Opinion
H050699
10-20-2023
IN RE E.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. E.F., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 22JV45635A.
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The minor, E.F., appeals from a dispositional order placing him on probation with various terms and conditions, following a finding by the juvenile court that he committed unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) (hereafter section 10851(a))). The minor contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's finding. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the dispositional order.
All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Petition
In June 2022, an amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed alleging that the minor, then age 14, committed two counts of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (§ 10851, subd. (a); counts 1 &2) and one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b); count 3). Counts 1 and 3 were subsequently dismissed on motion of the prosecutor, leaving a single count of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle.
B. The Jurisdictional Hearing
1. Witness testimony
On September 7, 2021, a newer model black Lincoln Navigator was stolen from the driveway of a residence in San Jose. Home surveillance video showed a "group of people" entering the vehicle and driving away around 4:55 a.m. The vehicle had been inadvertently left unlocked overnight with the "keys" in the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle testified that the vehicle had a "keyless entry." The owner described the vehicle's "keys" as a "key fob" which opened the vehicle when the key fob was pushed near the vehicle.
The victim did not realize that the Navigator was missing until later that morning around 7:45 a.m.
About one hour later, around 5:55 a.m., sheriff's deputies were dispatched to a Saratoga address regarding a different vehicle, a Lexus. The incident involved a "noninjury vehicle collision in which four subjects had crashed a vehicle onto a front lawn and were seen running away from the vehicle." The vehicle had been reported stolen several days earlier out of the San Jose Police Department. The four subjects who fled the vehicle crash in Saratoga were described as "Hispanic males wearing dark clothing." A deputy was able to detain one of the four subjects.
Another sheriff's deputy, Zachary Burke, drove to a Saratoga park where he thought the remaining three subjects might have run to. An individual who was walking his dog indicated that he had seen someone run by. The deputy left the park to set up a perimeter and coordinate with other deputies in an effort to find the subjects. The deputy flagged down drivers who were passing through to ask if they had seen anything suspicious.
About 6:30 a.m., Deputy Burke saw a black Lincoln Navigator driving towards him. The deputy testified that the sun was starting to come up and that he did not need a flashlight to see drivers, street signs, or addresses. The juvenile court took judicial notice that sunrise occurred at 6:44 a.m. that morning.
Deputy Burke stepped into the roadway and waived at the driver to indicate that he wanted to speak with the driver as he had "done with all the other motorists who had stopped." Although the deputy was at "an intersection that was controlled by a stop sign," the driver continued to accelerate. When it became clear the driver was not going to be able to stop in time at the stop sign, the deputy held up his hand and yelled at the driver to stop. The driver "continued to accelerate towards [the deputy], but not directly at [him] and drove around [him], failing to follow [the] instruction to stop."
The deputy testified that the driver appeared to be a "young Hispanic male, no more than 15 or 16 years of age." The driver had "a fairly light complexion," "no facial hair or beard," and "very short hair, almost like a shaved head." From what the deputy could see, the driver appeared to have been wearing black clothing. The driver matched the "very basic" description of the" 'young Hispanic males'" who had fled the crash site involving the Lexus.
Deputy Burke returned to his patrol vehicle, activated his emergency lights and siren, and attempted to make an enforcement stop on the Navigator. About a minute and a half later, the deputy terminated the pursuit in the interest of public safety. The driver did not appear to have "good control" of the vehicle, and it was a weekday morning with people on their way to work and school.
About 7:15 a.m., a different deputy made an enforcement stop on an older model four-door Volvo. The Volvo had been seen by that deputy driving slowly through the same neighborhood where the Lincoln Navigator had been seen by Deputy Burke. The Volvo's driver, who was female, appeared to be talking on the phone while approaching a stop sign. Law enforcement followed the Volvo, which made several turns before proceeding to northbound State Route 85. The driver of the Volvo was still on her phone. An enforcement stop was conducted for use of a cell phone.
The deputy asked the Volvo driver for her driver's license, but she did not have one. When the deputy asked for her keys and reached to grab them, he saw the minor in the back seat, lying in an "awkward" position. The deputy described the position as "really erect," meaning "you are standing quite tall as if you were at attention," "but across the back seat." When the deputy initially approached the vehicle, the minor did not make any sound and his eyes were closed. The deputy testified that the minor appeared to be hiding because "[t]he way he positioned himself in the back seat, it wasn't normal ...." When asked what he was doing in the back seat, the minor indicated he was sleeping. The deputy asked the minor "why wouldn't he sleep in the front passenger seat, kind of recline himself and be in a more comfortable position."
The minor was wearing a white tank top and black pants. In the front seat, there was a "black hoodie." The minor had "scuffs and cuts on his wrists kind of like people hopping fences."
Because the driver of the Volvo did not have a license, the vehicle was going to be towed. Sheriff deputies conducted an inventory search of the Volvo. In the back seat armrest, deputies located the stolen Lincoln Navigator's key fob.
The minor had essentially been lying against the armrest, which was in the "up position" and which was located "mid-torso" to him based on the way he was lying in the back seat. The key fob was thus "within arm's reach of where the minor was" lying.
Deputy Burke, who had earlier seen a teenage male driving the Lincoln Navigator and who pursued the Navigator for a short period of time, arrived at the scene of the traffic stop when the minor was being detained in the back of the Volvo. Deputy Burke had been only two blocks away from the location of the Volvo traffic stop. Deputy Burke testified that the driver of the Lincoln Navigator was "similar in appearance" to the minor. They both had "similar facial features" and a "short haircut." The driver of the Navigator appeared to have been wearing black clothing. Although the minor was wearing a white tank top and black pants, there was also a black sweatshirt or shirt in the Volvo. Deputy Burke testified that he "couldn't say definitively" that the minor was the person driving the Navigator, but he "could say confidently that their physical descriptions matched or were very similar."
Around 12:00 noon, law enforcement located the stolen Lincoln Navigator in front of a residence in Los Gatos. The vehicle was about seven or eight miles from the victim's home in San Jose and about three miles from the perimeter set up by Deputy Burke.
2. The parties' arguments
At the conclusion of the witnesses' testimony, the prosecutor argued that the evidence established that the minor drove the victim's Navigator without permission and attempted to evade officers. The prosecutor contended that the minor matched Deputy Burke's description of the driver of the stolen Navigator in appearance, including age, facial structure, and haircut. Further, the minor was detained in another vehicle with the Navigator's key fob. The prosecutor argued that "[t]he likelihood there's just a series of unfortunate accidents where the minor looks exceptionally similar to an individual driving a stolen car, evading police, and then being caught in another car with a key fob that opens that stolen vehicle is beyond remote."
The minor's counsel contended that Deputy Burke was not able to identify the minor as the driver of the Navigator. Counsel further argued that given the dawn or predawn lighting when the deputy saw the vehicle, and the stress of the situation when the vehicle was coming towards him and did not stop, the deputy's ability to perceive details about the driver's face was affected and made any identification of the driver less reliable. Counsel contended that there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt "because of the circumstances under which the identification was made." Counsel also argued that "if we were talking about just a single individual, it would be pretty clear that all the circumstantial evidence points highly at my client." Here, however, there were two different vehicles stolen and both incidents involved multiple young males. Counsel asked, "[W]here are the other young Hispanic males that match the description?" Counsel argued that the key was hidden in the Volvo "in such a way where [the minor] could easily have been in the vehicle and had no idea as to [the key's] presence."
In reply, the prosecutor contended that a person with a "very similar description" to the minor was seen driving past the deputy, and the stolen Navigator's key fob was "in a totally different vehicle with the minor." The prosecutor argued that "[t]he level of coincidence here is not a reasonable doubt. It's beyond a miniscule chance that that would occur."
3. The juvenile court's ruling
After hearing argument from the parties, the juvenile court took a recess to review its notes from the witnesses' testimony. The court subsequently indicated that it found "quite credible" the five witnesses who testified, which included the owner of the Navigator, Deputy Burke, and three other sheriff's deputies. After summarizing the evidence, the court acknowledged that although Deputy Burke was very clear that the minor looked very similar to the driver of the Navigator, the deputy could not be absolutely sure it was the minor.
The juvenile court then stated as follows, "Now when the Court analy[z]es all of this, I was particularly interested in the geography. And the reason I say that is, first of all, [the minor] lives in San Jose and the owner of the black Lincoln Navigator lives in San Jose. [¶] Somehow [the minor] is in the Los Gatos/Saratoga area, as is the black Lincoln Navigator and the key fob to the black Lincoln Navigator. So the geography matches. Somehow [the minor] and the black Lincoln Navigator and its key fob got from San Jose to the area between Los Gatos and Saratoga in that area, and there's a few miles separation, but it's a fairly small area.
"Then the question becomes: How is it that [the minor] is in the back of a Volvo which just happens to have a key fob of the stolen black Lincoln Navigator? And frankly I can speculate about possibilities, but none of them seem logical.
"And as a result the Court is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the People have carried their burden to prove Count 2, and I will sustain Count 2 as a felony violation of Vehicle Code Section 10851(a)."
C. The Dispositional Hearing
At the January 3, 2023 dispositional hearing, the minor was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation with various terms and conditions.
The minor observes that no minute order from the dispositional hearing is contained in the record on appeal. On our own motion, we augment the record to include the minute order from the January 3, 2023 dispositional hearing.
III. DISCUSSION
The minor contends that there was insufficient evidence that he took or drove the Lincoln Navigator. The Attorney General contends that there is ample evidence to support the finding that the minor took or drove the Navigator.
A. Legal Principles
Section 10851, subdivision (a) states that "[a]ny person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense ...." (Italics added.)
As explained by the California Supreme Court, "section 10851(a) 'proscribes a wide range of conduct.' [Citation.]" (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) For example, section 10851(a) prohibits the act of taking another person's vehicle without that person's consent. (Garza, supra, at p. 880.) "Unlawfully taking a vehicle with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession is a form of theft ...." (Id. at p. 871, italics omitted.) Alternatively, "section 10851(a) separately prohibits the act[] of driving a vehicle." (Id. at p. 880, italics added.) Unlawful driving is "when the driving occurs or continues after the theft is complete." (Id. at p. 871.) For example, a "person can violate section 10851(a) '. . . by driving . . . with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner of possession (i.e., joyriding).' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 876.)
"Mere possession of a stolen car under suspicious circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction of a violation of section [10851] of the Vehicle Code. [Citations.]" (People v. Warren (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 233, 244 [discussing former § 503]; see People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, 102 [stating that § 10851 was previously numbered as § 503].) "Possession of the stolen property may be actual or constructive and need not be exclusive. [Citations]." (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223-224 [discussing the crime of receiving stolen property], fn. omitted.) A person has actual possession of an item when the item is in the person's immediate possession or control. (People v. Pena (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1083 [discussing possession of a weapon].) Constructive possession occurs when the item, while not in the person's actual possession, is still under the person's "dominion and control, either directly or through others." (Id. at p. 1084.)
" 'The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials.' [Citation.]" (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994.) The People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor committed the offense alleged in the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 247; Welf. &Inst. Code, § 701.)
On appeal, we must determine" 'whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]'" (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372.) "[T]he critical inquiry is 'whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1371.) "Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the juvenile court's finding].' [Citation.]" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
In undertaking this inquiry, "we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] 'A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.' [Citation.]" (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
B. Analysis
We determine that there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that the minor took or drove the Lincoln Navigator. The Navigator and its key fob was stolen by a group of people from San Jose around 4:55 a.m. The juvenile court observed (without objection from the parties) that the minor also lived in San Jose.
However, the Navigator and its key fob, which was needed to drive the Navigator, were taken to the Saratoga/Los Gatos area, where the minor also happened to appear around the same time. When the Navigator was initially spotted in the Saratoga area around 6:30 a.m. by Deputy Burke, the driver of the Navigator refused to stop for the deputy who was standing in the roadway.
The driver of the Navigator matched the physical description of the minor - a young male, no more than 15 or 16 years old (the minor was 14 years old), with "similar facial features" as the minor, and a short haircut. Further, when the minor was located approximately 45 minutes later at 7:15 a.m., he was wearing, or had with him, clothing that matched the clothing worn by the driver of the stolen Navigator, that is, the minor was wearing black pants and he had a black shirt or sweatshirt in the Volvo with him.
Even more significantly, the minor was within arm's reach of the stolen Navigator's key fob while trying to hide in the back seat of the Volvo. As Deputy Burke testified, "[t]he way he positioned himself in the back seat" was "awkward" and "wasn't normal." He was "really erect," meaning "standing quite tall as if you were at attention," "but across the back seat."
As the juvenile court observed regarding the minor being "in the back seat of a Volvo which just happens to have a key fob of the stolen black Lincoln Navigator," one could "speculate about possibilities, but none of them seem logical." Or, as the prosecutor argued, "[t]he likelihood there's just a series of unfortunate accidents where the minor looks exceptionally similar to an individual driving a stolen car, evading police, and then being caught in another car with a key fob that opens that stolen vehicle is beyond remote." In view of the geographical "match[]" with respect to the location of the minor and the stolen Navigator; the physical match and clothing match of the minor and the driver of the stolen Navigator; and the short timeframe in which these occurrences took place, combined with the circumstance of the minor and the key fob being located together, with the minor immediately adjacent to the key fob and trying to hide from law enforcement, we determine that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the minor took or drove the Navigator.
We are not persuaded by the minor's arguments that the evidence was insufficient in comparison to the evidence in other cases. "When we decide issues of sufficiency of evidence, comparison with other cases is of limited utility, since each case necessarily depends on its own facts. [Citation.]" (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.)
For example, the minor relies on People v. Chubbuck (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1 and People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387 - cases in which a conviction under section 10851(a) was upheld where the defendant was found by law enforcement inside the stolen vehicle - to argue that "[i]n the present case, there was no evidence even remotely similar to that in Chubbuck and Calistro." Neither case held, however, that a defendant must be found in the stolen vehicle in order to sustain a conviction under section 10851(a). Nevertheless, in the present case, Deputy Burke testified that the driver of the stolen Lincoln Navigator was "similar in appearance" to the minor, including having "similar facial features," a short haircut, matching clothing, and about the same age, and the minor was ultimately located next to the stolen key fob while appearing to hide in the backseat of another vehicle a short time later.
The minor also relies on People v. Joiner (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 946 to argue that his close proximity to the stolen Navigator's key fob in the backseat of the Volvo was insufficient to establish that he took or drove the Navigator. In Joiner, the appellate court determined that there was no evidence establishing that the defendant either took or drove the vehicle. (Id. at p. 962.) The victim did not see who stole the vehicle (ibid.), and there was "no evidence . . . that [the defendant] drove or was seen driving the [victim's vehicle]" (id. at p. 963). The appellate court explained that "[t]he only evidence connecting [the defendant] to [the stolen vehicle] was that parts from it were found in [another vehicle] after [the defendant] performed 'repairs.'" (Id. at p. 962.) The court explained that "[w]hile the evidence would establish that [the defendant] was at some point in possession of stolen property, no evidence shows he was the actual thief of the [victim's vehicle]." (Ibid.) The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence to support the defendant's conviction under section 10851(a). (Joiner, supra, at p. 962.) In contrast to Joiner, a person who matched the description of the minor - both in terms of facial features, age, haircut, and clothing - was seen driving the Navigator, and a short time later the minor was located hiding next to the Navigator's key fob in another vehicle that was located in roughly the same geographical area.
In sum, we determine that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the minor took or drove the Navigator in violation of section 10851(a).
IV. DISPOSITION
The disposition order of January 3, 2023 is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: DANNER, J. BROMBERG, J.