Opinion
H047257
05-01-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ-DELGADO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS140200A)
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Alejandro Hernandez-Delgado was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and the jury found true gang and firearm allegations (Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life. This court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hernandez-Delgado (Dec. 11, 2018, H043755) [nonpub. opn.].)
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinion in People v. Hernandez-Delgado, supra, H043755. (Evid. Code, § 425, subd. (d)(1).)
Defendant appeals from the trial court's postjudgment order denying his petition to unseal identifying juror information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237. Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the petition because he established a prima facie case of good cause for the disclosure.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
For reasons that we will explain, we will reverse.
Defendant has also filed a petition for writ of mandate, which this court ordered considered with the appeal. We have disposed of the mandate petition by separate order filed this day. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b).)
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The jury found defendant guilty on March 8, 2016. Later that month, a defense investigator interviewed Juror No. 4 after she contacted defense counsel to provide "jury feedback." As relevant here, Juror No. 4 told the investigator that a female Hispanic juror "mentioned that the fact that [defendant] was from El Salvador . . . made her feel he was more guilty because . . . so many murderers come from El Salvador." However, according to Juror No. 4, "other people right away said, " 'You can't use that.' " When asked whether "anything other than the evidence convicted [defendant]," Juror No. 4 said, "No." She also stated that "[t]he jury deliberated reasonable doubt for a long time." Later in the interview, Juror No. 4 stated that the female Hispanic juror "had made a comment about El Salvadorians and that . . . people from El Salvador, that's where the gang's start and that's where - the kind of scarier people originate from."
Defendant subsequently moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct and provided the trial court with a transcript of Juror No. 4's interview. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant appealed from the judgment, contending among other claims that the trial court erred in denying the new trial motion. We assumed that the juror's statement was admissible under Evidence Code section 1150 and that it constituted misconduct since the juror also referenced facts not in evidence when she told the other jurors "so many murderers come from El Salvador." After reviewing the entire record, we affirmed the trial court's ruling, determining that defendant had not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the misconduct because " ' " 'there is no substantial likelihood that [defendant] suffered actual harm.' " ' [Citation.]"
Approximately six months after we affirmed the judgment, defendant filed a petition in the trial court to unseal identifying juror information pursuant to section 237 based on Juror No. 4's statements to the defense investigator. Defendant asserted that good cause existed for the disclosure of juror information because "a fellow juror may have relied on racial stereotypes in reaching a verdict." (Capitalization and bold omitted.) Defendant asserted that he "must investigate these matters so that he can raise a habeas corpus claim alleging that his state and federal constitutional rights were violated by the juror's reliance on racial stereotypes in reaching a verdict."
The trial court denied the petition. The court found that "defendant has failed to establish a prima facie showing of good cause to justify the disclosure."
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition to unseal identifying juror information. Defendant argues that based on the transcript of Juror No. 4's interview, he established a prima facie case of good cause for the disclosure because he made a " 'sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.' " The Attorney General asserts that the trial court's ruling should be upheld because defendant "relied on the prior appellate record and failed to substantively expand it" and, thus, this court's "legal conclusion that the prior appellate record failed to show a ' " 'substantial likelihood' " ' of ' " 'actual harm' " ' controlled the result" in the trial court because defendant "necessarily failed to demonstrate good cause for juror identifying information where the record demonstrated no substantial likelihood of actual harm from the alleged juror misconduct." We determine that the trial court erred.
1. Legal Principles
Following the recording of a jury's verdict in a criminal trial, the trial court must seal the record of "personal juror identifying information," including "names, addresses, and telephone numbers." (§ 237, subd. (a)(2).) "Pursuant to Section 237, a defendant or defendant's counsel may . . . petition the court for access to personal juror identifying information within the court's records necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose." (§ 206, subd. (g).) "The court shall set the matter for hearing if the petition and supporting declaration establish a prima facie showing of good cause for the release of the personal juror identifying information." (§ 237, subd. (b).) " 'Good cause . . . requires 'a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred . . . .' [Citations.]" (People v. Johnson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161-1162.) "Good cause does not exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported." (People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 346 (Cook).)
"Under . . . section 237, a showing of good cause does not automatically entitle the petitioner to the juror's contact information. The trial court may deny the request for jurors' contact information if the court finds a compelling interest for nondisclosure." (People v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 382 (Tuggles); see also § 237, subd. (b).) "Compelling interests include jurors' safety and the need for finality if a long period of time has elapsed since trial." (Tuggles, supra, at p. 382.)
Section 237, subdivisions (c) and (d) provide the hearing and disclosure procedures in the event that a prima facie showing of good cause has been made.
"If the court does not set the matter for hearing, the court shall by minute order set forth the reasons and make express findings either of a lack of a prima facie showing of good cause or the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure." (§ 237, subd. (b).)
We review a trial court's denial of a petition for the disclosure of juror information for abuse of discretion. (People v. Munoz (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 143, 165.)
2. Analysis
"An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. (U.S. Const., amends. VI and XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; [citations].) An impartial jury is one in which no member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every member is ' 'capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it" ' [citations]." (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 293-294.) " ' "The right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution." ' " (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110.)
Here, defendant premises his claim of misconduct on the alleged statements of a juror that she felt defendant "was more guilty because . . . so many murderers come from El Salvador" and that "El Salvador [is] where the gang's start and that's where - the kind of scarier people originate from." Thus, the alleged jury misconduct concerns possible racial bias. (See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 855, 862-863, 870].) Racial bias precludes impartiality and a verdict based solely on the evidence. The alleged misconduct also involves the communication of information to other jurors that was not part of the evidence received at trial. When a juror "shares improper information with other jurors, the event is called juror misconduct." (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 294.)
The Attorney General does not dispute that the juror's statements, if true, would constitute misconduct. Nor does the Attorney General contend that the biased statements are barred by Evidence Code section 1150. Rather, the Attorney General argues that because we concluded in the prior appeal that the record did not establish a " ' " 'substantial likelihood that [defendant] suffered actual harm' " ' [Citation]" from the alleged misconduct, defendant's section 237 petition for the disclosure of identifying juror information necessarily failed to demonstrate good cause as it relied on the prior appellate record. We reject the Attorney General's contention.
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) provides: "Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined."
In defendant's prior appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion based on juror misconduct. As we explained in our decision, once juror misconduct has been established, a presumption of prejudice arises " ' "which 'may be rebutted . . . by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm.' " [Citation.]' " We assumed defendant established misconduct, but determined there was no error because after reviewing the entire record " ' " "there is no substantial likelihood that [defendant] suffered actual harm.' " ' [Citation.]"
Here, defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his petition for the disclosure of identifying juror information pursuant to section 237. As we stated above, to demonstrate error in this regard, defendant must establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of good cause for the disclosure by a showing " 'sufficient . . . to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred. . . .' [Citations.]" (Cook, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 345-346.) In other words, the standard for establishing good cause for the disclosure of identifying juror information is entirely different from the standard for establishing the right to a new trial. In this instance, defendant did not have to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that he suffered actual harm from the alleged misconduct.
The trial court's denial of defendant's section 237 petition does not set forth the court's reasoning, stating solely that "[t]he court finds that the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie showing of good cause to justify the disclosure." On this record, we conclude that the trial court's finding was in error, as the transcript of Juror No. 4's interview established " 'a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred . . . .' [Citations.]" (Cook, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 345-346.)
We note that section 237, subdivision (b) requires a trial court to "set forth the reasons and make express findings either of a lack of a prima facie showing of good cause or the presence of a compelling interest against disclosure," when the court does not set the matter for hearing on the petition. --------
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's order denying defendant's petition for the disclosure of identifying juror information and direct the trial court to set the matter for hearing pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 237.
IV. DISPOSITION
The trial court's June 21, 2019 postjudgment order denying defendant's petition to unseal identifying juror information pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 237 is reversed. The trial court shall set the matter for hearing on the petition pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 237.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.