Opinion
344130
10-05-2023
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY JOSEPH GELIA, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Jackson Circuit Court LC No. 16-005361-FC
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and SHAPIRO and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM
ON REMAND
Defendant was 19 years old when he murdered a young mother. In Part II.B of our prior opinion, we considered defendant's unpreserved claim that his mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) violated due process, the federal prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the state prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. We held that defendant had "not demonstrated entitlement to relief on this issue," and we declined "to accept [his] invitation to extend the holding in Miller [v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465; 132 S.Ct. 2455; 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)]," to 19-year-olds. People v Gelia, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Jan. 21, 2020 (Docket No. 344130), slip op at 8.
This matter returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court with directions to reconsider Part II.B "in light of People v Parks, 510 Mich. 225; 987 N.W.2d 161 (2022)." People v Gelia, 984 N.W.2d 185 (Mich, 2023). In Parks, our Supreme Court recognized that the federal Supreme Court had foreclosed extending Miller to those who committed their crimes when they were 18 years of age or older. Parks, 510 Mich. at 247. A majority of the Parks Court went further, however, and granted relief under our state Constitution to those defendants who commit certain crimes (e.g., murder) when they were 18 years of age, essentially treating those defendants as juveniles for purpose of our state's mandatory-sentencing scheme. Specifically, the Court held: "We hold that this [proportionality] test, overall, compels the conclusion that mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants to life in prison, without first considering the attributes of youth, is unusually excessive imprisonment and thus a disproportionate sentence that constitutes 'cruel or unusual punishment' under Const 1963, art 1, § 16." Id. at 255.
At the same time, the Court took pains to limit its holding to those who were 18 years of age when they committed their crimes, see, e.g., id. at 232, 244-245, 255, 266-268, and it left in place its earlier holding in People v Hall, 396 Mich. 650; 242 N.W.2d 377 (1976), where the Court had held that mandatory LWOP did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, Parks, 510 Mich. at 255 n 9. In the words of the Parks majority, "our opinion today does not affect Hall's holding as to those older than 18." Id. Taken together, the Parks Court effectively redrew the statutory line separating youths and adults from "17 v 18" years of age to "18 v 19" years of age, at least for purposes of mandatory LWOP sentences.
In this case, defendant was 19 years old when he murdered the victim. Thus, the holding of Parks does not justify or permit this Court to ignore Hall, as a panel of this Court has already recognized in a recent published opinion. People v Adamowicz, ___ Mich.App. ___, ___; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 330612), slip op at 4 (noting that "Parks recognized Hall as still controlling for those over the age of 18, which include[d]" the defendant in that case). Although one could certainly read the analysis of Parks to reach those defendants who were 19 years of age or older when they committed murder or other serious offense and, as a result, received a mandatory LWOP sentence, lower courts are bound to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court and cannot "anticipatorily ignore" binding precedent. Assoc Builders &Contractors v Lansing, 499 Mich. 177, 191-192; 880 N.W.2d 765 (2016). And here, Hall remains good law, except as modified by Parks with respect to 18-year-olds.
Given this, assuming arguendo that this panel applied the same proportionality analysis to defendant that the Parks majority applied to the defendant in that case, and further assuming arguendo that this panel arrived at a conclusion similar to that of the Parks majority, this panel would still be without authority to provide defendant any relief, given the binding precedent of Hall as-applied to those like defendant who committed murder when they were 19-years-old or older. Thus, any review by this panel of the proportionality of defendant's LWOP sentence would be an exercise in futility and obiter dictum, given our Supreme Court's explicit recognition in Parks of the continuing viability of Hall to 19-year-olds and older. Parks, 510 Mich. at 522 n 9. "It is the duty of the Supreme Court to overrule or modify caselaw if and when it becomes obsolete, and the Court of Appeals and the lower courts are bound by the precedent established by the Supreme Court until it takes such action." People v Metamora Water Serv, Inc, 276 Mich.App. 376, 387-388; 741 N.W.2d 61 (2007).
Accordingly, having reconsidered Part II.B of our earlier opinion in light of Parks, including the Parks majority's express limitation of its holding to 18-year-olds, we again affirm.