Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR480317
McGuiness, P.J.
William Robert Hopper (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pled no contest to felony battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d) ), battery of a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b)), and willful resistance, delay or obstruction of a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We reject his contention and affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
On January 20, 2006, a felony complaint was filed charging appellant with assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count one), felony battery (§ 243, subd. (d), count two), battery of a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b), count three), willful resistance, delay or obstruction of a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count four), and misdemeanor battery (§ 242, count five). The complaint alleged an enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury on another person (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to count one, making that act a serious felony under section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).
The charges were based on an incident that occurred on January 19, 2006. According to a presentence report, Dameon Connelly and appellant were at a market when appellant shoved Connelly and threatened to hurt his “crippled ol’ man,” referring to Connelly’s stepfather, Richard Marsh, who has a “deformed and nominally functional left arm.” Connelly left the market, went to Marsh’s home, and told him what had happened. Connelly and Marsh returned to the market to talk to appellant, but after realizing that appellant was so intoxicated and belligerent that a conversation would be impossible, they turned to leave. At that point, appellant began throwing rocks and chunks of wet dirt at Marsh, hitting Marsh in the face with one of the chunks of wet dirt. When Marsh turned to protect his face, appellant tackled him, driving Marsh’s face into the ground where his eye was hurt and causing him to land on his “bad” arm. Appellant then “started swinging at” Connelly.
A California Highway Patrol Officer was driving past the market when he heard someone scream, “Get away from me! Leave us alone!” The officer saw Marsh bleeding under his eye and holding his left arm, and Connelly was “very distraught.” As appellant walked away, the officer ordered him to stop five times. Appellant ignored the officer and continued to walk away. The officer ran after appellant and grabbed him by the arm. Appellant struggled to free himself from the officer, and they fell to the ground. Appellant refused to place his hands behind his back and put his arms around a large pipe. When another man attempted to help the officer, appellant began to assault that person. Appellant also kicked the officer twice in his right thigh. The officer pepper sprayed appellant in order to subdue him. After being detained, appellant said to the officer, “I’m going to spank you with your badge!” A Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy arrived at the scene and witnessed Marsh holding his left arm and bleeding under his eye. Marsh told the deputy that “Will,” i.e., appellant, had “gone crazy,” started hitting him for no reason and slammed him into the ground. Marsh was transported to the hospital, and a doctor told the officer that Marsh had suffered a fracture.
On February 6, 2006, appellant pled no contest to counts two through four. On March 8, 2006, appellant’s counsel requested a suspension of the proceedings pursuant to section 1368. The court granted the request and appointed Dr. Thomas Cushing to examine appellant. In a March 19, 2006, report, Dr. Cushing stated that appellant’s mental health progress notes showed he was described on February 18, 2006, as being “hypervigilant, preoccupied, and with disorganized cognition,” and “as presenting rambling and circumstantial thoughts, as well as paranoid and grandiose ideation.” His mood and affect were “angry, expansive, labile, elevated, irritable, and incongruent,” and he was provisionally diagnosed with “Bipolar Disorder, Manic.” According to the notes, appellant yelled at other inmates on February 24, 2006, and hung a bed sheet across his jail cell on February 26, 2006, blocking the correctional staff’s view of him. He refused to take the sheet down, stating correctional staff “did not work for the FBI.” Later that day, appellant reported delusional beliefs that he had accessed the computer system to lock down the jail. Subsequently, correctional staff described appellant as being cooperative and appropriate. His hostility significantly decreased, although he became delusional again on March 13, 2006, when he informed mental health staff that he was not in jail and would soon be released. According to available records and appellant’s statements, he had never been hospitalized for psychiatric problems or had been prescribed psychiatric mediation.
Section 1368 provides in part that if a defendant’s attorney informs the court that the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be determined at a hearing, and suspend criminal proceedings until the question has been determined.
According to Dr. Cushing, appellant was able to give “a basically coherent and sequential account of his perspective of the instant offense” during the interview. He “appear[ed] to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him” and, after reviewing a copy of the felony complaint, “was able to . . . reiterate the multiple charges” against him. “He appeared to have a reasonable understanding of having entered a plea to one felony charge, and two misdemeanor charges . . . .” Appellant understood that a felony conviction was more serious than a misdemeanor conviction. When asked, he described the judge’s responsibilities as “[r]eviewing all the facts, . . . [and] see[ing] where the truth lies.” Appellant stated that a jury consisted of 12 people who “witness what happens in the courtroom [and] make the best decision they can.” Appellant knew that a hung jury results when the jury does not “come to a decision.” In response to a question regarding the role of witnesses, appellant demonstrated his knowledge that there are “different types of witnesses,” including “[e]xpert, civilian, people of the street, [and] custody officers,” can testify for or against a defendant.
Dr. Cushing noted that appellant made multiple negative references to his public defender during the interview. When asked for his understanding of the plea agreement, appellant said it “sound[ed] like a bunch of garbage” and noted he had experience with a “Harvey Waiver [in] 1997 or 1998 for a felony assault on a police officer.” Dr. Cushing concluded that appellant did “not comprehend his own status and condition in reference to the proceedings.” Appellant believed his case was no longer in criminal court, and that “since he [had] been placed in ‘civilian or civil court,’ both of the two original felony strikes were dismissed.” At one point, after voicing dissatisfaction with his attorney, appellant indicated that he thought he was representing himself. Appellant could not “comprehend the purpose of the competency interview or the potential consequences for being found incompetent to stand trial.” When he and Dr. Cushing reviewed a hypothetical plea bargain, appellant “demonstrated, at best, a rudimentary rationale for the selections he made.” Dr. Cushing concluded appellant was incompetent to stand trial, and recommended that appellant take antipsychotic medications.
On March 27, 2006, the trial court found appellant incompetent and referred the matter “ to mental health for an evaluation of [appellant] and the potential for his voluntarily or involuntarily receiving psychotropic medications and other ameliorative substances.” On March 28, 2006, Dr. Ronald Byledbal of the Mental Health Division evaluated appellant. Dr. Byledbal testified that he met with appellant after reviewing Dr. Cushing’s report and appellant’s mental health records from the jail. When asked if he noticed Dr. Cushing’s note that appellant’s behavior had recently improved, Dr. Byledbal described appellant’s condition as one “that waxes and wanes.” He testified that appellant’s condition “can also clear spontaneously.”
On April 13, 2006, psychologist Dr. Steven Ranish of the Sonoma County Department of Health services wrote to the court, recommending placing appellant at Napa State Hospital for “further evaluation, treatment and restoration to competency.” In two interviews with appellant, Dr. Ranish observed paranoid and delusional behavior. On April 17, 2006, the trial court ordered appellant to be placed in a state hospital for restoration of his competency. On October 5, 2006, the medical director of Metropolitan State Hospital reported that appellant had received treatment and his competency had been restored. On October 24, 2006, the trial court found appellant mentally competent and reinstated criminal proceedings against him.
On November 21, 2006, appellant moved to withdraw his no contest plea. At a hearing on the motion on January 8, 2007, appellant testified he did not understand the meaning of a no contest plea when he entered his plea on February 6, 2006. He claimed his attorney “was kind of upset because [he] did plead no contest, and she wanted [him] to plead guilty.” The trial court denied appellant’s motion, stating: “The court is quite far from clearly convinced of the propriety of withdrawal of a plea in this case. The general condition of [appellant] five, six, seven weeks after an entry of the plea is taken into some consideration and its settled or longstanding state to be sure is considered as well; but I look at the Tahl rights waiver form itself, I look at the plea that was taken . . ., the questions that were put to [appellant] and the answers that appear to readily come, and it would simply belie the record in so many respects to find otherwise. And what’s been presented just simply does not in any way come close to that.”
On March 9, 2007, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, asserting he was incompetent at the time of his plea and that there was new evidence of his innocence. The trial court denied the motion. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court dismissed counts one and five and the special allegation. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for three years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
Discussion
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea because he was not competent to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea. We reject the contention.
Section 1018 provides, in relevant part, that a trial court may, “for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” The defendant has the burden to establish good cause by clear and convincing evidence. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 167.) To establish good cause, the defendant must show that the plea was the product of “mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress, or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment . . . .” (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.) “The fact that [the defendant] may have been persuaded, or was reluctant, to accept the plea is not sufficient to warrant the plea being withdrawn. [Citation.] ‘Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 919.)
A no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea for this purpose. (§ 1016, subd. (3); see also People v. Rivera (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 924, 926-927.)
“A decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea ‘ “rests in the sound discretion of the trial court” ’ and is final unless the defendant can show a clear abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] Moreover, a reviewing court must adopt the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. [Citation.]” (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) Thus, the decision of the trial court granting or denying the motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse is clearly demonstrated. (People v. McMillan (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 576, 581.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. At the plea hearing on February 6, 2006, the court asked appellant if he had reviewed the plea documents “carefully with the help of [his] lawyer” before initialing and signing the document. Appellant answered, “Yes, your honor.” The trial court also asked appellant if he understood his legal rights as explained in the documents, and appellant again answered, “Yes, your honor.” Appellant indicated he had no questions about any of his legal rights under the plea. Appellant also stated he understood the terms of his plea agreement, specifically that he would be placed on probation, could face up to a year in the county jail, and could be imprisoned for up to four years if he violated his probation. Before taking appellant’s pleas, the trial court asked appellant, “Do you have any questions at all about this or anything you feel you are not clear about?” Appellant answered, “No, your Honor.”
When the court asked appellant for his pleas to each of the three counts, it referred to each charge by its count number, the statute violated, and the name of the charge. Appellant responded “no contest,” or “no contest, your honor,” as to each count. Appellant’s waiver form included the same information and stated: “I declare that the initials that appear above are my own and that I have read and understand each statement that I have initialed.” On appellant’s signed form, the words “have read and understood” are crossed out and replaced with the words, “my attorney has explained.” In addition, appellant’s counsel signed the form, declaring she had explained to appellant the rights he was waiving and that the trial court could accept the waiver form as “evidence of the defendant’s intelligent waiver” of his rights. Neither the judge nor defense counsel noted any concerns at any time during the plea hearing, and appellant made no statements indicating he had any problems understanding or participating in the plea proceedings. The exchange between the court and appellant, and appellant’s and his attorney’s signatures and initials on the waiver form, sufficiently establish that appellant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea.
Referring to the doctors’ opinions and to the various incidences in which he displayed delusional behavior during the two to three week period after he entered his plea, appellant contends that the evidence of his “slide into incompetency . . . was so close in time and so compelling, that it also clearly showed that he did not actually understand what he was doing when he entered his pleas of no contest, nor did he understand the significance and consequences of that decision.” Although appellant’s demeanor in the weeks following the plea hearing show that he was, at some points during the proceedings, incompetent, they are insufficient to rebut the presumption that he was competent at the time he entered his plea. (See § 1369, subd. (f) [a defendant is presumed to be competent in the absence of a showing that he is not]; see also People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 505 [close timing between a waiver and an incompetency finding is insufficient, by itself, to invalidate an otherwise valid waiver].)
In People v. Smith, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at page 502, the defendant, who was found to be mentally incompetent approximately two and a half weeks after he waived his right to a jury trial, attempted to withdraw the waiver on the ground that he had not been competent to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. (Id. at p. 501.) He asserted, as appellant does in this case, that the close timing between the waiver and the finding that he was incompetent suggests he was already incompetent at the time he entered his waiver. (Ibid.) The court of appeal rejected the contention, holding that the “temporal relationship between [a] waiver and the first evidentiary sign of incompetence alone” is insufficient to “invalidate an otherwise valid waiver.” (Ibid.) The court noted: “There is no denying that the timeframe between proceedings occurring when a defendant is presumed competent and the finding of doubt as to competency can be a very brief time period.” (Id. at p. 505.) Nevertheless, the court concluded that the incompetency finding did not “reach[] back” to the date the defendant entered his waiver, where there was no indication the defendant had any problems understanding the proceedings on the date he entered his waiver. (Id. at pp. 502, 505.)
Similarly, here, although appellant was found to be incompetent six weeks after the plea hearing, none of the doctors evaluated appellant at the time of the hearing or stated he was incompetent at that time. There is nothing in the record that shows that appellant’s mood and affect were “angry” or “irritable” during the plea hearing, as they were described to be twelve days after he entered his plea. Further, although he engaged in strange behavior approximately three weeks after the plea hearing, including putting up a bed sheet across his jail cell and telling mental health staff that he had accessed the jail’s computer system, “[m]ere bizarre statements or actions are generally insufficient to constitute substantial evidence raising a doubt as to the defendant’s competency.” (People v. Smith, supra, 110 CalApp.4th at p. 505, fn. 6; see also id. at p. 502 [that the defendant suffered from a mental illness at the time of the waiver “does not mean [he] was unable to understand the proceedings”].) Further, Dr. Byledbal opined that appellant’s condition was one that “waxes and wanes,” and “can also clear spontaneously.” Thus, the mere fact that appellant may have had a mental illness around the time of the plea hearing does not mean he was incapable of knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entering a plea.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Siggins, J., Jenkins, J.McGuiness, P.J.