Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. CC335502, CC500833
ELIA, J.
An information filed on December 16, 2005, in case number CC500833 charged defendant Ervin Gonzalez with one count of possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count one) and one count of being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a), count two). In addition, the information alleged that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12.
When defendant was arraigned on December 19, 2005, he entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, on February 17, 2006, defendant moved to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. On March 17, 2006, the court denied the motion. Subsequently, on March 20, 2006, after defendant submitted the matter to the court on the preliminary hearing transcript, the court found defendant guilty as charged.
It appears that on February 7, 2006, the district attorney moved to strike the prior conviction allegation.
On April 27, 2006, the court sentenced defendant to state prison for the low term of 16 months on count one and to 90 days in county jail on count two to be served concurrently to the term on count one. The court deemed that the sentence on count two had been served. On the same day, the court revoked probation in case number CC335502 and sentenced defendant to a concurrent term of two years.
On June 7, 2006, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant raises only one issue on appeal. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence that he was under the influence of and possessed methamphetamine should have been suppressed because he was illegally detained. By way of a supplemental opening brief, defendant contends that the exclusion of evidence is required in his probation revocation proceedings because "the egregious conduct of the officers violated due process." We affirm the judgment.
Facts and Proceedings Below
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on August 9, 2005, three San Jose Police officers, Officer Matt Archer, his partner Officer Carl Shephard and Sergeant Montano, accompanied by Santa Clara County Probation officers, went to 640 Sunset Avenue. They intended to serve an arrest warrant for a probation violation on a juvenile of Cambodian descent. (Hereafter, the juvenile) The police officers were in uniform; the probation officers were in plain clothes wearing gray vests with "Probation" printed on them. The officers parked their vehicles about one and one-half blocks from the house, a single-family dwelling. Officer Matt Archer spoke with an "elderly Asian" man and woman who informed the officers that they had not seen the juvenile they were looking for. The officers returned to their respective vehicles, where one of them saw a person repairing a bicycle on the sidewalk in front of 640 Sunset. From the officers' vantage point, the person with the bicycle matched the description of the juvenile they were seeking. As a result, the officers returned by car to the location and got out of their vehicles.
The officers had a photograph of the juvenile they were seeking and a description that he was an Asian male, 16 years of age, five feet, five inches tall, and weighing 150 pounds. At the time of his arrest defendant, a Latino, was in his early 20's, five feet, 10 inches tall, and weighing 190 pounds.
Officer Archer approached the individual with the bike, identified in court as defendant. Officer Archer said, "Hey, how are you doing?" According to Officer Archer, who did not draw his weapon, he stood about six feet from defendant. The officer was uncertain where his partner, Officer Carl Shephard stood, but believed that he was in "close proximity." Sergeant Montano remained about 20 feet away and did not have any contact with defendant. The probation officers played no role in the contact, never coming "within eyesight" until defendant was arrested. Defendant's path to the house was not blocked.
In response to Officer Archer's question, apparently surprised, defendant came to his feet and said, "whoa." Defendant asked "some questions," but it was "Nothing more than small talk." When Officer Archer asked for his name, defendant replied, "Henry Navarro." Defendant gave his date of birth as July 24, 1984. He said that he was on probation for possession of marijuana.
During this encounter, Officer Archer noticed that defendant was nervous, talkative, "and had a difficult time remaining still." He was "Constantly looking around, fidgeting, unable to stand calm . . . ." Officer Archer noticed that defendant was also "giddy and laughing and kind of talking real fast all at the same time, along with the fact that his lips are kind of sticking together when he's talking to me." Officer Archer could not help but notice that defendant had a "sticky film" on his lips. Based on his training and experience, within 30 seconds of contacting defendant, Officer Archer concluded that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
Since defendant said that he was a probationer, Officer Archer ran a radio check on his "P.F.N." He did not find a match in the database. The officer believed that defendant was being "deceitful" about his identity because arrestees have assigned personal file numbers and because defendant was unable to produce any identification. Officer Archer decided to continue to question defendant based on this discrepancy and defendant's apparent drug intoxication. The officer regarded defendant as "formally detained. He is no longer free to go about his business."
P.F.N. stands for personal file number.
During the continued questioning, Officer Archer checked defendant's pulse. He found that it was about 130 beats per minute. In Officer Archer's mind this pulse rate confirmed that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine. Officer Archer handcuffed defendant, advised him that he was under arrest and searched him. The search revealed a plastic baggie containing 0.7 grams of methamphetamine located in defendant's right coin pocket.
Officer Carl Sheppard testified that he, Officer Archer, Sergeant Montano, and two probation officers entered the home at 640 Sunset in search of the juvenile subject to the arrest warrant, but they were unable to locate him. All the officers left the house and walked to their cars, which were parked down the street. While standing at their vehicles, they saw a person repairing a bicycle on the sidewalk near 640 Sunset. The officers then "casually walked up to" defendant. Officers Sheppard and Archer "triangulated" defendant, standing on either side of him. The other officers were nearby, but did not "surround" defendant. Officer Sheppard did not remember the specific questions asked. However, he recalled that they tried to learn why he was there. They showed defendant a photograph of the juvenile and asked if defendant knew the person.
It appears that Officer Sheppard gave different spellings of his name to the court reporters.
Officer Sheppard recalled that he and his partner might have driven to defendant's location.
Officer Sheppard testified that the officers approached defendant to determine if he was the person suspected of a probation violation. Officer Sheppard was not certain if defendant was the person they were looking for even from a distance. Defendant was not permitted to leave when it was determined that he was under the influence of a stimulant. Officer Sheppard concluded that defendant was under the influence of a stimulant within five minutes of contacting him. Once defendant's drug-induced intoxication became apparent, Sergeant Montano and the probation officers retreated to a position behind the parked cars, leaving officers Sheppard and Archer to conduct the investigation.
Probation Officer Alexander Nguyen testified that he and Probation Officer Albert Maglines participated in the search for the juvenile. After failing to find him at 640 Sunset, the officers returned to their vehicles, which were parked 150-200 feet away. From that vantage point, Officer Nguyen saw a person repairing his bicycle chain near the front of the house at 640 Sunset. In the belief that the person may have been the juvenile, the officers walked towards him.
Officer Nguyen could not recall where Sergeant Montano was at this time.
According to Officer Nguyen, he and Officers Archer, Sheppard, and Maglines faced defendant as they drew close to him. They were side-by-side but different distances from defendant. When Officer Nguyen was six feet from defendant it was "obvious" that defendant was not the juvenile. However, Officer Archer asked defendant for his name and ran a radio check on his response.
As Officer Archer questioned defendant, both probation officers moved to the side of defendant. According to Officer Nguyen, they "backed off." While the officers waited for the result of the radio check, Officer Nguyen noticed that defendant was "fidgeting," "talkative," and "nervous." Defendant asked what the officers wanted with him. Then, Officer Archer took defendant's pulse.
At the suppression hearing, defendant testified to his version of the events of August 9. According to defendant, he was riding his bicycle down Sunset Avenue when he stopped to repair the chain, which had fallen from his bicycle. As he worked on the bicycle, defendant looked up to see a probation officer "in the middle of the street." Then, he saw two uniformed officers on the sidewalk near the probation officer. As defendant stood up he saw a patrol unit and an unmarked car coming toward him. Two probation officers got out of the unmarked car. Defendant speculated that Officer Archer parked the patrol unit at an angle to the curb "to prevent me from going anywhere . . . " A second patrol car arrived and parked next to Officer Archer's vehicle. A third patrol vehicle arrived about five minutes later.
When defendant saw the cars, he "jumped up." According to defendant he thought "like wow, what is going on here." He added, "why are you guys stopping me, what am I doing?" Officer Archer and his partner left their vehicle and approached defendant, telling him that he "looked suspicious." The probation officers also got out of their car and stood in front of it. The officers in the other two patrol units did not leave their vehicles. Officer Archer, his partner and the two probation officers "physically surrounded" defendant. He testified that he did not feel free to leave.
Officer Sheppard asked defendant what he was doing there. Defendant responded that he was "fixing [his] bike." Officer Sheppard inquired whether defendant knew anyone in the area. Defendant replied that he was coming from a friend's home on Sanders Street. However, when asked who the friend was, defendant said, "I don't know." Defendant added, "that's none of your business."
Officer Sheppard asked defendant to sit on the curb. As defendant did so, Officer Archer asked him where his friend lived. Defendant replied that he lived on Sanders. During this time, the probation officers remained standing next to Officer Sheppard, who stood about four feet from defendant. Officer Archer was farther from defendant, about six feet away.
The officers asked defendant where he lived (twice) and if he was using drugs. Officer Sheppard asked if he knew that he was in a high crime area. Officer Archer repeated the question. Officer Sheppard asked to check defendant's pulse. Defendant allowed him to do so, asking the officers why he was stopped. Again, the officers told him that he looked "suspicious." One of the probation officers displayed photographs to defendant, asking if he knew the person in the picture. Defendant replied that he had never seen the person.
When Officer Sheppard asked to pat search defendant, defendant consented to the search. Feeling "crunching" papers, Officer Sheppard removed them. One paper was a pink slip bearing the name "Henry Navarro." Defendant told the officers that "Henry Navarro" was the name of his younger brother. Defendant told the officers that he was Ervin Gonzalez. The officers searched defendant again, this time finding a carpet cutter. Defendant estimated that one hour passed between his initial confrontation with the officers and their question whether he was under the influence of drugs. Defendant testified that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time.
After listening to all the evidence, the trial court made extensive findings in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Specifically, the court reasoned that the search incident to the arrest for being under the influence of methamphetamine was permissible if the observations of drug intoxication that were made by the police occurred during a lawful detention or consensual encounter.
The court ruled out that this was a lawful detention. However, the court concluded that probable cause to justify the arrest developed during the course of a consensual encounter. The court found credible the testimony of the officers, especially Officer Archer, and specifically his testimony that he "immediately" noticed "symptoms of nervousness" and that defendant was "unduly talkative" and had "difficulty remaining still." The court was "persuaded" that "these symptoms of the defendant being under the influence were credible and identifiable within that short period of time."
Citing Florida v. Royer (1993) 460 U.S. 491, and Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, the court stated that the "crucial test" was whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.
In applying this test the court noted the following relevant factors. First, did the officer use a conversational tone of voice or an authoritative tone? The court found that Officer Archer used a calm conversational tone of voice. Second, did the officer order or demand things of the defendant or are they requests? The court found that during the initial encounter "there weren't demands. There weren't orders. There were requests. They were just inquiries." Third, was there an absence of threats or an absence of drawn weapons? The court found that "[t]here were no threats, no drawn weapons. There was no physical restraint until after the reasonable suspicion was formed." Fourth, were there a few officers or many officers and was the path blocked or not blocked? The court found that although the evidence was in dispute, there were five people that the defendant would have identified as law enforcement. However, it was not clear to the court that they surrounded the defendant at any time during the initial encounter. The court found the testimony of Officers Sheppard and Archer to be credible. Specifically, that Officer Sheppard was about three and one half feet away from the defendant and that Officer Archer was about the same distance from the defendant, maybe a foot more, and they formed a triangle with the defendant, but they did not surround him. The court noted that although after the initial encounter became a detention the probation officers made a move to the defendant's side, that did not change the fact that during the initial encounter defendant was not surrounded.
The court went on to say that the evidence was adequate for the purpose of this hearing to establish that there was "some vehicle" to the north and south of defendant. However, there was no reliable evidence that anyone "exited that vehicle and stood behind the defendant, and there is actually no evidence that the defendant was not free to walk away, and the officers never told him otherwise." Further, defendant's "sense of freedom" was shown "by the fact that he was willing to refuse to answer a question about where his friend lived. When asked to give consent to a search, though this is indeed later, still he felt free not even at that point not to disclose the contraband that was in his pocket."
Finally, the court concluded, "[t]his was indeed a consensual encounter up until the time [the officers] formed reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was under the influence. Therefore, since the original detention of defendant . . . took place only after reasonable suspicion was formed that the defendant was under the influence, that detention which then led to an arrest and led to a search, the arrest and the search were proper. So the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence is denied."
Standard of Review
"As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. [Citation.]" (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) In reviewing the court's ruling, we "defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) "Although that issue is a question of law, the trial court's conclusion on the point should not lightly be challenged by appeal or by petition for extraordinary writ. " (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, fn omitted.)
Discussion
Essentially, defendant contends that he was detained when the officers approached him.
"Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least intrusive to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual's liberty. [Citations.] Our present inquiry concerns the distinction between consensual encounters and detentions. Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. [Citation.]" (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; see also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429 [111 S.Ct. 2382] (Bostick).)
"A consensual encounter is the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement officer. If the individual is free to leave at any time during the encounter, he or she is not seized under the Fourth Amendment. Whether an encounter is a detention or a consensual encounter depends on whether the police conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. [Citations.] A person is seized only when that person has an objective reason to believe he or she is not free to end the conversation with the officer and proceed on his or her way." (U.S. v. Hernandez (10th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1493, 1498.)
"Unlike detentions, [consensual encounters] require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. [Citation.] [¶] The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions. [Citation.] As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual's liberty, does a seizure occur. [Citations.]" (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
In Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at page 434, the United States Supreme Court reviewed this area of law and explained that "[s]ince Terry [v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1], we have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 . . . (1983) (plurality opinion), for example, we explained that 'law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.' [Citations.]"
Thus, "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave" (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [100 S.Ct. 1870] (Mendenhall) (plur. opn. of Stewart, J.) or "not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
As noted above, a person is "seized" only when his freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or a show of authority. "Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards." (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553.) The court in Mendenhall noted that "[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. [Citations.] In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person." (Id. at pp. 554-555.)
Pursuant to California Constitution, article I, section 28, " 'a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal Constitution.' [Citation.] Exclusion is mandated under the federal Constitution only if the search or seizure was unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances presented. [Citation.]" (People v. Hoag (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1208.)
In evaluating whether the encounter at issue here constituted a detention, we must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether they were "so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded." (I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216.) "This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation." (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821 citing Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 567, 573.) "Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer's display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)
Defendant points out that the trial court found that there were five officers present during the exchange with defendant and that one or two officers were only three and one half feet from him during the initial exchange. Further, one or two vehicles were parked about 20 feet from defendant, but defendant was not surrounded and his path was not blocked. From these facts, defendant argues that the trial court failed to reach the correct legal conclusion. As defendant sees the issue, "[a] rational person in [his] position might believe he was free to go about his business if only one or two officers approached him. But the convergence of five officers was an overwhelming show of force."
At the outset, we point out that the trial court found that only two officers approached and spoke to defendant. All the other officers remained some distance behind Officers Archer and Sheppard only stepping forward and speaking to defendant once he was detained.
Judged by the standards outlined above, the trial court's ruling was correct. In U.S. v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [122 S.Ct. 2105], in which the United States Supreme Court found an encounter between police and passengers on a bus not to be a detention, the court emphasized that "[t]here was no application of force, . . . no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice." (Id. at p. 204.) Furthermore, as noted, we consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether they were so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded. (I.N.S. v. Delgado, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 216; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554.)
Defendant does not contend that the officers used force, and the testimony of Officer Sheppard that he and Officer Archer "casually" approached defendant was not contradicted by defendant. As noted, the court found that initially only two officers approached defendant, they did not surround him to block his departure, draw weapons, threaten him, or even use an authoritative tone of voice. We find substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusions.
In the present case, Officers Archer and Sheppard casually walked up to defendant and asked "hey, how are you doing?" There was no evidence that the officers approached defendant with weapons drawn or spoke to him in an aggressive manner. Thus, "[a]pproaching [defendant] in a public place and asking him questions were not actions in themselves constituting coercive police conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave." (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 822.) Furthermore, the fact that there were other officers around does not "tip the scales" in defendant's favor. (U.S. v. Drayton, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 205 [what is relevant is whether the other officers said or did anything to intimidate defendant or suggest that he could not leave]; I.N.S. v. Delgado, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 219 [no seizure even though several uniformed INS officers were stationed near the exits of a factory].)
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Washington (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3d. 1060, People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817 and United States v. Johnson (8th Cir. 2003) 326 F.3d 1018 for the proposition that five officers is an overwhelming show of force is misplaced. In United States v. Washington, supra, 387 F.3d 1060, Washington was confronted by six officers, five of whom were uniformed and visibly carrying weapons, and all six of whom surrounded him. The encounter with the six officers began in the hallway of Washington's apartment building and continuedinto Washington's one-room residence. The six officers moved Washington 20 to 30 feet away from his door, refused to heed Washington's request to shut the door to his own residence, and three times repeated that Washington faced being arrested for failing to register with the Reno Police Department. Moreover, one of the officers repeatedly admonished Washington about the charge to convey to Washington that he could be arrested if he did not cooperate and that he was not free to terminate the encounter. Finally, the officers never notified Washington that he had a right to refuse to answer their questions and to terminate the encounter. (Id. at pp. 1068-1069.)
In People v. Valenzuela, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 817, at an agricultural inspection check point, after being questioned by an agricultural inspector, an Hispanic driver was detained to determine his citizenship. A border patrol agent believed the defendant might be an illegal alien because he looked Hispanic, appeared nervous, spoke little or no English, and had a car with a trunk, which might be used to transport other illegal aliens. As requested, the defendant handed the agent his resident alien form, commonly known as a green card. (Id. at pp. 821-822.) Although the green card showed the defendant was legally in the United States, the agent was still suspicious that the defendant was transporting illegal contraband or aliens in the trunk of his car. (Id. at p. 822.) The agent requested permission to search the trunk, and the defendant gave his consent. (Ibid.) The agent did not return the defendant's green card until after his consent had been given. (Ibid.) The appellate court held the defendant's consent was given involuntarily because the agent had created an "inherently coercive" situation, since the defendant was effectively precluded from leaving by the agent's retention of his green card—a document that the defendant needed. (Id. at pp. 832-833.)
In United States v. Johnson, supra, 326 F.3d 1018, as Johnson was engaged in a loud conversation with a woman, who appeared to be frightened and was backing away from him, two sheriff's deputies and a security officer approached him. One deputy asked Johnson to come towards the officers to speak with them, as the other officers stood on either side him. Johnson complied. One officer requested identification, which Johnson produced. While the officers were examining Johnson's identification, Johnson began running from the scene. (Id. at p. 1020.) In concluding that this was not a consensual encounter, the Court of Appeals reasoned, "[a] reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave a scene where three uniformed officers drew him away from their party, stood closely at either side of him, and took possession of his personal property-here, his driver's license-while conducting a brief interrogation." (Id. at p. 1022.)
The conduct and actions of the officers in this case do not resemble the conduct and actions of the officers in United States v. Washington, supra, 387 F.3d. 1060 and United States v. Johnson, supra, 326 F.3d 1018, or the border patrol agents in People v. Valenzuela, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 817.
In conclusion, defendant's initial encounter with the officers was consensual. During that time Officer Archer observed that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine. Accordingly, since defendant's detention took place only after Officer Archer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, the detention, which then led to the arrest and led to the search incident to the arrest, was proper. A detention is initially justified "when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) Further, probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances, which are within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9 [99 S.Ct. 2248]; Ker v. State of California (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 25 [83 S.Ct. 1623].) Moreover, the existence of probable cause to arrest justifies arrest and a warrantless search incident thereto. (Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 [89 S.Ct. 2034]; see United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [94 S.Ct. 467].)
Thus, the trial court was correct in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence that he was under the influence of methamphetamine and possessed methamphetamine.
Since we have concluded that the trial court was correct in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we need not address defendant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that defendant might have been the wanted juvenile. Nor is it necessary to address defendant's claim raised in his supplemental opening brief that exclusion of evidence is required in the probation revocation proceeding because the egregious conduct of the officers violated due process.
Respondent argued that, assuming the evidence was seized in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, any error in denying the motion to suppress evidence would be harmless as to defendant's probation revocation in case number CC335502. Specifically, respondent contended that normally the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. Since we have concluded that defendant was lawfully detained after the consensual encounter and lawfully arrested, the evidence discovered on his person was not the fruit of antecedent illegality.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P. J., PREMO, J.