Opinion
1-22-0810
09-29-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 08 CR 16453 Honorable Charles P. Burns, Judge, presiding.
ELLIS JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
ELLIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's 33-year sentence for first-degree murder. Court considered defendant's youth, attendant characteristics, and all relevant factors in aggravation and mitigation. Court did not increase defendant's sentence on resentencing.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial in 2009, defendant Adrian Gomez was found guilty of first-degree murder for personally discharging the firearm that caused the victim's death. He was sentenced to 48 years' imprisonment, including a 25-year firearm enhancement. We affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Gomez, 2012 IL App (1st) 102195-U. Later, on collateral review, we vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. People v. Gomez, 2020 IL App (1st) 143269-UB. On remand, the circuit court imposed 33 years' imprisonment.
The mittimus states that defendant received a 32-year sentence. However, the court, in its oral pronouncement, imposed a 33-year sentence. Where the court's oral pronouncement and the written order conflict, the oral pronouncement controls. People v. Carlisle, 2015 IL App (1st) 131144, ¶ 87.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals from that order, arguing the sentence is excessive because he committed the offense at age 16, and the court did not sufficiently and correctly consider certain factors pursuant to People v. Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Defendant also argues that the court did not give proper weight to his rehabilitation, increased his sentence without the firearm enhancement to counteract its decision to not impose the enhancement, and imposed an excessive sentence. We find no error and affirm.
¶ 4 At trial, the evidence established that on June 20, 2008, defendant, then age 16, was standing on the southeast corner of Campbell Avenue and Potomac Avenue in Chicago when he was approached by Juan Torres. Torres punched defendant, who retreated. Shortly afterward, defendant returned in a van, which swerved toward Torres before departing. Later, defendant approached Torres on foot and shot at him. Torres attempted to hide behind vehicles, and defendant shot two to three more times. Torres died from gunshot wounds in his stomach, right cheek, and the back of his head. The parties stipulated that defendant had a tattoo of "Campbell" on his right hand and "Potomac" on his left hand. Defendant did not testify. Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 23 years' imprisonment with a 25-year firearm enhancement. We affirmed on direct appeal. Gomez, 2012 IL App (1st) 102195-U.
¶ 5 In June 2014, defendant filed a postconviction petition through counsel. He argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare him for trial and interview witnesses on his behalf. The circuit court dismissed the petition at the first stage of proceedings. On appeal, defendant abandoned the arguments in his petition and, in relevant part, contended that his 48-year sentence was unconstitutional. We affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's petition, finding, inter alia, that defendant forfeited the argument challenging his sentence. People v. Gomez, 2020 IL App (1st) 143269-U.
¶ 6 The supreme court denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal but issued a supervisory order vacating our judgment and, inter alia, directing us to consider the effect of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 and People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, overruled by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, on whether defendant received an unconstitutional de facto life sentence. People v. Gomez, No. 122548 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). Subsequently, we vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing in view of Miller, Buffer, and Holman. Gomez, 2020 IL App (1st) 143269-UB.
¶ 7 Before that hearing, the defense filed a report prepared by mitigation specialist Helen Kim Skinner. The court noted that it reviewed the report and asked whether it was "supposed to be an objective report," as Skinner took a "pretty strong approach as to what the sentence should be." The court commented that it was "a little concerned" about the report and questioned whether it needed to review an independent evaluation. After discussion with defense counsel, the court stated that the report was not objective, but rather a subjective mitigation report that did "not look at the total picture."
¶ 8 The mitigation report is included in the record on appeal. The report describes defendant's troubled adolescence and life in a "gang dominated neighborhood," where defendant joined the Spanish Cobras gang due to the example of his brother, for whom he dealt drugs. Two days before the incident, Torres, who was "the Chief' of the Spanish Cobras, ordered defendant to be brutally attacked for insubordination, and defendant subsequently tried to leave the gang. Defendant did not testify about what occurred because he was afraid of retaliation. Defendant rehabilitated in prison by educating himself, including earning a certificate as a legal assistant and paralegal. Lastly, though defendant had five "misconducts' in prison, they "would not be deemed illegal in society.' The most serious infraction involved possession of a homemade shank in 2014, which defendant stated belonged to his cellmate.
¶ 9 The mitigation report includes lengthy exhibits, including letters from defendant's friends and acquaintances, an interview summary from a trauma response specialist, who was a lifelong acquaintance of defendant's, and two job recommendations. The exhibits also include defendant's high school diploma, poems he published, and course certificates.
¶ 10 Defendant's resentencing hearing took place on March 8, 2022.
¶ 11 Defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI), presented at the hearing, showed juvenile charges from 2007 for aggravated assault, reckless conduct, and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, for which he was detained in the juvenile detention center. Defendant did not have a relationship with his father due to his father's heroin addiction, but he had a "pretty good' relationship with his mother, though she was neglectful. His older brother had a criminal background involving illegal drugs and thefts. Although defendant had been affiliated with the Spanish Cobras from 2005-2008, he was no longer a member of the gang. Defendant informed the interviewer that he felt like a victim "to a certain extent,' and felt "very remorseful' for the incident. At the hearing, the PSI was corrected to reflect that defendant earned his paralegal certificate.
¶ 12 In aggravation, the State noted that the mitigation report established that "[c]ertain aspects" of defendant's life were "difficult," including his involvement in a gang. The State argued, however, that defendant's prison disciplinary record seemed to belie his disavowal of the gang, because defendant received tickets for having a shank and had been stabbed. The State argued that, in any event, the facts of the shooting established that defendant escalated the situation when he retrieved a firearm and "gunned an unarmed man down."
¶ 13 In mitigation, defense counsel addressed the factors pertaining to defendant's youth and attendant circumstances from section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)). First, defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense and, due to his environment, had a "lesser ability to consider the risks and consequences of his behavior." Next, defendant grew up in "gang-ridden Humboldt Park" and had familial pressure from his older brother, who was a gang member. Additionally, defendant's living situation was volatile, and he had childhood trauma because his brother and sister were shot, and a fellow gang member died in his arms.
¶ 14 Next, according to counsel, defendant had potential for rehabilitation. While incarcerated, he received his high school diploma with a 3.42 GPA and, later, a paralegal certificate. Defendant was not allowed to attend certain classes because of his conviction, so he paid for his correspondence course. Defendant received numerous course certificates during his incarceration and published a poem collection. Defendant completed his goal for early program sentence credit but could not receive credit due to the nature of his conviction. While in the Cook County jail after his case was remanded, defendant acted as a role model among other prisoners and promoted "proper living and proper behavior." Further, he had multiple opportunities for work upon release.
¶ 15 The court commented that defendant "brought a gun to a fist fight." Defense counsel agreed but stated that defendant was "one of several" gang members to disobey his chief's orders and received a "three-and-a-half minute beating," after which he wanted to leave the gang. Defense counsel also contended that Torres was over 6 feet tall and approximately 300 pounds, while defendant was about "5-foot-6, 120 soaking wet." When Torres punched defendant, defendant fell to the ground and "knew" that the gang would kill him, so he retrieved the firearm; he did not plan the offense. Defendant trusted his attorneys who only visited him once, did not review the discovery, and did not answer his phone calls. Lastly, defense counsel noted that defendant used his time in prison to better himself and obtain an education in accordance with the court's advice given at the time of the original sentencing hearing.
¶ 16 In allocution, defendant stated that he wanted to prove that youths from impoverished communities can better themselves to become productive citizens. Defendant informed the court that when he entered the criminal justice system, he was a "troubled youth," did not know that how he was living was "wrong," and made many mistakes due to his involvement in the gang. Defendant's father was not involved in his life, so defendant looked for a father figure in the older men in the gang. Defendant accepted responsibility for his actions and acknowledged his faults. At trial, he did not explain everything that happened "during the gang meeting" or with Torres because he was afraid of consequences in jail, and did not aid his defense because he did not understand what was happening during the proceedings. Defendant apologized to the Torres family and stated that he wished he could undo what he had done and "destroy the existence of gang life completely." Defendant informed the court that he wanted to positively influence his community and serve as a role model for young boys without fathers in their lives.
¶ 17 In imposing sentence, the court noted that it believed that defendant had changed, but he still had been "actively involved in a gang." The court believed that defendant had been "pulled" or "led into" the gang but noted that defendant had not been forced to join. The court commented that it read defendant's PSI and knew that he sold drugs for his brother and had been charged with "aggravated battery" and a firearm offense as a juvenile. The court commented on the facts of the case and stated that defendant "escalat[ed] a fist fight into a murder" when he retrieved the firearm to confront Torres, who was not "a model citizen," but still represented "a life lost."
¶ 18 The court then listed each factor for juvenile sentencing under Miller. The court commented that it was "a little concerned" because "it seems like" defendant became involved in educational classes and self-help groups later into his prison term; still, the court credited defendant for being involved. The court did not believe that defendant's ability to interact with police officers and attorneys was relevant and noted that defendant's attorneys adequately represented him. The court added, however, that it believed defendant expressed remorse.
¶ 19 The court stated that first-degree murder is punished more severely than other offenses due to the consequences, and murder with a firearm is treated differently because "part of that is punishment and some of that is deterrence." The court noted that it "struggle[d]" with whether increased sentences deterred anyone from committing murder with a firearm. The court commented that it did not believe defendant deserved a de facto life sentence exceeding 40 years and chose not to impose a firearm enhancement. The court noted that defendant deserved neither the maximum nor minimum sentences but added that the situation was the "product of gang involvement" and "did not have to occur." The court sentenced defendant to 33 years' imprisonment.
¶ 20 Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that the sentence was excessive, and the court abused its discretion by failing to correctly consider defendant's youth, its attendant circumstances, and his rehabilitation. Defense counsel also argued that the court failed to consider the Miller factors, imposed an unconstitutional sentence, and failed to consider factors in mitigation. The court denied the motion.
The record does not contain a report of proceedings for the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence.
¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues that the court did not "thoroughly and sufficiently" consider the required factors under Miller and section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code when it failed to make findings as to each factor and erred in considering certain factors as aggravating. Defendant also argues the court did not give proper weight to his rehabilitation, increased his "base sentence" without the firearm enhancement to counteract its decision to not impose the enhancement, and imposed an excessive sentence.
¶ 22 A sentence should reflect both the seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I § 11; People v. Neasom, 2017 IL App (1st) 143875, ¶ 48. A sentencing court's decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212 (2010). A court abuses its discretion where the sentence is" 'greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.'" Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.2d 203, 210 (2000)). The court has broad discretion and is given great deference in imposing a sentence because the judge "observed the defendant and the proceedings" and is better positioned to weigh the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 212-13. The reviewing court" 'must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.'" Id. at 213 (quoting Stacey, 193 Ill.2d at 209).
¶ 23 A sentence within the statutory range is presumed proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. The sentencing range for first-degree murder is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2020). Further, defendant personally discharged the firearm that proximately caused Torres' death. Thus, the court had discretion to impose a 25-year sentencing enhancement, though it declined to do so. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(iii) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2020). Defendant's 33-year sentence falls within these statutory guidelines and is, therefore, presumed to be proper. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 24 Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by not making explicit findings of each mitigating factor under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code. Defendant posits that because the court "quick[ly]" recited the required factors, but did not make specific findings for each factor, it did not satisfy the statute's requirements.
¶ 25 Section 5-4.5-105 of the Code codified the factors that the court must consider before sentencing a juvenile offender. This statute does not replace the normal sentencing provisions but supplements them. People v. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 31. The statutory factors include, among other things, the offender's age, whether he was subjected to peer or family pressure, his potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, the circumstances of the offense, and his participation in the offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6) (West 2020). The court need not articulate each factor it considers in sentencing a juvenile offender, and that omission does not mean the court did not consider all relevant factors. People v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74. Absent "affirmative indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself," we presume that the court considered all mitigating evidence before it. People v. Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 67.
¶ 26 Despite defendant's contention, the court was not required to make specific findings regarding each sentencing factor it considered. See Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 74. Further, defendant does not affirmatively demonstrate that the court did not adequately consider the mitigating evidence and relevant statutory factors pertaining to his youth. Instead, the record shows that the sentencing court carefully considered those factors and supporting evidence.
¶ 27 The sentencing court addressed defendant's gang involvement and the effect of peer pressure, his potential for rehabilitation, the circumstances of the offense, and his remorse. The court also received a lengthy mitigation report containing multiple exhibits. Though the court is presumed to consider all evidence before it (Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 67), here the court affirmatively stated that it reviewed defendant's PSI and addressed facts from defendant's mitigation report, including that defendant sold drugs for his brother. Thus, defendant has not affirmatively demonstrated that the court did not adequately consider the relevant factors under section 5-4.5-105 of the Code.
¶ 28 Defendant also argues that the court improperly considered his gang involvement and use of a firearm as aggravating factors and erroneously relied on deterrence as a basis for its sentencing decision.
¶ 29 Although peer and familial pressure is a mitigating factor under the Code, involvement in a gang is not. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(2) (West 2020). In fact, gang motivation may be an aggravating factor during sentencing. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(15) (West 2020) (court may consider in aggravation that "the defendant committed an offense related to the activities of an organized gang"). Even so, the record establishes that the court believed that defendant was "led into" the same gang to which his brother belonged, though he had not been forced to join. The evidence also supported that the offense was related to the activities of defendant's gang. Thus, it properly considered potential peer or familial pressure on defendant in mitigation and defendant's involvement in the gang in relation to the incident in aggravation.
¶ 30 The court commented on defendant's use of a firearm, stating that he "brought a gun to a fist fight" during defense counsel's presentation of the mitigating circumstances. Similarly, when announcing sentence, the court noted that defendant "escalat[ed] a fist fight into a murder" when he used a firearm, and the way that murder with a firearm is punished partly reflects punishment and partly "deterrence." These statements reflect that the court considered the circumstances of the offense, albeit in aggravation. While the circumstances of the offense may be considered in mitigation, they can likewise be considered in aggravation. Merriweather, 2022 IL App (4th) 210498, ¶ 35. We find no error in the court's consideration of defendant's use of a firearm.
¶ 31 To that point, the court also commented that the more severe sentence for murder with a firearm is due partly for "punishment" and partly for "deterrence," and stated that it struggled with whether firearm enhancements function as deterrence. "[D]eterrence is diminished in juvenile sentencing because juveniles' recklessness, immaturity, and impetuosity make them less likely to consider possible punishment." People v. Morris, 2017 IL App (1st) 141117, ¶ 33; see People v. McKinley, 2020 IL App (1st) 191907, ¶¶ 89-90 (finding the sentencing court gave improper weight to the need to deter future criminal conduct in sentencing the juvenile defendant because deterrence "does not necessarily" apply to juvenile sentences). Even if the court considered deterrence in sentencing defendant, however, it ultimately declined to impose a firearm enhancement. See People v. Smith, 2022 IL App (4th) 200666, ¶ 28 (finding supreme court did not foreclose possibility of sentencing court considering deterrence in sentencing juvenile; rather, "deterrence did not justify the harshest punishment"). Accordingly, we find no error in the court's comments regarding deterrence.
¶ 32 Lastly, defendant argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion by not giving proper weight to his demonstrated rehabilitation, increased his base sentence without the firearm enhancement to counteract its decision to not impose the enhancement, and imposed an excessive sentence.
¶ 33 Defendant's argument that the court abused its discretion amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court. This we may not do. See Alexander, 239 Ill.2d at 213. First, as noted, defendant does not affirmatively demonstrate that the court did not adequately consider his rehabilitation. See Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 67. In fact, the court credited defendant for taking classes and participating in selfhelp groups during his incarceration but noted that defendant did not join these classes until later in his prison term. It also repeatedly discussed the circumstances of the offense. The court clearly considered defendant's rehabilitation in context but also emphasized the gravity of the offense. See Alexander, 239 Ill.2d at 214 ("[a] defendant's rehabilitative potential *** is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that the circuit court failed to give proper weight to defendant's rehabilitative potential. We do not find a 33-year sentence excessive where defendant responded to being punched by Torres, a fellow gang member, by leaving the scene but then returning after some time with a firearm to kill Torres, shooting him multiple times, including in the back of the head.
¶ 34 Defendant claims that the court increased his base sentence without the firearm enhancement-that is, the 23-year base sentence imposed in 2009-to 33 years on remand to counteract its decision not to impose the enhancement. The State argues that defendant did not raise this point in his motion to reconsider sentence and, thus, forfeited it. In his reply brief, defendant contends that the issue is not forfeited because he argued in his motion to reconsider that the court imposed an unfair and unconstitutional sentence. Defendant claims that, though he did not directly address the court's error in improperly increasing his base sentence without the firearm enhancement, the argument "did grow out of' the claim he raised in his motion. Defendant does not request plain error review. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.2d 539, 544-45 (forfeited claims may be reviewed under plain error doctrine).
¶ 35 We agree that defendant forfeited this issue on at least one level, if not two levels. Defendant did not raise anything close to this argument before the sentencing court in his motion to reconsider. Claiming that a sentence violates the constitution or is unfair is a far cry from arguing that the court improperly (and illegally) increased his sentence on remand. Nor, for that matter, did defendant properly raise the argument on appeal. In his opening brief, defendant argued that the court, though forgoing the mandatory gun enhancement, improperly gave defendant a partial enhancement by adding 10 years to the initial baseline sentence of 23 years for a total of 33 years.
¶ 36 It was not until his reply brief that defendant argued that the trial court violated the statute on resentencing, which generally prohibits the trial court from increasing a defendant's sentence on remand (to avoid punishing defendants for successful sentencing appeals). See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-4 (West 2020). Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) ("Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief'); People v. Bailey, 2019 IL App (3d) 180396, ¶ 22.
¶ 37 But because the imposition of a greater sentence on remand impacts defendant's fundamental rights, we will consider the issue for plain error. See People v. Miller, 286 Ill.App.3d 297, 301 (1997). The first step in the plain-error analysis is to determine whether error occurred in the first place. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill.2d 598, 613 (2010).
¶ 38 Section 5-5-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections generally bars the trial court on remand, following the invalidation of a sentence, to re-sentence the defendant to a greater term of years. 730 ILCS 5Z5-5-4 (West 2020). But that is not what happened here.
¶ 39 Defendant's argument is this: He was originally sentenced for first-degree murder to 48 years in prison, 25 of which was a mandatory firearm enhancement, and 23 of which was the base, discretionary sentence for first-degree murder. On remand, the trial court exercised its newfound discretion to forgo the mandatory add-on, leaving only the discretionary sentence. But instead of once again sentencing defendant to 23 years, the court sentenced him to 33 years. The bump in the base sentence, says defendant, violated the statute on resentencing.
¶ 40 We do not agree that defendant's sentence was more severe on re-sentencing. The court initially gave defendant 48 years and then, in its discretion, re-sentenced him to 33 years. That is not in any way a more severe sentence. The court could have imposed the firearm enhancement again, which would have guaranteed defendant a sentence of at least 45 years (20 years for first-degree murder being the minimum). Instead, the court refused to do so and gave defendant a sentence it deemed appropriate, 15 years less than the initial sentence.
¶ 41 Obviously, in initially imposing a discretionary sentence of 23 years, the trial court was factoring in that it had no choice but to impose a 25-year enhancement. At the initial sentencing, the judge would have been well within its discretion to be troubled by defendant's use of a firearm but to recognize, at the same time, that this concern was already embodied in the mandatory 25-year enhancement. The court, in its initial sentencing, might well have decided not to add years to the discretionary sentence based on defendant's use of a firearm, given that mandatory add-on. But on remand, having been given and having taken the opportunity to forgo the enhancement, the trial court was free to take the use of the firearm into account to some extent.
¶ 42 Defendant's argument rests on a technical view that the discretionary sentence and the mandatory enhancement are two different parts of the sentence. But there is "no reason to consider defendant's sentence as two separate pieces," one part the discretionary sentence and the other part the mandatory enhancement. People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 21. Rather, "we consider the sentence as a whole." Id. In a recent decision, we noted that a juvenile defendant who received a 45-year sentence for first-degree murder-20 years for the base sentence, 25 years for the mandatory enhancement-could be sentenced to no more than 45 years on remand, even though the trial court would be free, on remand, to forgo the now-discretionary firearm enhancement. See People v. Reyes, 2023 IL App (2d) 210423, ¶ 53 n.2. The same was true here; the cap on resentencing was 48 years, not 23 years. The court's 33-year sentence did not exceed that cap.
¶ 43 Defendant cites no authority for the principal that the trial court was tied to its original discretionary sentence of 23 years. To be sure, the trial court could not have exceeded the original total sentence of 48 years. See id. But the re-sentence fell well below that number. The trial court was not required to ignore the fact that defendant, in the court's words, "brought a gun to a fistfight," simply because the court chose not to utilize the mandatory enhancement. We find no error and thus no plain error.
¶ 44 The court's remarks show that it considered defendant's PSI, the facts of the case, and defendant's mitigation evidence, including the mitigation report and defendant's allocution in which he expressed remorse. See Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 67. It considered the evidence that defendant retrieved a firearm and shot Torres because Torres punched him sometime earlier. The court considered that defendant had been involved in the gang for years and had a violent adolescence, partly due to the influence of his brother. The court believed defendant's remorse and noted his rehabilitation. After considering all these factors, the court imposed a 33-year sentence, well within the range for first-degree murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2020). Defendant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion.
¶ 45 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 46 Affirmed.