Opinion
A158690
05-18-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TROY LIGHFOOT HOAGLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. 19-32363)
Defendant Troy Lightfoot Hoaglin pled no contest to one count of resisting an executive officer by threat (Pen. Code, § 69) and admitted to having suffered one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and having served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). On October 10, 2019, defendant was sentenced to midterm of two years, doubled due to the strike prior, plus one year for the prison prior.
All further statutory references are to the Penal code unless otherwise noted.
At the same time, defendant was sentenced to eight months for a conviction pursuant to a plea agreement entered in a separate case, Mendocino County case No. SCUK-CRCR-19-32601-01.
Effective January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) was amended pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 to limit the category of cases in which the enhancement applies. As amended, section 667.5, subdivision (b), which was previously applicable to all prior prison terms, now applies only to "each prior separate prison term for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code." (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) It is undisputed that defendant's prior prison term was based on convictions for battery with serious bodily injury, resisting an officer and evading an officer. (§§ 69, 243, subd. (d), 2800.2, subd. (a).)
On appeal, defendant contends that newly amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) applies to him retroactively under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 so that his prior prison term no longer qualifies for an enhancement under the statute. The Attorney General agrees that the courts' uniform retroactive application of other ameliorative sentence reforms supports the conclusion that Senate Bill No. 136 should also be applied retroactively. We agree.
Under In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, unless the Legislature provides otherwise, ameliorative legislation applies retroactively to all judgments that are not final when the legislation goes into effect. Defendant's judgment was not final on January 1, 2020, when Senate Bill No. 136 went into effect. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to have his one-year prison prior enhancement stricken. (See People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681-682 [holding Senate Bill No. 136 applies retroactively]; People v. Lopez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 337, 340-341 [same].)
The Attorney General suggests that this "case should be remanded for resentencing so that the trial court, within the bounds of the plea agreement, may 'exercise its discretion in light of the changed circumstances.' " Although defendant agrees that the matter may be remanded so that that the trial court can strike the enhancement, remand is not necessary to accomplish this task. Moreover, we fail to see the need for a new sentencing hearing in this instance. Generally, "when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing 'a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.' " (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) Here, however, no purpose would be served by a remand because given the terms of his plea, there is no way to impose a sentence greater than four years. As the Attorney General notes, defendant's "plea bargain provided that in exchange for his plea appellant would serve five years in prison, consisting of the midterm of two years for resisting an executive officer, doubled due to the strike prior, and one year for the prison prior." Defendant's conviction of the single felony count has a sentencing range of sixteen months, or two years or three years. (§ 18, subd. (a).) Evan assuming that the court could notwithstanding the terms of the plea impose the upper term on the conviction, the prior strike enhancement would cause the sentence to exceed the five-year cap in the agreement. Alternatively, striking the prior strike enhancement would result only in a three-year term. Accordingly, in the interest of justice, we strike the one-year prison term enhancement and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
Disposition
We modify the judgment to strike the one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The modified judgment shall reflect a sentence of four years in state prison. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the new sentence and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
POLLAK, P.J. WE CONCUR: STREETER, J.
TUCHER, J.