Summary
In Hodge, the trial court insisted that the defendant proceed without retained counsel where defense counsel had not arrived “after adequate time” to a preindictment preliminary hearing (id. at 316–317, 441 N.Y.S.2d 231, 423 N.E.2d 1060).
Summary of this case from People v. CarrOpinion
Argued March 23, 1981
Decided June 18, 1981
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, GEORGE W. STROEBEL, JR., J.
Richard D. Wickerham for appellant.
John B. Poersch, District Attorney (Arkley L. Mastro, Jr., and Clifford T. Harrigan of counsel), for respondent.
Defendant Gabriel Hodge has been convicted of the felonies of burglary in the third degree and escape in the first degree, each arising from an incident unrelated to the other. On appeal from an Appellate Division order of affirmance, the main issue we confront is whether he is entitled to a reversal of the escape conviction because a preindictment preliminary hearing on that charge, held pursuant to CPL 180.10 (subd 2), was conducted in the absence of retained counsel. For the reasons which follow, we hold that he is and that the appropriate corrective action is a new trial.
Hodge, who was then being held at the Schenectady County Jail in connection with a multicount indictment, was arraigned on a charge of escape in the Princetown Town Court. The case was adjourned for a week in order to afford him an opportunity to retain an attorney.
On the appointed date, the defendant appeared alone, but informed the court that he had retained counsel, whose name he furnished to the court and for whose absence on this day he was unable to account. When defendant demurred at having the hearing go forward without the presence of his lawyer, the court insisted, "You have had a chance to obtain counsel. Your counsel is not present. So we are going to proceed without your counsel for this matter."
In this case the handicap this represented is not dependent on inference alone. The record reveals, for instance, that during the examination of one of the People's witnesses, when the defendant was offered an opportunity to examine a document before it was received into evidence, he stated, "I am not an attorney. So I have never seen a preliminary hearing conducted without an attorney present. So it would be senseless to show this to me, you know." At another point, offered an opportunity to cross-examine, he responded, "Like I have said before, I have never seen another preliminary hearing being conducted without a lawyer being present." To this the court rejoined, "You were informed of your rights to an attorney. You have talked to your attorney in the meantime and your attorney is not present. In the criminal procedure law, if your attorney is not present after adequate time the court can proceed to examine the case."
In point of fact, the Criminal Procedure Law provides to the contrary. CPL 180.10 (subd 3), expressly states that a defendant has an absolute right to counsel at the hearing and subdivision 4 enjoins the court to "accord the defendant opportunity to exercise such rights and must itself take such affirmative action as is necessary to effectuate them."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged had been committed. The defendant was then bound over for the Grand Jury, which was to indict him for escape in the first degree, and, after proceeding to trial with counsel, he was convicted. Later, he separately pleaded guilty to burglary in the third degree in satisfaction of all the charges on which he was being held at the time he had been arraigned for the escape.
We begin our analysis with the observation that, since most constitutional rights are not self-executing, the right to counsel may be the most basic of all. Conscious of its role, in criminal cases in particular we have called for "the highest degree of vigilance in safeguarding the right of an accused to have the assistance of an attorney at every stage of the legal proceedings against him" (People v Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 207). And, in so protecting the right to a lawyer's assistance from the time the criminal process is initiated (see People v Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161), an explicit and implicit goal is that a system which ideally seeks equal representation for the State and for the defendant should move in that direction in fact as well as in theory.
With these concerns in mind, it is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court has ruled that a preliminary hearing is "a `critical stage' of the State's criminal process", thus triggering the United States Constitution's guarantee that a defendant be afforded "the guiding hand of counsel" (Coleman v Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9). After all, a preliminary hearing is no vestigial remnant of an earlier day. It has many functions besides the obvious formal ones, such as reduction of excessive charges, prompt arrangement for release where appropriate and, above all, early screening of unjustifiable and unprovable charges against the innocent.
In a very real sense, as scholars and practitioners agree, since the prosecutor must present proof of every element of the crime claimed to have been committed, no matter how skeletally, the preliminary hearing conceptually and pragmatically may serve as a virtual minitrial of the prima facie case (see Amsterdam, Segal Miller, Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases [3d ed, 1974], § 139 et seq.). In its presentation, the identity of witnesses, to greater or lesser degree, testimonial details and exhibits, perforce will be disclosed. Especially because discovery and deposition, by and large, are not available in criminal cases, this may not only be an unexampled, but a vital opportunity to obtain the equivalent. It has even been suggested that "in practice [it] may provide the defense with the most valuable discovery technique available to him" (United States ex rel. Wheeler v Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 198 [WEINSTEIN, J.]; see Hawkins v Superior Ct., 22 Cal.3d 584, 588-589 [MOSK, J.]).
Since the hearing provides an occasion for appraising witnesses and others who are likely to participate in the ultimate trial, at least as often as not attentive and sensitive counsel gain knowledge and insight that will be of invaluable assistance in the preparation and presentation of the client's defense. Moreover, judicious exercise may be made of the power of subpoena, which, in the discretion of the court, is available at a preliminary hearing (see CPL 180.60, subd 7; Amsterdam, Segal Miller Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases, op. cit., § 142). Its use to call to the stand witnesses whom the People have not elected to summon may present the only way in which a recalcitrant though material witness can be interrogated (Myers v Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843). This may turn out to be a fortunate perpetuation of critical testimony of witnesses who later may not be available for trial (cf. People v Simmons, 36 N.Y.2d 126, 131). Most important, early resort to that time-tested tool for testing truth, cross-examination, in the end may make the difference between conviction and exoneration. (See, generally, Bailey Rothblatt, Successful Techniques for Criminal Trials, § 25.)
In this perspective, we must reject, as did the Supreme Court in Coleman ( 399 US, at pp 8-9, supra), the People's suggestion that, because the Grand Jury subsequently indicted the defendant, any infirmities that occurred at the flawed hearing may be excused. True, the State, by presenting the case to a Grand Jury in the first instance, may bypass the preliminary hearing stage entirely (see, e.g., People v Edwards, 19 Misc.2d 412). And, though a preliminary hearing results in dismissal, it may nevertheless succeed in obtaining an indictment at the hands of a Grand Jury (People ex rel. Hirschberg v Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258; but see Graham Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 UCLA L Rev 635, 728-731, noting that prosecutors will "resubmit" only in "special" cases such as where additional evidence is subsequently obtained). But, though in the former case the People will have obviated the preliminary hearing process and, in the latter, rendered the favorable disposition ineffectual, once it pursues the path of the preliminary hearing, the defendant becomes entitled to have it conducted with full respect for his right to counsel (cf. Douglas v California, 372 U.S. 353 [no constitutional right to appeal, but if appellate review permitted, counsel must be appointed for indigent criminal defendants]).
Moreover, by no means did the Grand Jury proceeding compensate for the counselless hearing. It offered, for instance, no opportunity to exercise the privileges of subpoena or of cross-examination or even of having the examination of witnesses conducted in the presence of those whom they accused (see CPL 190.50). That a defendant, in some circumstances, may obtain a transcript of some of the testimony before the Grand Jury is no substitute. For, "Such a transcript will invariably reflect only what the prosecuting attorney permits it to reflect; it is certainly no substitute for the possibility of developing further evidence through a probing cross-examination of prosecution witnesses — a possibility foreclosed with the denial of an adversarial proceeding" (Hawkins v Superior Ct., 22 Cal.3d 584, 589, supra; cf. CPL 670.10; People v Johnson, 51 A.D.2d 884 [recognizing that preliminary hearing testimony, but not Grand Jury testimony, may on occasions be used at trial when a witness dies or disappears]).
We note too, that the distinction between denial of effective assistance of counsel at trial and, as here, its denial at a preliminary stage of a case is of no consequence. To be sure, in contrast to cases in which the infringement of the right to counsel occurs at trial — where it is "too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial" (Glasser v United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76; see, e.g., People v Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264; People v Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287) — its denial at a preliminary hearing may very well be subject to harmless error analysis (Coleman v Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11, supra; Moses v Helgemoe, 562 F.2d 62; Schnepp v Hocher, 429 F.2d 1096, 1101). In either case, however, it is of constitutional dimension.
But this is not such a case. On the present record, it is impossible to assert "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the deprivation of counsel produced no adverse consequences (Chapman v California, 386 U.S. 18, cited in Coleman v Alabama, supra, at p 11; People v Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689). This is particularly clear because the test must be not what the hearing did not produce, but what it might have produced if the defendant's right to counsel had not been ignored (see Moses v Helgemoe, 562 F.2d 62, supra; Schnepp v Hocher, 429 F.2d, at p 1101, supra; cf. People v Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 417). So measured, the result of such inquiry would have to be pure speculation.
Since, therefore, there must be a reversal we now turn our attention to the corrective action. Ordinarily, a defect in preliminary proceedings should not vitiate a subsequent indictment (People ex rel. Hirschberg v Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, supra). In most instances, it could be adequate and appropriate to afford a defendant in such case an opportunity to reopen the preliminary hearing though subsequent to indictment (see Coleman v Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187; Ross v Sirica, 380 F.2d 557; cf. State v McCloud, 357 So.2d 1132 [La]; contra, United States v Milano, 443 F.2d 1022 ). However, since, in the case before us now, there has been a full trial, on that occasion the People's case was most certainly "discovered". On a new trial, the defendant will then be in a position comparable to the one he would have occupied had his right to counsel not been compromised (cf. Schnepp v Hocher, 429 F.2d, at p 1101, supra).
Finally, we add that we have considered the other contentions raised by the defendant and find them to be either without merit or rendered academic by our decision on the counsel issue.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reversing the conviction of escape in the first degree, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and remitting the case to the Schenectady County Court for a new trial in accordance with this opinion, and, as so modified, affirmed.
It has always been the law of this State that the Grand Jury has the power to indict regardless of whether a defendant's preliminary hearing has resulted in a dismissal or whether a preliminary hearing has been held at all (People ex rel. Hirschberg v Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, 261). That body is not bound by what occurred before the Magistrate and it may indict a person when the appropriate evidence before it provides reasonable cause to believe that such person committed an indictable offense (see CPL 190.65, subd 1). Nevertheless, as the majority notes, in Coleman v Alabama ( 399 U.S. 1) the Supreme Court held that when a preliminary hearing is held the defendant must be accorded the right to counsel. By its holding today, however, the majority goes beyond Coleman and, in effect, creates a per se rule requiring a reversal and a new trial whenever an otherwise valid conviction is preceded by a preindictment preliminary hearing held in the absence of counsel. This position misperceives the dictates of Coleman v Alabama (supra), which requires corrective action only where the denial of counsel at a preindictment hearing results in some prejudice to the defendant. Here, the defendant has failed to assert, let alone establish, the existence of any prejudice arising from the conduct of the preliminary hearing. Hence I would conclude that the failure of the hearing court to adjourn until defendant could appear with counsel was, in the circumstances of this case, mere harmless error and, accordingly, would affirm the order of the Appellate Division upholding defendant's conviction.
In Coleman, the Supreme Court held that a preindictment preliminary hearing is a "critical stage" of the criminal process at which the accused has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. In reaching this result, the court observed that there are several things which may be accomplished by counsel at the preliminary hearing. Specifically, the court stated that (at p 9): "First, the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail". Several of these interests may be present in virtually every case. Nevertheless, despite the fact that some of these interests were no doubt abstractly present in the Coleman case, the Supreme Court remanded to the Alabama State courts to determine if the failure to provide counsel at the hearing was mere harmless error. Thus, it is evident that there is no per se rule requiring a new trial when a defendant has been deprived of counsel at a preliminary hearing. In the present case, however, the majority effectively creates such a rule.
The majority rests its determination that a new trial is necessary primarily on the rationale that defendant was deprived of the opportunity for discovery at the preliminary hearing by the absence of counsel. The preliminary hearing is designed to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant the court in holding him for the action of a Grand Jury (CPL 180.10) and, contrary to the suggestion of the majority, is not a virtual minitrial, since the People need only produce a modicum of evidence sufficient to demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony (CPL 180.60, subd 8). Indeed, the notion that the preliminary hearing is designed to function as a discovery tool is obviated by the fact that the preliminary hearing may be dispensed with entirely if the defendant is first indicted (People ex rel. Hirschberg v Close, supra), and, indeed, even during the pendency of a hearing. As a practical matter, however, observant counsel may gain some discovery advantage from the conduct of the preliminary hearing and, in addition, the Supreme Court has identified the discovery interest as one of the reasons for the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing stage (Coleman v Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, supra). Therefore, if the defendant is in some way prejudiced at trial by the absence of counsel at the preliminary hearing in regard to some discovery interest, a new trial may in fact be warranted. In the present case, however, the defendant does not even mention that he was deprived of any meaningful opportunity for discovery at the preliminary hearing. In fact, defendant merely asserts that counsel is important at a preliminary hearing because it permits defense counsel to observe the demeanor of his client as a witness. Thus, the majority requires that a new trial be held in this case even though defendant has asserted no significant prejudice arising out of the preliminary hearing. Since only defense counsel is in a position to comment on how he may have altered his trial strategy had he been given a meaningful opportunity for discovery at a preliminary hearing, to hold that the failure to provide defendant with this opportunity for discovery resulted in some prejudice, absent some allegations by defendant to this effect, requires an exercise of judicial speculation and, in effect, creates a per se rule requiring a new trial whenever a criminal defendant has been deprived of counsel at a preliminary hearing. Because I believe that the absence of any prejudice on this record indicates that the conduct of the hearing in the absence of counsel was mere harmless error, I must respectfully dissent.
The defendant, already incarcerated on an unrelated charge, could not have secured release at the preliminary hearing. In addition, inasmuch as defendant was subsequently indicted, it is clear that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony and a preliminary hearing would not have resulted in the early screening of unjustifiable charges (see People ex rel. Hirschberg v Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, supra).
We would also note that a defendant's power to subpoena witnesses is not so broad as the majority would suggest. CPL 180.60 (subd 7) merely provides that "[u]pon request of the defendant, the court may, as a matter of discretion, permit him to call and examine other witnesses or to produce other evidence in his behalf".
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JONES and MEYER concur with Judge FUCHSBERG; Judge GABRIELLI dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judges JASEN and WACHTLER concur.
Order modified and case remitted to Schenectady County Court for a new trial in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.