Opinion
D071792
04-06-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VALENTINA ESTRADA, Defendant and Appellant.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Barry Carlton, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JCF36870) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Donal B. Donnelly, Judge. Affirmed. Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Barry Carlton, and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Valentina Estrada of assault upon a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c); count 2), battery causing serious bodily injury to David Obeso (§§ 242, 243, subd. (d); count 3), making a criminal threat to Esmeralda Sanchez (§ 422, subd. (a); count 5), vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subd. (a); count 6), fleeing a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7), simple assault and battery of David (§ 240; count 8), and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a); count 9). As to count 3, the jury found true an allegation that Estrada personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 1203.075, subd. (a), 12022.7). The court sentenced Estrada to five years eight months in state prison.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We refer to David and his wife Nancy Obeso by their first names to avoid confusion, and intend no disrespect.
The jury found Estrada not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 and 4), simple assault against Nancy (§ 240; count 1), and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury against David (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 8).
Estrada's sole contention is that insufficient evidence supports the criminal threat conviction. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Sanchez lived next door to Nancy and David in Seeley, California for approximately 22 years, and they had an amicable relationship. Estrada is Nancy's sister.
On January 11, 2015, after Sanchez heard a commotion outside her home, she saw Nancy's car followed by Estrada's car followed by Imperial County Deputy Sheriff John Beltran in his sheriff's department truck with its lights and siren activated.
Estrada drove her car in front of Nancy's, forcing Nancy to stop. Estrada exited her car, walked toward Nancy angrily calling her a "bitch," and told her to "get out." Sanchez invited Nancy into Sanchez's home, but Nancy was scared and refused to exit her car.
At the scene, Deputy Beltran ran toward Estrada, yelling at her to stop. But Estrada continued walking toward Nancy. In an attempt to detain Estrada, Deputy Beltran wrapped his arms around her and pinned her to the ground.
At trial, the prosecutor asked Deputy Beltran why that action was necessary, and Deputy Beltran replied: "With the information that I had gathered throughout the day as far as her being in possession of knives, her attempt, as to what I was told, to run over Mr. Obeso, and the reckless driving that she had exhibited while I was in pursuit, I believed that she either had the knives on her person or—and she had a callous disregard for my safety and the safety of others and I felt it was necessary." --------
Estrada landed on her stomach with her hands underneath her. Deputy Beltran straddled Estrada and asked her several times to remove her hands from beneath her, but she refused. Instead, Estrada resisted arrest and attempted to stand. Estrada turned and "cocked her right arm back." Believing she was going to punch him, Deputy Beltran responded by striking Estrada on the left side of her face and on the back of her head. Deputy Beltran subsequently handcuffed her. Estrada sustained injuries to her face and was bleeding.
Afterward, while she lay on the ground as Deputy Beltran held her down, Estrada turned to face Sanchez, who was standing about four feet away, and said she was going "to kill [her] also." Estrada was saying a lot of "swear words," and Sanchez felt afraid and believed Estrada. On redirect examination, Sanchez testified Estrada also told her during the incident that if she said anything, Estrada would "get [Sanchez] and her family."
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, ' "[t]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.]' [Citations.] 'Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] We ' " 'presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " ' " (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942-943.) " 'Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" ' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
II. Criminal Threat
To prove a defendant made a criminal threat in violation of section 422, subdivision (a), "the prosecution must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant 'willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the threat 'with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that the threat—which may be 'made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device'—was 'on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,' (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and (5) that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
"To constitute a criminal threat, a communication need not be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. The statute includes the qualifier 'so' unequivocal, etc., which establishes that the test is whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the communication was sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution." (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861.) "[W]hether the words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific [such that] they conveyed to the victim an immediacy of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat can be based on all the surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone." (People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340.) In evaluating whether the defendant made a criminal threat, the trier of fact may consider defendant's "mannerisms, affect, and actions involved in making the threat." (People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013.) Purported threats, viewed under the circumstances in which they are made, must convey to the victim a gravity of purpose by being credible "as indications of serious, deliberate statements of purpose." (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137 (Ricky T.).)
III. Analysis
Estrada contends there was insufficient evidence her statement to Sanchez was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.
Here, Estrada's actions prior to her statement directed at Sanchez are relevant. Sanchez testified that after the police chase ended in front of her home, she saw a "very upset, very angry" Estrada quickly exit her car and walk toward Nancy and yell "mean" things to her. Estrada ignored Deputy Beltran's commands to stop but continued pursuing Nancy until Deputy Beltran tackled her. He struggled to apprehend Estrada, who forcefully resisted and refused to be handcuffed. After Deputy Beltran finally handcuffed Estrada, she looked at Sanchez and said she would kill her also. Under these circumstances, Estrada's conduct toward Nancy and Deputy Beltran added weight to Estrada's statement, thus, conveying to Sanchez a gravity of purpose. (See People v. Martinez (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218 ["I'm going to get you," "I'll get you," and "I'll get back to you," are insufficient standing alone to convey a threat, but were sufficient given all surrounding circumstances]; see also People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 338 [surrounding circumstances are enough to convey gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution even if threat was conditional].)
Estrada argues there is insufficient evidence of an immediate prospect of execution because she did not tell Sanchez how or when she would kill her. Although section 422 does not require an immediate ability to carry out the threat, it does require an immediate prospect of executing the threat. (People v. Lopez (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679-680.) However, a threat is sufficiently immediate even if it does "not communicate a time or precise manner of execution[;] section 422 does not require those details to be expressed." (People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806 [inmate's threats to "blast" correctional officer in ten months was sufficiently immediate to support the conviction for making a criminal threat].) Despite Estrada's seeming inability to harm Sanchez at the time Estrada uttered the threat, "the immediacy factor was present in the surrounding circumstances that defendant was in a rage." (People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1449.) Estrada fled the police, used her car deliberately to stop Nancy, yelled profanities at Nancy, and resisted arrest. Estrada was handcuffed and pinned to the ground when she threatened Sanchez; however, Sanchez did not know when she would next see Estrada or if Estrada would soon be released from police custody. Further, Estrada knew where Sanchez lived, and Sanchez reasonably believed Estrada would harm her, considering that Estrada had disregarded Deputy Beltran and pursued Nancy. (See Id. at p. 1449 [threat was imminent despite the presence of a police officer because the surrounding circumstances were a reminder that the officer would not always be there to protect the victims].) Thus, under all the surrounding circumstances, including Estrada's actions prior to her threat, the jury could have reasonably found Estrada's words carried the requisite gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution to constitute a criminal threat.
Estrada relies on Ricky T., where a minor reacted angrily after his teacher accidentally hit him with a door. The minor said, " 'I'm going to get you,' " causing the teacher to feel threatened. (Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.) Ricky admitted to the police that on the day of the incident, he told the teacher, " 'I'm going to kick your ass,' " while "getting in [his] face." (Id. at pp. 1136, 1137.) The juvenile court made a true finding that the minor committed a misdemeanor terrorist threat under section 422. (Id. at pp. 1134-1135.) The Court of Appeal reversed and held the record did not establish the threats, judged in their context, were unequivocal and immediate. (Id. at p. 1137.) The court reasoned the threats were not serious, deliberate statements of purpose because the school authorities did not call the police until the next day. Further, the remark, " 'I'm going to get you,' " was ambiguous and merely a vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution. (Id. at p. 1138.) Further, there was no evidence suggesting the minor and the teacher had a history of disagreements or that a physical confrontation was imminent. (Ibid.)
While Ricky T. provides some useful general guidance, sufficiency of evidence issues, especially with a crime like the present one, are highly fact specific. (See People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 838.) Here, Estrada's statement to Sanchez and the circumstances surrounding her arrest are distinguishable from the circumstances and the statements at issue in Ricky T. Estrada's words were unambiguous and meant to instill fear in Sanchez.
Estrada argues that like in Ricky T., the absence of any previous confrontations between her and Sanchez, and the lack of physical violence toward Sanchez at the time of the threat, warrants a reversal of the criminal threat conviction. While a relationship between the victim and the defendant can establish gravity of purpose and the immediate prospect of execution, we must look to all surrounding circumstances at the time of the threat. (See People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342 [one encounter between victim and defendant at a gas station was sufficient for a criminal threat conviction where the surrounding circumstances at the time of the threat conveyed to the victim a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution].)
In Ricky T., the court believed the statements were ambiguous and therefore considered whether the "appellant exhibited a physical show of force, displayed his fists, damaged property, or attempted to batter [the teacher] or anyone else." (Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1138, emphasis added.) Here, Estrada's threat was unconditional and specific. Moreover, Estrada displayed physical force toward Deputy Beltran when she forcefully resisted arrest. Thus, it is immaterial that Sanchez and Estrada had no prior disagreements or that Estrada was not physically violent toward Sanchez before or after she uttered her threat. Estrada sufficiently conveyed to Sanchez the requisite gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. NARES, J.