Opinion
A150767
12-19-2017
In re I.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. I.D., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nos. J1500140)
The juvenile court committed 18-year-old I.D. to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) after finding he committed assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, I.D. claims law enforcement's failure to preserve evidence denied him due process, and that the court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJJ. He also contends—and the Attorney General agrees—the court erred when calculating his maximum period of confinement and custody credits. We modify the judgment to correct these errors. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior Wardship Proceedings
I.D. has been a ward of the court since 2015, when the court sustained original and supplemental wardship petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleging he possessed a weapon on school grounds (§ 626.10, subd. (a)) and committed second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The court adjudged I.D. a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and committed him to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility. I.D. later admitted violating probation by failing to obey the rules at the facility, and the court committed him to additional time in custody. In June 2016—fewer than two months after being released from custody—I.D. failed to report to a scheduled appointment with his probation officer and failed to adhere to his curfew. The probation department issued a notice of probation violation (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 777) and the court issued a warrant for I.D.'s arrest.
Second Supplemental Wardship Petition
A June 2016 second supplemental wardship petition alleged I.D., then 17, committed assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and personally inflicted great bodily injury on R.B. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (a)).
R.B. testified at the October 2016 jurisdictional hearing. She began dating I.D. in 2015, and had a son with him. When they dated, I.D. was a member of the Goon Squad Norteños street gang. R.B. and I.D. broke up in mid-May 2016, but they "co-parent[ed]" their son. On the evening of May 30, 2016, R.B. and I.D. attended a memorial for a deceased Norteño gang member. R.B. drank heavily and was "very, very, very drunk." She did not "remember too much from that night," except for "getting into an altercation with another female." R.B. remembered a girl pulling her hair, and then being attacked by a group of girls, who punched, kicked, and kneed her. R.B. did not think I.D. was nearby when she was attacked.
On the morning of May 31, 2016, Antioch Police Officer Randall Gragg found R.B. "lying on the ground and bleeding from the mouth." She was unconscious. R.B. regained consciousness in the hospital, where she spent approximately a week recovering from her severe injuries, including "lumps on [her] head," two black eyes, and scrapes and bruises on her back and knees. She had difficulty walking and hearing; at the jurisdictional hearing, R.B.'s hearing was still impaired.
Gragg attempted to speak with R.B. when she regained consciousness. Initially, R.B. "was not able to speak. She just looked at [Gragg] and cried. . . . She couldn't even move her jaw." Gragg asked R.B. to write down her responses to his questions. When he asked R.B. who caused her injuries, "she wrote [I.D.], very shakily." When Gragg asked R.B. what I.D. did to her, she wrote: "He hit me. . . . Five times." Gragg did not know what happened to the piece of paper with R.B.'s responses; he did not preserve it as evidence. About an hour later, R.B. was able to speak, and she confirmed that I.D. had hit her.
At the jurisdictional hearing, R.B. claimed she did not recall speaking to police officers in the beginning of her stay at the hospital. R.B., for example, did not remember telling officers that I.D. hit her and knocked her out, or that he ordered the group of girls to attack her. When testifying for the defense, R.B. claimed she did not remember I.D. directing anyone to fight her, nor did she recall telling the police officers that I.D. hit her five times. R.B. testified I.D. did not hit her on a regular basis, and that he had never threatened to kill her.
That evening, Gragg interviewed R.B. She did not appear confused and she had no difficulty recalling the incident. R.B. said she had broken up with I.D. and "wanted nothing to do with him." At the memorial, I.D. approached her and "tried to talk shit" to her. R.B. did not want I.D. "talking to [her]" and they argued. A girl interfered in the conversation, and R.B. briefly fought the girl. Later that evening, I.D. hit her "five times"—so hard that she could not see or hear. R.B. told I.D. that he had " 'hit [her] for the last fucking time.' " She tried to walk away, but I.D. told a group of girls to beat her. R.B. screamed at the "top of [her] lungs" and asked someone to call 911. I.D. had "hit [her] a lot of times before" and had threatened to kill her. R.B. never told anyone because she did not want her son's father to go to jail and she feared I.D. would retaliate against her if she caused him to go to jail. She did not think she would testify against I.D. but she promised to "think about it."
The prosecutor played a recording of the Gragg interview for the court. About 48 hours after the incident, Antioch Detective Jason Vanderpool interviewed R.B. That interview was consistent with her interview with Gragg. The prosecutor played a recording of R.B.'s interview with Vanderpool for the court.
About two months after the incident, Vanderpool received a "very short" letter from R.B. (letter). "[I]t said something to the fact that she no longer wanted to pursue any charges." The letter did not contain any statements about the incident. After Vanderpool read the letter, he returned it to his mailbox. He never saw the letter again and did not know what had happened to it. His "normal practice would be to scan it . . . and attach it to the [police] report," but he "did not do that in this incident." Vanderpool did not deliberately discard or destroy the letter.
After I.D. was arrested, he called R.B. from juvenile hall. R.B. knew I.D. "had charges" stemming from the May 2016 incident. During one phone call, R.B. told I.D. that he had hurt her; in another conversation, R.B. said, "You're reaping what you s[o]w." I.D. asked R.B. to help him, and they talked about how R.B. would testify in court. R.B. wanted to help I.D. because her son "deserve[d] to know his father and have a relationship with him." She claimed, however, that she would not lie for I.D.
At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court determined R.B.'s claimed inability to recall the incident was not "credible at all, especially in light of her telephone conversations . . . while [I.D.] was in Juvenile Hall. [¶] In fact, those phone conversations completely undermine that claim. And when you listen to her statements to the officer, it supports the officer's testimony that she was clearheaded. . . . She was clear in her thought process and quite articulate. And we actually got to hear that here in court. . . . And it is clear from her own words and what she told the police that I.D. struck her repeatedly . . . And it was the blows to her fact that caused her to suffer hearing loss . . . and caused her to lose consciousness." The court found the prosecution had proven the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the November 2016 dispositional hearing, the court committed I.D. to the DJJ for an "aggregate" term of 9 years and 240 days. The court awarded I.D. 415 days of custody credit.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Trombetta Claim Fails
I.D. contends law enforcement's failure to preserve evidence violated his due process rights under California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 (Trombetta).
A. Background
At the outset of jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel argued there was a "Trombetta issue" because Vanderpool "lost" R.B.'s letter, which contained "exculpatory evidence." Counsel argued the letter was a "form of recantation." The court determined the issue was "premature" because it wanted to hear Vanderpool and R.B.'s testimony "before acting on whatever it is you want me to act on." According to the court, Vanderpool may "recall[ ] everything in that letter and it's consistent with whatever the alleged victim testifies to." When defense counsel remarked, "We don't have the letter," the court stated: "we have the victim who is going to testify." The court suggested counsel "renew any request or motion as we proceed with the evidence."
During the jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel did not renew his argument regarding the loss of evidence. He objected to Gragg's recorded interview on hearsay and relevance grounds, but the court overruled the objections. At the conclusion of the jurisdictional hearing, the court criticized the officers for failing to preserve R.B.'s written statements, but opined the statements were not "material" and did not "undercut the People's case," which was supported by an "overwhelming" amount of evidence. According to the court, the letter showed only that she had "buyer's remorse" for telling "the truth about what her former boyfriend and the father of her child had done to her."
B. The Trombetta Claim Is Forfeited and Has No Merit
I.D. claims Gragg and Vanderpool's "loss or destruction of key evidence denied [him] due process." Under Trombetta, "the federal constitutional guarantee of due process imposes a duty on the state to preserve 'evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.' [Citation.] In other words, that evidence 'must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.' [Citation.] Generally, due process does not require the police to collect particular items of evidence. [Citation.] 'The police cannot be expected to "gather up everything which might eventually prove useful to the defense." ' [Citation.] A trial court's ruling on a Trombetta motion is upheld on appeal if a reviewing court finds substantial evidence supporting the ruling." (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 837.)
I.D. has forfeited the Trombetta claim premised on Gragg's failure to preserve R.B.'s written responses. In the trial court, I.D. did not argue Gragg's failure to preserve R.B.'s written responses violated due process; the only piece of evidence I.D. mentioned was the letter. The Trombetta claim as to R.B.'s written responses to Gragg's questions is therefore "forfeited because [I.D.] failed to raise the issue below." (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1300 (Chism).)
"In any event, the claim is without merit." (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1300.) I.D. has not shown R.B.'s written responses to Gragg's questions "had ' "an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed [or lost]." ' " (Ibid.) When Gragg asked R.B. who caused her injuries, "she wrote [I.D.]." When Gragg asked R.B. what I.D. did to her, she wrote, "He hit me. . . . Five times." These responses were not exculpatory. (See People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1349 ["defendant failed to show [the evidence] actually contained possibly exculpatory evidence"]; People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 221 ["no indication" the evidence "would have exculpated defendant"], overruled on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19.) Even assuming R.B.'s responses were "potentially useful" to I.D.'s defense, nothing in the record suggests they were "lost due to bad faith on the part of law enforcement." (Chism, at p. 1300.) Gragg testified he did not think it was important to preserve the paper with R.B.'s responses and he did not know what happened to the paper. Without more, Gragg's failure to preserve the paper does not establish bad faith. (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 510 [substantial evidence supported conclusion that disappearance of evidence was inadvertent].)
I.D.'s claim pertaining to the letter fares no better—it too is forfeited. At the outset of the jurisdictional hearing, the court declined to rule on the Trombetta issue and invited defense counsel to "renew any request or motion as we proceed with the evidence." "A tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling, made without fully knowing what the trial evidence would show, will not preserve the issue for appeal if the appellant could have, but did not, renew the objection . . . and press for a final ruling in the charged context of the trial evidence itself." (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133.) Here, defense counsel did not raise the Trombetta issue when the prosecution presented evidence pertaining to the letter, nor did counsel press the court for a ruling on the issue. As a result, I.D. has forfeited his Trombetta claim pertaining to the letter.
The claim also fails on the merits. Vanderpool testified the letter was "very short" and contained no information about the incident. Vanderpool returned the letter to his mailbox; he did not deliberately discard or destroy the letter. Under the circumstances, I.D. has not established the letter was exculpatory, nor that Vanderpool acted in bad faith by failing to preserve the letter. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1246.)
II.
The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Committing I.D. to the DJJ
I.D. argues the court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ because there is no evidence a DJJ commitment will benefit him, and no evidence a less restrictive program would be ineffective.
A. Background
The prosecution urged the court to commit I.D. to the DJJ. The probation department, however, recommended the Youth Offender Treatment Program at juvenile hall (YOTP). According to the probation report, I.D. denied committing the offense and claimed he was " 'charged with something [he] didn't do.' " I.D. was an admitted member of the Goon Squad Norteños street gang and associated with gang members, despite "the gang terms previously ordered by the Court." I.D. started smoking marijuana in seventh grade, and began drinking alcohol at age 15, including "half-gallon bottles of tequila in excess." After his release from Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility in 2016, he regularly used alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. I.D. experimented with prescription drugs.
After his arrest, I.D. was involved in several "peer conflict[s]" at juvenile hall. In one incident, I.D. "struck another resident and Norteño gang member numerous times"; in a second incident, I.D. punched another resident "multiple times in the head with closed fists." According to the probation report, I.D. had a "high risk level for re-offense." The probation department acknowledged the "egregious" nature of the offense, and I.D.'s "serious issues related to substance abuse and continued gang associations." Probation noted I.D.'s "delinquency" had "escalate[d]" notwithstanding his "ample opportunities to rehabilitate at the least restrictive means," but recommended committing I.D. to YOTP, where he would receive individual counseling and participate in anger management and substance abuse treatment programs.
At the November 2016 dispositional hearing, probation officer Katelyn Jacobsen testified for the defense. She identified the programs available at YOTP, and the programs available at the DJJ. Jacobsen opined YOTP was an appropriate placement because I.D.'s "needs . . . could be met at a local level." On cross-examination, Jacobsen reviewed the programs at YOTP that I.D. had already completed in prior commitments, and acknowledged I.D. had recent gang-related conflicts in juvenile hall. Jacobsen also conceded I.D. had violated his probation, frequently used alcohol and marijuana, and violated court orders to refrain from communicating with R.B. and one of the girls involved in the incident.
The court committed I.D. to the DJJ. The court first noted "[t]his is a violent, violent, vicious beating that occurred. And, you know, between [I.D.'s] incredibly volatile violent behavior, his gang association, his use and abuse of substances, he is a ticking time bomb waiting to really hurt and destroy people and property and the community. . . . I believe that [I.D.] is a danger to his child, both in terms of the violence that he inflicts on those around him, but because he is so clearly entrenched in gang involvement, he is inviting violence to occur on his home, against his family members, including his own child. . . ."
The court observed local resources had been ineffective: "[w]e've tried probation. We've tried the ranch. He's been housed at juvenile hall pending these proceedings, and he has viciously attacked people at the hall. He has gone directly against a Court order and made numerous phone calls to [R.B.]. . . . It is clear to me that [I.D.] is failing miserably under local resources and the programs that we have to offer him. [¶] . . . [A]t YOTP he might get some individual counseling, but . . . not gang suppression therapy . . . and really [I.D.] needs intensive anger management. He needs to get some counseling about his gang involvement and hopefully assistance to get himself out of the gang culture and lifestyle which he apparently is unwilling to let go of at this time and I don't believe that his needs are met at a local level at all. [¶] In fact, I think it would be better for [I.D.] to be away from the local level. It would be safer for him, safer for everyone around him, and I believe the level of security at DJJ is better equipped to deal with [I.D.'s] continued acts of violence and aggression against other people." The court noted the DJJ has "very good programs there both in terms of school and vocational programming."
The court concluded: "at this time and in consideration of both the ranch, of placement, of Youth Offender Treatment Program, that the best alternative available and the best programs to address [I.D.'s] needs are offered through DJJ. So for those reasons, I am going to commit him to DJJ. [¶] I do find that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of [I.D.] are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory and educational discipline and other treatment that's offered through DJJ. . . ."
B. No Abuse of Discretion in Committing I.D. to the DJJ
We review the order committing I.D. to the DJJ "for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court's decision." (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) In doing so, we are mindful of the twofold purposes of the juvenile delinquency laws: "(1) to serve the 'best interests' of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and 'enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,' and (2) to 'provide for the protection and safety of the public.' " (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615.)
"Although the DJJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted. [Citations.] A DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate." (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734 [no DJJ commitment "unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided"].)
I.D. contends there is insufficient evidence he will benefit from the DJJ commitment. We are not persuaded. The juvenile court is only required to find whether "it is probable a minor will benefit from being committed" to the DJJ. (In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 486.) Contrary to I.D.'s suggestion, there is no requirement "the court find exactly how a minor will benefit from being committed to DJJ." (Ibid.) Here, the finding of probable benefit to I.D. is supported by the probation report—which chronicled I.D.'s gang involvement and substance abuse and anger management issues—and the testimony of the probation officer, who described the gang and anger management programs available at the DJJ. In addition, and based on I.D.'s violent conduct in juvenile hall, the court could reasonably find a secure environment was necessary to meet "the dual concerns of the best interests of the minor and public protection." (In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.)
We are not persuaded by I.D.'s claim that there is no evidence a less restrictive alternative would be ineffective or inappropriate. The probation report and the probation officer's testimony amply support the court's conclusion that the purposes underlying the DJJ commitment could not be accomplished in a less restrictive facility. (In re Jonathan T., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) I.D.'s reliance on In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142 is misplaced. In that case, the juvenile court "automatically impos[ed] a suspended DJJ commitment" from a previous disposition hearing, without evaluating whether a less restrictive placement would be appropriate, nor whether the placement would benefit the minor. (Id. at p. 1145.) Here, the court did not automatically impose the DJJ commitment; instead, it thoroughly analyzed the required factors and determined, under all of the circumstances, that DJJ was the "best alternative available" and that it offered "the best programs to address [I.D.'s] needs." In re Jose T. has no application here.
Under the circumstances, the DJJ commitment was not an abuse of discretion. (See In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 417 ["Some wards, like the minor here, may be best served by the structured institutional environment and special programs available only at the" DJJ]; In re Jonathan T., supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 486 [upholding DJJ commitment despite its "allegedly subpar programs" because of evidence the minor "require[d] a secure setting for his rehabilitative care"].) We have considered and rejected I.D.'s other complaints regarding the DJJ commitment.
III.
The Judgment Must Be Modified to Correct I.D.'s Maximum Confinement Time
and Custody Credits
I.D. contends—and the Attorney General agrees—the court erred when calculating his maximum confinement time and custody credits. When a minor who has been declared a ward of the juvenile court is removed from the physical custody of his parent, "the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1).) The minor is entitled to predisposition custody credits against this maximum period of confinement. (In re A.M. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1085-1086.)
Here, the Attorney General concedes I.D.'s maximum term of confinement was eight years and eight months, comprised of the following: seven years for the assault (§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7, subd. (a)), one year for the robbery (§ 213, subd. (a)(2)), and eight months for the weapon possession (§ 626.10, subd. (a)). (See In re David H. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1133.) The Attorney General also acknowledges I.D. was entitled to credit for time spent in custody from his arrest until his transfer to the DJJ: a total of 501 days. (See In re J.M. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1256.) We will modify the judgment accordingly.
DISPOSITION
The November 18, 2016 judgment is modified as follows: I.D.'s maximum term of confinement under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (d) is calculated as 8 years and 8 months, less 501 days of custody credits. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Simons, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.