Opinion
E052453
11-22-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CESAR VALLE GUTIERREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super.Ct.No. INF10000645)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jean Pfeiffer Leonard, Judge. (Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant and appellant Cesar Valle Gutierrez guilty of assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant had suffered a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant was sentenced to a total term of five years eight months in state prison. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence of highly inflammatory photographs. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
The jury found defendant not guilty of unlawfully preventing a witness from reporting a crime (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(1)) and child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). Another count of child endangerment was dismissed by the court in the interests of justice.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and Jane Doe were in a romantic relationship. For about a week, Jane and her three-year-old daughter were staying with defendant at defendant's mother's house in Riverside. On March 18, 2010, Jane told defendant that she would be leaving the next day, after defendant had hit her twice on her lip and slapped her because he thought she was cheating on him.
On March 19, 2010, defendant was upset that Jane wanted to leave the house, and he followed her around the house. At one point, he pulled her by the hand and hair and walked outside. Feeling concerned and afraid, Jane called 911 when defendant was out of her presence. The call, however, was "dropped" or disconnected.
Defendant called 911 back and told the operator that the original call was made in error. Jane screamed over defendant's voice saying, "No, it was not an accident." Defendant hit Jane on the back of her head with his closed fist about three times so she could not speak up. Jane "begged" defendant not to hit her.
Jane went into the bedroom and picked up her daughter, who was upset, and curled up on the corner of the bed. She yelled at defendant to stop hitting her because she was holding her daughter in her lap. She begged defendant to let her leave, but defendant refused and hit her in the face with a closed fist about three more times. Defendant then hit Jane with a hard object, cutting her head open and causing her to bleed profusely. Jane's blood spilled on her daughter and around the room. Jane again begged defendant to let her go, but defendant refused to let her go and tried to cover her mouth with underwear so the neighbors would not hear her yelling for help.
The police subsequently arrived. A few minutes after knocking on the front door and getting no response, the officers heard a female voice screaming. Defendant tried to muffle Jane's yelling by covering her with a blanket and stuffing her mouth with the underwear. Defendant eventually let Jane go. While Jane opened the front door, defendant fled the home. Jane received staples for her forehead wound. Jane's daughter was not injured.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting six highly inflammatory photographs at trial. The photographs defendant challenges are of the bloody underwear used to gag Jane, Jane's daughter in bloodied clothing, and blood spattered in the bedroom (trial exhibit Nos. 1, 5-1, 5-2, 6-1, 6-2, and 8a). The trial court reviewed the challenged exhibits, specifically exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and determined the probative value of the photographs outweighed any prejudicial effect they might have.
A. Additional Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant sought to exclude the challenged exhibits because they were irrelevant and highly inflammatory. Exhibit No. 1 was a photograph of the underwear defendant used to gag Jane. Defendant argued this photograph was inaccurate, irrelevant, and very inflammatory because the underwear was not bloodied by its use as a gag, and defendant had stipulated that it had been used in that capacity. The prosecution argued the picture was highly probative and necessary to the false imprisonment charge since the elements are intentionally and unlawfully restraining, confining, or detaining someone by violence or menace. The trial court allowed exhibit No. 1, finding it was not unduly prejudicial, did not consume undue time, and went "directly to one of the charged counts."
Exhibit No. 5-1 was a photograph of the corner of the bedroom showing bloodstained walls; exhibit No. 5-2 was a photograph showing blood stains on the bed and closet of the bedroom; exhibit No. 6-1 was a photograph of a bookcase in the bedroom; and exhibit No. 6-2 was a photograph of the bed and blood stains on the wall above the bed. Defendant argued these photographs were "extremely inflammatory" because of the blood stains on the walls and furniture would exaggerate the severity of Jane's injuries and inflame the jurors' passions. The trial court admitted these photographs, finding them to be probative and not prejudicial, because they would corroborate the victim's testimony as to the progression of the dispute, when defendant struck her with the hard object, and how hard defendant hit her.
Exhibit No. 8a was a photograph of Jane's daughter in a shirt with blood stains on the shirt. The trial court admitted this photograph, finding it to be relevant on the child endangerment charge and not prejudicial.
B. Analysis
"Under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion 'must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
Specifically concerning photographs of a victim, their admission into evidence lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 453-454.) "'The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]' [Citation.] '[A] court may admit even "gruesome" photographs if the evidence is highly relevant to the issues raised by the facts, or if the photographs would clarify the testimony . . . .' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 454.)
Photographs of a crime scene are relevant to show that a crime was committed and to corroborate or illustrate witness testimony about the crime. (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 14-15, 18.) In Scheid, our high court rejected the defendant's argument that a photograph of the murder victim's "bloodied, lifeless body" (id. at p.15) was irrelevant because the defendant was not at the scene during the actual shooting, the defendant was being prosecuted on a felony-murder theory and thus there was no issue of malice, and the parties were willing to stipulate as to the cause of death and the murder weapon. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) The Scheid court stated that the defendant's position was "based upon an inappropriately narrow view of the concept of relevancy." (Id. at p. 14.) The court explained that a photograph that showed a murder had been committed was relevant even if it was cumulative to other evidence, and the only ban on cumulative evidence arose under Evidence Code section 352. (Scheid, at pp. 15-16.) Further, the photograph did not lose its relevancy merely because malice was not at issue or because the defendant did not dispute the circumstances of the crime. (Id. at pp. 16-17.) The court reasoned that the prosecution was not obligated to prove details solely through witness testimony and was entitled to establish the fact that a murder had been committed "through the use of the most probative and compelling evidence available . . . ." (Id. at p. 17; see also People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 452 [gruesome photo of victim with her eyes cut out admissible because highly relevant]; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1168 [that photos of murder victims are graphic and disturbing does not render them unduly prejudicial]; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 532 ["[a]lthough photographic evidence is often cumulative of testimonial evidence, that fact does not require its exclusion, '[b]ecause the photographic evidence could assist the jury in understanding and evaluating the testimony'"].)
Here, in determining that the photographs were admissible, the trial court found they were not inflammatory or prejudicial. The court also found that they would be of assistance to the jury in understanding the events of the crime and the extent of the injuries defendant inflicted on the victim. The facts of the crime are not pleasant, and the pictures aid in the understanding of the crime. The trial court carefully weighed the prejudicial effect of such evidence against its probative value and concluded the photographs were admissible. This record does not demonstrate any abuse of the broad discretion vested in the trial court.
The prosecution was not required to rely solely on oral testimony in presenting its case. The burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt permits the prosecution to use physical evidence, including photographs, to substantiate its case. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.) Defendant's argument that such evidence was cumulative and misled the jury to believe defendant inflicted serious injury on the victim and her daughter is not persuasive. First, the jury found defendant not guilty on the child endangerment charge, thereby negating defendant's claim that the photographs misled the jury. Second, the photographs corroborated the victim's testimony. This was especially necessary here since the defense attacked the victim's credibility with her prior two theft-related convictions and prior inconsistent statements. Finally, the challenged pictures supported the charges and were relevant to the prosecution theory and how the crimes were committed.
We have reviewed the six challenged photographs and find that they are not unduly gruesome or inflammatory. They are not so graphic that they might have overcome the jury's rationality. The trial court could reasonably conclude any potential for prejudice was minimal, and there was sufficient probative value to warrant admission. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or deprive defendant of a fair trial by admitting the photographs.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, the trial court erred in admitting all or some of the photographs, any error was harmless under the standards of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict. There was other evidence in addition to the victim's testimony showing defendant's guilt. Defendant had fled the scene when the police arrived. In addition, the jury viewed the defense photograph showing an injury to the victim's chin, as well as other unchallenged photographs of the victim's injury, including a picture showing a bloodstain on the victim's collarbone. The challenged photographs did not give the jury any information that was not presented through witness testimony. Notably, the fact that the jury acquitted defendant on the intimidating a witness and child endangerment charges indicates it carefully considered the evidence and was not particularly prejudiced against defendant for any reason. Based on the witness testimony and other unchallenged photographic evidence, we reject defendant's contention that he would have achieved a more favorable result without the challenged photographs.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
Acting P.J.
We concur:
KING
J.
MILLER
J.