Opinion
April 22, 1996
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Dunne, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that his suppression motion should have been granted because there was no probable cause for his arrest is without merit ( see, People v. McCray, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 602). Although the defendant insists that the arresting officer's testimony was incredible, the hearing court's factual findings and credibility determinations are entitled to great deference on appeal ( see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759; People v Overton, 188 A.D.2d 491; People v. Bailey, 179 A.D.2d 662). In any event, the arresting officer's testimony regarding his observation of the defendant holding a bag containing drugs and the defendant's conduct thereafter, including his attempt to conceal the drugs from the officer, establish that there was a sufficient factual predicate to make the arrest ( see, People v Sargeant, 174 A.D.2d 767; People v. Goggans, 155 A.D.2d 689).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15). Resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the triers of fact, who saw and heard the witnesses ( see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94; People v. Scott, 168 A.D.2d 523). Their determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( see, People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88).
While it is necessary for the prosecution to establish that a defendant knew the weight of the drugs he or she possessed in order to find the defendant guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree ( see, People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 499), where, as here, the controlled substance is one that is measured on an aggregate weight basis, evidence that the defendant handled the controlled substance, together with other circumstantial evidence, may give rise to an inference that the defendant knew the weight of the controlled substance in his or her possession ( see, People v. Dillon, 207 A.D.2d 793, 796, affd 87 N.Y.2d 885; People v. Okehoffurum, 201 A.D.2d 508, 509). As the Court of Appeals recently explained, "handling" does not necessarily mean that the defendant manipulated or packaged the drugs, but "merely connotes sufficient contact with the substance to experience its weight — to give rise to a probability defendant became aware of the weight of the drugs in his possession" ( People v. Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d 27, 33). Moreover, inasmuch as the defendant was also found in possession of a quantity of small ziplock bags and an amount of drugs that could be packaged into 70 "doses" or saleable units, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant intended to sell the drugs and was sufficiently familiar with drugs so as to be able to determine their weight ( see, People v. Sanchez, supra, at 35; People v. Wright, 214 A.D.2d 989; see also, People v. Gutierrez, 211 A.D.2d 822).
The defendant's sentence was not excessive ( see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83). Mangano, P.J., Balletta, Copertino and Hart, JJ., concur.