to blow this motherfucker up.'"
When the manager returned to the station the next day, "The structure had been burned up, specifically the ramp leading to the employee area which is also located at the rear of the building." The ramp was connected to the double-wide, but the damage did not extend to the station.
An officer testified that he was dispatched to the bus station on February 8, 2021, in reference to a disturbance. At the bus station, he spoke with the manager who told him he wanted defendant removed from the property. The officer spoke to defendant who complained about not being on the right bus. The manager issued her a new ticket. She agreed to use it.
The officer responded to the bus station a second time that day where the manager explained that defendant refused to get on the bus and was still on bus station property. The officer asked defendant if she was willing to leave. She refused. The manager requested she be arrested for trespassing.
The officer placed her under arrest. Two additional officers broke down her camp and took her property to the police station for safekeeping.
A correctional deputy testified he first encountered defendant during the booking process for the trespass offense. Defendant said, "she was going to burn down the Greyhound station." "She said, 'I'm going to burn it down, burn it down to the ground,' . . ."
An officer who responded to the fire later that day testified he spoke with defendant, who admitted starting the fires. The fire was on the northwest side of the building, on "a little ramp that wraps around the trailer." Defendant had a lighter in her bag. The officer's body camera recorded defendant saying, "I ain't gonna deny I did it." She said, "And when I come back, I'm [going to] burn [it]. Y'all better keep me [be]cause I'm [going to] burn this mother fucker down."
An officer for CalFire testified he was tasked with conducting an arson investigation at the bus station. He transported defendant to jail. Defendant "started kicking her feet and striking [his] partner in the legs. And when he asked her to stop . . . she bit him in the hand." "[A]fter she bit my partner in the hand, it left teeth marks that were visible on his hand."
The other fire investigator testified defendant began kicking him at the jail. "I kind of felt something weird on my hand, and I looked down, and she was biting my hand." "It left a little mark."
The second investigator "conducted an origin and cause investigation of the fire." "Obviously, this was a structure fire ...." When asked to describe the structure, the investigator testified it was "a Greyhound bus station. It was, I believe, a kind of- almost like a two-double-wide business on a permanent foundation with ADA compliant ramps. That was a bus station for Greyhound." "It's on an affixed permanent foundation." It is not easily movable.
The investigator located several points of origin for the fire. "In total, I located five separate areas that looked like they had been ignited." "I located four on the first ADA compliant ramp."
The fire "burned through the decking, so the fire personnel had to actually remove the plywood to get to the fire underneath the decking." The decking was attached to the double-wide. The "ramp [was] connected to the Greyhound bus station." "[O]nce it burns through the decking material, then you have the structural members that hold the decking that begin to burn. And to get to those areas that are on fire, you have to cut the decking out to extinguish the fire underneath it."
When discussing exhibit 5, pictures of the ramp and the burnt portions thereof, the investigator said, "that's the south-south-facing ramp connected to the Greyhound bus station." He determined "the fire was human-caused," arson. "[T]he fire was . . . started by an individual that had lit some paper on fire which in turn was utilized to burn the decking." "Somebody used a handheld open-flame device-butane lighter or matches or regular lighter-to ignite paper or some other combustible material."
He interviewed defendant who admitted starting the fire. The audio recording from his body camera reflects that defendant said she had been arrested, "Because I tried to burn that Greyhound." The investigator told her that her frustration for having her property taken and Greyhound refusing to replace her tickets did not warrant burning the business down. Defendant responded, "oh yes it does." "I waited, I waited until after everybody's gone, I know the employees. I waited until they left. I'm not trying . . . to harm anyone." "But the only way I can get attention is [to] destroy property . . . so I figure that's, that's fair play."
Defendant testified she had been released from parole and was traveling from San Bernardino to Florida. Her bus broke down in Indio; she missed her connecting bus to Florida. The woman at the bus station said she was going to give defendant a new ticket, but that ticket was for a bus heading to Los Angeles. Defendant refused to get on the bus to Los Angeles. The woman told defendant she had to leave the bus station because they were closed. They called the police on defendant.
An officer took defendant to a hotel. He picked her up the next morning and brought her back to the bus station. Bus station personnel refused to give her a new ticket. The manager offered her a ticket heading west, rather than east to Florida. Defendant stayed at the bus station for almost a month because they would not issue her a ticket to Florida or refund her money. Officers then arrested her.
Defendant had over $300 in her wallet but the officers inventorying her property told her she had no money. She became upset. She said she "was going to burn it down."
When defendant was released, she returned to the bus station to charge her phone. She did not set fire to the ramp. Defendant told an officer she set the fire because she wanted to be arrested.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Defendant contends insufficient evidence supports her conviction for arson because the ramps were neither structures nor fixtures. We disagree.
"Section 451 makes a person 'guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property.'" (People v. Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th 360, 364 (Goolsby).) Defendant was charged with, and convicted of, arson under section 451, subdivision (c), which proscribes "[a]rson of a structure or forest land ...." (Italics added.) "Section 450 defines structure as 'any building, or commercial or public tent, bridge, tunnel, or powerplant.' [Citation.]" (Goolsby, at p. 364.) "In ordinary usage . . . [a] building usually describes a covered structure that stands predominately by itself and appears more separate and distinct from any other structure than connected to and a part of another structure." (People v. Muszynski (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 672, 679 [An apartment complex is a building or structure.]; People v. Brooks (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 200, 207 [Loading dock that the evidence established was attached to and an integral part of the adjacent building was a structure].)
A "'fixture is a thing, originally personal property, but later affixed or annexed to realty, so that it is considered real property. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Lee (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1777.) "A thing is deemed to be affixed . . . in the case of buildings; or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts, or screws; . . ." (Civ. Code § 660; see In re Jesse L. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 167.) "[A] fixture, i.e., personal property affixed to the realty so that it becomes an integral part of the structure, becomes part of the structure to the extent that a burning or charring or destruction by fire is all that is required to constitute a burning sufficient to support a conviction of arson under section 451, subdivision (c)." (In re Jesse L., at p. 168.)
"Annexation by weight and gravity, therefore, is not always alone a sufficient indication of an intent to make the article a permanent fixture and part of the realty. It must also appear from the nature of the chattel that if used for the purpose for which it was designed it would naturally and necessarily be annexed to and become a permanent and integral part of some realty; in other words, that it would become essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the property to which it was annexed. [Citations.]" (M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson (1936) 8 Cal.2d 31, 38.)
"'"To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a . . . verdict, a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable [fact finder] could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' [Citation.]" (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 377 (Thomas).)
"'When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence . . . the relevant inquiry is "'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.'" [Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.' [Citation.] '"'"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."'"' [Citation.] 'A reviewing court neither reweighs [the] evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' [Citation.] Reversal is not warranted 'unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction.]"' [Citation.]" (Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 377-378.)
The People adduced sufficient evidence that the ramp defendant burned was affixed or annexed to the double-wide such that it was a permanent and integral part of the bus station. The manager testified that the ramp was connected to the double-wide. A fire investigator testified the ramp was "on an affixed permanent foundation." (Italics added) It was not easily movable. The decking was attached to the double-wide. The "ramp [was] connected to the Greyhound bus station." (Italics added)
Defendant burned two separate ramps: one on the west side of the building and the other on the south side; however, four of the five burn areas were on the south facing ramp. Exhibit 5 shows only the south facing ramp and the four ignition areas thereon.
When discussing exhibit 5, the investigator said, "that's the south-south-facing ramp connected to the Greyhound bus station." (Italics added) He opined that it was "a structure fire."
Moreover, the ramps were ADA compliant. Exhibit 5 appears to show the ramp connected to the bus station to enable all persons, including those with disabilities, to access the building. Thus, the purpose for which the ADA compliant ramps were designed "would naturally and necessarily be annexed to and become a permanent and integral part of" the bus station such "that it would become essential to the ordinary and convenient use of the property to which it was annexed. [Citations.]" (M.P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 38.)
Thus, there was sufficient evidence that the ramps were permanently affixed to the bus station such that defendant's ignition of them qualified as a structure fire. Defendant's argument that the ramps could not be fixtures of the station because they were separately affixed to the land fails because a fixture can be both affixed to a structure and separately to the land. (See People v. Brooks, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 207 ["The evidence establishes that the loading dock is not some sort of a free standing building but a structure attached to and an integral part of the . . . building."].)
B. Custody Credits
Defendant contends she is entitled to an additional 224 days of conduct credit to include: (1) the time she spent in jail after the court ordered her committed to DSH but before she was transferred to DSH; and (2) the time she spent at DSH prior to January 1, 2022, the effective date of Senate Bill 317, which authorized conduct credit for those committed to DSH. In other words, defendant maintains that strictly applying Senate Bill 317 prospectively to those serving time in DSH after its effective date violates her constitutional right to equal protection. This is because, she contends, she was similarly situated to those receiving treatment in county jail, who expressly receive conduct credits under Senate Bill 1187.
The People agree that defendant is "entitled to conduct credits for time served in county custody pending her transport to the state hospital. And following recent amendments to section 4019, she is also entitled to conduct credits for time spent in the state hospital from January 1, 2022 (the effective date of the amendment) until her restoration to competency and return to county custody." However, the People disagree that defendant was entitled to credits for time spent at the state hospital before January 1, 2022. We agree with defendant.
"The calculation of actual credits is performed by simply adding together 'all days of custody' the defendant has served. [Citation.] In contrast, the calculation of conduct credits depends on the purpose for which they are being calculated. Under section 4019, a defendant can earn two conduct credits for every two actual credits. [Citations.]" (People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827, fn. omitted.) "We independently review whether a trial court has correctly applied these statutes in awarding custody credits. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
The probation officer's reports reflect that defendant was arrested on February 9, 2021, and released from jail to DSH on May 20, 2021. She was returned to jail on March 16, 2022. The court sentenced defendant to prison on September 2, 2022. The court awarded defendant 917 days of credit as recommended in the probation officer's report as follows: "Credits, 272 local. [¶] There are 74 days state hospital time after January 1st, 2022, because of the way the calculations have changed. There's state hospital time of 225 days prior to January 1st, 2022, and [section] 4019 time of 346 days for a total time of 917 days of credit against the 10-year sentence."
However, the record reveals that defendant was not, in fact, released from jail to DSH on May 20, 2021, as stated in the probation officer's reports. The best information that we can glean from the record is that defendant was transferred to DSH on or about November 15, 2021. Thus, we would agree that defendant would be entitled to additional conduct credits for the time she spent in jail after the date the court committed her to DSH, but prior to her transfer to DSH; however, we cannot definitively determine how many credits to which she would be entitled because we do not have dispositive information as to precisely when she was transferred to DSH. Therefore, the matter should be remanded to the superior to court to determine when she was transferred to DSH and how many additional conduct credits she should receive for her time spent in jail prior to that time.
Defendant additionally contends she is entitled to conduct credits for her time spent in DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317 because strictly prospective application of the amendment would violate her constitutional right to equal protection. This is because, she maintains, she was similarly situated to those receiving treatment in county jail, who expressly receive such credits under Senate Bill 1187 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). We agree.
"Historically-that is, prior to the recent legislative changes discussed herein- section 4019 did not award conduct credit to detainees for time spent in nonpenal institutions like state hospitals. [Citation.]" (People v. Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 319, 332 (Orellana).) "Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature in Senate Bill 1187 rejected in part this view by modifying the statutory framework governing conduct credit eligibility during incompetency treatment by amending sections 1375.5 and 4019 to authorize conduct credits for persons receiving treatment in county jail facilities." (Id. at pp. 332-333.)
"In October 2021, . . . the Legislature passed Senate Bill 317, which, inter alia, further amended section 4019 and took effect on January 1, 2022. Senate Bill 317 modified section 4019, subdivision (a)(8) (previously added by Sen. Bill 1187) to expand eligibility for presentence conduct credit '[w]hen a prisoner is confined in or committed to a state hospital or other mental health treatment facility, or to a county jail treatment facility ...." (Orellana, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.) "The plain meaning of this provision is that, as of January 1, 2022, defendants undergoing treatment for incompetence in a state hospital are eligible for section 4019 conduct credit on the same terms as those confined to county jails." (Ibid.) "Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively ...." (Id. at 334-338; accord People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120, 127-129 (Yang); see also People v. Shkrabak (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 943, 948, fn. 4 (Shkrabak).)
"The concept of equal protection recognizes that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law's legitimate purposes must be treated equally. [Citation.] Accordingly, '"[t]he first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner."' [Citation.] 'This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but "whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged."' [Citation.]" (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328 (Brown).)
"[T]he important correctional purposes of a statute authorizing incentives for good behavior [citation] are not served by rewarding prisoners who served time before the incentives took effect and thus could not have modified their behavior in response. That prisoners who served time before and after former section 4019 took effect are not similarly situated necessarily follows." (Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329 [Prospective application of statute providing additional custody credits to prisoners who served time in presentence custody only after the effective date of the statute did not violate equal protection because those serving presentence custody prior to the statute's effective date were not similarly situated.].)
In Orellana, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th 319, the court held that a defendant committed to state hospital pending restoration of competency was not similarly situated, for purposes of Senate Bill 317, to a defendant simultaneously incarcerated in county jail who received competency restoration treatment pending trial. (Id. at pp. 339-342.) The court quoted Brown in holding that "the purpose of the new provision '"is to affect the behavior of inmates by providing them with incentives to engage in productive work and maintain good conduct while they are in prison." [Citation.] "[T]his incentive purpose has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it. The very concept demands prospective application."' [Citation.]" (Orellana, at pp. 341-342.)
In People v. Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 127-129, the court disagreed with Orellana, finding that equal protection principles required the court to award custody credits to those committed to DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317. The court reasoned that those serving time in DSH and those receiving treatment in county jail simultaneously were similarly situated: "[B]oth groups of defendants are subject to the same [] standards and procedures. [Citation.] Moreover, both groups are committed for treatment aimed at restoration of competency so that a trial may proceed. The only apparent difference between them is the location where the defendant receives competency treatment, which appears dependent on multiple factors, such as whether a particular facility has the physical space and resources to accept the commitment, the medical needs of the defendant, the security risk the defendant poses, and whether the committing county can reasonably and timely transport the individual to the proposed facility." (Yang, at p. 129.)
In Shkrabak, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 943, the court agreed with Yang that equal protection principles required the court to award custody credits to those committed to DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317 because they were similarly situated to those receiving simultaneous competency treatment in jail. (Shkrabak, at pp. 950-951.)
We agree with Yang and Shkrabak. As Yang reasoned, "the same interest in incentivizing good behavior appears equally reasonable and workable for defendants receiving competency treatment in a state hospital where patients with varying issues and/or criminal histories or proclivities are housed." (Yang, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) Thus, defendant is entitled to custody credits for the entire time she spent in DSH, including the time prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317. "Consequently, we will remand the matter for resentencing so the trial court may recalculate defendant's custody credits." (Shkrabak, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
III. DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for recalculation of defendant's custody credits. The trial court is directed to recalculate defendant's conduct credits to include the time she spent in jail awaiting commitment to DSH and custody credits to which she is entitled for the time she spent DSH prior to the effective date of Senate Bill 317. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MILLER J., FIELDS, J.