Opinion
A148236
07-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEREK ALAN HAFELFINGER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. H56374)
Derek Alan Hafelfinger appeals a judgment convicting him of oral copulation with, and the continuous sexual abuse of, his young step-daughter, M.T. Defendant contends, among other things, that the court made prejudicial evidentiary errors and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance We find no error and shall affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
Defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of oral copulation with a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and one count of continuous sexual abuse (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that defendant had substantial sexual conduct with the victim who was under the age of 14, per section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
The following evidence was presented at trial:
M.T. and her mother S. began living with defendant when M.T. was two years old. Defendant and S. were married when M.T. was five years old. Throughout the relevant time period, M.T. regularly visited with her father, increasing from once a month when she was younger to alternating weeks as she grew.
M.T. was 14 years old at the time of her testimony and was then living with her father. She testified that defendant began sexually abusing her when she was seven or eight. She detailed numerous incidents of abuse, which usually involved defendant touching her vagina or making her orally copulate him.
S. testified that she discovered the abuse in January 2014. When her daughter learned that defendant would be sleeping in the room next to hers, she became pale, looked scared and locked herself in her room. S. was suspicious and checked defendant's smartphone, finding texts between M.T. and defendant sent the previous midnight. S. spoke to her daughter and demanded to know why she was upset. M.T. cried and told her that defendant touched her all the time and had been doing so for years.
Although DNA evidence was collected from a blanket that M.T. believed was used in the final incident of abuse and from underwear she wore that night, defendant was excluded as a contributor to the samples collected.
The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Following the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of 21 years to life. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion
1. Child Pornography
At trial, a computer forensic examiner testified that he examined a computer that had been seized from the family's residence. He found no evidence of browsing known child pornography sites, but found four files containing images of child pornography in an unallocated space. Although the four files were not shown to the jury, over defendant's objection the witness described the images for the jury. According to the witness, the images involved adults having sex with children, including children orally copulating an adult male, and children in suggestive postures. Defendant challenges the admission of this evidence on numerous grounds.
The expert testified that the "unallocated" space on the computer is that part of the hard drive where files are placed after they have been deleted, either by a user or automated software.
Defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress the images because the search warrant authorizing seizure of the family computer was not supported by probable cause. "The question facing a reviewing court asked to determine whether probable cause supported the issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing. [Citations.] 'The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' [Citation.] . . . 'In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant the test of probable cause is ... whether the facts contained in the affidavit are such as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.' [Citation.] The magistrate's determination of probable cause is entitled to deferential review." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041 (Kraft); United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 914 [There is "a strong preference for warrants" and " 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.' "].)
"We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 by applying the substantial evidence test to the factual determinations made by the court, with all presumptions favoring the trial judge's findings." (People v. Manderscheid (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355, 359.) " 'However, we use our independent judgment to determine whether those facts establish probable cause. [Citation.] We are prohibited from ordering the suppression of evidence unless federal constitutional standards require us to do so.' " (People v. Lim (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296.)
The warrant in this case was issued based on an affidavit submitted by a police detective summarizing M.T.'s description of defendant's sexual misconduct and opining, based on his police training and experience, that "persons who commit crimes such as child molestation often have an unnatural urge to have sex with children and look at pictures and videos of other people having sex with children" and that "they will often use the internet to conduct searches for these types of images and videos." Defendant argues that the police detective's "bald assertion" is insufficient to establish a fair probability that there may be images or videos depicting child pornography on defendant's computer.
The affidavit reads more fully: "Through my police training and experience, I know internet searches, photos, videos, call logs, text messages, and instant messages are stored internally in computers, cell phones, and electronic storage devices. I know that suspect(s) have the capability to download images and videos from laptop computers and transferred to other storage devices including but not limited to cell phone, memory sticks, and other electronic storage devices. . . . I know that persons who commit crimes such as child molestation often have an unnatural urge to have sex with children and look at pictures and videos of other people having sex with children. I know they will often use the internet to conduct searches for these types of images and videos. I know that internet access can be made through computers, laptops, tablets, and cell phones. I believe there may be images and or videos depicting child pornography on any computers, laptops, tablets or cell phones that were under the control of Derek Hafelfinger."
Defendant relies on two Ninth Circuit decisions in which the courts found similarly worded affidavits insufficient to establish probable cause. In Dougherty v. City of Covina (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 892, the court held that an affidavit alleging child molestation coupled with an assertion that child molesters are likely to possess child pornography, without more, was insufficient to establish probable cause to search for child pornography. (Id. at pp. 897-899.) The court explained, "The affidavit contains no facts tying the acts of Dougherty as a possible child molester to his possession of child pornography. The affidavit provides no evidence of receipt of child pornography. No expert 'specifically concludes' Doughtery is a pedophile. In the affidavit, Officer Bobiewicz states only that '[b]ased upon [his] training and experience . . . subjects in this type of criminal behavior have in their possession child pornography. . . .' The affidavit provides no indication that Doughtery was interested in viewing images of naked children or of children performing sex acts. There is no evidence of conversations with students about sex acts, discussions with children about pictures or video, or other possible indications of interest in child pornography. . . . Indeed the affidavit does not even verify that Dougherty owned a computer or the other targets of the search or had internet service or another means of receiving child pornography at his home." (Id. at pp. 898-899, see also United States v. Needham (2013) 718 F.3d 1190, 1195 [reaffirming holding in Dougherty that "the bare inference that those who molest children are likely to possess child pornography . . . alone, does not establish probable cause to search a suspected child molester's home for child pornography"].)
The Attorney General does not attempt to distinguish the Ninth Circuit cases but argues they do "not mandate an opposite result, particularly in light of [People v. Nicholls (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703] and other supportive federal authority." In People v. Nicholls, while the defendant was being held on sexual molestation charges involving his 10-year-old daughter, the police concluded there was probable cause to obtain a search warrant based on a similar affidavit and a conversation in which defendant told his mother that he had stored his computer in her garage and "not to let anyone 'mess' with it." (Id. at p. 715.) Defendant moved to quash the warrant, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because there was no evidence that pornography was involved in the alleged molestations or that he possessed any child pornography. The appellate court upheld the search warrant, stating: "Here, there was abundant evidence of child molestation, and the affidavit recited not only generalities about child molesters but also the statements of the child-victim describing incidents of molestation and defendant's expressed concern that no one 'mess' with his computer. Together with defendant's expressed concern about his computer, there was sufficient foundation that defendant was a member of the class of persons who tended to keep child pornography on a computer." (Id. at p. 713; see also United States v. Colbert (8th Cir. 2010) 605 F.3d 573 [relying on the "intuitive relationship between acts such as child molestation or enticement and possession of child pornography" to support search warrant]; United States v. Byrd (5th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 ["[C]ommon sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to order and receive child pornography."].)
We need not decide whether the affidavit established probable cause in this case because even if it did not, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897 undoubtedly applies. Under Leon, if a warrant is unsupported by probable cause, suppression of the evidence found in a search pursuant to that warrant is not justified if "the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate." (Id. at p. 926.) Although phrased in terms of "good faith," the "inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." (Id. at p. 922, fn. 23.)
Defendant argues that in light of Dougherty v. City of Covina, supra, 654 F.3d 892 and United States v. Needham, supra, 718 F.3d 1190, the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the detective's belief was unreasonable. We disagree. The affidavit in support of the warrant application first summarized M.T.'s description of the manner in which defendant had frequently sexually abused her, before opining, based on the officer's experience, that persons performing such acts often maintain child pornography on their computers. Given People v. Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 703 and the split among federal circuits as to whether evidence of a sexual offense against a child is sufficient to establish probable cause to search for child pornography, the detective's reliance on the warrant cannot be viewed as unreasonable.
Defendant also contends the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 and that the admission of the images deprived him of due process and a fair trial. Although evidence that a criminal defendant has the propensity or disposition to engage in certain conduct is "generally inadmissible to prove" that he did so "on a specified occasion" (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159; Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), Evidence Code section 1108 provides an exception to this general rule. Section 1108 "allows evidence of the defendant's uncharged sex crimes to be introduced in a sex offense prosecution to demonstrate the defendant's disposition to commit such crimes." (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1009.) The admission of "another sexual offense" is authorized whether or not the offense is charged. (Id. at pp. 1012-1013.) Section 1108 "evidence is presumed admissible and is to be excluded only if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value in showing the defendant's disposition to commit the charged sex offense or other relevant matters." (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 132.) Section 1108 reflects a legislative determination that " 'evidence of uncharged sexual offenses is so uniquely probative in sex crimes prosecutions it is presumed admissible without regard to the limitations of . . . section 1101.' " (People v. Britt (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 500, 506, italics omitted.) However, " '[s]ection 1108 passes constitutional muster if and only if [Evidence Code] section 352 preserves the accused's right to be tried for the current offense.' [Citation.] 'Rather than admit [ting] or exclud[ing] every sex offense a defendant commits' pursuant to section 1108, trial judges 'must engage in a careful weighing process under section 352.' " (People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 355, italics omitted.) Thus, "[u]nder section 1108, courts . . . retain broad discretion to exclude disposition evidence if its prejudicial effect, including the impact that learning about defendant's other sex offenses makes on the jury, outweighs its probative value." (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 919.)
Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) reads in full: "In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant's commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352."
The trial court here found that the evidence was admissible because the possession of child pornography in violation of section 311.11, is an offense enumerated in Evidence Code section 1108 for use as propensity to establish a defendant's commission of a currently charged sex crime (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (d)(1)(A)), and that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by any potential prejudice in its admission.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of section 311.1, subdivision (a) because there was no evidence that he "knowingly possessed" the pornography. Admission of an uncharged act under section 1108 does not require, however, that the prosecutor prove the act beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, evidence of an uncharged act is admissible even when the defendant has been acquitted of the offense. (People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 662.) Instead, "the degree of certainty of [the act's] commission" is one factor the courts must consider in evaluating the potential prejudice of admitting evidence of an uncharged act. (People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917 ["[T]rial judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant's other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense."].) In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in drawing the reasonable inference that defendant had knowledge of the child pornography found on the family computer. The trial court recognized that it could not be established conclusively that defendant viewed the images but that it was so unlikely that the images were placed in his computer in an innocent way, that the evidence remained highly probative. The court reasoned further that defendant would be able to challenge the prosecution's evidence regarding where in the hard drive the images were found and how that impacted the likelihood he had viewed them.
Section 311.1 provides that "Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, publishes, produces, develops, duplicates, or prints any representation of information, data, or image, including, but not limited to, any film, filmstrip, photograph, negative, slide, photocopy, videotape, video laser disc, computer hardware, computer software, computer floppy disc, data storage media, CD-ROM, or computer-generated equipment or any other computer-generated image that contains or incorporates in any manner, any film or filmstrip, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to, or to exchange with, others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to, or exchanges with, others, any obscene matter, knowing that the matter depicts a person under the age of 18 years personally engaging in or personally simulating sexual conduct, as defined in Section 311.4, shall be punished either by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year, by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison, by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by the fine and imprisonment."
Finally, defendant contends the evidence was inadmissible because the images created a substantial risk of inflaming the jury and of confusing the issues. We disagree. Compared to the crimes charged in this case, the four images of child pornography were not unduly prejudicial within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. The images were not likely to inflame the jurors' emotions and thus not likely to motivate them to use them, " 'not to logically evaluate the point upon which it [was] relevant, but to . . . punish [defendant] because of the jurors' emotional reaction.' " (People v. Escudero (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 302, 312.)
2. Adult Pornography
Over defendant's objection, S. testified that defendant watched adult pornography on the family computer several times a week. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his objection to this evidence under Evidence Code section 352.
Here, the trial court found that the evidence was highly probative and not particularly prejudicial. The court explained that the evidence was probative because it established "how much he's used the computer" which was relevant to whether he had viewed the child pornography images found on the same computer. The court explained, "[N]umerous people look at adult pornography. Very, very, very, very few people look at child pornography. . . . So the prejudice of the adult pornography is like to drop a ring in a snowstorm compared to the child pornography, but it does establish that he had a predilection of pornography of some kind. Plus it also shows that he's frequently accessed the computer and frequently accessed adult pornography. So it's going to be admissible." Contrary to defendant's argument, the evidence was not cumulative on this point in light of other evidence that defendant regularly used the family computer. The fact that defendant regularly accessed adult pornography on the computer supports a reasonable inference that it was also defendant who accessed the child pornography found on the computer. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's reasoning.
3. Evidence of Defendant's Drinking and Temper
M.T. was asked on direct examination if defendant had ever done anything that made her scared of him. She responded: "There was a scenario that I'll probably always remember. . . . [W]e were in the kitchen, and my mom had like gave him a punch in the arm, but it wasn't like an aggressive punch. And he was a heavy drinker, and so he had probably been drinking that night. And he got very agitated. And he had a knife in his hand, and he threw it across the room, not at anybody or with a room that had somebody in it. But I do remember the knife handle going flying and the knife stuck into the wood table. That was a pretty scary moment." Defendant contends the evidence was irrelevant and admitted in violation of Evidence Code section 352. Conceding that trial counsel did not make an appropriate objection, defendant argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object.
" 'In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citations.] A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel's actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel. [Citations.] If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. [Citation.] Otherwise, the claim is more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.' [Citation.] 'Failure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal representation.' " (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 206-207.)
The record in this case does not indicate why counsel did not object, and contrary to defendant's argument there is a possible tactical explanation for the decision not to object. As the Attorney General argues, "trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that objecting to the testimony would have drawn unnecessary attention to the brief exchange." This is particularly true because the evidence was likely admissible. The testimony was probative of the victim's relationship with defendant and not particularly prejudicial. Finally, even if inadmissible, there is no likelihood that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had trial counsel succeeded in excluding this relatively innocuous testimony.
4. Cross-examination of S.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to allow impeachment of M.T.'s character by asking S. whether her daughter had bragged to S.'s friend about lying and manipulating teachers at her school. The court ruled that counsel could ask S. whether she had heard the victim admit to cheating or lying at school, but that it would improperly elicit hearsay to ask the mother what she was told by her friend. Later, the court advised defense counsel that if she wanted to ask the mother about the victim's honesty, it would be necessary to hold an Evidence Code section 402 hearing first. Defense counsel did not request such a hearing and did not ask mother any questions related to the victim's alleged lying at school. Defendant contends this omission constitutes ineffective assistance for which reversal is required.
The Attorney General argues correctly that defense counsel's decision not to pursue this potential impeachment was inherently tactical. The record does not establish that mother actually heard the victim admit to lying, but even if such an admission could be established, the context in which the alleged lying occurred was so different from the context of this case that it is entirely possible defense counsel reasonably opted against pursuing this line of questioning. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the failure to impeach on this issue had any impact on the outcome of the case.
5. Cross-examination of M. T.
Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine for permission to cross-examine M.T. about "witnessing some sexual conduct" involving her father and step-mother. The court stated that such testimony would be irrelevant due to the victim's age. The court explained, "They know a lot now. . . . [E]ven if its oral sex, that's not relevant." During trial, defense counsel attempted a second time to introduce evidence involving M.T.'s father and also sought to present evidence that M.T. had seen pornography advertisements "pop up" on her grandfather's iPad. The court indicated that it understood counsel was trying to show that M.T. "could have some exposure to either pornography or sexual acts of oral copulation that would allow her to make this up against the defendant," but reiterated that because of the victim's age, the evidence involving the father was not particularly probative and that the evidence was likely to take up undue time and confuse the issues for the jury. The court ruled, however, that counsel could ask M.T. if she had seen videos or still images of couples engaging in oral copulation. When asked, M.T. denied ever seeing such images or videos.
There was no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of this evidence. The prosecutor was not arguing or suggesting that M.T. would not otherwise have known about these sexual acts if defendant had not forced this conduct upon her. M.T. was in the eighth grade when she disclosed that defendant had been molesting her for approximately six years. The court's assumption that most 12- or 13-year-old children have some knowledge of oral copulation is not unreasonable. On balance, as the Attorney General states, "the risk of undue consumption of time and confusion of the issues greatly outweighed the low probative value of the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. The issue was not what [M.T.] had been accidentally exposed to at her father's home, but what had occurred in her mother's and [defendant's] home, and what [defendant] had done to her. This tangential line of questioning would have taken too much time, and brought in irrelevant information that would have confused the jury."
6. New Trial
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on a letter written by M.T.'s father to the court in advance of the sentencing hearing. In the letter, the father wrote, "The long lasting damage that [defendant] has instilled upon [M.T.] is so multi-faceted and complex, that a criminal trial could never fully realize the impact that his crimes have had, and will always have, on [M.T.s] mental, emotional and sexual health. She was pushed into a very inappropriate role at a young age, and that carried over into her eagerness to have boyfriends at a very early age and generally over sexualized behavior. She began to take unsuitable actions with myself and my father, such as trying frequently to touch our genitals, which put both of us in uncomfortable positions, and we were very confused as to how to handle the situation. It was as if she was trying to have a closer relationship with the other men in her life, and she thought that was the way to do it. Now, as a teenager and in the midst of puberty, she feels more experienced than many of her peers, but is unable to pursue a healthy relationship due to the damage that [defendant] has done. It is unclear as to how long it will take her in her recovery to be able to learn healthy boundaries with men and how to protect herself from being pushed too far sexually."
A new trial may be ordered in a criminal matter "[w]hen new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial." (§ 1181, subd. 8.) Defendant argued that the evidence that M.T. had been trying to touch other men's genitals called into question "the credibility of all [M.T.'s] allegations."
In opposition to defendant's motion, the prosecutor submitted a declaration by an expert in child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome who opined that it would not be unusual for a female child who was regularly molested by her stepfather from the age of seven or eight to 13 years of age to act out sexually with other adult men and that the child "may have accommodated the sexual abuse touchings into her experiences and sought to engage others with such touchings now perceived as appropriate acts of affection."
The trial court denied defendant's motion, explaining, "I think that [the letter] would be very helpful to the prosecution. It might have been a quicker verdict. The letter—the fact that this happened almost confirms the evidence. It's very inappropriate for a girl to be doing that, but not for someone who has been subjected to what she said she was subjected to. It's very much understandable that that really—if the expert testimony would come in, it would just be devastating to the defense, and it would be a very quick verdict. [¶] And, really, it would be perceived as common, say, even without the expert, that what she was doing with her biological real father was a cry for help, and in hindsight now, he probably feels very badly he didn't explore it further, but he had no way of knowing. He had no suspicion this was going on. [¶] In any event . . . I find it would not be helpful to the defense."
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. (People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 466 [" ' "The determination of a motion for new trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.' " ' "].) "In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the trial court considers the following factors: ' "1. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; 4. That the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial; and 5. That these be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits." ' " (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 212.)
Defendant acknowledges that ordinarily " 'evidence which merely impeaches a witness is not significant enough to make a different result probable.' " (People v. Green (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 1, 11, quoting People v. Huskins (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 862.) He contends that it is sufficient in this case because the victim's credibility was "the central issue in the case." We disagree with defendant's assertion that the evidence so impeached her credibility that a different outcome was probable. To the contrary, as the trial court concluded, the evidence was much more likely to have supported the prosecution's case.
Because we have found no error in the trial court proceedings, we necessarily reject defendant's claim that the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors compels reversal. (See People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 465 ["we discern no error when defendant's contentions are considered individually, and therefore find no cumulative error"].) --------
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Pollak, J. We concur: McGuiness, P.J.
Jenkins, J.