Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Received for posting 1/4/10
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 050711333
Lambden, J.
Defendant Mark Lucky Edwards appeals from his conviction after jury trial below for evading a police officer causing serious injury and for driving under the influence causing injury, the latter also including enhancement findings that he caused great bodily injury to two different individuals. Defendant argues that his constitutional rights to due process and against double jeopardy were violated, and seeks reversal of conviction and sentence. We affirm his conviction and sentence.
BACKGROUND
In August 2007, the Contra Costa District Attorney filed a two-count information charging defendant with evading a peace officer causing serious bodily injury as prohibited by Vehicle Code section 2800.3 (count one), and driving under the influence causing injury as prohibited by Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a) (count two). Both counts alleged injury to three individuals, Cynthia Pierce, Lawanda Wadley, and Marsha Long, and also alleged sentence enhancements for personal infliction of great bodily injuries to Cynthia Pierce and Lawanda Wadley pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Regarding count two, the information alleged that, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), defendant had committed a prior driving under the influence offense within 10 years of the present offense. The information further alleged that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction and a prior strike conviction based on a 1994 robbery conviction, had violated probation, and was not eligible for probation based on a number of prior felony convictions.
A jury trial followed. Defendant raises purely legal issues in his appeal. Therefore, we summarize only the evidence presented at this trial sufficient to provide background to defendant’s appeal.
Defendant was charged and tried as a result of his role in a high-speed police chase and car crash near the border of El Cerrito and Richmond, California, on August 15, 2006, in which several people were injured. Evidence was presented that on that day, defendant, after taking his girlfriend home from a tubal ligation procedure, left her sleeping at home and took her blue SUV. His girlfriend testified that when she saw her car was gone, she called defendant and asked him to bring it back, but he refused. She thought he sounded like he had been drinking, but when she accused him of drinking, he hung up. A couple of weeks after the car crash, he told her he was sorry that he wrecked her car.
That same day, defendant went to the home of his cousin, Cynthia Pierce, who testified that, with her friend, Lawanda Wadley, she had been drinking and smoking crack cocaine. Defendant urged them to take a ride with him, and they did, with defendant driving. Pierce recalled a police car trying to pull them over because defendant had run a red light, but defendant sped off. She waved a white paper out the window to let the police know not to shoot, and closed her eyes because they “were in a high speed chase.” She recalled defendant crossing into incoming traffic, and next remembered waking up in a hospital, where she remained for four days. She experienced neck and back pain for two and a half weeks, and had a small scar from four stitches she had received on her head to close a wound.
Lawanda Wadley testified that she went with defendant and Pierce for a ride on the day of the accident, after she had been drinking. Defendant drove, Pierce sat in the front, and Wadley sat in the back. She did not remember much, but recalled that she put her head down because defendant was driving too fast, that a police officer tried to pull them over, and that she thought she told defendant to slow down. Defendant stopped the car briefly, then took off, ran some red lights, and went over the 13th Street overpass. Wadley next recalled lying on her back outside the car. She was in the hospital three or four days, received stitches on her head, had an injury to her leg that required a splint, and had to use a walker for about two weeks.
San Pablo Police Officer Timothy Cauwels testified that he was parked in a marked patrol car on August 15, 2006, about 8:30 p.m. when he saw a blue SUV heading in his direction run a red light and narrowly miss another car. Cauwels conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle and turned on his lights, but the SUV left as Cauwels started to put out a radio dispatch. He pursued, his flashing lights turned on, and saw a hand waving a white object out one of the SUV’s windows; the SUV accelerated to a speed exceeding 80 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone and ran through two more red lights. Cauwels ended his pursuit at the 13th Street overpass, around the Richmond boundary, with the SUV going at 90 to 100 miles per hour. He lost sight of the SUV for a few seconds as it went over the overpass, then saw a huge cloud of smoke. He went over the overpass and saw two cars “completely destroyed,” and defendant and two women lying in the roadway. When he asked the women who was driving, each pointed to defendant. Cauwels helped three people get out of a Nissan Murano turned on its side that had been struck by the SUV.
Aaron Powell testified that when the crash occurred, he was a passenger in the back seat of a Nissan Murano. The Murano was going 25 to 30 miles per hour when he saw a fast-travelling car swerve into their lane and headlights; there was a collision, and he heard a loud boom.
Richmond Police Sergeant Andre Hill testified that she responded to the crash. The speed limit on the overpass was 30 miles per hour. Hill observed fresh skid marks at the scene, which indicated that the SUV crossed over the double yellow line and ended up in the northbound lane, along with the second vehicle. The ejection of people from one vehicle showed the application of significant force or that the vehicle had gone into a spin or roll-over. Based on her observations, training, and experience, Hill believed the first vehicle was traveling southbound over the 13th Street overpass at a high rate of speed, lost control, began to brake, went into the northbound lanes of traffic, and struck the other vehicle.
Dr. Kenneth Leipper, a pathologist, testified that he tested a sample of defendant’s blood. The sample, taken from a specimen drawn at 9:40 p.m. on August 15, 2006, showed a 0.266 percent alcohol level. A urine screening test showed the presence of opiates and benzodiazepine, a sedative.
Leipper also testified about certain medical records he had reviewed. Pierce had a fracture of the second cervical vertebra, with no neurological damage, and was to wear a collar for six weeks. Wadley had a three-quarter inch left elbow laceration that required stitches. Defendant suffered numerous broken bones and fractures.
There was also testimony regarding a blood sample referred to as exhibit 74. While the parties’ discussions in their briefs suggest this was also a sample from defendant, they do not indicate where in the record it was established from whom this blood was drawn.
The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and found the great bodily injury enhancements related to count two to be true. The court found the allegations about prior robbery and prior driving under the influence convictions to be true as well. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 17 years, consisting of six years based on the upper term of three years for count two, driving under the influence with injury, doubled because of the prior “strike” offense; three years each for the great bodily injury enhancements regarding count two; and five years for the prior serious felony conviction. The court also imposed a five-year concurrent sentence for count one, evading a peace officer causing serious bodily injury. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Penal Code Section 12022.7 is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
Defendant argues that the phrase “great bodily injury,” as defined in Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (f), is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, and also is unconstitutional as applied to defendant. We find the phrase to be constitutional in all regards.
All references herein are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Section 12022.7, subdivision (a), states: “Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)
Section 12022.7, subdivision (f), states: “As used in this section, ‘great bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial physical injury.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (f).)
The People point out that defendant did not object below to the section 12022.7 enhancements attached to count two on any ground, nor did he object to the jury instruction that defined “great bodily injury” as inadequate. However, the People do not assert waiver. Therefore we address the merits of defendant’s appeal.
Defendant argues that although the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine “is based on both the right to notice and the prohibition against arbitrary enforcement, the more important aspect is the latter—the likelihood (or not) of arbitrary enforcement.” As he points out, the California Supreme Court has recognized that there can be a “fine line” that distinguishes “ ‘ “an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not quite meet the description,” ’ ” and that this is “a factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury.” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64.) “[A] great bodily injury determination by the jury rests on the facts as presented at trial in the context of the particular crime and the particular injuries suffered by the victim.” (Id. at p. 65.) “Proof that a victim’s bodily injury is ‘great’—that is, significant or substantial within the meaning of section 12022.7—is commonly established by evidence of the severity of the victim’s physical injury, the resulting pain, or the medical care required to treat or repair the injury.” (Id. at p. 66.)
In his opening brief, defendant argues that the definition of “great bodily injury” contained in section 12022.7 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Although he takes some care in outlining the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine in criminal cases, relying heavily on Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 (Kolender), he presents a very spare argument for his position regarding section 12022.7. Essentially, he poses a few hypothetical questions about different types of injuries, and cites People v. Nava (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, in which the appellate court found that the trial court committed instructional error when it instructed the jury that a bone fracture was a “great bodily injury” pursuant to section 12022.7, as this usurped the function of the jury. (Nava, at pp. 1495, 1497-1499.) Defendant concludes that under Kolender this approach “virtually entrusts lawmaking to the jury, and hence the statute is unconstitutional.” According to defendant, we must find section 12022.7 unconstitutional because it does not “establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” pursuant to Kolender’s instruction. (Kolender, at pp. 357-358.) Therefore, the true findings of the 12022.7 enhancements attached to count two should not be allowed to stand.
We disagree. The instructional error analysis in People v. Nava, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, is not relevant to the constitutional question defendant raises here; if anything, it stands for the proposition that determining whether an injury satisfies section 12022.7 is a jury function. On the other hand, in his opening brief, defendant, other than citing People v. Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th 58, ignores the ample California case law that has upheld the constitutionality of “great bodily injury” or equivalent language. For example, in People v. Guest (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 809, the court rejected a claim “that section 12022.7 is unconstitutionally vague because one cannot tell from instance to instance what injuries will be considered significant or substantial enough to constitute great bodily injury.” (Id. at p. 811.) The court explained:
“The orthodox test under the United States or California Constitutions for unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute ‘ “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application[,] [violating] the first essential of due process of law.” ’ [Citations.] However, ‘a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, “notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates may differ.” ’ [Citations.] As we have stated..., ‘We are persuaded by the long acceptance of “great bodily injury” as a term commonly understandable to jurors that it has not acquired a technical legal definition requiring in the absence of special circumstances a clarifying instruction.’ While the defendant may be correct in that an ‘I know it when I see it’ standard is applied to injuries under section 12022.7 [citation], men of common intelligence can apply these words of long usage to discern what injuries they are forbidden to inflict under pain of enhancement.... Section 12022.7 is constitutional.” (People v. Guest, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 811-812.)
In People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 679 (Maciel), the court also found that the phrase “great bodily injury” contained in section 12022.7 is not vague. The court acknowledged that a penal statute must define an offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Maciel, at p. 683.) If a criminal statute is not sufficiently certain and definite, it is unconstitutionally vague. (Ibid.) The court found that “the phrase ‘great bodily injury’ standing alone is not vague. ‘The term “great bodily injury” has been used in the law of California for over a century without further definition and the courts have consistently held that it is not a technical term that requires further elaboration.’ ” (Id. at p. 686.) The Maciel court quoted the definition contained in section 12022.7, subdivision (f), of “great bodily injury” as “ ‘a significant or substantial physical injury,’ ” and stated that the phrase was “ ‘sufficiently certain and definite to meet the constitutional requirements’ and avoid vagueness.” (Maciel, at p. 686; see also People v. La Fargue (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 878, 886-887 [“[t]he term ‘great bodily injury’ has been used in the law of California for over a century without further definition and the courts have consistently held that it is not a technical term that requires further elaboration”]; People v. Roberts (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 960, 962-963 [finding “great bodily injury,” as used in Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), was not unconstitutionally vague].)
The People cite most of these cases in their respondent’s brief. In his reply brief, defendant argues that the cases relied upon by the People “did not address the constitutionality of Penal Code section 12022.7 in light of Kolender[, supra, 461 U.S. 352]. Kolender is controlling authority on the issue, and merits some consideration.” Defendant does not explain why he failed to inform this court in his opening brief about California cases that have ruled on the very issue he raises here. Regardless, his effort to distinguish these cases based on Kolender is unpersuasive.
Defendant correctly points out that in Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. 352, the United States Supreme Court found that the requirement that a suspect loiterer provide “credible and reliable” identification to a peace officer to account for his presence, as provided for in section 647e, was unconstitutionally vague. In doing so, the court, relying in part on its previous ruling in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates (1982) 455 U.S. 489 (Hoffman Estates), noted, “As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Kolender, at pp. 357-358.) Furthermore, the majority in Kolender, in distinguishing its view from Justice White’s dissent, stated that his description of the court’s previous holdings as requiring that a statute be held unconstitutionally vague only if it was vague “ ‘In all its possible applications’ ” was “inaccurate in several respects.” (Id. at pp. 358-359, fn 8.) Relying again on Hoffman Estates, the majority stated that this description “neglects the fact that we permit a facial challenge if a law reaches ‘a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.’ ” (Kolender, at p. 359, fn. 8.) The majority also stated that “where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. [Citation.] This concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court’s discussion makes clear that Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. 352, rather than chart a new direction as defendant suggests, merely summarized and clarified its previous holdings, including its discussion in Hoffman Estates, supra, 455 U.S. 489. Defendant also fails to explain how the court’s treatment of the language and statute involved in Kolender has any real bearing on the language he challenges here, which, as we have indicated, has been employed for more than a century, and repeatedly been found to be constitutional.
Defendant makes a number of other unpersuasive arguments. First, he contends that People v. Guest, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 809, is somehow inapposite because the court relied on the long usage and commonly understood meaning of “great bodily injury.” (Id. at p. 811.) According to defendant, “[l]ong usage or common usage... plays no significant role in a vagueness analysis after Kolender.” We fail to see how this is the case from our reading of Kolender. Indeed, as we have discovered in our independent research, after Kolender, the Fourth District rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to the phrase “great bodily injury,” as used in Penal Code section 273ab, based on long usage, and with Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. 352, in mind. In People v. Albritton (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 647 (Albritton), the Fourth District quoted Kolender’s “sufficient definiteness” requirement, as well as the requirement stated in People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, that a criminal statute “ ‘be definite enough to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed,’ ” and “ ‘provide definite guidelines for the police... to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” (Albritton,at pp. 656-657.) The court also correctly pointed out that “ ‘[t]he starting point of our analysis is “the strong presumption that legislative enactments ‘must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears. [Citations.] A statute should be sufficiently certain so that a person may know what is prohibited thereby and what may be done without violating its provisions, but it cannot be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 657.) The Fourth District rejected Albritton’s argument that the phrase “great bodily injury” was vague because it could cover “ ‘a multitude of injuries ranging from a cut lip to broken bones,’ ” noting that, as we have discussed, the term “ ‘has been used in the law of California for over a century without further definition and the courts have consistently held that it is not a technical term that requires further elaboration.’ ” (Id. at p. 658, quoting People v. La Fargue, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 886-887.)
Further demonstrating the weakness of his argument, defendant also relies on Kolender and Heitzman, in his reply brief. Albritton makes clear that these cases are consistent with the conclusion that the phrase “great bodily injury,” meaning a “significant or substantial physical injury,” is not unconstitutionally vague.
Defendant also argues that the court in People v. Maciel, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th 679, should be ignored, because it employed the “vague in all its applications” test (id. at p. 683), that is intended for civil, but not criminal cases, as stated in Kolender,supra, 461 U.S. at pages 358-359, footnote 8. We do not necessarily agree that Kolender rejects the application of this test in all criminal cases, but need not determine this issue. Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive because Maciel did not directly apply this standard, instead looking to the long usage of the phrase “great bodily injury” and previous case law to conclude that it was not unconstitutionally vague. (Maciel, at p. 686.)
Finally, as the People point out, after Kolender,supra, 461 U.S. 352, the United States Supreme Court decided James v. United States (2007) 550 U.S. 192, which also provides some support for our conclusion here. In James, the majority, relying in part on the court’s discussion in Kolender, rejected Justice Scalia’s dissenting argument that the phrase “serious potential risk of physical injury” was unconstitutionally vague. (James, at p. 210, fn. 6.) In doing so, the court relied in part on similar formulations in federal and state criminal statutes, including California’s Health and Safety Code section 42400.3, subdivision (b), which criminalized air pollution that “ ‘results in any unreasonable risk of great bodily injury... ’ ” (James, at p. 210, fn. 6) Defendant argues that this analysis focuses on statutes involving risk of great bodily injury, rather than great bodily injury itself, and also cites People v. Roberts, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at page 964 (distinguishing between cases involving assaults in which there is a likelihood that great bodily injury will result and those involving enhancements for the actual injury inflicted.) We do not think this distinction is as relevant, however, as the fact that the James majority summarily dismissed Justice Scalia’s “void-for-vagueness” argument.
Defendant’s argument that section 12022.7 is void for vagueness as applied to him in this case is also without merit. Defendant does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. Instead, relying again on the inapposite instructional error discussion in People v. Nava, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 1490, and on his minimizing of the injuries to Pierce and Wadley, defendant appears to argue that if the jury had been properly instructed pursuant to Kolender, supra, 461 U.S. 352, it could have found that the injuries to Pierce and Wadley were not great bodily injuries. However, there was ample evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the two suffered significant and substantial physical injuries. They lost consciousness, later received stitches to their heads, were hospitalized for days, and endured pain and/or significant physical limitations for weeks after the accident. We reject defendant’s argument that under Kolender, his constitutional rights were somehow violated as a result of section 12022.7’s application to his case.
II. The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy Was Not Violated
Defendant argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated because he was convicted and punished twice for causing the same injuries to the same people, Pierce and Wadley. Defendant bases this argument on his conviction and sentencing in count one for evading a peace officer causing “serious bodily injury” as prohibited by Vehicle Code section 2800.3, and his sentencing pursuant to the “great bodily injury” enhancements accompanying count two (driving under the influence causing injury as prohibited by Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)). Defendant’s argument is without merit.
Once more, the People point out that defendant did not raise this double jeopardy argument below, but do not argue waiver. Therefore, we address the merits of his argument.
A. Proceedings Below
Initially, defendant was charged with “great bodily injury” enhancements regarding both count one and count two. However, he successfully moved to dismiss the count one enhancements because “serious bodily injury” already was an element of count one. The prosecutor agreed that the enhancements were inapplicable to count one, citing People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, and the trial court struck them.
In People v. Beltran, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 693, the court held that the terms “ ‘serious bodily injury’ ” and “ ‘great bodily injury’ ” have “substantially the same meaning” (id. at p. 696), a view which has been also reached by our Supreme Court and various other appellate courts. (See, e.g., People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824, 831 [finding them “closely analogous”]; People v. Chaffer (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1042; People v. Hawkins (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 527, 531.) Since section 12022.7, subdivision (c), prohibited adding the enhancement when “ ‘infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense of which [defendant] is convicted’ ” (Beltran, at p. 696), the Beltran court found that the section 12022.7 enhancement alleged against Beltran should not apply to his felony conviction for evading a peace officer causing “serious bodily injury.” (Beltran, at p. 697.)
At sentencing, the trial court stated that defendant’s count two conviction was the primary offense, imposed the upper three-year term for the count and doubled it because of defendant’s prior strike offense, imposed a concurrent five-year term for count one, and added three years each for the “great bodily injury” enhancements attached to count two, for a total prison term of 17 years.
B. Discussion
Defendant’s double jeopardy argument lacks merit. Section 12022.7 is an enhancement, not a substantive offense. (People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1325-1326.) As an enhancement, “it is a legislative attempt to punish more severely those crimes which actually result in great bodily injury,” and it “applies to all offenses except those where serious bodily injury is already an element of the substantive offense charged.” (People v. Parrish (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 336, 344; followed in People v. Guzman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 761, 765.)
Defendant does not cite any authority which indicates a defendant cannot be convicted and punished for a substantive offense that includes as an element conduct arguably equivalent to that found true for an enhancementto another offense. While we are unaware of our Supreme Court speaking directly to this issue, its discussion in People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110 (Sloan), discussed by the People in their respondent’s brief at some length, supports the conclusion that a defendant can be so convicted and punished.
The Sloan court considered whether section 12022.7 enhancement allegations should be considered for purposes of the rule prohibiting multiple convictions based on necessary included offenses. (Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 114.) Sloan had been convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition (count one), and also of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury (counts two and three), all stemming from the same domestic violence incident. (Id. at pp. 114-115.) The appellate court had ruled that Sloan’s convictions on counts two and three violated the rule prohibiting multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses when count one was considered with the great bodily injury enhancement that attached to it. (Id. at p. 115.) The appellate court also found that the count two and three convictions violated section 654’s ban on multiple punishment and principles of federal double jeopardy protection. (Sloan, at p. 115.)
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. It explained that section 954 generally permits multiple convictions, except for necessarily included offenses, and that section 654 generally prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or omission.” (Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 116.) The court concluded that consideration of count one’s great bodily injury enhancement would effectively establish the elements of count three’s battery charge (id. at p. 117), but that this was inconsequential because “enhancements are neither recognized nor considered in determining whether the defendant can be convicted of multiple charged crimes based on necessarily included offenses.” (Sloan, at pp. 114, 119-120.)
Section 654 provides in relevant part that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).)
Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th 110, establishes that, in evaluating whether multiple convictions have occurred, comparing enhancements for one substantive offense to the elements of another substantive offense is akin to mixing apples and oranges. Defendant argues in effect that the “greater bodily injury” enhancements found true regarding count two are the equivalent of necessarily included offenses within count one’s charge of evading a peace officer causing serious bodily injury. Pursuant to Sloan, this argument cannot be maintained.
Furthermore, as the People also point out, the Sloan court rejected the idea that the double jeopardy clause applied to multiple criminal punishments in a unitary trial. It stated, “the [United States] Supreme Court has made clear that ‘[t]he [Double Jeopardy] Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense... and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings ....’ ” (Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Hudson v. United States (1997) 522 U.S. 93, 99 (Hudson).)
Defendant argues that the People present “far too broad a description” of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He quotes the high court’s statement in Missouri v. Hunter (1983) 459 U.S. 359, that “[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed on a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the Legislature intended.” (Id. at p. 366.) Defendant ignores that the Sloan court’s source for its description of the limited scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause was the United States Supreme Court’s discussion in Hudson, supra, 522 U.S. 93, a case issued after Missouri v. Hunter, which cited the same page in Missouri v. Hunter from which defendant quotes. (Hudson, at p. 99.) Hudson’slimitation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to “successive proceedings” controls. In any event, we must follow our Supreme Court’s understanding of the scope of the clause, as stated in Sloan. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
In light of our analysis and conclusion, we have no need to address the remainder of the arguments by the parties regarding the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
We concur: Kline P.J., Richman J.