Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWF015397, Mark E. Petersen and Timothy F. Freer, Judges.
HALLER, J.
Luis DeLoera, Sr. (Senior) and his son Luis DeLoera, Jr. (Junior) were convicted of offenses arising from an altercation with two deputy sheriffs in front of the DeLoera residence. Appealing from their convictions, they request that we review the sealed record of the trial court's in camera review of police personnel records. Further, they (1) contend the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the right to defend property and eject trespassers, and (2) assert a revised version of CALCRIM No. 220 fails to inform the jury of the prosecution's duty to prove all the elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Junior, who suffers from schizophrenia, lives with his father. Junior's mother (Norma DeLoera) lives elsewhere. In January 2006, Norma ascertained that Junior was not taking his medications and she was concerned that he would become delusional. Norma told her son's next door neighbor (Catherine Johnson) about her concerns and asked Johnson to call for help if she noticed anything unusual.
On the afternoon of January 21, 2006, Deputy Sheriffs Jeffrey Maynard and Jeff Fisher responded to a call from Johnson requesting that the police check on the welfare of a neighbor who may have a mental health problem and be off his medications. When the officers contacted Johnson, Johnson informed them about the mother's concerns for her son's well-being because of his schizophrenia. Johnson explained that the garage door to the neighbor's residence had been "standing wide open" since the night before, and "very loud music" had been coming from the residence all night.
The officers proceeded to the DeLoera residence. They observed that the overhead garage door was standing open, and Deputy Fisher heard music playing inside the home. The deputies knocked on the front door and on the door inside the garage that led into the residence. Fisher "hopped" a side fence and checked the backyard and a sliding glass door. All the doors and windows were locked. The deputies looked through the windows and did not see anyone inside.
After finishing this inspection, the deputies decided they would try to get the phone number for the residence, or for the mother who had alerted the neighbor. They spoke again with Johnson and contacted dispatch from Fisher's patrol car, but were unable to obtain any phone numbers. As they were getting ready to leave the location, they noticed a car pull into the open garage of the DeLoera residence. The deputies walked back to the residence. When the deputies were in the driveway area, Junior and Senior got out of the car. Junior, who appeared very angry, yelled at the officers. Junior asked them why they were there, and told them they were trespassing and to " '[g]et off our property.' " Deputy Fisher responded, " 'No. We are just here to check on you. You guys live here?... Do you know who lives here?' " Junior gesticulated with his arms above his head and yelled at the officers to " '[g]et the fuck off my property.' " The deputies tried to calm him down, stating: " 'Calm down. We are just here to find out if you guys are okay. The neighbor called us to check on you. Do you live here?' "
Junior did not appear to want to listen, and he started walking rapidly towards the officers. When Junior was several feet from Deputy Maynard, Junior raised his hand, clenched his fist, and charged at Maynard. Maynard took a step back, and Deputy Fisher attempted to restrain Junior by putting his arm in a wrist lock. Junior resisted, and Fisher and Junior struggled across the driveway until they fell to the ground. Fisher was able to get on top of Junior and gain control of him.
Meanwhile, Maynard had turned to assist Fisher, but was thwarted when Senior ran down the driveway and punched Maynard in the eye. Maynard pushed Senior down the driveway. Senior came back up the driveway and punched Maynard in the face and upper torso. Maynard and Senior continued to fight, and Maynard fell to the ground. Senior got on top of Maynard, punched him in the face, and began choking him. As Maynard started to lose consciousness, he was able to kick Senior off of him and draw his gun. Maynard ordered Senior to back up and put his arms in the air, and Senior complied.
After Maynard holstered his weapon and as he was moving towards Senior to handcuff him, Senior ran to where Fisher was holding Junior down on the ground. Senior jumped on Fisher's back; Fisher lost control of Junior; and Senior started choking Fisher with his arm. Maynard pulled Senior off Fisher. According to Maynard, Junior then rolled on top of Fisher and punched him in the face. Maynard struck Junior with his baton. Junior got off Fisher and ran towards Maynard's patrol car. Meanwhile, Fisher got on top of Senior and successfully restrained him.
Maynard ran after Junior. Junior's arms were inside the open window of the patrol car, where there was a rifle and shotgun. As Maynard approached the patrol car, Junior ran off. Maynard chased him down the street. According to Fisher, at one point during the chase, Junior ran back towards Fisher (where Fisher was restraining Senior on the ground) and unsuccessfully tried to punch Fisher. A male neighbor came outside and assisted Maynard in the pursuit until they caught and restrained Junior.
Maynard's and Fisher's descriptions of Junior's conduct towards Fisher were somewhat different. Unlike Maynard's description, Fisher did not describe Junior rolling on top of him and punching him. Rather, Fisher testified that Junior ran away after Fisher lost control of him. Fisher did describe Junior trying to punch him while Maynard was chasing Junior; however, Maynard did not describe this attempted attack on Fisher. As we shall set forth below, the jury acquitted Junior of charges of misdemeanor battery and assault against Fisher.
During the altercation, the deputies continually ordered the DeLoeras to stop resisting, stop fighting, and get down on the ground.
Defense
Senior testified on his own behalf. (Junior did not testify.) Senior testified that when he arrived at the residence on January 21, Deputy Fisher was standing at his patrol car and Deputy Maynard was coming from the backyard into the garage through a side door. Senior and Junior did not know what the officers were doing there, and thought the officers might be breaking into their home. Junior exited the vehicle first, while Senior turned off the car and took out the keys. Maynard was outside the garage, and Junior asked him: "What are you guys doing? You guys breaking into my house?" By the time Senior got out of the car and walked around to the back of the car, Fisher was inside the garage holding Junior. Senior stated, " 'Wait a minute. Don't hurt my son.' " Maynard was a little behind Fisher, and when Maynard saw Senior coming towards them, Maynard punched Senior in the eye. Senior stated, " 'What are you guys doing?' " Maynard grabbed Senior, punched him, threw him to the ground on the driveway, and kicked him. Senior asked, " 'Why you guys doing this?' " and Maynard responded, " 'Shut up.' "
While Maynard was beating Senior, Senior heard his son making "painful screams." Senior decided "the hell with this stuff." Because Maynard would not let him go, Senior grabbed Maynard, flipped him over, and punched him in the face. Maynard pointed a gun at him, but Senior ignored this and ran to Fisher because he wanted to "save [his] son." Senior pushed Fisher off his son. When Senior saw that his son was going across the street and was safe, and because Maynard had a gun, he said, " 'I surrender. I give up.' " The officers then handcuffed him, threw him to the ground, and started hitting him.
Jury Verdict and Sentence
Senior and Junior were both charged with a felony count of resisting Deputies Maynard and Fisher in the performance of their duties. Additionally, Senior was charged with three felony counts of assault and battery of an officer (i.e., assault on Maynard by means likely to produce great bodily injury, felony battery of Maynard with infliction of injury, and misdemeanor battery of Fisher). Junior was additionally charged with two counts of misdemeanor battery and assault on an officer (i.e., misdemeanor battery of Fisher and misdemeanor assault on Fisher).
The jury found Senior guilty as charged. The jury found Junior not guilty of the misdemeanor battery and assault charges against Deputy Fisher, and found him guilty of the felony charge of resisting the officers in the performance of their duties. Senior was given probation and ordered to serve 180 days in custody that could be served on weekends. Junior's felony conviction for resisting the officers was reduced to a misdemeanor; he was granted probation and ordered to serve four days in custody.
I. Pitchess Review
Prior to trial, defendants filed Pitchess motions for disclosure of materials in Deputy Maynard's and Deputy Fisher's personnel records showing officer misconduct. They submitted the requisite declarations from counsel setting forth the factual foundation for their requests, and requested that the court review the officers' personnel records for information reflecting excessive force, dishonesty, racial discrimination, or mishandling of mentally ill persons. The trial court found it appropriate to conduct an in camera review of the officers' files for information reflecting excessive force or dishonesty, but upon review concluded there were no discoverable documents. Defendants request that we review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing and the personnel records examined by the trial court to ensure the court did not abuse its discretion. In addition to examining the files for information about excessive force or dishonesty, defendants request that we review the files for materials regarding experience with mentally ill persons. In accordance with People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228, we review the trial court's ruling on the discoverability of the materials in the personnel files for abuse of discretion.
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
The record on appeal contains the sealed reporter's transcript of the trial court's in camera review. We also ordered that the record be augmented with the personnel records reviewed by the trial court. We have reviewed the reporter's transcript and the personnel records (including for information regarding handling of mentally ill persons), and find no abuse of discretion.
It appears the personnel files transmitted to us by the sheriff's department include materials placed in the files after the trial court's Pitchess review. We confine our review to the documents in the files at the time of the trial court's Pitchess examination.
II. No Duty to Instruct on Defense of Property
The jury was instructed on defendants' right to use reasonable force to defend themselves or each other from an officer's use of excessive force. (See CALCRIM Nos. 2670, 3470.) Defendants contend the trial court should have also instructed the jury on an owner's or occupant's right to eject a trespasser and defend real property with reasonable force. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3475, 3476.) They assert the instructions were an integral part of their self-defense claim, and were needed to inform the jury that they had a right to order the officers to leave their property, and failing compliance, to use reasonable force to eject the officers. As evidentiary support for the instruction, they cite testimony (including Senior's version of the events) reflecting that defendants saw one of the officers coming from the backyard through a side door of the garage; Junior indicated to the officers they were trespassers and they should leave the property; and the officers did not leave but instead, without explanation, restrained Junior in the garage.
CALCRIM No. 3475 states: "The (owner/lawful occupant) of a (home/property) may request that a trespasser leave the (home/property). If the trespasser does not leave within a reasonable time and it would appear to a reasonable person that the trespasser poses a threat to (the home/property)/[or] the (owner/[or] occupants), the (owner/lawful occupant) may use reasonable force to make the trespasser leave. [¶] Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to make the trespasser leave...." (Italics omitted, brackets in original.)
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a defense if it is supported by substantial evidence and it is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (People v. Salas (2006)37 Cal.4th 967, 982.) In deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the instruction, "the trial court does not determine the credibility of defense evidence, but only whether 'there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt....' " (Ibid.)
An owner or occupant of real property, after warning a trespasser to depart, may use reasonable force to eject the trespasser when it appears there is imminent danger to property or to persons on the property. (People v. Corlett (1944) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 53, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 775-776.) Because defendants knew the persons on their property were law enforcement officers, defendants' right to assert a defense of property must be evaluated in light of this circumstance.
Absent the use of excessive force by an officer, a defendant has no right to use force to resist an officer in the performance of his or her duties, even if the officer is acting without legal authorization. (People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 351-352, 357, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1222 [defendant may not forcefully resist unlawful arrest]; In re Joseph F. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 975, 989 [defendant may not forcefully resist unlawful detention]; Evans v. City of Bakersfield (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321, 330 [accord]; People v. Henderson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 349, 356-358 [defendant may not forcefully resist unlawful service of search warrant].) This nonresistance rule is designed to "eliminate the 'anachronistic' privilege of violent self-help against police conduct undertaken without sufficient cause or authority, and to remove disputes about legality from the streets to the courts." (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1219.)
However, if it is ultimately determined that the officer acted without legal authority, the defendant who used forceful resistance can only be guilty of assault or battery; the defendant cannot be guilty of assault or battery on an officer or resisting an officer. (People v. Curtis, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 354-356; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 161, 166-167; see also In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1217, 1219.) That is, "the legal effect of unlawful [police conduct] is to merely remove the cloak of authority from the officer" so as to eliminate the officer-related component of the defendant's conduct, but without giving the defendant license to assault the officer unless excessive force triggers the right of self-defense. (Evans v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 331.) When the circumstances show the possible existence of a defense to an offense against an officer based on unauthorized police conduct, the prosecution has the burden to show the lawfulness of the conduct and the issue must be submitted to the jury as a factual question. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1020; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1217, 1223; People v. Henderson, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 358-359; People v. Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138, 145.)
Thus, if there was evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to whether the officers were lawfully present on defendants' property, defendants were entitled to an instruction informing the jury that if the jury found the prosecution had not established the officers' presence was lawful, the defendants could not be found guilty of assault or battery against an officer or resisting an officer. (See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 2672 [if officer engaged in unlawful arrest, defendant is not guilty of assault or battery against an officer, but may be guilty of lesser offenses of assault or battery as long as no excessive force used by officer].) Here, however, there is no evidence of unlawful presence.
An officer has the right to enter private property without a warrant when performing "community caretaking" functions. (People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 467-468, 476-478 (plur. opn. of Brown, J.) [after receiving report that door of residence had been open all day and that it was a " 'shambles inside, ' " police properly knocked and entered through open door to check on welfare of any persons inside]; see also People v. Morton (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1047.) The courts recognize that a technical trespass by the police does not alone translate into a violation of a defendant's rights. As explained in Ray: " '[N]ecessity often justifies [police] action which would otherwise constitute a trespass, as where the act is prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and reasonably appears to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.' " (Ray, supra, at p. 473.) In exercising their community caretaking duties, the police may properly make a warrantless entry onto private property when there are facts showing a need to inspect whether there is a danger to persons or property; i.e., when entry is " 'reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance [or property is at risk]....' " (Id. at p. 477, brackets in original; see also People v. Mandersheid (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355, 361-363 [even though entry was technical trespass, police properly entered into defendant's backyard and knocked on back door in response to report that armed parolee-at-large was hiding in residence].) On the other hand, the police cannot properly make a warrantless entry into private areas of residential property when the entry is not reasonably associated with an inspection for a possible danger. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 828, 836-838 [when responding to complaint of excessive noise in violation of municipal ordinance, police acted improperly when (hearing no excessive noise) they entered into private side yard late at night without first knocking on front door].) To be lawful, a warrantless entry " 'must be suitably circumscribed to serve the exigency which prompted it.' " (People v. Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 477.)
In a case factually similar to the one before us, the court held the officers were not trespassers who could be resisted by force when they arrived at the front of the defendant's house without a warrant in response to a report that there was a disturbance involving a shotgun and a threat to life. (People v. Hupp (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 447, 448-450.) Similarly here, the facts show the officers' intrusion on defendants' property was confined to a reasonable inspection of whether there was a safety-related problem at the residence. The officers were responding to a request from a neighbor to check on the welfare of a possibly mentally ill person at the residence. The officers were informed that the person might be off his medications, and the mother of this person was concerned about his welfare. They observed the open overhead garage door, which the neighbor stated had been open since the night before, and one of the officers heard music as also described by the neighbor. No one responded to the officers' knocks on the doors. The officers' entries into the driveway, open garage, and backyard of the residence were reasonable intrusions designed to determine if someone was in need of assistance. When the deputies saw the car enter the garage, this circumstance did not necessarily reflect that there were no problems at the residence. The officers reasonably returned to the residence to continue their safety-related inspection. Upon encountering the DeLoeras, the deputies entered no further than the driveway and open garage area. These circumstances establish the deputies were not unlawful trespassers; rather, they were officers on the property performing their community caretaking functions.
To support their contention that there was evidence supporting the officers' unlawful presence, defendants underscore that under Senior's version of the incident, the officers "were inexplicably on his property, would not give an explanation for their presence, restrained [Junior] almost immediately after he got out of the car, and refused to let him go when told to do so." (Italics added.) These facts describe the defendant's perceptions, whereas the lawfulness of an officer's entry is judged based on the officer's perceptions; i.e., how a reasonable officer would act under the circumstances known to the officer. (See People v. Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 477, 479.)
A resisting defendant is afforded the benefit of reduced culpability when the objective facts show the officer acted unlawfully. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 815 [because officer has no duty to take illegal action, when officer acts unlawfully defendant cannot be convicted of offense against officer engaged in performance of duties].) On the other hand, when the objective facts show the officer acted lawfully, there is no reason to provide reduced culpability based solely on a defendant's subjective perceptions given that under the law a defendant knows he or she is never entitled to resist an officer absent excessive force. (Evans v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 332-333 [the law does not permit "spur-of-the[-]moment physical force [against officer] triggered by the detainee's lay perception of the detention's legal justification"].)
Nor do the elements of the charged officer-related offenses require proof that the defendant subjectively perceived that the officer's conduct was legally authorized. The charged officer-related offenses include an element requiring that the defendant know the victim is an officer performing his or her duties. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2) [defendant commits battery of officer when defendant "knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties"]; § 241, subd. (c) [defendant commits assault of an officer when defendant "knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer... engaged in the performance of his or her duties]; § 69 [defendant commits resistance of an officer when defendant "knowingly resists... such officer, in the performance of his duty"].) However, there is no element requiring that the defendant know that the officer's conduct was legally proper. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1020-1021 [defendant's subjective understanding that officer's conduct was lawful is not element of offense against officer performing duties].)
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Thus, if the defendant knows the person on the property is an officer performing his or her duties, and the objective facts show the officer's presence was lawful, the defendant's subjective perceptions concerning the officer's entry cannot render the officer's presence unlawful so as to reduce the offense.
In support of their argument defendants also assert: "[T]he police had already checked out the noise complaint and were preparing to leave when the defendants arrived. Once the defendants demanded that the police leave their property, the police no longer had a valid reason for being on the property." (Italics added.) In this contention, defendants fail to recognize that the officers were checking on the welfare of a possibly mentally ill person, not a mere noise complaint. The officers reasonably stayed on the property to accomplish this community caretaking function notwithstanding Junior's demand that they leave.
Defendants cite People v. Hubbard (1923) 64 Cal.App. 27 to support their position that the jury should have been instructed on defense of property principles. In Hubbard, the victim (not a police officer) confronted the defendant inside the defendant's home, and the court held it was error to fail to instruct the jury that the defendant had a right to use force to eject the victim after he refused to leave. (Id. at pp. 30-37.) Here, the victims were deputy sheriffs checking whether there was a mentally ill person at the residence in need of assistance. The circumstances of this case are not comparable to those in Hubbard.
Because there was no evidence that created a doubt regarding the lawfulness of the officers' presence on the property, defendants were not entitled to instructions pertaining to a defense based on the officers' intrusion onto their property.
III. No Instructional Error Regarding Prosecution's Burden to Prove All Elements Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Defendants argue that the revised version of a standard CALCRIM instruction given in this case (CALCRIM No. 220, rev. 2006), which informs the jury that the prosecution has the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, fails to apprise the jury that all the elements of the charged offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The identical contention was rejected in People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pages 1087-1088. We agree with the Ramos holding.
The Attorney General asserts the issue is forfeited on appeal because no objection was raised before the trial court. We decline to find a forfeiture because if there was instructional error concerning the prosecution's burden of proof as claimed by defendants, it would affect defendants' substantial rights. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.)
In reviewing a claim that the jury was misled by the court's instructions, we inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury understood the instructions as asserted by the defendant. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 37-38.) We consider the instructions as a whole and assume the jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions. (People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)
Using the language of CALCRIM No. 220, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the prosecution's burden of proof, as follows: "A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶]... [¶] In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. [¶] Unless the evidence proves the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, they are entitled to an acquittal and you must find them not guilty." (Italics added.)
Unlike the current version of CALCRIM No. 220, a former version included an express reference to the elements of the offenses, stating: " 'This presumption requires that the People prove each element of a crime [and special allegation] beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088, fn. 3, brackets in original.)
In other instructions, the trial court instructed the jury regarding each element that the prosecution had to prove for each of the charged offenses. These instructions delineating the elements of the offenses contain a prefatory provision stating: "To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that...."
Reading the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury did not understand that each element of the charged offenses had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In the language of CALCRIM No. 220, the jury was told that anything the People had to prove, had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In other instructions, the jury was provided a list of the elements of the offenses, and told the prosecution had to prove each of these matters. These instructions clearly indicated that the elements needed to be proven by the prosecution, and that they needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1088-1090; see also People v. Wyatt (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1601.)
Contrary to defendants' assertion on appeal, there is nothing in the other instructions provided to the jury in this case that suggested any other standard of proof could be applicable to proof of the elements. Defendants point to various instructions that repeat the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, including some instructions that refer to elements of the offenses. They assert that because the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof was explicitly set forth for some (but not all) of the elements of the charged offenses, and because CALCRIM No. 220 does not explicitly state each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury might have thought a lesser standard could apply to prove elements for which the standard of proof was not specifically reiterated.
For example, the jury was explicitly instructed that the following matters needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: facts supporting guilt that are shown by circumstantial evidence; the officers were lawfully performing their duties; the defendant acted with the required mental state notwithstanding his mental disorder; and defendants did not act in self-defense or defense of another.
We are not persuaded. Again, the jury was told that whenever the prosecution had the burden of proof, the applicable standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a straightforward instruction that the jury would have understood applied to each matter set forth in the instructions concerning the elements of the offense that the prosecution had to prove. If anything, the repetition of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in other instructions would serve to reinforce, not detract from, the jury's understanding of the proper standard of proof. Defendants' contention that the jurors might have assumed a lesser standard could apply to some elements is unsupported.
Our conclusion that the jury properly understood the standard of proof for the elements is buttressed by a statement by the prosecutor during closing argument. When discussing the charges against Junior, the prosecutor stated: "[I]t is true that I have to prove all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt."
There was no instructional error concerning the standard of proof applicable to the elements of the charged offenses.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., McDONALD, J.
CALCRIM No. 3476 states: "The owner [or possessor] of (real/[or] personal) property may use reasonable force to protect that property from imminent harm. [¶] Reasonable force means the amount of force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to protect the property from imminent harm...." (Italics omitted, brackets in original.)