Opinion
April 13, 1992
Appeal from the County Court, Dutchess County (Hillery, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's claim, his statements to the police were not subject to suppression on the ground that they were involuntarily obtained. The record demonstrates that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights which he waived (see, People v Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775). The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was made voluntarily (see, People v Jenkins, 167 A.D.2d 421).
The defendant further claims that he was not criminally responsible for his conduct by reason of mental disease or defect (see, Penal Law § 40.15). We disagree. As a general rule, where conflicting expert testimony is presented at trial, the question of sanity is for the trier-of-fact which has the right to accept or reject the opinion of any expert. Where, as here, there is no serious flaw in the testimony of the People's experts, the resolution of the trier-of-fact on the issue of mental disease or defect will not be disturbed (see, People v Surdak, 167 A.D.2d 436; People v Ludwigsen, 159 A.D.2d 591; People v Enchautegui, 156 A.D.2d 461).
The defendant also maintains that the court erred in failing to charge the jury with respect to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. However, we find that there was simply no evidence, expert or otherwise, to show that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the incident and that he had a reasonable explanation or excuse for his condition (see, People v Savage, 148 A.D.2d 553; People v Feris, 144 A.D.2d 691).
We have considered the remaining contentions raised by the defendant, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Harwood, Balletta and Copertino, JJ., concur.