Opinion
E071763
10-28-2019
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RYAN ANTHONY GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1302061) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson Uhler, Judge. Affirmed. Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Arlene A. Sevidal, Andrew Mestman, and Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Ryan Anthony Garcia, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a)). Defendant also admitted to inflicting great bodily injury in the commission of the voluntary manslaughter. (§ 12022.7, subd. (d).) Defendant was sentenced to 18 years four months in state prison. The court also ordered that defendant pay $49,412.94 in victim restitution, including $46,960 for lost wages, to Heather C., the mother of the decedent. Defendant appealed.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant argues that the amount of the restitution to be paid to Heather C. should be reduced because it was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts concerning defendant's underlying offense are taken from the police report and the preliminary hearing transcript.
On June 18, 2013, Heather C. left her seven-month-old son, Lukas C., with defendant and Alyssa D., who were both acting as Lukas C.'s babysitters. At some point, defendant became frustrated with Lukas C. and shook him, hitting his head on the couch frame. Alyssa D. called emergency services requesting medical services for an infant that was not breathing. Ontario police officers responded to the scene and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Lukas C., but he remained unresponsive and was not breathing on his own.
Lukas C. was airlifted to a hospital, where doctors determined that Lukas C. had multiple skull fractures to the back of his head. They also observed bruising to Lukas C.'s forehead and temples, swelling on the side of his head, and retinal hemorrhaging. Lukas C. died on June 21, 2013.
Defendant was charged by information with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and assault on a child causing death (§ 237ab, subd. (a); count 2). Defendant was tried by a jury and, on January 17, 2017, he was convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to count 2 and the court declared a mistrial as to that count.
On July 16, 2018, defendant entered a negotiated plea. The People added a charge of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 3) and a charge for child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 4). They further alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the voluntary manslaughter. (§ 12022.7, subd. (d).) Defendant pled guilty to both of the new charges and admitted the allegation. The trial court granted the People's request to set aside the previous conviction and dismiss counts 1 and 2.
The probation officer calculated the value of victim restitution to Heather C. using a statement from Heather C. Heather C. produced copies of receipts for plane tickets as evidence of certain travel costs, but the remainder of the statement only contained a description of alleged economic losses. These economic losses included claimed lost wages.
Heather C. admitted that she did not have paystubs for any of her jobs, and so only sought the minimum wage for any time she was off work as a consequence of the crime. According to the statement Heather C. provided to the probation officer, she "was out of work from June 18, 2013 . . . until mid-December 2013." She was then "asked to take some more time off by [her] boss in January 2014." She "returned back to work September 1 just two weeks before the company went out of business." After that she "went back to work in February 2015 and left that job in September 2016." She did not return to work until August 2017.
Based on this time line, Heather C. concluded that she missed 26 weeks of work in 2013, a combined total of 54 weeks of work in 2014 and 2015, and a combined total of 48 weeks of work in 2016 and 2017. All of her positions were full-time. Heather C. calculated lost wages of $8,320 for 2013, $19,440 for 2014 and 2015, and $19,200 for 2016 and 2017. These lost wages totaled $46,960. The probation officer incorporated these calculations into his or her report without amendment.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate of 18 years four months in state prison. Along with defendant's state prison sentence, the court ordered defendant to pay $49,412.94 to Heather C. as victim restitution. Defendant objected to this restitution order both on and off the record, and the court acknowledged both objections on the record. In ordering victim restitution, the trial court apparently relied on the probation officer's report in determining the amount of restitution to be paid to Heather C., as the final number matches the number calculated in the probation officer's report.
Defendant timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered victim restitution for lost wages because there was insufficient evidence to support Heather C.'s claims for lost wages. We disagree.
The California Constitution provides that crime victims have a right to restitution when they suffer losses as a result of criminal activity. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A), (B); see People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652 [discussing former Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)].) This constitutional mandate is implemented by section 1202.4, which provides, in pertinent part: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f); see § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1); People v. Giordano, supra, at p. 656.) A "victim" for purposes of restitution includes not only the actual victim of the offense, but also immediate family members "who ha[ve] sustained economic loss as the result of a crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (k)(1), (3)(A).) "'[T]he court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so . . . .'" (People v. Giordano, supra, at p. 656, italics omitted.)
When challenged on appeal "[a] restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. '"[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'" (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.) "[A] prima facie case for restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim's testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss. [Citations.] 'Once the victim has . . . made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed by the victim. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.)
Although a restitution order may be challenged on the ground no substantial evidence supports the order, "[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the '"power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the trial court's findings.' [Citations.] . . . 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court's] findings,' the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact." (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468-469.)
"[T]he trial court is entitled to consider the probation report when determining the amount of restitution. A property owner's statements in the probation report about the value of her property should be accepted as prima facie evidence of value for purposes of restitution. [Citation.]" (People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946-947, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 238-245.)
In support of her prima facie case for restitution, Heather C. provided a breakdown of the approximate number of weeks of work she missed per certain relevant time periods, and correctly calculated the minimum wage losses associated with that missed time. Though her narrative explaining the amount of time she missed is not specific about exactly when she left and returned to work, she supplemented this narrative by providing an estimate of the actual number of weeks of work she missed. The number of weeks she claims to have missed was consistent with the narrative (e.g., Heather C. says she missed 26 weeks of work in 2013 because she left work after June 18, 2013, and returned in mid-December, which is approximately 26 weeks).
On the other hand, defendant did not provide the trial court with any independent evidence rebutting the amount of the claimed lost wages. Though defendant objected to the victim restitution order both off and on the record, the record does not contain any indication as to what defendant found objectionable. Defendant offered and offers no independent evidence suggesting that Heather C.'s accounting of her lost wages is not accurate, is less than claimed, or otherwise should not be ordered in the amount claimed.
Instead, defendant argues that Heather C.'s statement does not constitute sufficient prima facie evidence of Heather C.'s lost wages. In support of this argument defendant cites In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, and People v. Vournazos (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 948. Each is distinguishable.
Of the three cited cases, Vournazos is the closest to the circumstances here. In Vournazos, the defendant pled no contest to receipt of stolen property and unlawful driving and taking of a vehicle. (People v. Vournazos, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 951.) In support of the restitution order, the victim provided the probation officer with a list of allegedly stolen and damaged items and the claimed replacement and repair value for each. (Id. at p. 953.) The probation officer incorporated this information into his report, and the trial court adopted it wholesale. (Id. at p. 958.) The reviewing court found that "[w]hile a defendant bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property," the list of items and a related dollar value does not "establish[] that the sum claimed by [the victim] for loss of property was based on the replacement cost of the property." (Id. at pp. 958-959.) For this reason the court held that the People in that case did not make a prima facie case for restitution and that therefore defendant "was not required to meet that burden inasmuch as the replacement or repair cost of [the victim's] property was not established." (Id. at p. 959.)
We have previously respectfully disagreed with the reasoning in Vournazos. For instance, in Foster "we f[ou]nd the reasoning of the Vournazos court unpersuasive," for a number of reasons. (People v. Foster, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 946.) "In reaching this conclusion, we note[d] that the trial court is entitled to consider the probation report when determining the amount of restitution. A property owner's statements in the probation report about the value of her property should be accepted as prima facie evidence of value for purposes of restitution." (Ibid.) We then reiterated the general rule that "[w]hen the probation report includes information on the amount of the victim's loss and a recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary information to challenge that amount." (Id. at p. 947.)
We reaffirmed that Foster was correctly decided and reiterated our rejection of Vournazos in Gemelli. In that case, we clearly stated that "to the extent Vournazos might be read to require more than a victim's statement of loss and a probation officer's recommendation as prima facie evidence of value to determine an appropriate amount of restitution, we decline to follow it for the policy reasons set forth in Foster . . . ." (People v. Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.)
We agree with our previous decisions in Foster and Gemelli and reject Vournazos to the extent it holds that a victim's statement to a probation officer is not sufficient prima facie evidence of loss.
Neither Travis J. nor Harvest counsel a different approach, as both are inapposite. In Harvest, the court reversed a $5,500 restitution order for burial expenses. (People v. Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.) The court noted that this restitution order was not factually supported because the probation report merely mentioned a claim for burial expenses, but there was no further evidence of these expenses. (Ibid.) The court concluded that mention of a "claim in the probation officer's report, . . . may satisfy notice requirements for due process [citation], but it cannot take the place of evidence." (Ibid.) Harvest's analysis is not inconsistent with our holdings in Foster and Gemelli. In those cases, the probation report incorporated evidence provided by the party seeking restitution, whereas in Harvest it appears that burial expenses were merely mentioned in the probation report without any statement or other evidence from the victim regarding the value of those expenses. We agree that a bare mention of a category of expenses without any accounting for the value of those expenses is insufficient to establish a prima facie case for restitution. Here, however, Heather C. provided a breakdown and explanation for each of the items for which she sought restitution.
Travis J. is also distinguishable. In Travis J., the reviewing court, relying in part on Vournazos and Harvest, reversed a restitution order that ordered defendant to pay $800 for the replacement cost of a single tire. (In re Travis J., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 204.) In reversing this order, the court noted that "[t]he juvenile court specifically indicated that it did not find [the restitution recipient's] statements to the probation officer credible. Rather, the juvenile court based its restitution order . . . on nothing more than speculation," and thus abused its discretion. (Ibid.) Here, we have no such credibility determination from the trial court nor any reason to disbelieve the trial court's conclusion that Heather C.'s statement created a prima facie case for restitution. Moreover, to the extent that Travis J. relies on Vournazos to conclude that a prima facie case for restitution requires more than a victim's statement and valuation, we decline to follow it for the reasons stated above.
We therefore conclude that Heather C.'s statement was sufficient prima facie evidence to satisfy the People's burden. The burden thus shifted to defendant to rebut the amount of the loss.
Defendant attempts to do so by arguing that Heather C.'s statement contains insufficient evidence linking certain of her claimed work absences to defendant's conduct. According to defendant, restitution should not have been ordered as to those losses because section 1202.4 only provides for restitution of "economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct." (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Defendant points to two periods of unemployment he argues were not related to defendant's crime. The first, from January to September 2014, was precipitated by Heather C.'s boss asking her to take time off. The second, from mid-September 2014 to February 2015, started when that same company went out of business only two weeks after Heather C. returned to work. Defendant argues that the fact the business closed shortly after her return suggests Heather C. was asked to take time off because the business was struggling and looking to reduce its payroll. Similarly, defendant argues that the period of unemployment following the business's closure is a consequence of the business's closure, and not defendant's conduct.
However, even if we agree that this is a plausible reading of these facts, so long as the evidence reasonably justifies the trial court's finding, we may not overturn the restitution order just because it also reasonably supports a contrary finding. (People v. Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 469.) "We do not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact." (Ibid.)
As the People point out, there is ample evidence in the record that Heather C. suffered from, and continues to suffer from, severe mental health issues caused by her son's death, which could impact her ability to obtain and maintain employment. For instance, in her victim impact statement, Heather C.'s mother stated that Heather C. "suffered depression and mental health [issues] for many years," and "has not moved on in life because of this." Heather C. herself stated that in the eight months after Lukas C.'s death she did not get out of bed, had to have family and friends force her to eat, and attempted suicide. This period would have overlapped with her brief return to work from mid-December 2013 to January 2014, at the end of which her boss asked her to take additional time off. There is thus sufficient evidence to conclude that Heather C.'s boss asked her to take further time off in consideration of Heather C.'s ongoing grief. Given the severity of Heather C.'s mental health issues and the length of time they persisted, there is also sufficient evidence to conclude that Heather C.'s extended period of unemployment between September 2014 and February 2015 was a consequence of the grief caused by defendant's conduct. Though this period of unemployment was precipitated by her employer shutting down business, there was sufficient evidence for the court to conclude that Heather C.'s ongoing mental health issues made it difficult for her to find steady employment thereafter.
Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's restitution order and that it did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay $49,412.94 in restitution to Heather C.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. McKINSTER
J.