Opinion
G052399
01-11-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CARL WALLACE EADES, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Elizabeth M. Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14CF0176) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed. Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Elizabeth M. Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Carl Wallace Eades, Jr., was charged with several drug crimes, along with enhancement allegations based on a prior drug conviction, passing fictional instruments (Pen. Code, § 476), and attempting to defraud an innkeeper (§§ 664 & 537, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant ultimately entered guilty pleas to two drug charges and admitted the allegations based on his prior conviction. The trial court granted a motion for acquittal on the attempt charge. A jury returned guilty verdicts on the passing fictional instruments and another drug charge. The court sentenced defendant to three years for possessing methamphetamine for sale, plus a concurrent two-year term on the passing fictitious instruments charge.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, defendant challenges only his conviction for passing fictitious instruments. He contends the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (Brady) by failing to disclose its witness could not identify the person who passed false currency. Alternatively, defendant argues that witness's inability to identify him precludes his conviction for passing fictitious instruments. We conclude both claims lack merit and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTS
Noemi Harris, the manager of a motel, was at the front desk when a man approached asking to rent a room. As Harris took the man's information, he placed three $20 bills on the counter. Harris immediately realized the bills were fake and informed the man of this fact. He responded, "Wow, you are good," claimed he had just received the bills at a store, and said, "Well, let me go and get my other wallet where I keep my real money," and giggled. The man departed, leaving his wallet, cell phone, and the three counterfeit bills lying on the counter. Concerned that she might be blamed if anything was missing, Harris photographed the items with her cell phone.
The man returned, giving Harris valid cash. Laughing, he stated, "This is where I keep my real money." Harris handed the man a room key and he picked up the counterfeit bills from the counter. At that point, another man entered the lobby and said, "Did you find your wallet?" The man who had paid for the room responded, "Yes, I did. And I brought the fake bills with me." At this point, the two men began laughing.
After both men left the lobby, Harris telephoned the police. When officers arrived, Harris showed them the photograph she had taken of the counterfeit bills and directed them to a room.
The officers approached room #429 and knocked on the door. Defendant opened it and consented to a search of his person. The search resulted in the discovery of a coin purse holding a ziplock bag that contained a white crystalline substance resembling methamphetamine, and nearly $230 in cash in different denominations. With defendant's consent, the police also searched the motel room. They found additional methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and counterfeit $20 bills.
The police took defendant to the police station. After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant agreed to speak with the officers. When asked about the counterfeit bills, defendant claimed that he may have received them as change for a recent purchase at a nearby store. However, defendant did not respond when asked why he segregated the counterfeit bills from his other funds.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (Miranda). --------
II
DISCUSSION
A. Brady Error
1. Background
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense moved for acquittal on the charges of passing fictitious instruments and attempt to defraud an innkeeper. Defense counsel argued Harris never identified defendant as the man who handed her the counterfeit $20 bills. The prosecutor responded, claiming there was enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference defendant was that person and that he acted with the requisite intent to defraud. However, he acknowledged Harris had told him "that due to the passage of time she couldn't say for sure that she would be able to identify him." The trial court granted the motion as to the attempt charge, but denied it as to passing fictitious instruments.
The next day, defense counsel moved to dismiss the latter charge because of the prosecutor's failure to inform her before trial that Harris could not identify defendant violated Brady. Defense counsel argued, "I would have altered my cross[-]examination had I been privy to that information. . . . I stayed away from th[e] . . . identification issue because I thought it was an omission on the part of the People, not a knowing strategy on a point they were privileged to have but never turned over to the Defense." In response, the prosecutor said that he only learned Harris would "[p]robably not" recognize defendant "as we were walking through the [courtroom] doors."
The trial court denied the motion, but allowed the defense to recall Harris and question her on the identity issue. Recalled to the stand, Harris acknowledged she could not "remember [the] face" of the person who handed her the counterfeit $20 bills, nor could she identify anyone in the courtroom as that person. However, Harris testified that she sent the police officers to a specific motel room and "remember[ed] the gentleman . . . in the backseat of the police car . . . was the person that handed me the fake bills."
2. Analysis
Defendant contends his conviction for violating section 476 must be reversed because the prosecution failed to immediately inform defense counsel of Harris's inability to identify him as the person who handed her the counterfeit $20 bills. He claims "Harris was the crucial witness . . . on the fictitious instruments charge" and "the failure of the prosecution to disclose in advance to the defense that Harris was unable to identify [him] as the person who attempted to pay for [the] room with fake currency was material and prejudicial."
In Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, the United States Supreme Court held "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." (Id. at p. 87.) Further, "the duty to disclose such evidence exists even though there has been no request by the accused." (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 1042.)
However, to support a claim that a defendant's due process rights were violated under this doctrine, three elements must be established. "The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." (Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 [119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286].) "Thus, a true Brady violation occurs only when [these] three conditions are met." (People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 274, disapproved on another point in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53, fn. 19.)
Contrary to the Attorney General's argument, the record shows the first and second elements of a Brady claim were met in this case. Harris's inability to identify defendant as the man who tried to pay for a motel room with counterfeit bills certainly was favorable to the defense because she was the only person present when the man attempted to pay for the room with counterfeit bills. Without her identification of defendant the jury had to infer defendant was the perpetrator from the circumstantial evidence. In addition, the lack of identification could be used by the defense for impeachment. The Brady doctrine "encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence." (People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1042.)
Although the prosecutor claimed that he only learned about Harris's inability to recognize the perpetrator as he and Harris entered the courtroom, this did not justify his initial nondisclosure of this fact. (Merrill v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1594 ["Evidence that [witness] had emphatically refused to identify [the petitioner] as one of the men in the vicinity of the robbery murder was exculpatory evidence" because "[i]t constituted substantial material evidence on the issue of guilt," and "[f]ailure to disclose it violated the mandates of . . . Brady"].)
People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th 153, the case cited by the Attorney General to claim there was no suppression of evidence is distinguishable. There the prosecutor "immediately turned over" the relevant evidence upon receiving it. (Id. at p. 273.) Here, the prosecutor did not divulge Harris's inability to positively identify defendant as the person who tried to pass counterfeit bills until questioned about it during the motion for acquittal.
However, we conclude that because the defense learned Harris was unable to make a positive identification during trial and was given the opportunity to recall and question Harris on this issue, we conclude defendant has failed to establish prejudice. To support the prejudice element a defendant "must show a 'reasonable probability of a different result.'" (Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 699 [124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166]; People v. Salazar, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1042-1043 ["'[T]he term "Brady violation" is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence—that is, to any suppression of so-called "Brady material"—although, strictly speaking, there is never a real "Brady violation" unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict'"].)
The defense discovered Harris's inability to identify the man who attempted to pay for a room with counterfeit bills during trial and the court afforded it the opportunity to recall Harris and question her on this issue. During closing argument, defense counsel's argument on the passing fictitious instruments charge focused solely on the identity issue. She argued, "Harris was an important witness" because for the prosecution "to prove the identity of the individual that . . . actually passed those bills," "she ha[d] to be able to identify the individual . . . and whether or not that individual actually knew that they were counterfeit." (People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 274-275 [since defense was able to "locate[] and call[] three witnesses" to impeach prosecution's witness, and "retained the ability to recall or subpoena" that witness "defendant was able to make effective use of" the exculpatory evidence "and therefore, there was no prejudice stemming from its allegedly untimely disclosure"].)
For this reason, Merrill v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 1586, the case on which defendant relies is distinguishable. In Merrill, the defense did not learn about the witness's insistence that the petitioner was not one of the perpetrators until long after trial.
Given that the defense learned about Harris's inability to identify the person who attempted to pass counterfeit bills during trial and was afforded the opportunity to question her and argue the issue to the jury, we conclude defendant cannot show a reasonable probability of a different result in this case. Consequently, his Brady violation claim lacks merit. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Alternatively, defendant argues Harris's inability to identify him as the person who attempted to pay for the room with counterfeit bills precludes his conviction for violating section 476. According to defendant, absent the identification testimony, "there was insufficient evidence that [he] attempted to pass fake bills to anyone or intended to defraud anyone."
We find this argument also lacking in merit. The applicable standard of review is well established. "When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding." (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
This standard of appellate review applies "[e]ven where, as here, the evidence of guilt is largely circumstantial . . . ." (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44.) Thus, while "[i]t is the duty of the jury to acquit the defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence. [Citation.] [T]he relevant inquiry on appeal is whether, in light of all the evidence, 'any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (Ibid.)
Here, the inferences the jury could draw from the evidence supported findings that defendant was the person who attempted to pass the counterfeit bills and that he did so with the requisite intent to defraud. While Harris was unable to recognize defendant as the man who handed her three fake $20 bills, she did direct the police officers to a specific room in the motel and defendant was one of the two persons occupying that room. In the room, the police found counterfeit $20 bills. Further, since Harris testified the person who attempted to pass the fake bills was a man, the room's other occupant, a woman, was excluded as the possible perpetrator of the crime.
Harris also testified the man placed in the backseat of the police car, i.e., defendant, was the man who tried to pass the counterfeit bills. Defendant complains about how this testimony was elicited, but he does not argue it was inadmissible. While defendant questions the credibility of this testimony, that was an issue for the jury to resolve. "'A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility.'" (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890.)
As for proof of an intent to defraud, defendant's comment, "Wow, you are good" when Harris told him the bills were fake, along with his other statements about "real money" and "fake bills" supported an inference that he knew of the instruments' fictitious nature before he attempted to use them to obtain a motel room. (People v. Bollaert (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 699, 715 ["Specific intent to defraud is often proven by circumstantial evidence; it is thus typically inferred from all of the facts and circumstances"].) In addition, when questioned by the police, defendant could not explain why he segregated the counterfeit bills from his other funds.
Consequently, we conclude the evidence suffices to support defendant's conviction for violating section 476.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J. IKOLA, J.