Opinion
October 7, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the trial court's ruling which permitted the prosecution on redirect examination of the defendant's paramour to adduce evidence of uncharged crimes. This evidence consisted of allegations by the paramour of domestic violence against her including testimony regarding an attempt to strangle her. While this testimony concerned an incident similar in nature to the crime for which the defendant was being tried, it nevertheless was probative of the paramour's motivation for offering testimony which tended to negate the voluntariness of the defendant's confessions. Indeed, the defendant's paramour testified that the confessions were elicited in disregard of the defendant's repeated requests for the assistance of an attorney. However, as the paramour also testified of threats made by the defendant, including the threat that she would have "reason to be in great fear" if she spoke up, the evidence of the defendant's past acts of aggression was probative of her motivation to offer exculpatory testimony as the jury was entitled to know that the paramour might have testified falsely out of fear (see, People v. Rodriguez, 143 A.D.2d 854).
In any event, assuming that the prejudicial impact of this evidence outweighed its probative value and that the admission into evidence of proof of uncharged crimes was therefore error, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt there is no significant probability that such error might have contributed to the defendant's conviction (cf., People v Testaverde, 143 A.D.2d 208; People v. Beckles, 128 A.D.2d 435), and the admission of that evidence at trial was harmless (see, People v. Rodriguez, supra; see also, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230). Indeed, the defendant confessed to the instant crime to his paramour, then to investigating detectives and finally to an Assistant District Attorney before a video camera (see, People v Aveille, 148 A.D.2d 461; People v. Morey, 119 A.D.2d 929). Moreover, there was ample evidence that these confessions were voluntarily obtained following knowing, intelligent and voluntary waivers of the defendant's constitutional rights (see, People v Hamilton, 138 A.D.2d 625). Finally, there was additional evidence corroborating the defendant's confessions (CPL 60.50; see, People v. Constantine, 35 A.D.2d 613).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, P.J., Kunzeman, Miller and Copertino, JJ., concur.