Summary
In People v Gibson (On Remand), 90 Mich. App. 792, 795-798; 282 N.W.2d 483 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 868 (1980), this Court also recognized that there are circumstances in which the trial court must raise the issue of disqualification on its own.
Summary of this case from People v. McLeodOpinion
Docket No. 43862.
Decided June 19, 1979.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Edward Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and John L. Wildeboer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Barbara R. Levine, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: V.J. BRENNAN, P.J., and BRONSON, and CYNAR, JJ.
ON REMAND
On July 11, 1977, following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. On August 11, 1977, he was sentenced to serve 7-1/2 to 20 years imprisonment and defendant appealed this conviction as of right. The prosecution's motion to affirm defendant's conviction was granted by a panel of this Court in an order dated August 8, 1978. However, this order was vacated by the Supreme Court on February 6, 1979, and the case was remanded to this Court for full consideration of the issues raised by defendant. 405 Mich. 818 (1979).
The robbery in question was allegedly committed by defendant and a co-defendant, Richard Peete. At trial the complainant testified that on February 3, 1977, defendant, Peete and two women came to his room at the Stowell Hotel in Jackson. After a period of conversation Peete unexpectedly struck the complainant on the head with a bottle. Defendant and Peete then dragged the complainant into another room where defendant brandished a knife. The complainant was subsequently bound and robbed.
Defendant testified that he played no part in the robbery. He claimed that the robbery was committed solely by Peete and that he had no prior knowledge of it. He testified that he left the premises when Peete struck the complainant with the bottle.
On appeal defendant raises several issues. However, we need only address one: whether the circumstances of this case required the trial judge to disqualify himself sua sponte.
Although the charges against defendant and codefendant Peete were brought in a single complaint, the proceedings against the two defendants were completely separate. They had separate arraignments, preliminary examinations, and trials and were represented by separate counsel. The separate treatment of the two defendants was necessitated by the existence of Peete's confession, which inculpated defendant in the crime.
Peete was tried on April 26, 1977. He waived a jury trial and was tried before Jackson County Circuit Court Judge James G. Fleming. In finding Peete guilty of armed robbery the trial judge concluded:
"I find that as far as the elements that the defendant in this case, together with another acting in concert did take from MR. HUNT the sum of Seventy-seven Dollars ($77.00) in his wallet. Immediately following the hitting of MR. HUNT over the head with this pop bottle and tying him up after forcing him down, and took it from MR. HUNT against his will and while he was under physical attack. There is no question in the Court's mind that this was done by MR. PEETE and MR. GIBSON, his companion, this assault with intent to steal from MR. HUNT his monies or other things of value that they found in the vicinity." (Emphasis added.)
Defendant claims that the above findings amounted to a prejudgment of his case requiring Judge Fleming to have disqualified himself from sitting as trier of fact at defendant's trial.
At the time of defendant's trial, the disqualification of judges was covered by GCR 1963, 405. This rule provided that the issue of disqualification may be raised "by motion of any party or by the judge upon his own motion". Disqualification is warranted when the judge "is personally biased or prejudiced for or against any party or attorney". GCR 1963, 405.1(3).
We note initially that no motion to disqualify Judge Fleming was ever made by defendant. However, this factor is not dispositive of this issue. In some circumstances, a trial judge is required to raise the issue of disqualification on his own motion. See People v Dixson, 403 Mich. 106, 109; 267 N.W.2d 423 (1978).
The bias alleged in the present case is apparent only to one who had attended the Peete trial or one who had read a transcript thereof. There is no evidence that defendant or his attorney were present at this trial or that they were aware of Judge Fleming's statement at the trial. Under these circumstances we conclude that Judge Fleming was under an affirmative duty to raise the issue of bias sua sponte. Therefore, defendant's failure to raise this issue below does not preclude consideration of it by this Court.
As a general rule, where possible bias is discovered after trial defendant should raise the issue below via a post-trial motion for new trial. In this way a complete record can be provided the reviewing court. See People v Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 442-443; 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973), Brill v Brill, 75 Mich. App. 706, 711; 255 N.W.2d 739 (1977). In the present case, however, the alleged bias is embodied in the transcript of Peete's trial and no further record is necessary.
The question of course, remains whether there was sufficient evidence of bias to require Judge Fleming to disqualify himself. Generally, disqualification of a trial judge is required where the record discloses actual bias on the part of the judge or where the judge expresses a preconceived notion as to defendant's guilt or innocence. People v Koss, 86 Mich. App. 557, 560; 272 N.W.2d 724 (1978), People v Alexander, 76 Mich. App. 71, 78; 255 N.W.2d 774 (1977). Disqualification for bias has been held to be warranted when the trial judge admitted some degree of personal animus toward the defendant, People v Lobsinger, 64 Mich. App. 284; 235 N.W.2d 761 (1975), when the trial judge worked on the case as counsel for one of the parties, Armstrong v Ann Arbor, 58 Mich. App. 359; 227 N.W.2d 343 (1975), and when the judge was made aware of inadmissible polygraph test results, People v Hale, 72 Mich. App. 484; 250 N.W.2d 103 (1976).
We conclude that Judge Fleming's statement at Peete's trial, expressing his belief that this defendant had committed an armed robbery, required Judge Fleming to disqualify himself from subsequently hearing defendant's case. This statement, which was made prior to defendant's trial on the charge, amounted to a prejudgment of defendant's case. Although there is no evidence during defendant's trial of bias on the part of the trial judge we conclude that, in light of the prejudgment, defendant's conviction cannot stand. In accord, see People v Robinson, 18 Ill. App.3d 804; 310 N.E.2d 652 (1974).
Nothing said herein should be construed as requiring disqualification of a trial judge merely on the basis of rulings made in the course of a defendant's case or statements made in conjunction with such rulings. See for example People v Mexicott, 288 Mich. 671; 286 N.W. 121 (1939), People v Rorke, 80 Mich. App. 476; 264 N.W.2d 30 (1978), and People v Rayford Johnson, 68 Mich. App. 54; 242 N.W.2d 35 (1976), rev'd on other grounds 397 Mich. 686; 246 N.W.2d 836 (1976). It is the trial judge's prejudgment, rather than an exercise of his judgment, which requires disqualification in the present case.
In so concluding, we in no way mean to impugn the integrity of Judge Fleming in these proceedings. Because of the separate proceedings against Peete and defendant, Judge Fleming was required to make findings of fact at the conclusion of Peete's trial which would necessarily include reference to defendant. Thus, the "prejudgment" was necessitated by the exigencies of the circumstances. We hope that nothing stated herein will tend to deter trial judges from continuing to make thorough findings in bench trials. However, when such findings do amount to a prejudgment of the case of a yet-to-be-tried defendant, the trial judge should then disqualify himself from consideration of such a defendant's case.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial before a different trial judge.