Opinion
F050507
5-4-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EDWIN GREGORY, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
THE COURT
The typewritten opinion filed in the above entitled action on April 5, 2007, is modified as follows:
1. On page 28, after the full paragraph that ends with footnote 19, the following new paragraphs are inserted:
In his petition for rehearing, Edwin argues that the only real question before this court is whether substantial evidence supported the trial courts finding that Edwin did not actually understand the significance and consequences of his no contest plea, and that, because the evidence supported the finding, it makes no difference why Edwin did not actually understand. Substantial evidence is evidence that is "reasonable, credible, and of solid value." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) Although it is not the province of an appellate court to reappraise witness credibility or resolve factual conflicts (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367), we are not bound by evidence accepted by the trier of fact where it is inherently improbable and impossible of belief (People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 562, 577).
Under the evidence presented in this case, capacity to understand and actual understanding, although legally distinct, are factually one and the same. The evidence does not permit them to be artificially divorced, as Edwin seeks to do. As we have explained, Edwins evidence showed he did not understand solely because he could not understand; he was incapable of processing the information necessary for understanding, whether that information was presented by his attorney or by the judge presiding over the change of plea proceedings. Thus, once Edwin took the position in the writ proceedings that he was competent, he necessarily rendered insubstantial any evidence that he did not actually understand the nature and consequences of his plea. Whether we term such evidence irrelevant or inherently unreliable and impossible of belief, as far as actual understanding is concerned, the fact remains that it supports a finding Edwin was incompetent, not a finding that he was able to enter a valid plea but did not actually do so. The evidence simply does not support a conclusion that Edwin was able to understand what he was doing, but, at the same time, did not actually understand what he was doing.
Had Edwin made the argument that he was incompetent when he entered his no contest plea, we would have a different basis on which to evaluate the evidence. We cannot, however, uphold the trial courts ruling as an example of "right result, wrong reason." (See People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 700, judg. vacated and cause remanded sub nom. California v. Braeseke (1980) 446 U.S. 932, sub. opn. People v. Braeseke (1980) 28 Cal.3d 86.) Here, each reason — lack of understanding or lack of competence — requires distinctively different findings and carries the significantly different result of whether certain discreet proceedings are voidable or all proceedings are void. We are prevented from finding the latter by Edwins stipulation of competence; by the very nature of such a concession, Edwin has limited the findings any court could make to vacate the plea because of incompetency.
Edwin says it does not make any difference, from a federal constitutional perspective, why a defendant did not actually understand the significance and consequences of his or her plea. Depending on the evidence in a particular case, such an argument might have merit. There are reasons for the distinction and different conclusions necessary, however, because of the significantly different consequences. Because Edwin insists on maintaining he was competent to change his plea, we must conclude all inferences that flow from that concession based on the record before us: specifically, that he was fully, legally capable of understanding what was being said to him. Edwins insistence that he was competent to provide informed responses during the change of plea colloquy leaves us no basis on which to conclude his appropriately given responses, shown by the reporters transcript of those proceedings, were the result of lack of understanding. There was nothing said to Edwin that was unclear by reasonable standards; no response of his was ambiguous. Edwin now asks us to find that his appropriate responses were based on a lack of understanding of what was occurring, and that this deficiency was caused by a confluence of his medication and mental condition. To reach the conclusion urged, however, we would have to reject the concession that he was competent.
Edwin attempts to circumvent this result by claiming that, had he been given explanations that were substantially more detailed and repetitive, this could have or would have resulted in a valid plea. Contrary to Edwins assertion, however, the record does not contain evidence showing that any kind of accommodation could have been made to render Edwins no contest plea knowing and voluntary. Dr. Mills opined it was possible that, had Edwins parents gone over with Edwin, on a daily basis, information about the consequences of the plea, Edwin might have learned the necessary information. This is not evidence of an accommodation that could have been made, at or reasonably near the time of the change of plea proceedings, to render the plea knowing and voluntary. Instead, it is the type of repetitious teaching that, if it accomplished anything (a result Dr. Mills could not predict beyond a mere possibility), arguably would have impacted in Edwins ability to enter a valid plea, i.e., his competence. To the extent such conduct would be aimed at programming a response, the correct response, without understanding, does not render a plea knowing and voluntary. It is, in fact, exactly what Edwin claims the transcript of the change of plea proceedings already shows.
The law draws a distinction between incompetence and lack of actual understanding precisely because a court cannot be sure that someone who is incompetent can or does understand what he or she is being asked to do. Upon being asked at the time of the change of plea proceedings, Edwins defense attorney expressed his confidence that Edwin understood. Now, after a substantial length of time, Edwin asserts that, as a result of his mental condition and medication, it did not seem to him that his attorney was speaking to him in English. This cannot have any credibility if, as Edwin has consistently and repeatedly insisted, he was competent. While we are at a loss to understand the reason for refusing to assert incompetence in this case, we will not be thrust into the incomprehensible morass of inconsistent results created by the argument.20 The evidence adduced in the court below was constricted in its implications by the concession made. At oral argument, we afforded repeated opportunities to change that concession. All expressly were rejected. We are thus left with a situation that is no different than stipulating a defendant was sane, then presenting evidence on a motion for new trial in order to argue that he was insane since he did not understand the nature and quality of his act or that it was wrong, hence he should not have been convicted of premeditated murder because he lacked malice, yet he nevertheless was sane and it should make no difference why he did not understand, since his lack of understanding negated a finding a malice. We will not engage in this kind of hypertechnical sophistry.
2. The text of footnote 20 reads as follows:
We recognize that Edwins experts opined he was marginally competent to stand trial. It appears their testimony was based, however, on a mistaken conclusion that there are separate standards of competency to stand trial and competency to enter a plea, with the level of competency required to stand trial being somehow lower than that required to enter a guilty or no contest plea. As we previously have discussed, however, there is no lower standard. Likewise, on appeal, Edwin urges conclusions that are just as irreconcilable as those of the experts.
3. On page 29, the paragraph following the heading DISPOSITION is deleted and the following new paragraph is inserted:
The judgment (order granting the writ and deeming the plea withdrawn) is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to address all remaining issues. The court and parties should note that piecemeal resolution is disfavored, and that failure to address particular issues may have a significant impact on timeliness concerns.
This modification does effect a change in judgment.
Respondents petition for rehearing is denied.
We concur:
Dawson, J.
Kane, J.