Opinion
No. 28182
Decided February 5, 1979.
People appealed from a decision of the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss first-degree criminal trespass in which it held section 18-4-502, C.R.S. 1973 (Repl. Vol. 8) unconstitutional.
Reversed
1. TRESPASS — Criminal — First Degree — Statute — Constitutional — People v. Marshall. Section 18-4-502, C.R.S. 1973 (Repl. Vol. 8), the first-degree criminal trespass statute is not unconstitutional because it proscribes different conduct than section 18-5-504, C.R.S. 1973; People v. Marshall, 196 Colo. 381, 586 P.2d 41 (1978) is dispositive of the issue raised in instant case.
Appeal from the District Court of Douglas County, Honorable John P. Gately, Judge.
Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., District Attorney, James C. Sell, Chief Deputy, Paul A. King, Deputy, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Craig L. Truman, Chief Deputy, Forrest W. Lewis, Deputy, for defendant-appellee.
[1] Defendant Huston was charged with first-degree criminal trespass under section 18-4-502, C.R.S. 1973 (Repl. Vol. 8), which makes first-degree criminal trespass a class 5 felony. He moved to dismiss on the grounds that section 18-4-502 proscribes the same conduct as section 18-4-504, C.R.S. 1973 (Repl. Vol. 8), which makes third-degree criminal trespass a class 1 petty offense.
The district court held that section 18-4-502 was unconstitutional, finding that it punishes as a felony the same conduct which 18-4-504 punishes as a misdemeanor. We reverse and hold the statute to be constitutional. People v. Marshall, 196 Colo. 381, 586 P.2d 41 (1978), is dispositive of the issue raised here.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views here expressed.