Opinion
July 24, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mallon, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
A defendant may offer evidence of his intoxication whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged (see, Penal Law § 15.25; People v Lang, 143 A.D.2d 685). However, even an intoxicated person may be capable of forming the intent necessary to support a conviction (see, People v Lang, supra; People v Morales, 125 A.D.2d 605; People v Gonzalez, 119 A.D.2d 768; People v Bell, 111 A.D.2d 926). Whether a defendant was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the requisite intent for a given crime presents a question of fact for the jury to resolve (see, People v Danaher, 115 A.D.2d 905, 906; see also, People v Lang, supra). A jury may consider evidence of intoxication as negating specific intent, but it is not required to do so (see, People v Jones, 27 N.Y.2d 222, 228-229). In the case at bar, while the defendant submitted evidence that he consumed quantities of alcohol prior to the commission of the crimes charged, we find no basis upon which to disturb the jury's determination that the defendant had the requisite intent to murder his wife and to cause her serious physical injury (see, People v Sanbolin, 133 A.D.2d 654; People v Charles, 114 A.D.2d 466).
Further, we find that, reviewing the charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed that it could relieve the defendant of the criminal responsibility for his conduct "only where the intoxication is of such a degree, character and extent as to deprive a defendant of the power to form the particular criminal intent" (1 CJI[NY] 9.46; see also, People v Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262; People v Leonardi, 143 N.Y. 360).
Finally, we have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and have found them either to be unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Eiber, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.