Opinion
B326882
02-23-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAURICE RAUL DUPLEASIS, Defendant and Appellant.
Michael Clough, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. KA118360 Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael Clough, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MORI, J.
After punching and disabling the victim, appellant Maurice Raul Dupleasis entered an open plea to mayhem, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault and received a sentence of seven years in state prison. In a prior appeal, this court remanded the matter for resentencing. The trial court reduced appellant's sentence to two years and subsequently held a restitution hearing in which it ordered appellant to pay the victim $69,985.29 for medical expenses and loss of income. Appellant now appeals the restitution order, contending it was unsupported by sufficient evidence establishing the victim's loss. We disagree and accordingly affirm the trial court's order.
BACKGROUND
A. Guilty Plea and Conviction
Appellant was accused of punching the victim, Adam Alcantara, in the head during an altercation in front of a bar. This resulted in Alcantara falling, striking his head on concrete, and suffering a traumatic brain injury. As a result, an information was filed in December 2018, charging appellant with mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) (count 1), battery with great bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) (count 2), and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 254, subd. (a)(4)) (count 3). As to counts 2 and 3, the information further charged that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
In December 2019, appellant entered an open plea of guilty to the charges and admitted the special allegations. On February 25, 2020, the trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for a total of seven years, which included the four-year upper term on count 3, plus an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court stayed sentence on the remaining counts.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated the Victim Compensation Board submitted a restitution claim form to recover payments it had distributed and ordered appellant to reimburse the Board $50,360.70 plus 10 percent interest as of that date. The court stated additional restitution would be warranted given "the extensive injuries and the life-long medical attention that [Alcantara] will need." The court retained jurisdiction over any additional amount of victim restitution and set a restitution hearing.
In his opening brief, appellant indicates the hearing was originally set for January 21, 2021, and continued pending the outcome of his direct appeal.
B. Direct Appeal and Resentencing
In August 2021, on direct appeal, this court vacated the sentence as unauthorized and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to resentence appellant. (People v. Dupleasis (Aug. 20, 2021, B305985) [nonpub. opn.].)
In June 2022, the trial court resentenced appellant to the low term of two years on count 1 and stayed sentence on the other counts. The court set a hearing to resolve the matter of victim restitution.
C. Restitution Hearing
The victim, Alcantara, had incurred substantial expenses related to the injuries sustained, a portion of which had been covered by the Victim Compensation Board. At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor submitted a packet from the Victim Compensation Board including itemized bills for payments made to the victim. The payment covered medical expenses of $305.71 and income loss of $69,679.58, for a total of $69,985.29. The prosecutor argued that appellant should pay the victim this amount in compensation.
The prosecutor noted the victim had reimbursed the Board for the total amount after receiving a civil settlement from the company responsible for security at the bar where the altercation had occurred. The prosecutor explained, "The Victims Compensation Board has a clause within their contract with victims that, if they are to receive a settlement related to their case, that they must reimburse the Victim Compensation Board." The prosecutor contended that even though the victim reimbursed the Board under the terms of their contract, appellant was liable to pay the victim the $69,985.29 in medical expenses and loss of income described in the itemized bills as restitution. In making this argument, the prosecutor cited to case law stating, "[I]f a settlement payer is completely distinct and independent from the defendant, the amount cannot be offset against the defendant's restitution obligation. That's In re: Tommy A., 131 Cal.App.4th 1580." (Italics added.) The prosecutor also noted, "There are additional restitution expenses that the victim has incurred since then," but the victim only sought reimbursement for the expenses itemized in the bills submitted.
Defense counsel acknowledged the legal principle that a third party settlement with the victim cannot be used to offset a restitution award owed by the defendant. However, he argued that once the victim, Alcantara, compensated the Board, there was no "mandatory" debt for appellant to pay. Counsel further observed that he was aware the settlement received by the victim was "very substantial." Finally, counsel argued that the court should consider the mitigating circumstances surrounding the incident underlying the charges.
The trial court responded that the majority of appellant's comments were mitigating circumstances relevant to punishment, which the court previously considered in resentencing appellant. Insofar as restitution, the court stated, "This is an issue before the court as to compensation for [the victim's] injuries and the amount of money paid out by the Victim Restitution Board or Compensation Board to cover those expenses despite the fact that there was a settlement separate and apart from the criminal case." The court concluded, "[t]he victim is entitled to the reimbursement for monies paid out to the Compensation Board" and that the court would order restitution in the amount as claimed, $69,985.29, plus interest from the date of sentencing.
Defense counsel informed the trial court he intended to appeal the restitution order. He argued there was no evidence or "no [ ] recent evidence in the records" as to cost and no "mandatory basis" for making a restitution order. He questioned whether there was "a factual basis for the court to determine what the amount of restitution is."
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Victim Restitution Statute
Victims of crime in California have a constitutional and statutory right to receive full restitution directly from a defendant for economic loss suffered as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b); § 1202.4, subd. (f); People v. Hamilton (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 932, 939.) Section 1202.4, the restitution statute, allows for recovery of a broad variety of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant's conduct, "including, but not limited to" medical expenses, mental health counseling expenses, wages or profits lost by the victim, and psychological harm. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)
B. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence. Once the prosecution makes a prima facie showing of the victim's economic loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount. (People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 199.)
We review a court's determination of restitution for abuse of discretion. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663.) "When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court." (People v. Dalvito (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 557, 562; see also People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542-1543.)
Here, appellant fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion as the record contains a factual basis to support the restitution award of $69,985.29.
C. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion in Ordering $69,985.29 in Victim Restitution
In his opening brief, appellant states, "[The victim] did not provide the court with any statement as to his economic loss, or otherwise present a claim for restitution to the court, and the district attorney inexplicably appears to have made a deliberate decision not to present any evidence of an actual economic loss suffered by [the victim]." The record belies this contention.
The prosecutor presented the restitution packet prepared by the Victim Compensation Board in support of the restitution request. The documentation included a sworn certification of itemized bills related to medical expenses and income loss submitted to and paid by the Board on behalf of the victim. Significantly, defense counsel did not address the Board's documentation nor dispute any itemized payments the victim received to cover medical expenses and loss of income. (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 [stating that because defendant failed to offer any evidence to challenge any of the expenses presented, trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding those amounts]; People v. Taylor (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 761 [explaining that once victim makes prima facie showing of economic losses incurred as result of defendant's acts, burden shifts to defendant to disprove the amount of loss claimed by the victim].)
Appellant complains the victim himself, Alcantara, "did not provide the court with any statement as to his economic loss, or otherwise present a claim for restitution to the court." However, section 1202.4 does not require any particular proof but simply provides that a court's restitution order shall be "based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (§ 12022.4, subd. (f), italics added; see also People v. Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1542-1543 ["Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of proof"].) Here, the Board's documentation was sufficient evidence of the victim's loss. Indeed, in his reply brief, appellant states that he "did not-and does not-dispute the accuracy of the amounts listed in the Victim Compensation Board packet."
Instead, appellant argues the amounts paid to cover the victim's medical expenses and loss of income do not represent an "actual" "economic loss" to the victim. In other words, appellant contends the victim cannot show he suffered actual economic loss because he has now received a settlement from the bar's security company to compensate him for his injuries. As acknowledged by appellant in his opening brief, however, the question of whether an independent third party settlement precludes a victim from receiving restitution is separate from the question of whether the restitution amount itself was accurate. The former question is one of law and can be answered "no." (See People v. Vasquez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133-1134; People v. Short (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 899, 903; In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1582-1583.)
As explained in People v. Vasquez, "An order of restitution pursuant to section 1202.4 does not preclude the crime victim from purs[u]ing a separate civil action based on the same facts from which the criminal conviction arose." (Id. at pp. 11331134.) This is so because "the judgment obtained in a civil action does not completely satisfy the purpose of an order of restitution entered in a criminal case." "In addition to compensating the victim," the restitution order "is intended to rehabilitate the defendant and to deter the defendant and others from future crimes." (Ibid.) It is only when the victim has obtained a settlement payment from either the defendant or a company that insured the defendant for civil liability that the amount of the restitution order in a criminal action must be offset by money paid to the victim. (People v. Short, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.) Under these circumstances, the victim is deemed to have received a payment "directly from the defendant" within the meaning of section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1). (Ibid.)
In the trial court, it was undisputed that the settlement was paid by the security company for the bar where the altercation took place. It was undisputed that the security company was a third party, separate and distinct from appellant. (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26, fn. 6 [specific arguments not made in trial court regarding restitution order forfeited on appeal]; People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 755 [same].) A settlement payment made by an independent third party does not reduce the amount of restitution a defendant owes. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution in this case. (People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order for victim restitution in the amount of $69,985.29 is affirmed.
We concur: CURREY, P.J., ZUKIN, J.