People v. Girard

Full title: The People of the State of Colorado v. Reginald Author Girard

Court: Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc

Date published: Jul 3, 1978

582 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1978)

582 P.2d 666

Opinion

No. 28021

Decided July 3, 1978. Rehearing denied August 28, 1978.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary, felony theft, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery and appealed.

Reversed

1. TRIAL — Crimes — Jointly — Separate Trial — Co-Defendants — Denial — Abuse. In prosecution for second-degree burglary, conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary, felony theft, aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a trial separate from that of his two co-defendants where the particular circumstances reflected in the record indicated that he was denied a "fair determination of guilt or innocence" by being tried jointly with two co-defendants.

Appeal from the District Court of El Paso County, Honorable Hunter D. Hardeman, Judge.

J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy, Edward G. Donovan, Solicitor General, Lynne Ford, Assistant, for plaintiff-appellee.

John A. Purvis, Acting State Public Defender, Lee Belstock, Deputy, for defendant-appellant.

MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal arises from the same trial involved in People v. Warren, 196 Colo. 75, 582 P.2d 663 and People v. Albers, 196 Colo. 66, 582 P.2d 667 announced contemporaneously with this opinion. A complete statement of the facts of the case is contained in People v. Warren.

[1] The appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary,¹ conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary² felony theft,³ aggravated robbery,⁴ and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.⁵ We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a trial separate from that of his two co-defendants, and therefore we reverse and remand for a new trial.

1 Section 18-4-203, C.R.S. 1973.

2 Section 18-2-201, C.R.S. 1973.

3 Section 18-4-401, C.R.S. 1973.

4 Section 16-11-309, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Supp.).

5 Section 18-2-201, C.R.S. 1973.

Our reasoning in People v. Warren, supra, is also dispositive here. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

MR. JUSTICE KELLEY dissents.

MR. JUSTICE HODGES does not participate.