Summary
In People v. Goetz, 73 N.Y.2d 751, 536 N.Y.S.2d 45, 532 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S.Ct. 1315, 103 L.Ed.2d 584 (1989), the Court of Appeals of New York stated that, although nothing prevents a "jury from acquitting although finding that the prosecution has proven its case, this so-called ‘mercy-dispensing power’, as defendant concedes, is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court[.]"
Summary of this case from State v. SaylesOpinion
Argued October 17, 1988
Decided November 22, 1988
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Stephen Crane, J.
Mark M. Baker and Barry Ivan Slotnick for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Gregory L. Waples and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that, if it found that the People had proved each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it "must" find defendant guilty. It is well settled that the jury's function is to apply the legal definition of the crime to the evidence and to convict if it is satisfied that each of the elements of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 562; see, Sparf v United States, 156 U.S. 51; Duffy v People, 26 N.Y. 588, 592-593). While there is nothing to prevent a petit jury from acquitting although finding that the prosecution has proven its case, this so-called "mercy-dispensing power", as defendant concedes, is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court (People v Mussenden, supra, at 562-563; see, People v Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 180; People v Sullivan, 68 N.Y.2d 495, 500-501). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the jury instruction does not amount to a directed verdict because it does not encroach upon the jury's exclusive fact-finding prerogative by removing from its consideration some element of the crime or of a defense to it (cf., United States v Hayward, 420 F.2d 142 [DC Cir 1969]; Brascomb v State, 261 Ark. 614, 550 S.W.2d 450).
There is no merit in defendant's argument that the sentencing court abused its discretion, as a matter of law, or that it failed to exercise discretion in determining that a one-year definite sentence would not be "unduly harsh" (see, Penal Law § 70.02 [c]).
Chief Judge WACHTLER and Judges SIMONS, KAYE, ALEXANDER, TITONE, HANCOCK, JR., and BELLACOSA concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.